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The crisis that hit the financial, energy, and food sectors with booming prices 
in the mid-2000s gave rise to a new wave of transnational, large-scale land 
acquisitions (LSLAs) in developing countries. Energy and food price hikes 
accompanied by export restrictions on rice and other staples raised food secu-
rity concerns worldwide, and in particular among net food importing coun-
tries. Both foreign and domestic investors from the private and public sectors 
have since sought to acquire ownership rights and long-term leases over large 
portions of land in low-income countries.
This spurred renewed research interest in agrarian change and ‘land grab-
bing’, as reflected in a series of special issues dealing with the topic in major 
development and agrarian studies journals. On the policy side, social mobili-
sation against large-scale land acquisitions encouraged intergovernmental 
organisations and governments to elaborate regulatory frameworks and volun-
tary guidelines meant to protect the interests of local communities and other 
stakeholders affected by the new land rush.
Notwithstanding a rapidly growing body of knowledge on LSLAs, there 
remain various gaps, for example between specific insights from case stud-
ies performed at the community level and studies that look at land acquisi-
tion dynamics at the macro level. There remains much scope to better grasp 
how land deal plans are effectively implemented on the ground and how they 
impact the livelihood of community members over the mid to long run, includ-
ing in terms of human rights.
In 2014, the editorial board of International Development Policy invited 
three guest editors for a special issue on the LSLA phenomenon. We asked 
Christophe Gironde (Senior Lecturer, the Graduate Institute, Geneva), 
Christophe Golay (Coordinator of the Project on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and 
Human Rights) and Peter Messerli (Director of the Centre for Development 
and Environment, University of Bern) to fill specific gaps in our understanding 
of LSLAs. I wish to commend the guest editors for bringing major innovative 
features to this Special Issue, which—in the context of a rapidly growing litera-
ture on LSLAs—stands out in four respects.
First, the Issue brings a broad range of disciplines to bear in a coherent 
framework, thus providing a rich interdisciplinary perspective on LSLAs that 
includes history, sociology, economics, geography, and law, alongside significant 
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expertise in the fields of agrarian and development studies. Second, this Issue 
strikes a delicate balance between theoretical, critical reflections and detailed 
analysis of actual practice and field reality, looking not only at global actors, 
but also at the role of political and economic elites at the national and local 
levels. Third, the Issue offers the first major collection of articles on LSLAs with 
a focus on South-East Asia, a region that has attracted relatively little atten-
tion thus far. It looks at actual processes and practices of land acquisitions and 
agrarian change in Cambodia and Laos in particular. Fourth, this Special Issue 
stands out by analysing the impact of land acquisition and agrarian change 
from a human rights perspective: several contributions examine LSLA dynam-
ics through human rights instruments and frameworks.
A series of chapters draw on a collaborative, North-South research proj-
ect funded by the Swiss Network for International Studies (SNIS).1 This 
project—entitled ‘Large Scale Land Acquisitions in Southeast Asia: Rural 
Transformations between Global Agendas and Peoples’ Right to Food’—was 
carried out between 2012 and 2014 under the leadership of the guest editors. 
For other papers, we invited authors unrelated to the research project to offer 
additional historical and global perspectives, and provide the views of public 
and private investors, as well as of multilateral organisations. The draft papers 
were first examined and debated during an international workshop held in 
Geneva in September 2014. This was followed by intense exchanges between 
the authors and the editors as well as external experts who participated in 
the workshop. The volume was then submitted to an anonymous peer review 
process. I wish to thank in particular Ben White and an anonymous reviewer 
who provided insightful remarks, constructive critique, and numerous sugges-
tions for improvements on the whole Issue.
The volume is organised in three parts. Part 1 sets the scene by providing 
a historical perspective on contemporary LSLAs, situating this phenomenon 
within global agro-food dynamics and land policies. Part 2 discusses a rich col-
lection of case studies from South-East Asia. Part 3 examines critical questions 
on the influence and relevance of human rights instruments. I hope that our 
readers will enjoy this collection of papers that shed novel light on a phenom-
enon that lies at the intersection between development and agrarian policies, 
involving complex social, economic, political and environmental dynamics 
that affect people’s livelihoods, food security, and social dynamics in many 
parts of the developing world.
1   See ‘Large-Scale Land Acquisitions in Southeast Asia: Rural Transformations between Global 
Agendas and Peoples’ Right to Food project’, SNIS website: http://www.snis.ch/project_large-
scale-land-acquisitions-southeast-asia-rural-transformations-between-global-agendas 
(accessed on 4 June 2015).
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International Development Policy is edited by the Graduate Institute of 
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CHAPTER 1
Large-Scale Land Acquisitions: A Historical 
Perspective
Laurence Roudart and Marcel Mazoyer
Abstract
Large-scale land acquisitions have been a recurrent historical phenomenon since 
ancient times. This article analyses four of these historical processes: the latifundia of 
ancient Rome, enclosures in Britain, latifundia in the Spanish and Portuguese colonies 
of the Americas, and Soviet collectivisation. The article then compares these historical 
occurrences with the current wave of acquisitions in order to better understand the 
latter and to shed light on certain important debates in the areas of public policy and 
research that have once again come to the fore. Both the historical and current experi-
ences share a set of economic and social characteristics: a small number of beneficia-
ries and a large number of dispossessed, exploitation of all or part of the land and the 
labour of those dispossessed of their land—some of them being excluded in certain 
cases—resistance, armed violence, laws favouring acquisitions, the decisive role of 
governments, and legitimising discourse. At the same time, the current wave of acqui-
sitions has some specific characteristics of its own: its global scale, the context of pub-
lic policy liberalisation, the facilitating role played by governments and international 
organisations, and the risk of wholesale exclusion. All of these features run counter to 
the main economic and social objectives of sustained development, namely, to reduce 
poverty, generate jobs and livelihoods for the greatest possible number, promote 
growth, ensure food security for all, and narrow income disparities.
1 Introduction
Following the surge in agricultural prices in 2007–2008, the increasingly fre-
quent acquisitions of land rights, whether through purchase, lease, conces-
sion, or de facto occupation, has raised many questions. Can such a trend 
lead to the global expansion of wage-based, capitalist agriculture, and to what 
extent will this form of agriculture replace family holdings in developing coun-
tries, or indeed in developed countries? What are the potential economic, 
environmental, social, cultural, and political consequences of such upheavals? 
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What might the effects be on production, employment, poverty, and food 
security?
Far from being a new movement or one unique to the capitalist system, 
the large-scale acquisition of vast areas for the benefit of their new owners, 
and to the detriment of previous rights holders and users who have been dis-
possessed of some or all of their rights, is in fact a recurrent event in history. 
Tombstone inscriptions and papyrus writings indicate that there were already 
large public estates under the Old Kingdom of Egypt during the third millen-
nium BC, where several villages were often obliged to provide unpaid labour to 
the state. Some of these estates were granted to the clergy or to officials of the 
royal court. Royal estates possibly existed even before the unification of Egypt 
and the establishment of the First Pharaonic Dynasty (Moreno García, 2008).
The first aim of this article is to analyse four historical instances of large-
scale land dispossession in order to single out their shared economic and 
social features. We have selected the following cases: the latifundia of the 
Roman Republic and Empire, as an experience of ancient colonisation that 
existed well before the development of capitalism; the enclosures in Britain, 
as an endogenous dynamic linked to the dissolution of the feudal regime and 
the emergence of capitalism; the large Spanish and Portuguese colonial estates 
in the Americas as a product of colonisation by external powers, which itself 
was linked to the expansion of mercantile capitalism; and collectivisation in 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), as an endogenous dynamic 
linked to the wish to establish a sort of state capitalism within a managed 
economy. Our approach is fundamentally inductive in nature. It is aimed at 
bringing to the fore the traits common to historical experiences that each fall 
within a given economic and social dynamic. Nevertheless, this approach is 
also inspired by existing analytical frameworks, in particular concepts per-
taining to agrarian political economy and the issues that this raises: who 
were the original possessors and users of land? What other social categories 
were concerned? What social relations existed between these various cat-
egories? Through what processes did these acquisitions and dispossessions 
of land take place? Were they sanctioned by legal and judicial mechanisms? 
Were they legitimised by a particular type of discourse? What social catego-
ries were involved in the newly-established production structures? What rela-
tions existed between them? What was being produced? Under what working 
conditions? How was the wealth thus created then distributed? For what 
purpose was it used? What were the consequences of these developments 
for the former users of the land? Did they become richer or poorer (Fairbairn 
et al., 2014; White et al., 2012; White and Dasgupta, 2010)?
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The second aim of this article is to analyse the current trend of acquisitions 
and dispossessions in the light of the common features identified from past 
experiences, so as to determine the extent to which the current trend is similar 
to or different from past instances of large-scale land acquisitions and thus 
shed light on a number of public policy and research issues that are currently 
being examined: what agricultural production structures are best suited to 
encouraging sustained human development—large-scale, wage-labour farm 
holdings or family-owned operations? What are the prospects for a politi-
cal project based on an alternative conception of agricultural and general 
development?
Sections 2 to 6 of this chapter are each devoted to one of the four histori-
cal instances of land acquisition mentioned earlier, with Section 5 reviewing 
several others. Section 7 will present their common features. Section 8 analyses 
the current trend of large-scale acquisitions and dispossessions of land in the 
light of these common features while also pointing out their specific charac-
teristics. Section 9 summarises the main findings of our analysis and correlates 
these with a number of important ongoing public policy and research debates.
2 The latifundia of the Roman Republic and Empire
In the fifth century BC, Rome was only a small republic whose peasant soldiers 
could barely hold out against attacks from neighbouring cities. By the end of 
the third century, a thoroughly battle-hardened Rome had already conquered 
the entire Italian peninsula, Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica and the southern part of 
Hispania. In the process, it had expropriated a large part of these territories, 
generally the best land, declaring it to be ager publicus—that is to say, agricul-
tural land belonging to the Roman people. The Romans also confiscated mines, 
salt works, and the treasures of the conquered peoples, enslaving hundreds of 
thousands of prisoners of war.
Governed by its Senate, the Roman State rented out the greater part of this 
ager publicus in the form of large estates to rich individuals, most of whom 
were already landowners, senators or knights. As the state had fallen heavily 
into debt to support its wars and always needed further money to continue 
waging them, it sold whole sections of ager publicus at reduced rates or ceded 
full ownership by way of repayments. Roman property rights were individual, 
exclusive and fairly unrestricted. Large agricultural estates called latifundia 
were thus created, most often through the seizure of conquered land, which 
was leased out or sold as property (Nicolet, 1967). There came into existence a 
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highly influential landed oligarchy, which put constant pressure on the state to 
make new conquests for the sake of increasing its wealth further.
Over the following centuries, thanks to military conquest, the ager publi-
cus and latifundia greatly increased in area. Under the Empire, rich citizens 
started to occupy plots of ager publicus that had not been allocated by the 
state, initially upon payment of a modest amount of tax, and then without 
paying any tax at all as, over time, they came to regard themselves as owners 
of these plots. Large estate holders used other methods, legal or otherwise, to 
extend their holdings, by purchasing or usurping land belonging to peasants 
who had died in battle, who had been ruined, or who had given up farming, 
and by appropriating unregistered land and common pasture.
A single individual could control dozens, hundreds, or even thousands of 
hectares of land, perhaps divided into multiple different holdings of a few 
dozen or a few hundred hectares, which might be spread across different 
regions. Most owners of latifundia estates did not live on them, except occa-
sionally for leisure purposes, and delegated the task of supervision to stew-
ards. The necessary labour was generally provided by slaves or, failing that, by 
poorly-paid free peasants or by colonists, who were a category of tenant farm-
ers allocated a plot of land in exchange for a share of their harvest, possibly 
reaching as much as two-thirds (Garnsey, 1988; Jones, 1974).
Over the course of various conquests, the extent of these colonial latifundia 
increased. As they were using very cheap land and labour, their grain, wine, 
and olive oil were shipped for sale at low prices in Rome and certain provincial 
cities, or to the military (CNRS, 1995). They gained market share at the expense 
of small and medium-sized holdings, which could not survive the competition. 
In the area around Rome, latifundia specialised in horticulture or extensive 
livestock breeding, the products of which faced less competition from imports 
(Aymard and Auboyer, 1995; Roux, 1910).
As a consequence, the Italian countryside became depopulated. A large 
number of peasants were at war or had been killed; many others, impover-
ished by the competition they faced, abandoned the land and became plebs 
in Rome. By the second century BC, the recruitment of legionnaires from 
among the ranks of peasant landowners had declined significantly. The army 
was becoming professional, and Italy’s food dependency on the provinces was 
becoming chronic (White, 1970).
In the first century BC, several well-known Latin writers were sharply criti-
cal of the latifundia. In De Re Rustica, Varro admonished the absentee own-
ers of large estates living idly in Rome and voiced concern regarding Italy’s 
food dependency. In the Georgics, Virgil (1982) lyrically sang the praises of 
mixed-crop and livestock farming as practised by the owners of small farms, 
an increasingly rare breed. In the first century AD, in his Natural History (book 
 7A Historical Perspective
XVIII), Pliny the Elder felt that ‘large estates have been the ruin of Italy, and are 
slowly proving to be the ruin of the provinces too’, and reminded the reader 
that, ‘[i]n old times it was thought that to observe moderation in the size of a 
farm was of primary importance, for the maxim was: sow less, plough better’ 
(Pliny the Elder, 1848).
Yet at the start of the second century BC, an agrarian law had been passed 
with the aim of addressing this problem, by limiting the amount of ager publi-
cus that could be leased to 125 hectares (500 jugera) per individual, capping 
the number of animals grazing there (100 head of large livestock, 500 head of 
small livestock), and placing an obligation on the tenants of large estates to 
employ a given proportion of free men rather than just slaves, all of which was 
enforceable by fines. However, this law was only very rarely applied and, in 133 
BC, Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, a Tribune of the Plebs, had a new agrar-
ian law passed, which sought to return some urban plebs to the land, increase 
army recruitment, and restore the grandeur of Rome. This law was concerned 
exclusively with the ager publicus, rather than land held as property, which 
was not subject to any limitation. It confirmed the state’s repossession of ager 
publicus above the maximum 125 hectares per person, permitting the owner-
ship of an additional 62.5 hectares per male child, up to a limit of two children. 
In exchange, the holders of ager publicus obtained the land that remained to 
them as their full property. The land taken back by the state was supposed to 
be redistributed to poor citizens in 7.5 hectare lots, which was perceived as 
a truly revolutionary step. The law provoked strong opposition from senators 
and other owners of significant quantities of land, such that it sparked a civil 
war against the plebs who supported the law, and resulted in the assassina-
tion of Gracchus. Some years later, his brother Gaius picked up the baton of 
reform, and this set off a fresh wave of terror and massacres. Yet, despite this 
ferocious opposition, the law, as the expression of the people’s will, was partly 
applied, albeit with numerous amendments. In particular, there was a growing 
tendency for plots of land to be allocated only in the provinces, and only to war 
veterans. The allocation of land to poor citizens would be resumed only under 
the consulship of Julius Caesar (Earl, 1963; Stockton, 1979).
These land allocations were however insufficient to stem the rural exodus 
and the swelling of Rome’s plebeian population. By the early second century 
AD, the population of the city had reached about 1 million. As the food offered 
by the rich became less and less adequate to feed the poor, a whole series of 
wheat distribution laws, providing for the distribution of free or inexpensive 
grain to Roman citizens, were adopted (Duncan-Jones, 1974).
However, as the Empire slowly sank into a military and economic impasse 
because of the expansion of its frontiers, the growing strength of its external 
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enemies, and the increasing number of domestic uprisings (by slaves and 
plebs), the Roman State no longer had the means to plunder new territories, 
with all their riches and their fresh manpower, by which it supported itself 
and its slave-based economy. Agricultural production collapsed on the Italian 
peninsula, despite numerous attempts by the state to remedy the situation 
(Finley, 1976).
During the highly-troubled times at the end of the Roman Empire, an 
increasing number of large landowners took refuge in their country villas. They 
organised by themselves the defence of their estates against attacks from dis-
banded legions, barbarians, and looters. They also arranged for their land to be 
farmed by a new kind of colonists, or serfs: these were former slaves, peasants, 
city dwellers or deserting soldiers, to whom the property owners allocated a 
plot of land in exchange for a share of the harvest and a significant amount of 
unpaid labour on the land they set aside for themselves (Bloch, 1947). This was 
the starting point for the gradual emergence of a new political, economic, and 
social order, which would take centuries to establish itself in the West, namely, 
feudalism.
3 Enclosures in Britain
As a result of the agricultural, food and health crisis of the fourteenth cen-
tury, which culminated in the Black Death (1347–1350), Europe had lost around 
half its population. Land was once again plentiful but labour was in short 
supply (Mazoyer and Roudart, 2006). In early fifteenth century England, the 
feudal system found itself in difficulty. After two centuries of social conflict, 
the unpaid tasks that the serfs had to carry out on manorial land had become 
less arduous, and had been partly replaced by paid work, whose price was on 
the rise. Manorial estates had become difficult to manage. At the same time, a 
class of enriched serfs had come into being. They farmed more land on their 
own account, owned more livestock than others, and had control over the use 
of common pasture and forests. They even fulfilled certain judicial roles and 
helped maintain law and order. Given this situation, in the first half of the 
fifteenth century, almost all the landlords opted to lease their estates to 
these richer peasants, rather than to continue managing them by themselves 
(Byres, 2009).
The archetypal large structure of agricultural production that thus emerged 
would become the point of reference for the founding fathers of classical 
political economy (including Smith, Ricardo, Malthus, and Marx), in which the 
landlord rents out his land in exchange for payment of a land rent; the tenant 
farmer uses this land with the aim of turning a profit and pays this land rent; 
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while agricultural labourers sell their labour to the tenant farmer in exchange 
for a wage.
Nevertheless, many peasant families who had been freed from serfdom con-
tinued to farm the plot of land to which they had been attached. Small and 
medium-sized farm holdings thus developed on the ruins of the feudal system, 
run by independent freeholders called yeomen, who cultivated their land on a 
more or less individual basis. They made use of common grazing rights on the 
fields after they had been harvested, and had access to common forests and 
pastures.
However, in the sixteenth century, the landlords formed alliances with their 
tenant farmers and began forcibly to take possession of common land as well 
as that being farmed by independent peasants. They demarcated the new 
boundaries of their estates, closing them off by means of hedges or low stone 
walls, hence the term enclosure given to this process of appropriation/dispos-
session. These appropriations grew in scale under the Protestant Reformation, 
when the royal authorities confiscated part of the estates of the Catholic 
Church, which until that time had been the largest landowner in the country, 
and granted this land to their clients, either free of charge or against payment. 
Many peasants were then driven out, and individual houses or even whole vil-
lages were razed to the ground. Many other peasants lost all or part of their 
access to common or individual land, and were therefore deprived of a large 
part of their livelihoods. A whole series of peasant revolts prompted the royal 
authorities to promulgate laws restricting these abusive practices. In the end, 
however, these laws had only a limited effect (Land, 1977).
Many of these newly-enlarged units specialised in raising sheep in response 
to the strong demand for wool from the rapidly-developing cloth manufactur-
ing industries in Flanders and England. Sir Thomas More described the situa-
tion as follows: ‘sheep, which are naturally mild, and easily kept in order may 
be said now to devour men and unpeople, not only villages, but towns, [. . .] 
there the nobility and gentry, and even those holy men [. . .] stop the course 
of agriculture, destroying houses and towns, reserving only the churches, and 
enclose grounds that they may lodge their sheep in them. [. . .] for when an 
insatiable wretch [. . .] resolves to enclose many thousand acres of ground, 
the owners, as well as tenants, are turned out of their possessions [. . .] are all 
forced to change their seats, not knowing whither to go; [. . .] what is left for 
them to do but either to steal, and so to be hanged (God knows how justly!), 
or to go about and beg and if they do this they are put in prison as idle vag-
abonds, while they would willingly work but can find none that will hire 
them; [. . .] One shepherd can look after a flock, which will stock an extent of 
ground that would require many hands if it were to be ploughed and reaped’ 
(More, 1978).
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The policy of enclosure was pursued until the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, and was furthered by a succession of Acts of Parliament, which 
sought to promote the first agricultural revolution of modern times by replacing 
fallow land with feed crops so as to increase livestock production, improve 
soil fertility, and boost crop production (Mazoyer and Roudart, 2006). These 
laws abolished common grazing rights, provided for common land to be 
shared and obliged owners to enclose their consolidated areas of land (Mingay, 
2014; Slater, 1907). Though the application of the laws did not lead to dispos-
session everywhere (Hunt and Leuilliot, 1956), it undermined the economic 
position of those smallholders who lacked the means to enclose their land 
and lost their communal rights, to the extent that the worst off amongst them 
finally had to sell their land. As a result, whereas peasant land had still made 
up almost a third of agricultural land in England at the end of the seventeenth 
century, it accounted for only a fifth of it by the end of the nineteenth century 
(Beckett, 1999).
The enclosures caused many peasant holdings to disappear in favour of a 
small number of farming businesses employing only the minimum number of 
workers required to satisfy industrial and urban demand. This contributed to 
release many more unemployed onto the labour market than the number of 
jobs available in industry and in the cities. Therefore, enclosures were largely 
responsible for the development of a poor unemployed underclass in England, 
and more widely in Great Britain and the United Kingdom, which led the 
authorities to put in place a series of Poor Laws from 1536 to 1930 (Polanyi, 
1971). According to E. Hobsbawm (1977, 188), ‘the Poor Law of 1834 was designed 
to make life so intolerable for the rural paupers as to force them to migrate to 
any jobs that offered. [. . .] From 1850 land-flight became general’.
In Book One of Das Kapital, Karl Marx was already speaking about ‘land 
grabbing’ in relation to enclosures (Marx, 1965). He interpreted them as the 
founding event of the capitalist regime, prompting the formation of a class 
of individuals who owned the means of production, in this case land that 
had largely been stolen, and a class of footloose workers who had to sell their 
labour in order to survive, even if it meant working under the most unfavour-
able conditions.
Hoping for better times, many of the poor and unemployed emigrated to 
the settlements of North America, Australasia, and southern Africa, where vast 
territories were being seized by force from the native inhabitants. Enjoying 
access to vast lands that were usually cheaper than in the United Kingdom, 
and, from the nineteenth century onwards, being well-equipped with indus-
trial machinery, these colonial farmers became more competitive than their 
European counterparts, to the extent that British industrialists, concerned to 
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lower their costs of production as much as possible, concluded that it would 
be more beneficial for them if Britain imported agricultural produce at low 
prices (American wheat to feed the workers, Australian and New Zealand wool 
to supply the textile mills), rather than producing it locally. After much heated 
debate, they secured the repeal in 1846 of the protectionist grain legislation 
known as the Corn Laws (Schonhardt-Bailey, 2006), which led to the ruin of 
many British farmers. By an ironic twist of history, the landlords and tenant 
farmers had to concede defeat to those who were mostly descendants of the 
peasants that their ancestors had driven off their land at the time of the enclo-
sures (Mazoyer and Roudart, 2006).
4 Haciendas and Fazendas: Spanish and Portuguese Colonies in the 
Americas
In January 1492, the armies of the Catholic Monarchs of Spain completed the 
reconquest of the Iberian Peninsula from the Muslims. A few months later, 
Christopher Columbus landed in the Bahamas, opening up the New World to 
the Spanish Crown.
The Spaniards who set out to conquer the Americas from this time onwards 
were mostly penniless nobles who had borrowed the necessary capital 
from merchants and bankers to fund their arms, travel to, and settlement in 
America, as well as the costs of the servants with which they surrounded them-
selves. There were also royal officials, soldiers, and clerics. In debt and greedy 
for profit, they began by pillaging the treasures of the defeated indigenous 
societies. Then, they set about exploiting the gold and silver mines. From the 
outset of the conquest, the royal authorities confiscated the conquered ter-
ritories and distributed them as encomiendas—immense feudal fiefdoms—to 
expedition leaders, soldiers, royal officials and clerics, as well as compliant 
dignitaries from among the indigenous peoples. For example, Hernán Cortés, 
who defeated the Aztec Empire, received around four million hectares (Piel, 
2013). These allocations usually applied for one or two generations. The 
encomenderos were responsible for exploiting the wealth of these fiefdoms 
while protecting, civilising, and evangelising the resident native populations. 
Taking advantage of what was in practice their absolute power, the encomen-
deros kept a large share of the best land for themselves, forcing the indigenous 
inhabitants onto marginal land. The encomenderos subjected them to large-
scale unpaid labour on their own estates, to forced labour in the mines, to 
deductions from their harvests in order to supply the towns and the mines, 
and to all sorts of ill-treatment or even massacres in response to any revolt. 
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The consequences were disastrous. On the territory of the former Inca Empire, 
the indigenous population, which had been around 10 million in 1530, fell 
to 2.5 million in 1560 and to 1.4 million by 1590, a level at which it remained 
unchanged until the early nineteenth century (Wachtel, 1977).
In response to the fervent denunciations of the encomienda system by clerics 
and royal officials, for both moral and economic reasons, the Crown undertook 
in the late sixteenth century gradually to replace this system with haciendas. 
These very large estates could cover several tens of thousands of hectares, with 
the hacendado enjoying sole ownership of the soil and the subsoil, as under 
ancient Roman law. This form of land tenure was a fundamentally alien notion 
to the native American societies, for whom possession of the land could only 
be collective.
A number of these haciendas were based on the old encomiendas, to which 
some territories purchased from the Spanish Crown had been added, while 
others were created from scratch, granted by the Crown for services rendered 
or sold, to conquistadors or compliant native chiefs. The Catholic Church, 
which benefited from large numbers of donations, became the biggest land-
owner. The fate of the indigenous populations was little different from before: 
they were confined to restricted areas, known as reducciones, where each 
family farmed its own plot and made use of common forests and pastures 
while being collectively subject to the payment of tribute to the haciendas, in 
labour or in kind (Kay, 1974). Tribute in kind was gradually replaced by taxation 
in cash, which obliged the farmers to work even harder for their sole employ-
ers, the hacendados, for a paltry wage. There were many revolts against these 
taxes and the endless expansion of the haciendas for the benefit of whites and 
mestizos (those of mixed race) to the detriment of the indigenous peoples, 
especially in the eighteenth century. These revolts were put down, however, 
and did not hinder the process (Luna, 2013).
Large-scale land grabbing also took place in Brazil, the vast territory that 
fell to the Portuguese Crown by the terms of the Treaty of Tordesillas (1494) 
between Spain and Portugal. Initially, the territory was divided into 15 heredi-
tary captaincies allocated to nobles, who were responsible for exploring, 
exploiting, and administering them. The Portuguese Crown then conceded 
vast tracts of land, called seismarias, to individuals on long leases. Large plan-
tations were set up, with a labour force consisting of slaves captured from 
amongst the indigenous populations, to produce sugar cane, cotton, coffee, 
cocoa beans, tobacco, etc. in function of the demand from Portugal and else-
where in Europe. Over time, however, slave labour became scarcer and more 
expensive as the indigenous population had collapsed and survivors had fled 
to the interior or taken refuge in missions. Slaves then began to be imported 
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from Africa to replace them, until the abolition of slavery towards the end of 
the nineteenth century. Thereafter, the masters of the large agricultural estates 
employed ‘free’ workers who were either ill-paid labourers, hired on a daily 
or seasonal basis, or tenant farmers or sharecroppers, often in debt to their 
masters and therefore at their mercy, or else resident former slaves who would 
be allotted a plot of land in exchange for their labour—effectively, they were a 
kind of serf (Bauer, 1979; Monbeig, 1984).
Independence was far from heralding an end to land grabbing. In the former 
Spanish colonies, constitutional decrees made changes to the conditions for 
accessing land, presenting new opportunities for setting up or enlarging haci-
endas. When the economic climate was favourable to exports (in 1850–1873 
and 1890–1920, for example), the haciendas were further expanded, to the det-
riment of the indigenous peoples, either through the military conquest of new 
territories, with populations that resisted being exterminated, or by confiscat-
ing grazing land that had been declared to be surplus (Piel, 1988).
All in all, these large-scale land grabs gave rise to very significant trans-
fers of wealth to Spain and Portugal, including to their respective Crowns. In 
addition, they formed the basis of the minifundia-latifundia land system that 
has endured in most countries of Latin America to this day, since subsequent 
agrarian reforms have in the main not been sufficient to supplant these dualist 
structures (Chonchol, 1970; Graziano Neto, 1991; Kay, 1998; 2014).
5 Other Cases of Colonial and Postcolonial Dispossession
Following the Age of Discovery, colonisation greatly accelerated, and took 
on different forms. Aside from the Spanish and Portuguese colonies in the 
Americas, it was above all in the colonies of settlement, set up in temperate 
zones, that land grabs at the expense of the native populations were most sig-
nificant. These took place in the British colonies of North America, Australasia, 
and east and southern Africa; in the French colonies in North America and 
northern Africa; and in the Dutch colonies of South Africa. In different loca-
tions and at different periods, the indigenous people were either exterminated, 
driven out, or resettled in reserves, where the scarcity of good quality land 
forced them to work on the farms or plantations, or in the mines of the colo-
nists (Bernstein, 2010).
In colonies of exploitation, the colonists exploited the land, the workforce, 
and other resources by forcing the indigenous populations to grow specific 
crops or to pay tax in cash, which obliged them either to produce and sell agri-
cultural produce to be shipped to the home nation, or to carry out paid work in 
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the mines or on the plantations. This was the case, for example, in the French 
colonies of sub-Saharan Africa, in the British colonies of South Asia and in the 
Dutch colonies of the East Indies (now Indonesia). At the same time, however, 
with the support of the colonial powers, vast tracts of land were also appro-
priated to be used by either companies or wealthy settlers to establish large 
plantations (of sugar cane, rubber trees, oil palms, cotton, bananas, tea, cloves, 
sisal, etc.) or to create areas for large-scale rice cultivation. These plantations 
developed most of all during periods of economic growth and expansion in 
international trade, especially following the two world wars (Bagchi, 2009; 
Beckford, 1999).
In sub-Saharan Africa, many newly independent states decided to nation-
alise their land, thus appropriating the rights to its use, in particular so that 
they could allocate vast tracts of land to be used for major agricultural projects 
by state or parastatal agencies, public or private companies, and even indi-
viduals. Millions of hectares were thus perfectly legally confiscated from local 
populations (Alden Wily, 2012).
6 Collectivisation in the USSR
In 1929, when the Communist Party decided to launch its collectivisation pro-
gramme, the Russian peasantry still had memories of the terrible struggles for 
land and freedom that it had previously been compelled to wage.
To be sure, the Tsar had decided to abolish serfdom in 1861 and to redistrib-
ute some of the land owned by the nobility to peasant communities (mirs). This 
agrarian reform was rendered largely inoperative, but the idea itself became 
widespread at the end of the nineteenth century and after the Revolution of 
1905. During the summer of 1917, after the Tsar had been deposed and many 
nobles had taken flight, peasants occupied their estates and undertook to dis-
tribute the land amongst themselves. After the Bolsheviks seized power, the 
decree on land of October 1917 endorsed this state of affairs, proclaiming 
the confiscation of large estates, and making them freely available to local 
agrarian committees (Méquet, 1930). In issuing this decree, Lenin and the 
Bolshevik Party, anxious to rally the peasantry to the revolution, conveniently 
shelved the ideas of nationalising all the land in the country and collectivising 
the large estates in order to set up model farms, as advocated in Lenin’s April 
Theses and approved by the Bolshevik Party (Sorlin, 1964).
In 1921, to put an end to the peasant revolts and workers’ strikes caused by 
the ambient economic chaos, the Bolshevik Party also agreed to adopt the 
more liberal ‘New Economic Policy’ (NEP). In 1928, however, to resolve prob-
lems with grain supply, the party launched the ‘battle for grain’. Party emissaries 
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were sent into the countryside to collect grain by whatever means necessary. 
This sparked a great many revolts, giving rise to fears that the first five-year 
plan of 1928–1932 might fail. To salvage the plan, and the revolution, a number 
of Politburo members, in particular Stalin, decided to implement a new policy, 
collectivisation, which came into effect in 1929 (Lewin, 1971).
The main objective of collectivisation was to oblige the peasantry to pro-
duce and deliver enough foodstuffs to supply the cities and permit the rapid 
industrialisation of the country (Nove and Morrison, 1982; Sapir, 1990). 
Furthermore, many Party members, inspired by Marx and Lenin, believed that 
family holdings were much less economically efficient than larger farms. But 
the official line went much further: according to Stalin (1930) it was imperative 
to ‘eliminate the kulaks as a class’, which meant that it ‘must be deprived of the 
productive resources that make its existence and development possible (free 
use of land, ownership of the means of production, land-renting, right to hire 
labour, etc.).’
In a return to the Bolshevik Party programme of 1917, collectivisation 
involved nationalising all the land in the country, dissolving the mirs and 
replacing them with agricultural production cooperatives, or kolkhozes. The 
state made available land that had been nationalised, while villagers had to 
give over most of their means of production and pay to be admitted into the 
cooperative. Each family was meant to enjoy individual use of their dwelling, 
their vegetable garden, their gardening tools, and a small amount of livestock 
intended for domestic consumption (Stalin, 1930). Collectivisation also gave 
rise to the large state farms known as sovkhozes, along with machine and trac-
tor stations that carried out work for the collective farms. In essence, the Soviet 
Union’s land, workers, and farming activity were all controlled by the manag-
ers of the kolkhozes and sovkhozes, who were themselves under the orders of 
the Party.
Collectivisation got under way in the summer of 1929 and by March 1930 
had already been applied to nearly 60 per cent of peasant families, or around 
15 million families (Lewin, 1971). Supposedly voluntary, collectivisation was in 
fact imposed by force, often with acts of unheard-of violence being perpetrated 
by armed militia. There was mass destruction of livestock and agricultural 
equipment, both by peasants who refused to give them up to the kolkhozes 
and by the militias. The ‘liquidation of the kulaks as a class’ and of other oppo-
nents in general took the form of outright murder and mass deportation (Viola 
et al., 2005).
Fearing that this violence might eventually lead to failure, the Party’s 
Central Committee allowed peasant families to leave the kolkhozes, which 
9 million of them did in the spring of 1930, despite all the obstacles put in their 
way. This policy reversal did not last long, however, for in the autumn of 1930, 
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collectivisation had resumed and would continue for nearly four years. By 1935, 
upwards of 90 per cent of agricultural land in the USSR was collectivised, with 
4 per cent being set aside for family plots (Conquest, 1986).
Under Stalin, each kolkhoz was obliged to supply the state with large vol-
umes of agricultural produce at low prices and to pay high taxes, either in cash 
or in kind. Agricultural labourers were organised into brigades. The pay for this 
work did not even cover the workers’ basic needs, and the family plots only 
partly made up for the shortfall. The kolkhozniks lived in such deplorable condi-
tions that many fled to the cities, leading the authorities to prohibit them from 
moving without formal permission (Danilov, 1988). With insufficient land for 
themselves, and now obliged to stay in their villages to work for almost nothing 
on large estates run by the state to supply industry and the cities, Russian peas-
ants found themselves reduced to a situation of virtual state serfdom.
7 Common Characteristics
Although these past instances of large-scale land acquisitions are far removed 
from one another in both time and place, and are different in their social con-
texts and applications, they nonetheless share a set of common basic features.
Each of them benefited a very small number of individuals who, at little 
expense to themselves, became owners, tenants, de facto owners or stewards 
of large estates, whether the beneficiaries were foreign, like the Roman sena-
tors and knights, the Spanish hacendados or the Portuguese fazendeiros, or 
whether they originated from amongst the indigenous population, like the 
British landlords and tenant farmers or the Soviet hierarchs. These acquisi-
tions were detrimental to a great number of previous rights holders and users 
of the land, who were completely or partially dispossessed of their land and 
livelihoods.
The beneficiaries were able to exploit not only the land, which was gener-
ally chosen from amongst the best available, but also, depending on the situ-
ation, all or part of the workforce formed by the dispossessed. In some cases, 
the dispossessors enlisted almost the entire workforce. In the Roman colonies, 
most of the able-bodied dispossessed were reduced to the condition of cap-
tive slave workers, or serfs paying a double tribute in the form of work and 
benefits in kind, or sharecroppers compelled to surrender a proportion of their 
harvest. In the Spanish and Portuguese colonies, they were reduced to being 
slaves or serfs, and then sharecroppers or small-scale tenant farmers or paid 
workers earning barely enough to live. In the Soviet Union at the time of col-
lectivisation, dispossessed peasants became virtual state serfs. In other cases, 
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the dispossessors employed only some of the labour of the dispossessed. At the 
time of the enclosures in Britain, landlords and tenant farmers employed only 
a fraction of those who had been dispossessed, as sharecroppers or agricultural 
labourers. Everyone else had to seek gruelling, low-paid employment, in the 
mines or in the burgeoning industrial sector, or had to settle for life as a vaga-
bond or beggar, taking refuge in workhouses or poorhouses, or else emigrating 
to the colonies of settlement.
These large-scale acquisitions of land allowed a small number of disposses-
sors to derive unparalleled comparative advantages from their cheap land and 
workforce in responding to demand from more or less distant markets, or to 
orders from the state: wheat, wine and olive oil for Rome and its army; sugar, 
cotton, hides, meat, coffee, cocoa beans and tobacco for the European colo-
nial powers; foodstuffs and raw materials for the expanding British cities and 
industries, and also for Soviet cities and industries under a regime of planned 
growth.
In every case, elements within the populations affected openly resisted 
the appropriation, and the consequent exploitation and marginalisation. 
There were instances of resistance to colonisation by ‘barbarians’ and native 
American populations, and there were escapes and revolts by slaves, serfs, and 
peasants who were maltreated or excluded, or who refused to accept collectivi-
sation. All of these victims put up clandestine resistance to the domination of 
the oppressors on an everyday basis (Kerkvliet, 2009; Scott, 1987). Occasionally, 
these resistance movements managed to halt, locally and temporarily, and had 
the overall effect of slowing down the drive towards acquisition and dispos-
session. However, the lack of a broad alliance with the dispossessed of other 
regions and with other victims of the established order meant that the balance 
of power between the dispossesors and the dispossessed was not reversed and 
the acquisitions/dispossessions continued.
For the most part, land acquisitions were extended and perpetuated 
through the exercise of armed force that was greatly superior to that of the dis-
possessed: Roman, Spanish, and Portuguese armies; private militias imposing 
de facto the enclosures in sixteenth century Britain, or the seizures by Spanish 
and Portuguese conquerors; police forces applying the Enclosure Acts from the 
eighteenth century onwards; and—in Russia—Party militia, police, and the 
army imposing collectivisation. Those who resisted were pursued and killed as 
an example to others, or tortured before being put back to work, either in situ 
or in deportation camps.
Acquisitions were generally reinforced by an arsenal of formal legal and reg-
ulatory measures that established and protected the rights of the new possess-
ors, without regard to the previous rights of the dispossessed. These statutory 
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provisions either predated the appropriations—as was the case with Roman 
law for example—or they were imposed on an ad hoc basis, as was the case 
with the ‘Indian Laws’ of Spain, the Enclosure Acts, and the decrees on the 
nationalisation or collectivisation of agricultural land in the USSR.
Furthermore, the beneficiaries developed a narrative to legitimise their 
actions: Rome’s ‘preventive’ conquests to stave off supposed threats of attack 
(Castignani, 2012); the civilisation and evangelisation of indigenous peoples; 
the rational exploitation of resources and growth in productivity justifying the 
enclosures from the eighteenth century onwards; and the economic develop-
ment and the construction of socialism during collectivisation in the USSR. 
At the same time, a derogatory discourse, depicting the dispossessed as infe-
rior, developed: to the Romans they were uncivilised barbarians; to the Iberian 
conquistadors the Indians were inhuman savages; to the British nobles they 
were vile peasants; and to the Bolsheviks they were peasants with bourgeois 
aspirations.
Finally, by contributing to this discourse legitimising acquisitions of land 
rights, by adopting laws and regulations legalising these acquired land rights, 
and by the use of public force to impose and enforce these laws, states and 
governments, acting in concert with the beneficiaries, played a decisive role in 
these acquisitions (Lewin, 1971; Nicolet, 1967; Piel, 2013; Slater, 1907).
8 Acquisitions Today
Although the current wave of land acquisitions has given rise to a great many 
publications, the information that they convey is often unreliable and fragmen-
tary (Scoones et al., 2013). They nevertheless allow us to consider that these 
current acquisitions share, in their own way, the general features described 
above, while differing from previous waves of acquisitions in terms of their 
context and some of their methods.
Their first particularity, from a geopolitical standpoint, is that such acquisi-
tions are developing throughout the world, in virtual defiance of national bor-
ders, whereas they previously occurred in national or colonial territories that, 
while they might be vast, were under the control of a single state.
Since the 1980s, acquisitions have been greatly facilitated by the liberali-
sation of public policies. Indeed, the liberalisation of agricultural policies in 
developing countries, implemented as part of stabilisation and structural 
adjustment programmes, has deprived farmers of the technical, economic, 
and financial support that had enabled them to invest and progress, insofar 
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as this support existed. Moreover, liberalisation in the international trade of 
agricultural produce, albeit incomplete, combined with the use of increasingly 
powerful and inexpensive methods of transportation and trade, has brought 
an ever-increasing number of farmers from all regions into competition with 
the world’s most competitive agricultural producers, who in some cases receive 
subsidies from their governments. This has impoverished or ruined hundreds 
of millions of farmers (Mazoyer and Roudart, 2006). Finally, financial liberali-
sation has made it possible for major investors to enjoy easy access to cheap, 
large-scale credit.
Besides, the land policies implemented in many countries since the 1990s 
have facilitated large-scale land acquisitions (Gironde and Senties Portilla, 
this volume) and have encouraged the concentration of land ownership rather 
than its redistribution (Borras Jr. and Franco, 2012). Governments and admin-
istrative authorities in the countries in which recent acquisitions have taken 
place play a considerable role, on the one hand by acting as intermediaries 
between national or foreign investors and local political authorities, and on 
the other by acquiring land themselves (Wolford et al., 2013). Meanwhile, some 
governments of the investors’ countries of origin actively support these acqui-
sitions (Woertz and Keulertz, this volume).
Another specific feature of the current wave of acquisitions is the major 
role played by international organisations. The International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), the World Bank, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), and the World Trade Organization (WTO) have greatly 
contributed to putting in place today’s liberal economic rules. Furthermore, 
the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (an agency of the World Bank) 
provides investors with guarantees against risks, while the World Bank and 
other development banks fund the infrastructures enabling such investments 
to become profitable. In addition, several international organisations have 
begun to draft non-binding principles to guide investors in their strategies 
(Borras Jr. and Franco, 2010).
Where land currently being acquired is effectively used for agricultural 
purposes, it is generally exploited by large, highly-capitalised farming units 
employing extremely productive mechanical, chemical, and biological means 
of production. These means are much more productive than those used by the 
vast majority of the world’s farmers, most of whom work with manual tools 
and little or no agricultural inputs. The gap in productivity between the world’s 
most productive and least productive farmers has never been as wide as it 
is today (Mazoyer and Roudart, 2006). It follows that production costs are 
far lower for the most productive farmers than for the others. And, within the 
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current context of globalised trade, large, highly-capitalised farms are expand-
ing over vast swathes of the globe and gaining increased market share to the 
detriment of many farmers in other regions.
The current wave of acquisitions and its consequences are therefore global 
in their implications. If it continued to grow, it could have a negative impact on 
hundreds of millions of individuals, either indirectly through competition on 
markets or directly through partial or complete dispossession. In today’s world, 
land is an essential means of existence for many populations: when dispos-
sessed, or excluded, they find themselves incapable of meeting their essential 
needs because they are surplus to labour requirements in other sectors of the 
economy (Li, 2011), without new continents available to colonise as a potential 
outlet. Over time, such a development would pose colossal political risks.
In order to combat these acquisitions, peasant organisations, some of which 
have an international outreach, have been engaging in campaigns of resistance. 
They are attempting to attract the attention of the press, public opinion, and 
political authorities, while mobilising other civil society organisations across 
the world (Borras Jr. et al., 2008; Edelman, 2003; McMichael, 2006). Some of 
these efforts have been successful: in 2009, the mobilisation against a project 
in Madagascar to lease more than one million hectares to the South Korean 
company Daewoo led to the resignation of the country’s President and the 
abandonment of the project (Petric, 2011).
These particular features aside, the current wave of land acquisitions shares, 
in its own way, the characteristics common to past waves of acquisitions ana-
lysed above. Existing studies, although far from being exhaustive, show that 
these current acquisitions are of actual benefit to a small number of actors—a 
few thousand individual entrepreneurs, company shareholders, and managers 
or investors in public or private investment funds. In the meantime, on the 
ground, a great many individuals have already lost all or part of their liveli-
hoods (Anseeuw et al., 2012; Gironde and Senties Portilla, this volume).
Just like the landlords and tenant farmers at the time of the enclosures, the 
new acquirers of land do not employ all the manpower offered by the dispos-
sessed, partly because new holdings, when they are developed, are equipped 
with powerful machinery and require little labour (Li, 2011). It is also because 
a large portion of the newly-acquired land remains uncultivated (Land Matrix, 
2014). In fact, many acquirers keep land in reserve, probably in anticipation of 
its increasing value or of a new surge in agricultural prices, or alternatively for 
reasons of environmental conservation. Others are slow to develop their land 
because of a wide range of technical, financial, and organisational difficulties 
(Boche, 2014).
The working conditions of labourers on large agricultural estates are usually 
very harsh. Permanent jobs are rare, while casual employment, of a daily or 
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seasonal nature, is common. Working hours are variable and often unfair. Pay 
is often on a piecework basis, and is rarely adequate to cover the costs of sup-
porting a family and even the labourer himself. Social security and accident 
prevention measures are practically non-existent (Hervieu and Purseigle, 2013; 
Hurst et al., 2005; IFAD, 2010; Jacques-Jouvenot and Laplante, 2009). Despite 
this, these jobs are sought after by the dispossessed, who are compelled to 
undertake any sort of casual work, legal or otherwise, or else end up as beggars 
or vagrants (Anseeuw et al., 2012). Being of no use to the economic or social 
system as either workers or consumers, these surplus populations are in prac-
tice excluded (Castells, 1998).
In fact, whenever investors develop newly acquired land, it is obviously to 
derive a profit by producing foodstuffs for which there exists a solvent demand. 
This corresponds to diverse, more or less distant markets (Borras Jr. and Franco, 
2012), but the aim is not to satisfy non-commercial domestic needs.
Open acts of resistance by the dispossessed have taken place. As was the 
case in the past, they trigger a response from the forces of law and order, the 
army, paramilitary groups or private militias (Grajales, 2011). To forestall or 
stamp out such resistance, the dispossessors and the authorities resort to vari-
ous forms of pressure including intimidation, threats, the withholding of infor-
mation and the presenting of situations as faits accomplis. They claim that the 
transfer of land rights is necessary for the country’s development, and equate 
any resistance with political opposition to the regime or the governing authori-
ties (Cismas and Paramita, this volume; Jacob and Le Meur, 2010).
The neo-liberal-inspired legal and regulatory measures that have been put 
in place in many developing countries since the 1980s (bilateral or multilateral 
investment treaties, and laws or codes governing investment and land) consid-
erably benefit major acquirers of land rights, whereas the rights of the previous 
users, with no formal title that they can assert, are generally not taken into 
consideration (Alden Wily, 2012). In addition, the dispossessed have hardly any 
prospect of judicial redress (Golay, this volume). In this regard, the processes 
which formalise and commodify land rights have often had damaging effects 
on the poor (De Schutter, this volume).
The arguments of those who legitimise current land acquisitions emphasise 
what is considered to be the relatively unproductive, or even non-existent, use 
of the land in question, and the need to invest to increase agricultural produc-
tion so as to feed a rapidly-growing human population and to supply biofuels, 
textile fibres, wood and other products. This discourse of legitimisation also 
asserts that ‘large’ farms (employing wage-earning manpower) are more pro-
ductive than ‘small’ (family) farms, and that no significant progress can be 
expected from the latter (Collier, 2008). Finally, some new landowners claim 
to be acting in the name of environmental conservation (Fairhead et al., 2012).
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9 Key Findings and Implications for Public Policy and  
Research Debates
In the preceding pages, we have analysed the current wave of large-scale land 
acquisitions in the light of similar historical experiences. Given the limited 
space available, we have selected only four historical cases amongst many 
others. Our analysis is therefore incomplete and no claim is made here that 
the features identified as being common to these four cases would prove valid 
for all others. We nevertheless feel that this study permits a better understand-
ing of current acquisitions and sheds light on the public policy and research 
debates that they have reopened.
One such debate concerns the structures of agricultural production and 
seeks to answer the following question: which production structures (family-
owned farms or wage-based farms) are better capable of encouraging sus-
tained development, primarily aimed at reducing poverty, generating jobs and 
livelihoods for hundreds of millions of people, promoting growth, providing 
food security for all and reducing income disparities while enhancing the envi-
ronment (Byerlee et al., 2009; Thematic Group on Sustainable Agriculture and 
Food Systems, 2013)?
Our analysis shows that the current wave of acquisitions is driven, as were 
several past waves, by the search for cheap land and labour, for the purpose 
of creating large competitive units able to generate a profit by producing agri-
cultural goods cheaply and by selling these goods to populations enjoying a 
degree of purchasing power. Like the previous waves, the current one is largely 
predicated on the dispossession of local populations, which directly impov-
erishes and excludes certain of their members. And, insofar as present land 
acquisitions are followed by the creation of large-scale, highly-equipped, pro-
ductive and competitive farms, this current wave, like several previous waves, 
results indirectly in the impoverishment and exclusion of rural populations 
in other parts of the world through competition on the international market.
All of these effects run counter to the above-mentioned aims of sustained 
development.
Our analysis also suggests that the present acquisitions, promoted by many 
governments and major investors, reflect a broad consensus amongst the lead-
ing decision-makers, and that the negatively-affected social categories, and 
their various potential allies, appear unable to organise an effective political 
force putting up resistance and putting forward alternative proposals at the 
international, national, and sometimes local levels. Therefore, the current 
wave of large-scale land acquisitions leads researchers in the field of agrarian 
political economy to reflect on the parameters of an alternative agricultural 
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development model to replace that which has held sway over the past few 
decades. Admittedly, this dominant model has created a great deal of wealth 
but it has also caused major environmental damage and much poverty and 
exclusion (McIntyre et al., 2009; MEA, 2005). And it has generated the current 
wave of large-scale land acquisitions, which leads researchers to consider also 
how an alternative agricultural development model could harness widespread 
political support.
10 Conclusion
On a planet where there is practically no more unused arable or grazing land 
left, it is more or less impossible to acquire the right to exploit large tracts 
of land without directly acting against the interests and living conditions of 
dispossessed rights holders and their descendants. And, in a global economy 
where solvent demand is already limited by enormous poverty, there are no 
more opportunities for large-scale investment in agriculture without indi-
rectly reducing the market shares, incomes, or jobs of less competitive family 
farmers.
The current wave of large-scale land acquisitions, since it knows no bound-
aries, would, if it continued, have consequences on an unprecedented scale. 
Who would then house, feed and occupy the billions of people living in slums? 
Which authority would regulate the hundreds of millions of beggars, home-
less people and migrants flocking towards those islands of prosperity that still 
remained? What army would contain the endless, pointless global civil war 
that would ensue?
Fortunately, however, we can never be certain that the worst will happen. At 
the beginning of the twentieth century, many democratic liberal governments 
concluded that large agricultural estates with paid workers were less conducive 
to economic development and social harmony than family farms, and accord-
ingly adopted policies to further the development of the latter. And several of 
these governments even made agrarian reform the first step in their economic 
and social development policy. In the aftermath of the Second World War, the 
victorious liberal democracies, drawing lessons from the two major economic 
crises, totalitarian regimes, and two World Wars of the long preceding half-
century, were anxious to provide full employment and an adequate level of 
well-being. They adopted policies to encourage widespread economic and 
social development, with close links between large-scale industry and family 
farming. They imposed agrarian reforms in several of the defeated countries, 
where the landed oligarchy had clearly been in league with the dictatorships. 
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All of this with evident success! As the world attempts to steer a path towards 
sustained development on a global scale, it is a point worth remembering.
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CHAPTER 2
States as Actors in International Agro-Investments
Martin Keulertz and Eckart Woertz
Abstract
Since the global food crisis of 2008 states have encouraged international agro- 
investments by their respective private sectors or have undertaken them directly via 
state-owned companies and sovereign wealth funds. This chapter analyses the crucial 
role played by national governments with the help of three case studies: the Gulf coun-
tries, China, and potential host countries. It thus shows the varying constraints experi-
enced by these three cases and the strategies pursued to overcome them. States in the 
Gulf are heavily dependent on food imports and are concerned that export restrictions 
could undermine their food security. For the same reason, China has pursued a strat-
egy of grain self-sufficiency, which is now being modified in the light of recent changes 
to diet and rises in demand. Governments in potential host countries and regions, like 
South-East Asia, Russia, and Brazil, on the other hand, have sought to keep their agri-
cultural export industries national, maximise their revenue streams, and leverage 
them for geopolitical purposes. While much of the literature has focused on ‘land grab-
bing’ by foreign states in developing countries, this chapter offers a different perspec-
tive by placing the interests of states into the context of twenty-first century food 
politics. It concludes that: the focus of investments has been on value chains down-
stream rather than on farmland in the upstream sector; that ‘security mercantilism’ is 
far more complex than the land acquisition processes themselves; and that emerging 
economies in Asia seek to challenge the Western world in its hegemony over food pro-
duction and virtual water trade.
1 Introduction
Food and agriculture have been intertwined with national interests histori-
cally. Initially these interests focused on food provision for armies; later, local 
populations were ruthlessly subjugated to serve development agendas, be 
it during the famines in the colonial tropical belts in the second half of the 
nineteenth century or during the brutal modernization of communist regimes 
in the twentieth century (Davis, 2001). The idea that affordable food should 
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be an inalienable right entered the vocabulary of political legitimacy only in 
the recent past. It did so in a context of proliferating support for farms and of 
nutrition programmes in the US in the 1930s that became closely intertwined 
with a development model of intensive growth. Labour was no longer a mere 
cost factor, as seen in the extensive growth model of the nineteenth century; it 
was also an important source of demand in growing consumer markets, such 
as those for white goods and cars. The Right to Food was enshrined in interna-
tional treaties, like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 1966.
Agricultural overproduction became a permanent feature of the post-war 
decades, first in North America and then in Western Europe. Countries were 
eager to dispose of their structural surpluses via subsidised food aid and used 
the allocation and withdrawal of such aid to further their foreign policy agen-
das during the Cold War. Governments in the developing world in turn used 
such subsidised food imports to feed their growing urban populations and as 
an input factor for their import-substituting industrialisation strategies, which 
were prevalent at the time.
The global food crisis of 2008, with its price hikes and export restrictions, 
has raised doubts over whether global agricultural trade flows will remain as 
readily available as in the past. Food importers in the Middle East and Asia 
have reacted by announcing agro-investments in developing countries, which 
have been identified as a ‘new frontier’ of agriculture as they have suppos-
edly unused or underutilised land that could produce more food if yield gaps 
were closed by introducing modern management and production technolo-
gies (Deininger and Byerlee, 2011). These investments have met with a critical 
reception as they could threaten the land rights of smallholders and pasto-
ralists, especially if such rights are not registered and are only customary in 
nature. Although there is a large implementation gap and media reports have 
often been inaccurate, the interests of these governments illustrate a growing 
concern about global food production and trade. Their role in international 
foreign direct investment (FDI) flows has increased over the last decade. While 
sovereign wealth funds predominantly pursue portfolio investments, some of 
them have a more proactive private equity orientation. The roughly 550 state-
owned transnational corporations (TNC) make up only 1 per cent of global 
TNCs, but a substantial 10 per cent of global FDI (UNCTAD, 2009; UNCTAD, 
2014). The relative share of agriculture in these FDI flows is miniscule, but still 
substantial in absolute terms. Often governments try to provide framework 
conditions for their respective private sectors, rather than investing them-
selves. Ownership also does not necessarily mean managerial control, which 
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often follows commercial prerogatives at the state-owned entities. Yet the 
direct and indirect investment initiatives clearly point to a heightened interest 
on the part of states.
This article analyses the role of states in international agro-investments 
with the help of three case studies. Countries located in the Gulf are heavily 
dependent on food imports and are concerned that export restrictions could 
undermine their food security. For the same reason China has pursued a strat-
egy of grain self-sufficiency, which is now being modified in the light of recent 
changes to diet and rises in demand. Governments in potential host countries 
and regions, like South-East Asia, Russia, and Brazil on the other hand have 
sought to keep their agricultural export industries national, maximise their 
revenue streams, and leverage them for geopolitical purposes.
While much of the literature has focused on ‘land grabbing’ by foreign states 
in developing countries, this article offers a different perspective by placing 
the interests of states into the context of twenty-first century food politics. The 
focus of investments has been on value chains downstream rather than on 
farmland in the upstream sector. ‘Security mercantilism’ is far more complex 
than the land acquisition processes themselves. Emerging economies in Asia 
seek to brace themselves and to challenge the Western world in its hegemony 
over food production and virtual water trade.
2 Food Importers in the Second Food Regime
While the long-distance trade in grains played only a limited role in the Roman 
Empire, by the nineteenth century it had become a cornerstone of food sup-
plies and food security strategies. In 1846 the British abolished the protection-
ist Corn Laws after a long struggle between the landed aristocracy, which had 
an interest in high grain prices, and the nascent industrial bourgeoisie, which 
wanted lower grain prices in order to moderate the wages of urban work-
ers. From a position of maritime supremacy the United Kingdom (UK), by 
1880, imported the majority of its grain from colonial settler states like North 
America and Australia, but also from India and Russia. Fuelled by railways and 
steam ships, the grain trade fed Britain’s workers and facilitated its industrial 
revolution in a first food regime that lasted from the 1870s to the 1930s. Exports 
of tropical commodities—such as sugar, cotton, and rubber—from the colo-
nies were a second pillar of this first food regime (McMichael, 2009b).
After a period of crisis and reconfiguration, the first food regime was super-
seded by a second food regime in the aftermath of the Second World War. This 
new regime was characterised by subsidised grain production in core states and 
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surplus disposal in the developing world via export promotion programmes 
like the Public Law (PL) 480 programme in the US that was renamed the Food 
for Peace programme during the Kennedy administration. Diets underwent a 
process of ‘meatification’ in the developed world, and one of ‘wheatification’ 
in the developing world. The market for packaged, durable foods expanded in 
industrialised countries. Domestically produced input factors like soy oil, corn 
syrup, and synthetic fibres increasingly substituted colonial export crops like 
sugar and cotton.
There is an ongoing debate regarding whether we can speak of a third food 
regime today in which nation states have been superseded as main actors 
by transnational companies and the World Trade Organization (WTO), due 
to these increasingly influential actors’ dominant roles in value chains and 
trade liberalisation (McMichael, 2009b; McMichael, 2009a; Friedmann, 2009; 
Pritchard, 2009; Burch and Lawrence, 2009). Many emerging markets are now 
also undergoing the same processes undergone by the developed world in ear-
lier decades, such as the ‘meatification’ of diets and the ‘supermarketisation’ of 
distribution systems. As a result, new actors have emerged and new relation-
ships have been forged. Thailand and Vietnam have developed into major rice 
exporters. Brazil is now a soybean superpower and an indispensable feedstock 
supplier to the Chinese livestock industry. Russia has become a large cereal 
exporter again akin to its nineteenth and early twentieth century role. The 
Soviet days—when the union was one of the largest grain importers in support 
of the ambitious livestock programme of the 1970s and 1980s—are gone. Yet 
these changes notwithstanding, the geography of food trade that was drawn 
after the Second World War still looms large.
The picture of the global net trade in cereals is telling: with 88 million tons in 
2013–14, North America is by far the largest net exporter, followed by the former 
Soviet Union economies (57 million tons), Oceania (24 million tons), Europe 
(17 million tons) and South America (14 million tons). South Asia has also had 
a significant export surplus over the last three years, with its net exports cur-
rently standing at 16 million tons. On the other side of this equation, Middle 
East and North African (MENA) countries are the largest net importers of cere-
als globally (92 million tons), although their population size is relatively small 
with about 500 million people. East Asia and South-East Asia with over two 
billion people have less cereal net imports than the MENA (66 and 11 million 
tons respectively). Central America and the Caribbean are net importers too, 
at 10 million tons. So is sub-Saharan Africa with 29 million tons, a figure that is 
expected to increase in the future (USDA, 2014).
Of course, there are other important agricultural commodities, like soy-
beans or palm oil, which are dominated by other producer countries such as 
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Brazil, Indonesia and Malaysia. But the focus on cereals is warranted; corn 
and barley are important feedstocks for livestock and wheat and rice alone 
constitute roughly 40 per cent of human calorie intake globally (FAOSTAT, 
2013). Hence, cereals are of particular strategic significance. The cereal 
trade—especially that in wheat, as rice, corn, and barley are traded less across 
borders—also constitutes about 15 per cent of global virtual water trade, sur-
passed only by water-intensive cotton (25 per cent) and followed by soybeans 
(9 per cent) (Sojamo et al., 2012). Virtual water is the water, in food and fibres, 
that is used to produce a given commodity. It cannot be pumped like blue 
water, but is accessible via trade. As 70 per cent of global crops are produced 
by rain-fed agriculture, the focus of the global debate on blue water and the 
conflicts over surface water sharing can be misleading because water scarcity 
can be mitigated by virtual water ‘imports’ (Allan, 2011). Accessing foreign rain-
falls via food, and therefore the virtual water trade, is of paramount strategic 
importance for food importers.
The food question also reveals the power of North America and Europe 
in the global economy. Over a period of 150 years, vertical integration in the 
food supply chain enabled and fostered the establishment of the agribusiness 
industry. Aided by subsidies of up to USD 1 billion per day, Western agribusiness 
corporations permeated the global food trade (Peterson, 2009). In 2003, Archer 
Daniels Midlands (ADM), Bunge, Cargill, and Louis Dreyfus (the ABCDs) were 
estimated to be trading 73 per cent of global bulk cereal commodities (Murphy 
et al., 2012). This estimation did not even include the Swiss energy and food 
commodity trader Glencore, which has grown and ranks now as the fifth larg-
est market participant from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) countries. The upstream and downstream management 
of the food supply chain has been strategically transferred to the private sector 
since the 1980s, which has enabled the West to control global food trade. By 
making use of economic power, Western agribusiness companies do not rely 
solely on domestic agriculture for trade. The companies are also strategically 
present in water-endowed regions such as Latin America and Asia. The result-
ing dependence on companies in the West for food imports and virtual water 
‘provision’ has developed into a concern for emerging economies seeking to 
define the twenty-first century politically and economically.
This dependence has implications for the three case studies in question, for 
the reaction of the respective states to the global food crisis of 2008, and for 
these states’ role in international agro-investments. The Gulf countries’ depen-
dence on food imports will increase. Domestic agriculture is being scaled down 
due to a lack of water, and population growth will only peter out after 2050. 
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) governments have announced a flurry of 
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agro-investments since 2008; these have so far been largely unsuccessful and 
are conspicuously reminiscent of the failed Sudan breadbasket strategy of the 
1970s. China has traditionally followed a policy of self-sufficiency, supported 
by its agrarian society model. However, China’s rapid industrialisation has led 
to a moderation of the self-sufficiency paradigm. Beijing now seeks to accom-
modate changing diets and subsequent rising demand with additional imports 
made possible by strategic investments in supply chains throughout the world. 
Meanwhile, the new agro-exporters that have emerged over recent decades, 
like Brazil, Russia, and the rice exporters of South-East Asia, try to strengthen 
their positions in the new geo-economic landscape of food trade.
The agricultural investment policy choices made by the GCC countries and 
China illustrate the importance of food in the current world order. While theo-
rists in international relations have focused on military capacity or economic 
power as a key determinant of state power, the role of control over agricultural 
commodities is often a neglected area of analysis. However, food and water 
security have always played a strategically important role for people charged 
with state power. State interests in agricultural investment reveal a new ‘secu-
rity mercantilism’ seeking to repatriate agricultural products to investing states 
(McMichael, 2013). The contemporary multipolar order represents a new phase 
of ‘inverse globalisation’ by which new actors in the global political order, such 
as the GCC countries and China, start to become investors instead of being the 
beneficiaries of investment (Allan et al., 2013; Sojamo et al., 2012). This chapter 
will return to this issue in its conclusion. First, the objectives and strategies, 
and the preliminary results of state actors’ involvement in agricultural invest-
ment will be analysed in the following sections.
3 Of Self-Sufficiency and Breadbasket Illusions: The Gulf Countries
Beside Asian countries, like China and South Korea, and western financial 
investors, Gulf countries constitute a third grouping in the wave of agro-
investment announcements triggered by the global food crisis of 2008. Like 
the former two, Gulf countries share a specific set of motivations and concerns 
and a historical background all of which drives their actions. All are net food 
importers with a severe water shortage, and during the Second World War and 
in the 1970s all experienced the risk of geopolitical food supply disruptions. As 
oil exporters, Gulf countries were able to digest the concomitant food price 
hikes of the commodities boom of the 2000’s, but they have been unnerved by 
the temporary export restrictions that food exporters like Russia, Argentina, 
Vietnam, and India announced in 2008. Affordable food is part of the social 
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contract of Gulf countries, which are ruled in an authoritarian manner and 
buy off possible dissent over a lack of participation by using welfare pay-
ments and the offer of public sector jobs. Beside fuel and electricity, food and 
water are subsidised to varying degrees, at least for the local population. There 
are also differences between individual Gulf countries’ approaches to agro- 
investments; Qatar and Saudi Arabia have the most institutionalised approach 
with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as a distant third, while Kuwait and 
Bahrain lag behind. While Saudi Arabia only aims at providing favourable 
framework conditions for its private sector, Qatar has established Hassad Food, 
a bespoke sovereign wealth fund (SWF) for agro-investments. Oman is yet to 
announce any agro-investments, but has the most advanced strategy in terms 
of strategic storage and other relevant domestic factors (Woertz, 2013).
These states’ sense of vulnerability is heightened by a lack of water and a 
need to downsize domestic agriculture. Gulf countries have one of the world’s 
highest domestic per capita water consumption rates. Agriculture accounts 
for the lion’s share of water withdrawal at about 80 per cent. While residential 
supplies are largely satisfied by desalinated seawater, farming has exploited 
fossil water aquifers at unsustainable rates, and these are drawn down and suf-
fer from salt-water intrusion. Governments have started to react. Saudi Arabia 
has begun to phase out its subsidised wheat production and plans to end it in 
2016 and the UAE is doing the same with Rhodes grass. However, livestock pro-
duction continues to expand. As a result alfalfa is in high demand and farmers 
have switched from wheat to the latter crop, the cultivation of which consumes 
more water than wheat as it is planted all year round, and not only in the winter 
months. Saudi Arabia imports an enormous 40–45 per cent of globally traded 
barley as feedstock. As it will need to decrease its domestic alfalfa production 
it is expected to become the largest alfalfa importer in the world, importing 
either as hay or pellets, surpassing other major importers like the UAE, Japan, 
South Korea, and Taiwan (Personal interviews, Kuwait, November 2013).
The Qatar National Food Security Programme (QNFSP) raised eyebrows in 
2009 with its cornucopian plan to raise self-sufficiency from its current level of 
10 per cent to 70 per cent in 2023, with the help of futuristic farming designs 
and solar-based desalination. This figure was reduced to a more conservative 
40–60 per cent in a later version of the programme’s food security ‘Master Plan’ 
(Kanady, 2013). Even that target is unlikely to be met. QNFSP has been down-
graded after internal restructurings and food security issues have been handed 
over to an inter-ministerial committee. The QNFSP website no longer exists. 
For a state with a small population and large amounts of capital at its disposal 
QNFSP’s plans might have been possible in theory, but they hardly made eco-
logical or economic sense. While some fruits and vegetables could be produced 
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in greenhouses with sufficient water efficiency, this is not the case with cereals 
and other water intensive crops that would be better imported. Yet, like other 
Gulf countries, Qatar has been interested in self-sufficiency out of fear of sup-
ply disruptions. During the Second World War famines in the region were only 
averted by food supplies from the Allied Middle East Supply Center (MESC) in 
Cairo and in the 1970s the US threatened a food boycott in retaliation for the 
Arab oil embargo (Woertz, 2013: ch. 2 and 4).
At the time of that threatened boycott, the Gulf countries devised an ambi-
tious plan to develop Sudan as an Arab breadbasket to reduce such exposure 
to geopolitical risk. New institutions were founded in Khartoum, like the 
Arab Authority for Agricultural Investment and Development (AAAID) or the 
Arab Organization for Agricultural Development (AOAD), and private Gulf 
capital appeared on the scene. The Saudi arms trader Adnan Khashoggi and 
the Kuwaiti royal Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jaber engaged closely with the Nimeiri 
regime, which engineered an ecologically questionable expansion of mecha-
nised, rain-fed farming, and had an infatuation with large-scale project designs 
that it tried to satisfy by increasing foreign and domestic indebtedness. Fears 
of land grabs mounted and displacements occurred (O’Brien, 1985), but the 
role of the Gulf countries remained subdued. Mostly they did not follow up 
on their ambitious announcements, and were anxious about lacking infra-
structure and the notorious corruption and cronyism of Nimeiri’s regime. 
They dragged their feet and rarely moved beyond feasibility studies. When 
they did, many projects—like the Faisal scheme—proved to be failures. The 
Kenana Sugar Company is the only surviving signature project of that era. It 
received sumptuous investment guarantees from the Sudanese government 
and is half-owned by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia (Woertz, 2013: ch. 6). Meanwhile 
Sudan went through an epic famine in 1984–5, which must also be ascribed to 
Nimeiri’s breadbasket plans, which neglected and disenfranchised traditional 
smallholders and pastoralists while being unable to create viable commercial 
farming ventures (Verhoeven, 2015).
With the reversal of the food price hikes of the 1970s and reduced US politici-
sation of the food trade, the Gulf countries’ interest in foreign agro-investments 
faded in the 1980s and 1990s. Instead, their focus turned inwards. Saudi Arabia 
launched its subsidised wheat schemes, which now have to be phased out 
for lack of water. It reached self-sufficiency and even became the sixth larg-
est wheat exporter in the early 1990s. Yet the boom was not sustainable. Due 
to the global food crisis of 2008 the Gulf countries are, once again, engaged. 
Now, as in the past, they have announced agro-investments on an epic scale 
against the backdrop of rising food prices and a global commodities boom. 
Their interest is in staple foods, not in biofuels that have constituted a majority 
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of announced foreign agro-investments globally. Sudan has again been at 
the top of the list, followed by Pakistan, the Philippines, Ethiopia, and Egypt, 
mostly countries that are geographically and politically close, but have food 
security and water issues of their own. There has also been considerable inter-
est in other countries along the East African coast, like Kenya, Tanzania, and 
Mozambique (Woertz, 2013). Cash-strapped developing countries have shown 
an interest in attracting Gulf funds. Sudan, in particular, launched a large dam-
building programme in the 2000’s and rolled out project designs that make 
Nimeiri’s earlier breadbasket dreams pale by comparison. Gulf and Chinese 
funds financed the Merowe dam 350 km (220 miles) north of Khartoum, 
which was finished in 2009. Its construction led to the displacement of over 
50,000 people and to violent protests. Other dams are to be built this decade 
(Verhoeven, 2015).
However, Merowe and a few other projects apart, there has been a huge dis-
connect between media reports of land grabs and the reality on the ground. 
Like in the 1970s, Gulf investors have rarely followed up on their announce-
ments. Political instability, poor infrastructure, and a lack of commercial via-
bility have discouraged them. If they have put money on the table, it has been 
in developed agro-markets rather than in the developing countries in which 
most announcements have been made. Qatar-based Hassad Food’s invest-
ments in Australia or Saudi Al Marai’s in Argentina are cases in point. In the 
developing world most of the projects have either not got off the ground at all 
or only on a fraction of the announced scale. Often they have run into difficul-
ties and are threatened by failure, as is the case of Saudi billionaire Mohamed 
al-Amoudi’s Saudi Star project in Ethiopia’s Gambela province (Woertz, 2013; 
Verhoeven, 2015).
This implementation gap has been particularly pronounced for projects 
in South-East Asia, which is far away from the Gulf countries and does not 
have the advantage of geographical proximity like East Africa (Woertz, 2013). 
The Saudi Bin Ladin group cancelled a USD 4.3 billion project for basmati rice 
cultivation in Indonesia citing funding problems in the wake of the global 
financial crisis. Nothing more has been heard about an agricultural project for 
over 100,000 hectares in East Kalimantan, which UAE based Minerals Energy 
Commodities Holding (MEC) announced as part of a larger investment in a 
coal mine, a railway, and an aluminium smelter. Kuwait sent a reconnaissance 
mission to Cambodia, Thailand, Laos, and Myanmar in 2008 to investigate the 
potential for Kuwaiti agro-investments in these countries. Although Kuwaiti 
announcements were interpreted by the press as a sign that investment deci-
sions were imminent and those announcements are still widely quoted to this 
day, the overall conclusion of the delegation was to ‘do nothing’ and carefully 
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assess both Kuwait’s needs and conditions in target countries first (Interview 
with a Kuwaiti executive, 20 November 2013, Kuwait City). Political risk, under-
developed infrastructure, and the non-existent export capacities of dispersed 
smallholdings were among the mission’s concerns. The sticky white rice that is 
produced in South-East Asia also does not match the pronounced consumption 
preference in the Gulf for basmati rice, which is mainly produced in Pakistan 
and India. The plans of the Saudi Al-Rajhi Group in the Philippines have 
been more concrete. It has established the Far East Agricultural Investment 
Corporation (FEAICO) to produce food on 78,000 ha in Mindanao, along with 
its local partner Aztropex. Its efforts to consolidate landholdings by leasing 
parcels from smallholders are controversial and it remains to be seen whether 
the corporation will be able to set up larger farming operations (Salerno, 2010; 
Revelli, 2012).
Gulf countries lack capacities to implement projects of this scale, espe-
cially in foreign ecologies and investment environments. Some of the sover-
eign wealth funds that have announced investments in hundreds of thousands 
of hectares have not had a single agro-engineer among their ranks. If there is 
implementation, Gulf countries tend to mimic the practice at home of running 
large-scale agro-projects with Western operating companies; at times even the 
manual workers are expatriates, at least on the foreman level (Woertz, 2013).
Seven years after the aforementioned wave of announcements, a new sense 
of reality has set in on the part of investors, target countries, and observers 
from academia and advocacy groups. The first version of the Land Matrix, a 
joint research effort of several think tanks to compile and verify media reports 
about land grabs, still contained numerous on-paper foreign agro-investor 
projects that had not seen any implementation at all, thus painting an exag-
gerated picture. That picture, and the project’s database, was used by academ-
ics in peer-reviewed journals (Rulli et al., 2013). The media, in turn, picked up 
these presumably authoritative scientific works, which were in fact based on 
unreliable media reports, and the news cycle came full circle (Rural Modernity, 
2012; Brautigam, 2012; Woertz, 2012b). Revised versions of the Land Matrix have 
been considerably improved and provide a more accurate picture. Some on-
paper projects have been removed from the database and information has 
been introduced that allows projects to be differentiated according to their 
implementation status. In academia, there is a growing perception that instead 
of a quantitative fixation more qualitative case studies are needed to give the 
topic a differentiated treatment without belittling the many problems that 
exist (Allan et al., 2013; Edelman, 2013; Oya, 2013). Target countries, like Sudan 
or Ethiopia, have voiced their frustration with projects that have not been 
realised and Ethiopia has started withdrawing concessions from companies 
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whose projects are delayed (Edelman, 2013; Davison, 2013; Bekele, 2013). Gulf 
countries, on the other hand, have lost a great degree of interest in greenfield 
investments in the developing world in a manner not dissimilar to the events 
of the 1970s. Beside brownfield investments in developed agro-markets, atten-
tion has focused increasingly on food trade and logistics. All Gulf countries 
have increased their strategic storage capacities. Saudi and Qatari investors 
participated in the initial public offering (IPO) of commodity trader Glencore, 
which has expanded its presence in global grain markets with the takeover of 
Viterra, the largest wheat handler in Canada and South Australia. Port facilities 
have expanded and emergency plans have been drawn up. If Gulf countries 
have built pipelines in order to have alternative outlets for their oil exports in 
case of a closure of the Strait of Hormuz, similar considerations are at work for 
food. For such an emergency, Kuwait has an agreement in place to land food 
at the port of Fujairah on the UAE’s eastern coast, send it by truck to Jebel Ali 
in Dubai, and then ship it from there up the Gulf to Kuwait (Interview with a 
Kuwaiti executive, 20 November 2013, Kuwait City).
4 Food, Development, and Strategic Joint Ventures: China
China’s food security challenges are arguably more formidable than those of 
the Gulf countries. It has only 9 per cent of the world’s arable land, but needs 
to feed 20 per cent of the world’s population (Brautigam, 2009). Satisfying most 
food requirements with imports is an option for the Gulf countries, but not 
for a country of over 1.3 billion people. Such an enterprise would overwhelm 
exportable surplus capacities on world markets. This is particularly true for 
rice, China’s main staple food. Only a small proportion, 7–8 per cent, of global 
rice production is traded across borders. The respective figure for wheat stands 
at around 20–21 per cent (Timmer, 2013; FAO, 2014). As a result of this lack of 
liquidity it is difficult to balance rice supply shortages via trade and rice mar-
kets are prone to volatility. Rice production and consumption is also heavily 
concentrated in Asia; India and China alone produce half of the global harvest, 
mostly for domestic purposes.
Hence, self-sufficiency concerns are of great strategic significance to China. 
Notwithstanding brutal policy blunders like the ‘Great Leap Forward’ famine 
(1959–61) that cost the lives of 30–45 million people, agricultural develop-
ment issues have been deeply engrained in the mindset of the Communist 
Party since it built its support base in rural areas that suffered from famines, 
in the 1930s and 1940s. China has managed to increase agricultural production 
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significantly since the reform era of 1978, yet it became a net importer of food in 
2004. Rapid economic development and rising incomes have caused a dietary 
change towards favouring meat consumption and dairy products. Population 
growth has decreased due to the one-child policy, but it is still occurring and 
in a country like China small relative increments still result in large absolute 
numbers of additional mouths to feed. Further domestic production growth 
proves challenging, as the north of the country suffers from water shortage and 
land is lost to urban sprawl and ecological damage.
Demand for animal feedstock is now met to a large extent by imports. In the 
case of soybeans the figure stands at over 70 per cent, mostly from the US and 
Brazil (Sharma, 2014). In contrast, the Chinese government has been anxious 
to maintain a high degree of self-sufficiency in grain production for human 
consumption. It long regarded 95 per cent self-sufficiency and 120 million ha 
of cultivated land as an absolute minimum. In 2008, China underlined this self-
sufficiency goal in its 20-year food security strategy, in which it ordained that 
staple crops should be produced at home and outsourcing should be confined 
to commercial crops like cotton and animal feedstock, similar to the aforemen-
tioned soybean imports (Cotula et al., 2009: 55). Cracks in this stance appeared 
in 2014, when China maintained the self-sufficiency goal in principle, but for 
the first time set grain production targets well below consumption levels, 
eyeing a ‘stabilisation’ of production in 2020 at roughly 10 per cent below the 
harvest of 2013. Instead, China now places greater emphasis on issues of food 
safety and quality and the production of higher-value-added foods like meat, 
vegetables, and fruit (Hornby, 2014).
Whilst China will always need to maintain a high level of self-sufficiency, 
it has now braced itself for greater reliance on imported food. Due to its size, 
a marginal increase in its demand has a considerable impact on world mar-
kets. This was demonstrated in the global corn markets of 2010–11, when China 
caused a price hike after becoming a large buyer following a drought. China 
holds the largest wheat stocks in the world, 31 per cent of the total. It has con-
siderable means to balance price fluctuations and to smooth its increased 
engagement with world markets. In comparison, the US holds only 12 per cent 
of global wheat stocks, India 8 per cent, and the Arab world, as the largest 
cereal-importing region, a relatively low 10 per cent (World Bank and FAO, 
2012).
China’s ‘going global’ policy has had two decisive moments. First, policy 
measures have been put in place—since 1999—to secure raw material supplies 
for the country’s rapid industrialisation. Investments have focused on energy 
and mining. Second, the introduction of agricultural subsidies in 2004 laid the 
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foundations for increasingly profitable agribusiness. Responding to growing 
fears of political instability, due to a widening gap between the countryside and 
China’s booming urban centres, the central government in Beijing reversed the 
practice of taxing agriculture shortly after 1 January 2006. China’s transforma-
tion from an agricultural to an industrial economy has gone hand in hand with 
the decreasing economic (yet not strategic) importance of agriculture (Gale 
et al., 2005).
Although the stimulus of 2004 only marginally affected agricultural output, 
it offered new opportunities for the private sector. For example, the past ten 
years has seen the rapid ascension of the Hong Kong-headquartered Noble 
Group to its position as one of the world’s largest agribusiness companies. 
Founded through a British businessman’s investment of USD 100,000 in 1987, 
the company also trades energy and minerals and currently has similar rev-
enues to the US agribusiness multinational Archer Daniels Midlands (ADM). 
The growth pace of Noble is breathtaking. While its revenues were only USD 
15 billion in 2007, they sextupled within six years to USD 98 billion in 2013 
(Forbes, 2014; Stevens, 2007; South China Morning Post, 2012). China’s sover-
eign wealth fund, China Investment Corporation (CIC), holds 15 per cent of 
shares in—what is referred to as—‘the company’ (Koons and Venkat, 2014). 
However, yet another strategic public–private partnership was announced 
in April 2014. Channelled through the state-owned China National Cereals, 
Oils and Foodstuffs Corporation (COFCO) and private equity investment firm 
HOPU Investment, a new joint venture between China’s public food com-
panies and Noble will see the establishment of Noble Agri JV, giving COFCO 
and HOPU, collectively, 51 per cent of the shares while Noble retains 49 per 
cent. HOPU Investment is owned by the infamous Chinese business tycoon 
Fang Fenglei, who was previously Goldman Sachs’s Asia chief executive officer 
(CEO). The rationale of this joint venture is to provide Noble with capital and 
COFCO with Noble’s downstream supply-chain knowledge and operations to 
establish what, in due course, may become the world’s biggest global agribusi-
ness company. The new company intends to increase China’s access to agri-
cultural production regions and countries, such as Latin America and Russia, 
as a first step. Other takeovers by Chinese companies in the food processing 
and trading sector have included Tnuva, the Israeli cheese and consumer foods 
supplier, US pork producer Smithfield Foods, the UK breakfast brand Weetabix, 
and Australian winemaker Hollick. China is preparing to compete with the 
Cargills and Nestlés of this world rather than just gobbling up farmland in 
the upstream sector.
China has understood that strategic agricultural investments are necessary 
to maintain its transition from an agrarian society to the potentially biggest 
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economy in the world. To this end, Africa has played a prominent role as a 
potential target region for supplies of agricultural imports.1 Mostly state-
owned companies have made foreign agro-investments as part of this strategy; 
focusing on industrial input factors such as, rubber, palm oil, or cotton but 
avoiding investments in food crops. Insofar as they have aimed at food crops in 
Africa, they have done so for local markets, not for export to China, since the 
long distances, underdeveloped infrastructure, and lack of expertise amongst 
Chinese state investors in downstream supply would make such exports pro-
hibitively expensive. For the stated strategic reasons, China has a preference 
for domestic production of staple crops. However, this preference may have 
to be modified in the coming years due to growing prosperity and China’s new 
economic expansion policy.
China regards Africa as an important export market for corn and rice hybrid 
seeds. In 2006, the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation in Beijing propagated 
a spirit of ‘win-win cooperation’ in the field of agriculture and China pledged 
to set up agricultural demonstration centres in Africa. It has also used agro-
investments as an instrument in its competition with Taiwan for diplomatic 
recognition and as an ancillary tool for soothing concerns about Chinese infra-
structure and mining projects with high environmental impacts. Yet, China 
has remained a minor investor, thus far taking a cautious approach to the 
‘last frontier’ in global agriculture: sub-Saharan Africa. Apart from research 
and development cooperation, China has not made great efforts to utilize the 
continent’s potential ‘food bowls’. Beside Africa and Latin America, South-
East Asia has, for China, developed into an important procurement source for 
industrial input factors such as rubber. Corresponding investments, whether 
foreign or domestic, have led to a deep restructuring of land tenure systems.2
In general, Chinese foreign investments have been blamed for relying on 
imported labour from China and on large-scale project designs, and for under-
mining environmental standards and offering limited benefits to target coun-
tries. While these reproaches may have merit in many cases, in others they 
do not accurately reflect economic dynamics, which have been stimulated by 
Chinese investments, and one is hard pressed to find differences with compet-
ing Western investment practices (Asongu and Aminkeng, 2013). Justified criti-
cism of such practices notwithstanding, some Chinese projects have a genuine 
development motivation. China already undertook rice projects in Africa in 
the 1960s that had a dedicated smallholder orientation. While the systems 
1    This is not the case for China alone; Africa has played a similar role for other emerging 
economies.
2    See Messerli et al., and Gironde and Senties Portilla in this volume.
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created by these projects fell into disrepair after the Chinese left, as relative 
complexity and labour intensity affected project continuity, China is now try-
ing to breathe new life into such schemes.
In addition to the variety of qualitative aspects of Chinese investments, it 
should be pointed out that a considerable discrepancy exists between media 
reports on such investments and their quantitative extent in reality. This is 
strikingly similar to the case of the Gulf countries, outlined above. By 2012 
only a few Chinese agro-investments in Africa above 5,000 ha had been imple-
mented and none at all in the large scale bracket above 10,000 ha (Brautigam, 
2013). However, the advent of ‘China Ag Corporation’ triggered by a new growth 
strategy implemented through strategic investments in ‘the company’ (Noble) 
may alter this approach in the coming years.
5 Policies of Host Country States
If governments in the Gulf and China have tried to foster investments in foreign 
agricultural value chains, governments of host countries have also enacted pol-
icies that affect this investment drive. Three different investment targets have 
been discussed in this article: a) companies in developed markets that focus on 
upstream value chains like input procurement, food processing, and trading; 
b) greenfield investments in agricultural land in developing countries; and 
c) agricultural investments in developed markets, often brownfield. Depending 
on the nature of the investment, policies in host countries vary.
Value chain investments in developed markets are less emotionally charged 
than land investments in developing countries. Often they have taken the form 
of smooth ownership transfers like the aforementioned Chinese acquisitions of 
Tnuva, Weetabix, and Smithfield. On other occasions they have raised strategic 
concerns, even though food processing and trading companies are less likely 
to be identified as strategic industries than are energy or high tech companies. 
The Australian government blocked a takeover of the grain trader GrainCorp 
by US based ADM in 2013 citing national interest and food security concerns 
(Scott and Behrmann, 2013). Australian BHP Billiton’s attempted hostile take-
over of Canadian fertiliser producer Potash Corp. in 2010 and a potential coun-
ter bid from Chinese state-owned Sinochem stirred protectionist sentiments 
in Canada (Massot, 2011). How SWFs and state-owned TNCs are perceived has 
changed since the mid-2000s when Western countries were concerned about 
the political influence of foreign governments on their economies. Since then, 
SWFs have subscribed to the Santiago Principles, an IMF-sponsored public 
outreach exercise that aims to alleviate concerns over transparency issues. 
 45States As Actors In International Agro-investments
SWFs also have become welcome providers of capital in the wake of the global 
financial crisis of 2008. Currently they are rather perceived as normal market 
participants, but a renewed wave of protectionist sentiment cannot be ruled 
out given the shifts in global food markets and the magnitude of global finan-
cial imbalances, where government-owned entities in the Middle East and 
Asia hold large assets in OECD countries (Woertz, 2012a).
Land investments in developing countries are the most controversial of the 
three types of investments. Cash-strapped governments in host countries have 
tried to attract them as they are in need of capital imports and have hoped 
for agricultural development-led industrialisation (ADLI) (ECOSOC, 2007). 
Ethiopia and Cambodia for example have tried to lure foreign investors with 
the use of bespoke investment agencies, and favourable laws and taxation 
regimes (Shepherd, 2012; Shepherd, 2013). However, large-scale greenfield 
projects have often met with bottom-up resistance from small-scale farmers 
and holders of customary land rights who stand to lose from such initiatives. 
Together with political instability in many target countries, this has affected 
the calculations of potential investors and has contributed to a pronounced 
implementation gap in this investment category.
Land investments in developed agro-markets, the third category, have 
met with a different set of challenges. Governments of these host countries are 
also keen to foster agricultural exports, but on their own terms by leveraging 
their market position and limiting foreign ownership of land. Thailand only 
allows agricultural investments if there is a Thai majority partner, Brazil has 
limited large-scale landownership by foreigners out of fear of Chinese acquisi-
tions, and Australian politicians have mulled over similar steps (Woertz, 2013). 
Such assertiveness is also reflected in the politics of agro-exporters—like 
Brazil, Thailand, Canada, South Africa, and Australia—at the WTO, where they 
have formed the Cairns groups in order to lobby against agricultural subsidies 
in the US and the EU, which they regard as elements of unfair competition 
(Weis, 2007).
Russia and the South-East Asian rice exporters provide examples of how 
newly emerging agro-exporters are trying to leverage their market positions, 
which could prove to be to the detriment of importer nations. Russia is an 
importer of fruit, vegetables, meat, and dairy products, but it has become a 
major grain exporter again, as it was in the nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies. At the turn of the millennium, Russia’s global wheat market share was 
still as low as 0.5 per cent. Within only ten years, Russia increased its market 
share to 13.8 per cent and some expect it to become the largest wheat exporter 
worldwide by 2019 (Pall et al., 2011). Yet, there is uncertainty about these esti-
mates because rain-fed harvests have been volatile and Russia’s agricultural 
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sector continues to be hampered by inefficiencies resulting from poor gover-
nance. Similar to China, yet differently conceived, Russia has begun to stra-
tegically subsidise and de-tax its agricultural sector. To this end the Russian 
government has adopted the State Program for Development of Agriculture 
and Regulation of Agricultural Commodities Markets for the period 2013–2020 
(Vassilieva, 2012b).
The Russian government has sought cooperation with neighbours Ukraine 
and Kazakhstan on grain marketing, which has caused concerns about cartel-
like price fixing. On the other hand, Russia has offered Egypt and Algeria subsi-
dised wheat below world market prices (Pall et al., 2011). These political moves 
echo Russia’s plans to use food as a bargaining chip to expand its geopolitical 
sphere of influence. Through Russian presidential decree no. 290 of March 20, 
2009, the United Grain Company (UGC) was established to strategically handle 
food trade logistics. UGC has since acted as the intermediary agent between the 
state’s interests in domestic and international agricultural relations (Vassilieva, 
2012a). In 2010, President Medvedev decided that UGC would have to be partly 
privatised by 2012 in order to inject more capital. Despite widespread Western 
interest in purchasing shares of the company, the investment group Summa, 
owned by the business tycoon Ziyavudin Magomedov, acquired 51 per cent of 
the shares of UCG to take over the company. As a strategic objective, UCG has 
formed joint ventures with companies in East Asia to increase its market share 
there, namely in China, Taiwan, and Japan (Bloomberg Business, 2015). Similar 
to its energy giant Gazprom and with the core objective to ‘look east’, Russia’s 
agricultural expansion plans eye Eurasian investments aided by strategic 
public–private joint ventures.
At the height of the global food crisis of 2008 five rice producers in South-
East Asia—Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar—contemplated 
forming the Organisation of Rice Exporting Countries (OREC). Although 
Thai prime minister Samak said, ‘We don’t aspire to be like Organization 
of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC),’ the mere contemplation of 
OREC sent shockwaves through rice importing countries like the Philippines 
and Indonesia, which feared cartel-like price fixing. Thailand and Vietnam 
alone accounted for half of globally traded rice exports at that time (Brummer, 
2011). Cartels usually struggle with internal discipline and can overpower 
market forces only for a limited time. So far no formal organisation has been 
established. The website of OREC appears rudimentary3 and there have 
been no new posts since early 2013, which would hint at limited activity. In 
contrast to 2008, rice markets are now well supplied. Thailand grapples with 
3    Available at http://www.orecinternational.org/ (accessed on 2 April 2015).
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overcapacities that go back to a subsidy programme launched in 2011 that paid 
farmers above world market prices. It was terminated in 2014 after losses of 
more than $18 billion and widespread accusations of corruption. If a future 
OREC served as an intergovernmental rice traders’ association, as a lobbying 
arm to reduce rice trade restrictions in Asia, or as a coordinator of regional 
buffer-stocks instead of as a cartel, it might have a beneficial impact (Brummer, 
2011). Yet the mind games surrounding its attempted formation show how food 
exporters seek to benefit from the changing global food system and the grow-
ing interest from food importer nations in their production capacities.
6 Conclusion
States as actors in global food supply-chain investments and trade is a topic 
that has attracted increasing interest in the past few years. ‘Security mercan-
tilism’ is far more complex than land acquisition processes. While much of 
the literature has focused on ‘land grabbing’ by foreign states in developing 
countries, this chapter offers a different perspective by placing the interests 
of states into the context of twenty-first century food politics. It sheds light on 
a new, and as yet under-researched, period of globalisation. Emerging econo-
mies in Asia seek to brace themselves and to challenge the Western world in 
its hegemony over food production and virtual water trade. These strategies 
involve sophisticated public–private joint ventures in the respective national 
interests. The economies analysed differ substantially in their approach to 
‘security mercantilism’. The defining moment for policy changes was the food 
price spikes of 2007–08, after which new strategies were conceived in order 
to gain independence from Western food trade. While the GCC opted for the 
unsuccessful revival of the ‘dream’ of a Sudanese ‘breadbasket’, China stra-
tegically channelled capital into the agro-industry to copy the model of the 
West. New agro-exporters like Brazil, Russia, and Thailand on the other hand 
sought to influence the changing landscape of food trade to their advantage, 
by leveraging pricing power and putting ceilings on foreign ownership. Asia 
will be the most crucial area for the demand side of food politics in the twenty-
first century both due to its dominant share of future economic growth and 
because of the changing diet of its citizens. It will rival the MENA region, which 
is currently still the largest net-importer of cereals globally. While it remains 
an ongoing process, Asian economies have begun to prepare themselves to 
inverse power relations within the food globalisation process. Therefore, it can 
be concluded that the politics of food will define the first half of the twenty-
first century in no minor way.
48 Keulertz and Woertz
References
Allan, T. (2011) Virtual Water: Tackling the Threat to Our Planet’s Most Precious Resource 
(London: I. B. Tauris).
Allan, T., J. Warner, S. Sojamo and M. Keulertz (eds.) (2013) Handbook of Land and 
Water Grabs in Africa: Foreign Direct Investments and Food and Water Security 
(London and New York: Routledge).
Asongu, S.A. and G.A.A. Aminkeng (2013) ‘The Economic Consequences of China–
Africa Relations: Debunking Myths in the Debate’, Journal of Chinese Economic and 
Business Studies, 11(4), pp. 261–277, DOI: 10.1080/14765284.2013.838384.
Bekele, K. (2013) ‘Saudi Star Rice Project Feels the Pinch’, The Reporter, 23 November, 
http://www.thereporterethiopia.com/index.php/news-headlines/item/1282-saudi-
star-rice-project-feels-the-pinch (accessed on 17 February 2015).
Bloomberg Business (2015) Company Overview of JSC United Grain Company, http://
investing.businessweek.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId= 
99331238 (accessed on 17 February 2015).
Brautigam, D. (2013) ‘Chinese Engagement in African Agriculture: Fiction and Fact’, in 
Allan, J.A., M. Keulertz, S. Sojamo and J. Warner (eds.) Handbook of Land and Water 
Grabs: Foreign Direct Investment and Food and Water Security (Abingdon: Routledge).
——— (2012) “Zombie” Chinese Land Grabs in Africa Rise Again in New Database!, 
http://www.chinaafricarealstory.com/2012/04/zombie-chinese-land-grabs-in-
africa.html (accessed on 30 April 2012).
——— (2009) The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa (Oxford and New 
York: Oxford University Press).
Brummer, M. (2011) ‘The Cartel of Good Intentions? Orec and Food Security in Asia’, 
Asian Journal of Public Affairs, 4(1), pp. 27–41.
Burch, D. and G. Lawrence (2009) ‘Towards a Third Food Regime: Behind the 
Transformation’, Agriculture and Human Values, 26(4), pp. 267–279, DOI: 10.1007/
s10460-009-9219-4.
Cotula, L., S. Vermeulen, R. Leonard and J. Keeley (2009) Land Grab or Development 
Opportunity? Agricultural Investments and International Land Deals in Africa 
(London and Rome: IIED–FAO–IFAD).
Davis, M. (2001) Late Victorian Holocausts: El Niño Famines and the Making of the Third 
World (London and New York: Verso).
Davison, W. (2013) ‘Ethiopia’s Farm Investment Plans Falter on Flood Plain’, Bloomberg 
Business, 25 November, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-11-24/ 
ethiopian-drive-to-lure-farm-investment-founders-on-flood-plain (accessed on 
2 February 2015).
Deininger, K. and D. Byerlee (2011) Rising Global Interest in Farmland. Can It Yield 
Sustainable and Equitable Benefits? (Washington, D.C.: World Bank–International 
 49States As Actors In International Agro-investments
Bank for Reconstruction and Development), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
DEC/Resources/Rising-Global-Interest-in-Farmland.pdf (accessed on 26 May 2015).
ECOSOC (United Nations Economic and Social Council) (2007) The Agricultural 
Development Led Industrialization (ADLI) Strategy, Ethiopia 2007 (New York: 
ECOSOC), http://webapps01.un.org/nvp/indpolicy.action?id=124 (accessed on 
17 February 2015).
Edelman, M. (2013) ‘Messy Hectares: Questions About the Epistemology of Land 
Grabbing Data’, The Journal of Peasant Studies, 40(3), pp. 485–501, DOI: 10.1080/ 
03066150.2013.801340.
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization) (2014) FAO Cereal Supply and Demand 
Brief (Rome: FAO) http://www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/csdb/en/ (accessed on 
16 January 2015).
FAOSTAT (2013) FAOSTAT (Rome: FAO), http://faostat.fao.org/ (accessed on 2 November 
2014).
Forbes (2014) Noble Group, http://www.forbes.com/companies/noble-group/ (accessed 
on 4 November 2014).
Friedmann, H. (2009) ‘Discussion: Moving Food Regimes Forward: Reflections on 
Symposium Essays’, Agriculture and Human Values, 26(4), pp. 335–344, DOI: 10.1007/
s10460-009-9225-6.
Gale, F., B. Lohmar and F. Tuan (2005) China’s New Farm Subsidies, WRS-05-01, February 
(Washington, D.C.: United States Department for Agriculture), http://www.ers.
usda.gov/media/872040/wrs0501_002.pdf (accessed on 2 April 2015).
Hornby, L. (2014) ‘China Scythes Grain Self-Sufficiency Policy’, Financial Times, 
11 February, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/6025b7c8-92ff-11e3-8ea7-00144feab7de.
html—axzz2wsaV0gtd (accessed on 17 Feburary 2015).
Kanady, S. (2013) ‘Food Security Plan Getting Final Touches’, The Peninsula, 30 June, 
http://thepeninsulaqatar.com/news/qatar/243335/food-security-plan-getting-
final-touches (accessed on 2 November 2014).
Koons, C. and P.R. Venkat (2014) ‘China’s Cofco, Hopu to Buy 51% Stake in Noble 
Agriculture Unit’, Wall Street Journal, 2 April, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB10001424052702304157204579476073967321180 (accessed on 19 April 2014).
Massot, P. (2011) ‘Chinese State Investments in Canada: Lessons from the Potash Saga’, 
Canada-Asia Agenda, No. 16, 21 January, http://www.asiapacific.ca/sites/default/
files/filefield/chinese_state_investments_in_canada_v4.pdf (accessed on 2 April 
2015).
McMichael, P. (2013) ‘Land Grabbing as Security Mercantilism in International 
Relations’, Globalizations, 10(1), pp. 47–64, DOI: 10.1080/14747731.2013.760925.
——— (2009a) ‘A Food Regime Analysis of the “World Food Crisis” ’, Agriculture and 
Human Values, 26(4), pp. 281–295, DOI: 10.1007/s10460-009-9218-5.
50 Keulertz and Woertz
——— (2009b) ‘A Food Regime Genealogy’, Journal of Peasant Studies, 36(1), pp. 139–
169, DOI: 10.1080/03066150902820354.
Murphy, S., D. Burch and J. Clapp (2012) Cereal Secrets: The World’s Largest Grain Traders 
and Global Agriculture, Oxfam Research Reports (Oxford: Oxfam), https://www.
oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/rr-cereal-secrets-grain-traders-agriculture-
30082012-en.pdf (accessed on 2 April 2015).
O’Brien, J. (1985) ‘Sowing the Seeds of Famine: The Political Economy of Food Deficits 
in Sudan’, Review of African Political Economy, 12(33), pp. 23–32, DOI: 10.1080/ 
03056248508703630.
Oya, C. (2013) ‘Methodological Reflections on “Land Grab” Databases and the “Land 
Grab” Literature “Rush” ’, The Journal of Peasant Studies, 40(3), pp. 503–520, DOI: 
10.1080/03066150.2013.799465.
Pall, Z., O. Perekhozhuk, R. Teuber and T. Glauben (2011) Wheat Trade—Does Russia 
Price Discriminate across Export Destinations?, paper presented at the IAMO 
Forum 2011, 23–24 June, http://econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/50794/1/670792926.pdf 
(accessed on 26 May 2015).
Peterson, E.W.F. (2009) A Billion Dollars a Day: The Economics and Politics of Agri-
cultural Subsidies (Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell).
Pritchard, B. (2009) ‘The Long Hangover from the Second Food Regime: A World-
Historical Interpretation of the Collapse of the WTO Doha Round’, Agriculture and 
Human Values, 26(4), pp. 297–307, DOI: 10.1007/s10460-009-9216-7.
Revelli, P. (2012) ‘Wie Der Zucker Nach Luzon Kam’, Le Monde Diplomatique, 12 October, 
http://www.monde-diplomatique.de/pm/2012/10/12.mondeText.artikel,a0044.
idx,14 (accessed on 17 Feburary 2015).
Rulli, M.C., A. Saviori and P. D’Odorico (2013) ‘Global Land and Water Grabbing’, 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 110(3), pp. 892–897, DOI: 10.1073/
pnas.1213163110.
Rural Modernity (2012) The Land Matrix: Much Ado About Nothing, http://rural 
modernity.wordpress.com/2012/04/27/the-land-matrix-much-ado-about-nothing/ 
(accessed on 27 April 2012).
Salerno, T. (2010) Land Deals, Joint Investments and Peasants in Mindanao, Philippines, 
unpublished MA Thesis (The Hague: Institute of Social Studies, Graduate School of 
Development Studies).
Scott, J. and E. Behrmann (2013) ‘Adm’s $2 Billion Graincorp Bid Blocked by Australia’, 
Bloomberg Business, 29 November, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-11-28/
australian-treasurer-hockey-rejects-adm-takeover-of-graincorp.html (accessed on 
3 November 2014).
Sharma, S. (2014) The Need for Feed. China’s Demand for Industrialized Meat and Its 
Impacts, (Minnesota and Washington, D.C.: Institute for Agriculture and Trade 
Policy) http://www.iatp.org/files/2014_03_26_FeedReport_f_web.pdf (accessed on 
2 April 2015).
 51States As Actors In International Agro-investments
Shepherd, B. (2013) GCC States’ Land Investments Abroad. The Case of Ethiopia, Summary 
Report No. 8 (Doha: Center for International and Regional Studies, Georgetown 
University School of Foreign Service in Qatar), https://repository.library.george 
town.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/558319/CIRSSummaryReport8TheCaseof 
Ethiopia2013.pdf?sequence=5 (accessed on 2 April 2015).
——— (2012) GCC States’ Land Investments Abroad. The Case of Cambodia, Summary 
Report No. 5 (Doha: Center for International and Regional Studies, Georgetown 
University School of Foreign Service in Qatar), https://repository.library.george 
town.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/558540/CIRSSummaryReport5TheCaseof 
Cambodia2013.pdf?sequence=5 (accessed on 2 April 2015).
Sojamo, S., M. Keulertz, J. Warner and J.A. Allan (2012) ‘Virtual Water Hegemony: 
The Role of Agribusiness in Global Water Governance’, Water International, 37(2), 
pp. 169–182, DOI: 10.1080/02508060.2012.662734.
South China Morning Post (2012) ‘Richard Elman Finds Noble Group Successor’, South 
China Morning Post, 10 November, http://www.scmp.com/business/commodities/
article/1078987/richard-elman-finds-noble-group-successor (accessed on 19 April 
2014).
Stevens, A. (2007) ‘The Boardroom: Richard Elman, Founder and Ceo, Noble Group’, 
CNN, 24 September, http://edition.cnn.com/2007/BUSINESS/09/21/boardroom.
elman/index.html (accessed on 19 April 2014).
Timmer, C.P. (2013) ‘Food Security in Asia and the Pacific: The Rapidly Changing Role 
of Rice’, Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies, 1(1), pp. 73–90, DOI: 10.1002/app5.6.
UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) (2014) World 
Investment Report 2014. Investing in the SDGs: An Action Plan (New York and 
Geneva: United Nations), http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2014_en.
pdf (accessed on 2 April 2015).
——— (2009) World Investment Report 2009. Transnational Corporations, Agricultural 
Production and Development (New York and Geneva: United Nations), http://unctad 
.org/sections/diae_dir/docs/tdb09_wir_zhan_en.pdf (accessed on 2 April 2015).
USDA (United States Department of Agriculture) (2014) Foreign Agricultural Service 
Database. Production, Supply and Distribution (PSD) (Washington, D.C.: USDA) 
http://www.fas.usda.gov/psdonline/psdQuery.aspx (accessed on 23 May 2014).
Vassilieva, Y. (2012a) Privatization of the United Grain Company, GAIN Report 
No. RS1240 (Moscow: USDA), http://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent GAIN Publications/
Privatization of the United Grain Company_Moscow_Russian Federation_6-8-2012.
pdf (accessed on 2 April 2015).
——— (2012b) Russia: Agriculture Development Program 2013–2020, GAIN Report 
No. 1270 (Moscow: USDA), http://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent GAIN Publications/
Agriculture Development Program 2013–2020_Moscow_Russian Federation_ 
11-6-2012.pdf (accessed on 2 April 2015).
52 Keulertz and Woertz
Verhoeven, H. (2015) Water, Civilisation and Power in Sudan. The Political Economy of 
Military-Islamist State-Building (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Weis, T. (2007) The Global Food Economy: The Battle for the Future of Farming (London 
and New York: Zed Books).
Woertz, E. (2013) Oil for Food. The Global Food Crisis and the Middle East (Oxford and 
New York: Oxford University Press).
——— (2012a) ‘Gulf Sovereign Wealth Funds in International Comparison’, in 
Woertz, E. (ed.) GCC Financial Markets: The World’s New Money Centers (Berlin and 
London: Gerlach).
——— (2012b) To Be Expected: Faulty Land Matrix Database Goes Academic . . ., http://
oilforfood.info/?p=423 (accessed on 23 May 2014).
World Bank and FAO (2012) The Grain Chain. Food Security and Managing Wheat 
Imports in Arab Countries (Rome and Washington, D.C.: FAO–World Bank).
© Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, ���6 | doi ��.��63/9789004304758_004
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
Noncommercial 3.0 Unported (CC-BY-NC 3.0) License.
CHAPTER 3




The initial reaction to the sudden increase in large-scale leases and acquisitions of 
farmland in developing countries has been to promote titling schemes, allowing land-
users, often poorly protected under customary forms of tenure, to be recognised as 
fully fledged owners of their land—allowing them to decide whether to sell, to whom, 
and under which conditions. This chapter places this transformation in a historical 
and global perspective. It recalls why titling was advocated in the 1990s as a develop-
ment tool, and why—during the mid-2000s—doubts began to emerge with regard to 
such an approach. It then reviews alternatives to the simple transposition of Western 
conceptions of property rights; alternatives that may better serve the needs of rural 
households currently facing the threat of eviction and displacement, as a result of the 
race for farmland that we have witnessed in recent years. The chapter notes the impor-
tance of avoiding confusion between the need to ensure security of tenure, on the 
one hand, and the creation of markets for land rights on the other, the latter of which 
processes—when considered in a dynamic perspective—may not be advantageous to 
the poorest rural households. For these households, which depend on agriculture 
for their livelihoods, true security of tenure ultimately should be understood as the 
right to live decently from the agricultural activities that feed them.
1 Introduction
We have witnessed in recent years an unprecedented rise in the sale or lease 
of large areas of farmland, particularly in developing countries. The regions 
concerned are those where both land suitable for cultivation and water are 
abundant, the workforce is cheap, and access to global markets relatively easy. 
The investors are either the local elites or, increasingly, foreign investment 
funds or agribusiness corporations. But they also include the governments of 
cash-rich but resource-poor countries seeking to outsource food production 
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in order to ensure a stable and reliable supply of food for their populations 
(Haralambous et al., 2009; Cotula et al., 2009; Deininger and Byerlee, 2010; 
Kugelman and Levenstein, 2009; Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, 
2010). Of course, the recent wave of large-scale acquisitions or leasing of farm-
land is not entirely unprecedented. But the speed at which the phenomenon 
has been developing recently and its overall scope are. In addition, the signifi-
cance of this current surge is different from what was seen in the past: in many 
cases, rather than investing in countries that present certain comparative 
advantages in agriculture in order to supply international markets at the most 
competitive conditions, the buyers or lessees of land seek to ensure access to a 
stable supply of agricultural commodities in order to circumvent international 
markets, which have become increasingly unreliable. A global market for land 
and water rights is thus rapidly taking shape (Mann and Smaller, 2010).
The main problem, as many commentators see it, is that in many of the 
regions targeted by these new investments, the rights of land users are not 
properly secured. As a result of systems of tenure inherited from colonial rule, 
much of the land in rural areas is formally owned by the government, and land 
users have no property titles on the land they cultivate. This situation creates 
legal uncertainty. It also implies that land users will not have access to legal 
remedies, and will not receive adequate compensation if they are evicted from 
the land they cultivate, for instance after their government has agreed that for-
eign investors may take possession of the land.
The answer to the threat of ‘land grabs’, it would seem then to follow, is to 
strengthen property rights, or to transform informal use rights into formalised 
property rights. Titling schemes could be implemented in order to protect land 
users from the risks of unjustified eviction or eviction without fair compen-
sation. Titling their property would allow land users to decide under which 
conditions they want to sell, and to whom, and would ensure that if their land 
is taken by the government for reasons of public interest, they will have access 
to courts in order to challenge the conditions under which this expropriation 
has taken place. This is the approach that characterised the 2001 Land Law 
(No. 197/C) in Cambodia, for instance, which allowed for the registration of 
property rights that had been enjoyed in peaceful, uncontested circumstances 
for a period of at least five years, while at the same time defining ‘state public’ 
and ‘state private’ property and imposing a prohibition on the sale or exchange 
of the former—that is, state property that serves a public purpose (Art. 15) 
(Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing, 2006).
We now understand that such an approach underestimates the challenges 
associated with the commodification of land rights: the rolling out of rural 
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property titles in Cambodia launched in 2012, combined with the ‘Leopard-
skin strategy’ in the country (in which smallholder farming is supported along-
side economic land concessions), testifies to the shift that is now taking place 
(Müller, 2012; Dwyer, 2013 and 2015). This chapter places this transformation 
in a historical and global perspective. Section 2 recalls why titling was advo-
cated in the 1990s, initially to accelerate the transition to market economies 
in Eastern Europe, but also as a development instrument, and why—a decade 
later—doubts began to emerge. Section 3 reviews the debate on the pros and 
cons of titling, illustrating why some of the hopes that were raised about this 
approach led only to disappointment. Section 4 turns to alternatives to the 
simple transposition of Western conceptions of property rights; alternatives 
that may better serve the needs of rural households that are currently facing 
the threat of eviction and displacement due to the race for farmland that we 
have witnessed in recent years. Section 5 provides a brief conclusion.
2 A Brief History of Titling: Its Rise and Fall
Though land registration processes have a long history (Place, 2009; Colin and 
Woodhouse, 2010), the belief that such processes can form the central compo-
nent of development strategies is more recent. It emerged first with the large-
scale and rapid privatisation of the formerly socialist economies of Central 
and Eastern Europe. In 1993, the World Bank presented a report entitled 
Housing: Enabling Markets to Work, in which—while it warned against costly 
titling programmes—it underscored the importance of ‘systems of property 
registration and titling and workable systems of foreclosure and eviction’, as 
these were considered ‘necessary to ensure the collateral security of mortgage 
loans’ (Mayo and Angel, 1993, 46). The emphasis in that report was more on 
ensuring security of tenure than on titling as one means of achieving it, but it 
did include a strong recommendation for the removal of any restrictions on 
the emergence of a market in property rights over land (Mayo and Angel, 1993, 
117; and see Feder and Feeny, 1991). USAID first supported programmes for the 
privatisation of land and titling in Russia in 1994, with the purpose of sup-
porting the Russian authorities in creating real estate and land registries and 
clarifying ownership rights, first in a number of ‘hub’ cities and then in larger 
areas, including the rural areas. Then, in 1998, a major titling programme was 
launched in Peru, with Hernando de Soto’s Institute for Liberty and Democracy 
(ILD) in the leading role. That programme inspired de Soto to publish his most 
important book, The Mystery of Capital, in which he attributes the failure of 
developing countries to grow to undeveloped property regimes (de Soto, 2000). 
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The book also placed the ILD on the map as the most effective advocacy organ-
isation for titling and the clarification of property rights.
The promoters of titling programmes and land registration schemes see 
them as presenting a number of advantages. First, and perhaps of most direct 
relevance here, the security of tenure favoured through titling should encour-
age individual landowners to make the necessary investments in their land, 
thus improving their living conditions and, in rural areas, enhancing the pro-
ductivity of the cultivated plot: the occupants, it is supposed, shall not invest 
in their land unless they are certain to be protected from the risk of losing 
it. In addition, as emphasised by de Soto, titling of their property allows the 
owners to mortgage their land, and thus to obtain access to credit, allowing 
them to make such investments. Thailand was seen as proof of this process: up 
to 50 per cent of rural households, having benefited from registration of their 
property rights, were able to obtain access to credit, leading to what de Soto 
calls the ‘capitalisation process’ (Feder et al., 1988). This process transforms 
‘dead (physical) assets’—‘where assets can not be readily turned into capital, 
can not be traded outside narrow local circles where people know and trust 
each other, can not be used as collateral for a loan, and can not be used as 
a share against an investment’—into live capital, which can be mobilised for 
investment (de Soto, 2000, 6). The World Bank notes, referring to a study by the 
McKinsey Global Institute on the conditions of growth in India:
With fewer assets in the formal sector, more entrepreneurs are excluded 
from using property as a collateral, and less credit is allocated. The pos-
sibility of getting loans is the only reason to take on the daunting task of 
registering in some countries [. . .] But when it is too difficult, few bother. 
Entrepreneurs will invest less if their property rights are less secure. 
Inefficient registration is associated with lower rates of private invest-
ment. And it leads to lower productivity, since it is harder for property to 
be transferred from less to more productive uses. The result is slower 
growth. One study estimates that restrictive land market regulations cost 
1.3% of annual economic growth in India. (World Bank, 2004a, 40; see 
also World Bank, 2004b, 78)
The contribution of titling to access to capital can operate directly, as regis-
tered property can be used as collateral to obtain credit. But it can also operate 
indirectly, as a signalling device that provides information about the trustwor-
thiness of the borrower: recent research in Indonesia illustrates this by relat-
ing titling to the practice of local banks, who tend to see titling of property as 
proof that the household will be able to repay the loan, independently of the 
use of the property as collateral (Castañeda Dower and Potamites, 2012).
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Second, the clarification of property rights should encourage the emergence 
of efficient land markets: lowering transaction costs, it is supposed, shall result 
in the land going to the most productive user, thus maximising the productiv-
ity of land as an economic asset (Feder and Noronha, 1987). The World Bank 
notes, thus, that ‘secure and unambiguous property rights [. . .] allow markets 
to transfer land to more productive uses and users’ (World Bank, 2007, 138). 
The intellectual roots of this argument can be found in the work of Ronald H. 
Coase, according to which if transaction costs are low enough (and, ideally, 
reduced to zero), the freedom of transactions shall result in solutions that 
are most economically efficient (Coase, 1960). The basic reasoning is simple 
enough: buyers of property will pay the price they considers reasonable, taking 
into consideration the streams of income that are expected to flow from mak-
ing productive use of the assets acquired; therefore, if such assets are trans-
ferred to the highest bidder, as an efficiently functioning market for property 
rights should allow, they should ultimately be captured by the economic actors 
who can use them most productively, thus contributing to general economic 
growth.
Third, the clarification of property rights and the development of markets 
for land rights should attract foreign investors. This is why the Doing Business 
rankings of the World Bank, which use a series of indicators to measure the 
quality of the ‘investment climate’ of the countries surveyed, include among 
their criteria the time and cost of transferring a property title from one seller 
to the buyer—from the moment the buyer has a copy of the seller’s title to the 
moment when the transfer is opposable to third parties, so that the property 
can be resold or used as collateral when approaching a bank (Chavez Sanchez 
et al., 2014). The 2014 edition of the Doing Business annual report—the eleventh 
of the series—found that over the period 2008–2013, 90 economies undertook 
124 reforms increasing the efficiency of property transfer procedures, though 
some regions remain far behind. The easier it is to register property rights, the 
faster and the cheaper the procedures are for transferring property rights, and 
the more investors will be willing to enter the country concerned and thus, it 
is hoped, to contribute to its development (although the automaticity of this 
relationship has of course been questioned; see De Schutter et al., 2012).
Fourth, the formalisation of property rights over land allows public authori-
ties to increase their tax revenues, and where necessary to deliver certain pub-
lic services that depend on fees being paid by the users. As de Soto remarks, 
once they are formally registered, assets provide ‘an accountable address for 
the collection of debts and taxes’ as well as ‘the basis for a creation of reli-
able and universal public utilities’ (de Soto, 2000, 6). The two arguments are 
combined where public services are provided against the payment of users’ 
fees: only where users have registered property can they be taxed (preferably, 
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at a rate that will depend on the value of the property that they own) in order 
to finance the provision of water, telephone lines or electricity to the areas in 
which they live. For cash-strapped countries, struggling to provide basic infra-
structure to their populations in large part due to their inability to collect taxes 
efficiently, this is not of minor significance.
Yet despite these apparently powerful arguments in favour of titling pro-
grammes, doubts have emerged in recent years. As more lessons could be 
drawn from a series of titling programmes implemented in the developing 
world during the 1990s, a number of ambiguities gradually came to the sur-
face. A turning point was the establishment, in 2005, of the Commission for 
the Legal Empowerment of the Poor (CLEP). Launched at the initiative of a 
range of governments from different regions, working together with the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe, the CLEP was established under the co-chairmanship 
of Hernando de Soto and Madeleine Albright. It was tasked with studying the 
relationship between ‘informality’ and poverty. The concept note presenting 
the initiative states:
One of the staggering facts about poverty, which is not addressed explic-
itly in the MDGs, is that the vast majority of the world’s poor live their 
daily lives in what is often referred to as the informal or extralegal sector, 
often excluded from the benefits of a legal order. [The work of Hernando 
de Soto shows that] legal exclusion, in the sense that the assets and trans-
actions of the poor are not legally protected and recognised, produces 
and reproduces poverty throughout the developing world and in former 
communist societies (CLEP, 2005, 3–4).
The process of ‘capitalisation’, through which ‘dead capital’ is brought to life, 
was central to the inquiry of the commission. Indeed, to many, the CLEP was 
seen as an opportunity to validate the findings of Hernando de Soto and his 
conclusion that underdevelopment had much to do with the failure to estab-
lish reliable systems for property rights through the registration of assets, 
especially immovable assets. It therefore came as a surprise to most that, when 
it presented its final report in June 2008, the CLEP felt compelled to note a 
number of problems associated with titling schemes. The CLEP referred to the 
risks associated with ‘elite capture’: ‘[i]n many countries,’ it noted, ‘speculators 
pre-empt prospective titling programmes by buying up land from squatters at 
prices slightly higher than prevailing informal ones. Squatters benefit in the 
short term, but miss out on the main benefits of the titling programme, which 
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accrue to the people with deeper pockets’ (CLEP, 2008, 80, citing Platteau, 2000, 
68; on the risks of elite capture, see also Firmin-Sellers and Sellers, 1999). The 
commission also identified, as one of the failures of titling programmes as they 
had been implemented in the past, that these programmes tended to neglect 
the role of collective rights and of customary forms of tenure: such forms of 
tenure, the commission conceded, could be highly legitimate and effective in 
guaranteeing security of tenure (CLEP, 2008, 52).
The CLEP concluded that the benefits of titling schemes may have been 
exaggerated in the past, and that it may be inappropriate to simply transplant 
the Western concept of property rights into the legal systems of developing 
countries, the legal traditions and needs of which may be markedly different:
Promoting a truly inclusive property-rights system that incorporates 
measures to strengthen tenure security requires learning from the mixed 
experience with past individual titling programmes. To ensure protection 
and inclusion of the poorest, a broad range of policy measures should be 
considered. These include formal recognition, adequate representation, 
and integration of a variety of forms of land tenure such as customary 
rights, indigenous peoples’ rights, group rights, and certificates. Success 
depends greatly upon comprehensively reforming the governance sys-
tem surrounding property rights [. . .] These systems need to be accessi-
ble, affordable, transparent, and free from unnecessary complexity. 
Above all, the poor must be protected from arbitrary eviction by due pro-
cess and full compensation (CLEP, 2008, 65).
These statements are significant, both because the initial bias of the CLEP 
clearly was in favour of following de Soto in his optimistic views about the 
virtues of titling, and of course because—although not a member of the work-
ing group on property—he was the co-chair of the commission. But the con-
clusions of the CLEP were foreshadowed by a number of studies published in 
the interim, after the first large-scale titling programmes had been launched 
(Firmin-Sellers and Sellers, 1999; von Benda-Beckmann, 2003; Unruh, 2002). 
Indeed, the World Bank itself noted in 2006 that ‘most policy analysts now 
no longer simply assume that formalization in a given context necessarily 
increases tenure security, and leads to collateralized lending. The original 
assumptions have now become questions for empirical research’ (cited in 
Payne et al., 2007, 3). The next section summarises some of these findings that 
instilled doubt about titling programmes being the magic bullet they once 
were thought to be.
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3 Why Titling Isn’t a Magic Bullet
Why might titling programmes fail? And why is it that, after ten years during 
which such programmes were actively promoted and supported by all develop-
ment actors, they now are heavily contested and have become a battleground 
for a highly ideological debate?
3.1 The Two Faces of the Commodification of Land
A major factor explaining this development is that the arguments that are put 
forward in defence of land registration and titling have been, from the very 
start, inherently contradictory (Table 3.1). These arguments have been sum-
marised above. They follow two separate logics that run in opposite directions. 
On the one hand, the clarification of property rights was to provide security 
of tenure: to allow slum dwellers to be recognised as owners of their home in 
the informal settlement where they are staying, or to allow those operating 
small farms to be protected from eviction from the land which they cultivate. 
On the other hand, however, the clarification of property rights was justified 
by the need to establish a market for land rights, allowing a more fluid transfer 
of property rights—a lowering of transaction costs increasing the liquidity of 
these markets. The expansion from the former conception of ‘security of ten-
ure’ to include the latter appears in a 1987 study by two authors from the World 
Bank, where they note that ‘the ability of an occupant to undertake land trans-
actions that would best suit his interests’ should be considered part of ‘security 
of tenure’ (Feder and Noronha, 1987, 159). Yet, the contradiction between these 
two objectives becomes clear once we realise that the commodification of 
property rights can be a source of exclusion and increase insecurity of tenure.
Such exclusion may occur by means of any of four mechanisms. First, as 
already noted, the process of titling itself may be captured by the elites—in 
addition to the risk of ‘pre-emptive speculation’ noted by the Commission on 
the Legal Empowerment of the Poor, titling schemes may be manipulated or 
tainted by corruption; or the formalisation of property may be too costly or 
complex for the poorest segment of the population to benefit. Second, once 
property has been formalised and land demarcated, taxes may be imposed, 
and more easily collected, by public authorities. This may present an oppor-
tunity to better finance public services, as noted above. But it may also have 
exclusionary effects: it may occur that the poorest are not able to pay those 
taxes and are forced to sell off their land as a result. Third, whether to pay those 
taxes or to make the necessary investments in their houses or on their culti-
vated lands, the poor (who by definition have no capital of their own) shall 
be tempted to mortgage their land in order to have access to credit. But even 
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if this works—even if, that is, lenders are willing to provide loans—the risk 
is that the debts will accumulate, and that the land will finally be seized by 
the lender: the commodification of land, in such a case, shall have made the 
loss of land possible, rather than protecting the land user from such a risk. 
Fourth, the rural poor may be tempted to sell off land in order to overcome 
temporary economic hardship such as a bad harvest or a fall in the ‘farm gate 
prices’ received for their crops. In its 2003 report on land rights, the World Bank 
clearly recognised that land markets could encourage such ‘distress sales’, thus 
potentially increasing insecurity of tenure, rather than reducing it (Deininger, 
2003, 96–98; see also Cousins et al., 2005, 3).
This risk, it is worth noting, should not be seen as failure of the system, or 
as a problem that should be remedied in order for the system to proceed more 
smoothly. Instead, it is inherent in the very process of commodification of prop-
erty rights that gives property its value. It has been written that, in de Soto’s 
view, the problem of informal forms of tenure is not so much too little security 
of tenure, but instead too much: the problem of ‘dead capital’ is that is cannot 
be lost, because it cannot be sold or mortgaged (Mitchell, 2006, 7). Indeed, de 
Soto is explicit about this, noting that one of the benefits of formal property sys-
tems is that they make people ‘accountable’, encouraging people ‘in advanced 
countries’ to ‘respect titles, honor contracts, and obey the law’, because of ‘the 
possibility of forfeiture’ (de Soto, 2000, 55–56). In other terms, the counter-
part of the improved security of tenure that formalisation of property allowed 
was the insecurity resulting from the possibility of losing property—whether 
because the household finds itself unable to reimburse the lender after having 
mortgaged the land, because the level of taxes makes paying those taxes unaf-
fordable and forces the family to leave, or (where rural farming households 
are concerned) because the household finds it impossible to expand its prop-
erty following the speculation fuelled by the titling process, and thus cannot 
achieve the economies of scale required to be competitive on the markets.
Nor was this permanent balancing between providing more security and 
introducing insecurity the only ambiguity inherent in titling programmes. 
Another results from the fact that the prescriptions were designed for urban 
populations (de Soto mostly wrote with the slum dwellers of Lima in mind), 
yet were transposed, with rather little reflection, to the registration of property 
in rural areas. The relationship to landed property is very different for each 
of these groups, however. Real property, for the urban poor, primarily ensures 
adequate housing. For the rural poor, land is a factor of production: the most 
important input to the farming upon which they depend for their livelihoods. 
The stakes are thus much higher for the rural poor. For urban dwellers, being 
priced out of certain gentrified neighborhoods means having to move to places 
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TABLE 3.1  Contradictory arguments in favour of titling programmes
Titling as a means of ensuring security of 
tenure
Titling as commodification of property rights
– Protect land users from eviction –  Ensure land goes to the highest bidder, 
presumed to be the most efficient user
–  Encourage land users to invest in  
their property to increase its long- 
term value
–  Ensure registered owners can be taxed 
to finance public services—if they can 
afford it
–  Allow land users to use land as 
collateral in order to have access to 
credit, bringing ‘dead capital’ to life
Source: Author.
that are located further from employment opportunities or less well covered 
by public services. But for smallholders who lose the land that they cultivate 
and lack the education and training necessary to take up jobs in industry or 
the service sector (provided such jobs exist) this means losing everything: what 
threatens them if they lose land is a fall into the most extreme poverty. Like the 
urban poor, rural farming households may benefit from the improved security 
of tenure that is allowed by the registration of property; but the costs of the 
insecurity referred to above may also be particularly high for them.
One way of framing this discussion is to distinguish between a static analy-
sis (attentive to the immediate or short-term impacts of the formalisation 
of property rights) and a dynamic perspective (attentive to the longer-term 
impacts). The commodification of land rights, which is often seen as being an 
inherent quality of registration processes, may benefit land users in the short 
run, as the assets they ‘own’ (and shall henceforth be recognised as owning) 
can be transformed into capital, increasing their value. But whether or not 
they benefit in the long run will depend on the range of conditions that will 
either allow them to seize the opportunities this creates for them, or instead 
increase their marginalisation further. Why this possibility of marginalisation 
should exist becomes clear when we consider the consequences of treating 
land as a tradeable asset.
3.2 Land as a Tradeable Asset in a Dynamic Perspective
Will the registration of land allow small-scale farmers to have access to 
credit, and thus to improve their productivity? The short answer is that it will 
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only do so under a specific set of circumstances, including the existence of 
a network of credit institutions that can provide loans suited to their needs 
(Bruce and Migot-Adholla, 1994; for a literature review see Place, 2009). But 
establishing such institutions shall not suffice, unless complementary mea-
sures are adopted. Lenders typically will have no interest in accepting as col-
lateral a parcel of land that is too small in size to be of interest to commercial 
investors, or that cannot be easily resold because of the resistance of the com-
munity to the arrival of an outsider (Smith, 2003, 214); and smallholders them-
selves may be too risk-averse to take loans, particularly if the consequence is 
that they may loose their land through foreclosure (Platteau, 2000, 59; Shipton 
and Goheen, 1992, 317).
Even more troubling is the fact that where titling schemes have been imple-
mented, they have often led to increased inequalities, making the poorest even 
worse off. More than a decade ago, Berry already noted that ‘in country after 
country, when land has become valuable enough, the powerful have pushed 
the weak off what land they had’ (Berry, 2001, 130). This is true to the extent that 
the national elites, who have superior purchasing power, may emerge victori-
ous from the auctioning of land that titling schemes in fact lead to. As noted 
by Geoffrey Payne et al. (2007, 9), ‘the provision of titles may actually reduce 
security for both tenants and newly titled owners, given the attraction of the 
suddenly enhanced values of their assets to higher income groups or others 
with the motives and ability to take advantage of the changed tenure status’. 
Because land in general cannot be used twice as collateral, first in order to 
purchase and then to acquire the working capital required, access to credit by 
mortgaging land is in fact only a means of improving the productivity of rela-
tively large plots of land or of those who have access to other forms of capital 
beyond land; it hardly benefits those who have nothing but a small parcel of 
land that increases in value. Inequalities may increase, rather than be reduced, 
as a result.
This effect may be further strengthened where investors from abroad 
seek to acquire large areas of land in order to develop agriculture for export, 
and are encouraged in their quest by the creation of a market for land rights. As 
such markets develop, speculation over land increases, and so does land con-
centration: foreign investors are mostly interested in developing large-scale 
plantations that are relatively non-labour-intensive and contribute relatively 
little to rural development (De Schutter, 2011); and conflicts over land increase 
as land becomes a valuable asset (Amanor, 2012). This is particularly problem-
atic in contexts where the distribution of land is already unequal, because in 
such contexts access to land—and not merely security of tenure, which in itself 
may in fact simply confirm existing inequalities—should be a priority for the 
landless or quasi-landless rural poor. Yet, as acknowleged by Klaus Deininger, 
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a lead economist at the World Bank, in the absence of outside support, ‘the 
purchase market does not operate as a mechanism of land access for labour-
abundant, capital-constrained households’ (Deininger, 2003, 114).
The further markets for land rights develop, the more there is a risk that the 
price of land shall increase as a result of speculation. Speculation means that 
capital that could be put to productive uses, for instance for creating employ-
ment, will be immobilised. Even if we hypothesise that the ‘speculative’ part 
of price-setting can be separated from the ‘market’ price, the price of land fol-
lowing titling shall increase, by at least 25 per cent according to most stud-
ies available (Payne et al., 2007, 15–16). In principle, that represents a benefit 
for those who can register their land. But things look quite different when 
examined in a dynamic perspective: the poorest households may in fact be 
tempted to sell their land either to overcome a temporary shock or to profit 
from the opportunity resulting from sudden increases in the price of land, only 
to discover that the prices of other parcels too have become unaffordable, as 
the increased price of titled land creates ripple effects making all land more 
expensive (Payne et al., 2007, 16).
The speculation on land that follows registration processes, leading to 
inflated prices for land, leads one to question not only the de Soto hypothesis 
according to which such processes should benefit the poor by allowing them 
to use their (until then ‘dead’) assets as capital, but also the Coase hypoth-
esis, which anticipates that, as markets for land rights develop, land will go 
to the most ‘productive’ users. As we have seen, these two narratives to a cer-
tain extent contradict each other: whereas the latter emphasises the benefits 
to the poor of the formalisation of property rights, the former emphasises 
property’s contribution to economic growth when in the hands of the most 
efficient actors. Yet, remarkably, both these narratives fail to take into account 
the impacts that result from the highly unequal distribution of purchasing 
power in many of the societies where such formalisation processes take place. 
One implication of speculation over land is that the poorest landowners will 
be priced out of land markets, and that even those who manage to register 
their property may soon lose it, as a result of incurring unsustainable debts 
or because they seek to benefit from the ‘windfall’ effect that follows. Another 
implication is that where land is transferred it does not necessarily go to the 
most productive user, thus leading to efficiency gains and improving average 
productivity; rather, it goes to those who have the strongest purchasing power. 
Indeed, as interest for agricultural land has been rising significantly in recent 
years, the risk of the poorest being priced out of increasingly speculative land 
markets is higher now even than in the past.
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3.3 The Opportunity Costs of the Registration of Land Rights
A different set of questions arises once we examine the impacts of the formali-
sation of property rights and land registration for the rural dwellers who have 
no access to land before the titling process, and are therefore entirely depen-
dent on their labour as a source of income. Titling is generally defended on 
the grounds that it will support the poor, and small-scale farmers in particular, 
since the registration of the property that they own de facto shall allow them to 
unlock their productivity potential (Deininger and Binswanger, 1999; Platteau, 
2000, 51–74). What generally fails to be mentioned, however, is that registration 
also gives a premium to those who already occupy land, making entry into land 
markets more difficult for the landless. Land registration may benefit the rela-
tively better-off, who have some land and may hope to improve its productiv-
ity by making the necessary investments; it is not a means of ensuring access 
to land for those who have none, who should instead be supported by grants 
(Deininger, 2003, 96). In that sense, titling may be said to constitute a transfer 
of wealth from the landless to those who occupy land, and from the next gen-
eration to the present one: as titling increases the market value of land, land 
will become less affordable for the poorest part of the population or for new 
entrants to the land markets, for whom access to land—not just the consolida-
tion of unrecognised property rights—is vital. This consequence is, of course, 
particularly disturbing where inequality in the distribution of land is greatest, 
and where the population comprises a large number of landless rural workers, 
or small-scale farmers who must rent the land that they till and may not be 
able to afford higher rents (Payne, 1997, 46).
3.4 ‘Clarifying’ Property Rights and Competing with Customary Forms  
of Tenure
A final ambiguity stems from the terms ‘clarification’ and ‘formalization’, which 
are used to refer to the improvements to property rights regimes that titling 
should allow. The purpose is, ostensibly, to confirm existing use rights. But 
these use rights are often complex. It is not unusual for conflicting claims to 
exist over any piece of land. And there are various types of land users, not all 
of who are ‘dormant landowners’ awaiting an opportunity to register the land 
they occupy.
Moreover, prior to the formalisation of property rights through titling, ten-
ure generally is regulated by custom, which is often highly legitimate and, as 
recognised by an influential report authored in 2003 by Klaus Deininger for 
the World Bank, can ensure a high level of security of tenure (Deininger, 2003, 
53) and deliver the same services as formalised property rights, including by 
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favouring in certain cases efficiency-enhancing exchanges (Deininger, 2003, 
31–32). Research has highlighted that, in fact, traditional (or customary) sys-
tems of tenure in many cases allow for the individualisation of ownership, and 
that even where communal ownership subsists, such systems allow for cultiva-
tion and possession to remain with individual households (Feder and Noronha, 
1987). The superimposition of titling on these pre-existing, customary forms of 
tenure may result in more conflicts rather than in more clarity, and in less secu-
rity rather than in improved security (Toulmin and Quan, 2000). In addition, 
customary forms of property may provide security for those depending on the 
commons—such as pastoralists, artisanal fishers, or those with small herds—
for whom classic property rights are generally not an appropriate solution.
Though they present many advantages, customary forms of tenure tend to 
exclude certain members of the community and outsiders, however, and are 
often a tool which traditional elites use to maintain their dominant position 
within communities. Women in particular may be discriminated against under 
existing customs. Though the phenomenon is by no means limited to that 
region (Yngstrom, 2002; Whitehead and Tsikata, 2003), discrimination against 
women in access to land is particularly pronounced in some parts of Asia. In 
much of rural China, for instance, though the Marriage Law gave women the 
right to land within the household unit and the Agrarian Reform Law granted 
men and women equal right to land in general, customary practices still pre-
vail, and sons rather than widows or daughters continue to be considered the 
natural heirs of land (OECD, 2010, 25).1 It is therefore hardly surprising that 
women’s land rights are seldom reflected in the land certificates issued to 
households: a study published ten years ago concluded that only 7 per cent of 
certificates were in the name of the woman, while 5 per cent of the certificates 
were issued to a man and a woman jointly; the remaining land-use certificates 
were in the name of the husband, father, or father-in-law (Zongmin and Bruce, 
2005, 276). In India, to give another example, even after the amendments intro-
duced in 2005 to the Hindu Succession Act, giving women equal rights in their 
natal family assets,2 women inheriting property is rare. Women also often tend 
to renounce their claim to natal property that they are entitled to in order to 
 
1    This is particularly troublesome since, in large part due to migratory patterns in which men, 
more frequently than women, seek employment outside agriculture, women account for 
between 60 and 70 per cent of all farm labour (de Brauw et al., 2012).
2    A first reform of the Hindu Succession Act, in 1956, had guaranteed equal inheritance rights 
for sons and daughters, but exempted agricultural land (Ramachandran, 2006, 4).
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maintain good social relations with their brothers: in particular, women may 
accept a lump sum payment in lieu of their property rights, in order to pre-
serve visitation rights to the parental home. Customary forms of tenure should 
therefore not be idealised: it would be wrong to think of them as inherently 
equitable and inclusive (Feder and Noronha, 1987).
4 Alternatives to the Commodification of Land through the 
Globalisation of Property Rights
The recent wave of large-scale land acquisitions has undoubtedly increased 
the risks of eviction of land users who lack adequate legal protections, and 
has made the prospects of landless or quasi-landless rural households even 
more dire. However, it does not follow that the rolling out of titling schemes 
shall produce the magical outcomes they are sometimes touted for. Rather, the 
remarks above suggest that we may have to make a clear distinction between 
protecting the rights of land users against the risks of eviction, which we 
must, and transplanting Western concepts of property rights into contexts for 
which they may be ill-suited. At a minimum, protecting the rights of poor rural 
households requires ensuring security of tenure by the registration of land-
use rights and by the adoption of anti-eviction legislation, combined with 
the provision of tools—such as legal aid, legal literacy training, and access to 
legal advisors—to ensure that formally recognised rights can be effectively 
vindicated (Cotula and Mathieu, 2008); and by strengthening the capacity of 
land administrations and fighting against corruption in these administrations. 
However, as illustrated for instance by the certification process that took place 
in Cambodia in 1989—in preparation for the withdrawal of the Vietnamese 
army from the country, a process during which farmers were granted land 
certificates confirming that they had applied for title (Dwyer, 2015)—neither 
certification (or registration of use rights) nor anti-eviction laws require that 
land be commodified; neither require that fully fledged property rights should 
be granted as if this were the single institutional means by which security of 
tenure could be ensured.
Anti-eviction laws should be conceived as the domestic implementation 
of the international standards set by the Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights in its work on evictions (CESCR, 1998) and by the Special 
Rapporteur on the right to adequate housing when he presented the Basic 
Principles and Guidelines on Development-Based Evictions and Displacement 
to the Human Rights Council (Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing, 2007). 
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The main purpose of such laws is to impose on public authorities or on private 
landowners the condition that, when they seek to evict land users from land 
that they occupy—provided at least that the land users have been occupying 
the land for a certain length of time—certain procedures are complied with. 
Classic examples among these requirements are that the occupiers are given 
due notice, that no eviction can take place without a negotiation, that the 
occupants must have options for relocation, and that, in order for their reset-
tlement to be possible, they are provided with financial support (UN-Habitat, 
2003). Of course, as illustrated by Chapter 10 (Cismas and Paramita) of this 
volume, for such laws to be effective the beneficiaries should have access to 
remedies in cases of violation, including access to legal aid, which in many 
developing countries is weak or non-existent. Provided the institutional sup-
port is adequate, however, anti-eviction laws can ensure a certain security of 
tenure without requiring the attribution of full property rights as would occur 
through a classic titling process (Santiago, 1998).
But other instruments may also be used. The adoption of tenancy laws could 
protect tenants from eviction and from excessive levels of rent or crop-sharing. 
Thus, for example, the tenancy laws in the Indian state of West Bengal, which 
a left-wing administration revived in 1977 in what was known as Operation 
Barga, provide that if tenants register with the Department of Land Revenue, 
they are entitled to permanent and inheritable tenure on the land they have 
sharecropped against payment to the landlord of at least 25 per cent of the 
output as rent (Banerjee, 1999; Banerjee et al., 2002). Such laws may also allow 
the heirs of the tenant to occupy the land if the tenant dies, and provide the 
tenant with a right to preemption if the landowner wishes to sell (ideally, at 
lower than market prices); they may provide for joint titling, as tenants, of both 
husband and wife in order to protect widows from the risk of eviction; and 
they could ensure that the tenant will be allowed to remain on the land if the 
property changes hands. Tenancy laws are often circumvented by unscrupu-
lous landowners who tend not to register their tenants in order to avoid hav-
ing to recognise their rights. Where such laws have been effectively enforced, 
however, they have been shown to increase productivity, both because they 
improve the crop-share of tenants and thus are an incentive to produce, and 
because they encourage productivity-enhancing investments in land, because 
of the increased security of tenure that benefits the tenant: in the 2002 study 
cited above, Banerjee et al. (2002) estimate that the revival of tenancy laws in 
West Bengal led to a 28 per cent increase in agricultural productivity.
Finally, where landlessness or near-landlessness are strongly correlated 
with extreme poverty, access to land should be improved by agrarian reform 
schemes. The international community has acknowledged the importance 
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of agrarian reform ‘mainly in areas with strong social disparities, poverty and 
food insecurity, as a means to broaden sustainable access to and control over 
land and related resources’ (ICARRD, 2006). A more equitable distribution of 
land can have strong poverty-reducing impacts: cross-country comparisons 
show that ‘a decrease of one-third in the land distribution inequality index 
results in a reduction in the poverty level of one-half in about 12–14 years’, 
a level of poverty reduction which could only be achieved after 60 years of 
3 per cent annual agricultural growth in the absence of changes in land distri-
bution (El-Ghonemy, 2003). Progress in the reduction of rural poverty in the 
Asian region has benefited largely from this approach: post-World War II land 
reforms in Asia have resulted in a 30 per cent increase in the incomes of the 
bottom 80 per cent of households while leading to an 80 per cent decline in 
the income of the top 4 per cent (Penciakova, 2010, 8). This was what led those 
drawing up the Cambodian 2001 Land Law to include a provision for ‘social’ 
land concessions intended to benefit the landless rural poor, though this part 
of the law remained essentially a dead letter (Dwyer, 2015; Müller, 2012, 3).
In addition to its economic function in stimulating growth and reducing 
rural poverty, a more equitable access to land for the rural poor contributes 
to social inclusion and economic empowerment (Quan, 2006, 3). It improves 
food security, since it makes food more easily and cheaply available, provid-
ing a buffer against external shocks (Carter, 2003): as illustrated by the case of 
China, access to even a small plot of land provides an almost complete insur-
ance against malnutrition at the household level (Deininger and Binswanger, 
1999, 256). Land distribution schemes also support the growth of small, family- 
owned farms, which often can use the land in more sustainable way, and con-
tribute to rural development because they are more labour-intensive. More 
equitable distribution of land and the development of owner-operated fam-
ily farms is thus desirable on both efficiency and equity grounds (Deininger 
and Binswanger, 1999, 248). Where rural areas face high unemployment and 
under-employment of labour and relative scarcity of land, it is sensible both 
from an economic perspective and from a social justice perspective to raise 
land productivity rather than to try to increase labour productivity. Such land 
redistribution schemes will fail to produce such impacts, however, unless the 
beneficiaries are supported in their ability to use the land productively, and to 
achieve decent incomes through farming. Indeed, Michael Lipton warns of the 
risk that land redistribution schemes may benefit primarily those operating 
larger farms since they can more easily obtain bank loans and thus use land 
productively, whereas those operating smaller farms may be led into distress 
sales or be tempted to sell off land (Lipton, 2009, 25). Others have estimated 
that improving access to credit, access to markets, and rural extension, can 
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account for 60–70 per cent of the total costs of a land reform, thus exceeding 
the costs of acquiring and transferring the land (Palmer et al., 2009, 31).
A final comment relates to the framing of the debate on land redistribu-
tion schemes. In the past, the discussion of land reform was discouraged by a 
strong ideological divide between the proponents of market-led land reforms 
and those advocating state-led land reforms. In general, the arguments of the 
former are based on the principle of a willing seller and a willing buyer negoti-
ating transfers of land at market prices, a relationship in which the role of the 
state is primarily to provide a regulatory and institutional framework ensuring 
a fluid market for land rights and to support the access of the poor to credit 
in order to allow them to enter such markets (Deininger and Binswanger, 
1999; World Bank, 2007, 141–147). In contrast, state-led land reforms generally 
include compulsory expropriations from the owners of large quantities of land 
in the name of social justice objectives, in principle against a compensation 
that may or may not correspond to the actual market value of the land con-
cerned. While market-led land reforms are defended as more economically 
efficient—as land, it is supposed, shall go to the most efficient users, who can 
use it most productively—state-led reforms are sometimes seen as the only 
realistic possibility in the face of social inequalities so marked that the state 
cannot compensate for them; but they also have been associated with authori-
tarian regimes, and they are seen as exacerbating social and political conflict 
to such an extent that they may ultimately prove counter-productive. In fact, 
however, this opposition is misleading. There are many ways in which the state 
may promote a more equitable access to land, ranging from the taxation of 
land left unproductive by the owners of large quantities of land to progres-
sive inheritance laws, and from subsidies to smaller production units to ceiling 
laws that impose limits on how much land can be owned by a single individual 
(El-Ghonemy, 2003). Classifying the various instruments that can be used into 
two groups unnecessarily transforms what should be a pragmatic search for 
the most optimal mix in specific contexts into an ideological discussion in 
which participants adopt postures that make the emergence of a consensus 
less likely (Borras Jr. and McKinley, 2006; Borras Jr. et al., 2007).
5 Conclusion
Although the formalisation of property rights has been widely promoted as 
a safeguard against the threat of expropriation in the current wave of large-
scale acquisitions and leases of land, it is important not to confuse security 
of tenure, which is certainly of considerable importance to rural households, 
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and the creation of markets for land rights, which in a dynamic perspective 
may not be advantageous to them. The role of property rights in the debate on 
‘land grabs’ has therefore been highly ambiguous: while such rights are seen by 
some as a key to avoiding massive disruptions, they have also been denounced 
as legitimising increased land concentration in the hands of the elites or 
potential buyers with the highest purchasing power. As seen in Section 4 of 
this paper, there is nothing inevitable in this trade-off. Security of tenure may 
be protected using a number of tools, without necessarily having to result to 
fully fledged property rights.
For rural households that depend on agriculture for their livelihoods, secu-
rity of tenure ultimately should be understood as the right to live decently from 
farming. This presupposes access to land, and protection from eviction; but it 
includes much else in addition. Indeed, policies that promote a more equi-
table access to land are futile, and may in some scenarios render a disservice 
even to their intended beneficiairies, unless they fit under broader schemes for 
rural development. Even in regions where the pattern of land distribution is 
highly unequal and where hunger and malnutrition are closely correlated with 
landlessness or quasi-landlesness, simply redistributing land will not suffice. 
In order for such a reform scheme to be sustainable, the beneficiaries must 
also be supported by comprehensive rural development policies supporting 
smallholders and improving their ability to compete against larger farms, or 
the positive redistributive impacts may be significantly eroded.
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Abstract
Since the mid-2000s, corporate sector investments in agriculture in developing coun-
tries have increased sharply, driven by rising commodity prices, the strategic concerns 
of food-importing countries, and commercial opportunities. Using the findings of 
fieldwork conducted by UNCTAD and the World Bank in countries across Africa and 
Asia, this chapter focuses on the impact of such investments on communities in South-
East Asia. Relying on interviews with representative of the companies concerned and 
with members of local communities, as well as other stakeholders, carried out using a 
dyadic approach, the chapter provides detailed findings on the impact of investments 
in areas such as employment, incomes, land rights and the environment. It shows that 
both beneficial and negative consequences of agricultural investments can be traced 
to specific factors, such as decisions taken by investors (and governments) at the early 
stages of investment processes, the business models utilised, and investor-community 
relationships, as well as the degree to which responsible approaches are built into 
operations. The findings on Asia, as well as from the wider study on which this chapter 
is based, offer valuable information for governments, investors and civil society groups 
with regard to designing policies and practices, and to establishing relationships 
between these actors and monitoring areas relevant to the impact and performance of 
investments.
1 Introduction
The challenges facing global agriculture in the coming decades are monu-
mental, both as a provider of food and, more broadly, as an engine of growth 
in developing countries. The sector will have to feed a projected population 
of 9 billion people by 2050. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 
estimates that an average annual investment of USD 209 billion is needed to 
meet the projected demand for food in 2050—and even more is required 
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to eliminate hunger, and target poverty and malnourishment (FAO, 2012a). 
Moreover, faced with a number of common economic, social, and environmen-
tal challenges, developing countries require long-term sustainable, increased 
investment, including investment in agriculture; and in this context an addi-
tional average annual investment of some USD 250 billion per year until 2030 is 
required (UNCTAD, 2014). However measured, the agricultural investment gap 
is enormous and in many developing countries will most likely require larger 
scale corporate investment, over and above existing sources.
The central role of smallholder farmers’ investment in any strategy for pro-
moting agricultural development is widely recognised (IFAD and UNEP, 2013; 
HLPE, 2013). But since the mid-2000s, corporate sector interest in agriculture in 
developing countries has increased sharply, driven by rising commodity prices, 
the strategic concerns of food-importing countries, and various commercial 
opportunities in the sector. Corporate investment, both foreign and domestic, 
in agriculture has jumped accordingly, coming not only from traditional inves-
tors such as agribusiness enterprises, but also from state-owned enterprises 
and sovereign wealth funds, as well as private equity and other investment 
funds, although there is a high degree of uncertainty regarding scale, source 
of investment, and geographic scope (Schoneveld, 2014; FAO, 2012a; Anseeuw 
et al., 2012; UNCTAD, 2009).
Much of the research on investment in agriculture to date has focused on 
Africa, but Asia—especially South-East Asia—has also been a major target for 
investors. For instance, according to data available to UNCTAD, the stock of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) in 2012 in Cambodia, Malaysia, and Vietnam 
stood at USD 1.1 billion, USD 3.8 billion, and USD 3.8 billion, respectively (all 
of which figures are probably underestimates). Moreover, for some very poor 
countries such as Cambodia and the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, invest-
ment in agriculture constitutes a very large share of total FDI (Figure 4.1), 
which reflects the larger number of investments from Cambodia in the sample. 
The following figure is based on recent flow data, but stock data are not too 
different, albeit highlighting the significance of FDI in agriculture in South-
East Asian countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia, historical beneficiaries 
of investment in agriculture.
After decades of struggling to attract a significant level of corporate invest-
ment, including FDI, to their agricultural sectors, developing countries are 
now faced with a challenge: in what ways should they accept the type, size and 
number of such investments in order to maximise development benefits and 
minimise socio-economic and environmental risks (Deninger and Byerlee, 
2011; Human Rights Council, 2011; Vermuelen and Cotula, 2010; Mann and 
Smaller, 2009)? In their initial naïveté as investment in agriculture began to 
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surge from the mid-2000s many governments encouraged investment without 
carefully considering the consequences for the economy, rural areas, farmers 
or communities. As research has multiplied, and more importantly experience 
has been enriched, in Africa, South-East Asia and elsewhere, it is increasingly 
being recognised that overall net positive outcomes depend very much on the 
business models in place, the types of investor-community linkages, partner-
ships and relations established, etc.
The tenor of the arguments is that of more inclusive business models, 
achieved for instance by outsourcing as many activities as possible, be this 
‘outgrower’ schemes with nucleus estates/operations outsourcing the farm-
ing, or franchised retail dealerships for local-market orientated operations.1 
Building on such business models, inclusive investor-community relationships 
can further involve many facets, including issues of ownership and control of 
assets (for instance, with respect to land and its associated use, communities 
can interface with investors through sale, lease, equity joint ventures and a 
large array of other types and combinations of arrangements); the risks and 
rewards of any arrangements; and the specificities of consultative, partner-
ship, or other routes to communicating and addressing issues (Cotula and 
Leonard, 2010; Chaimberlain-Ven der Werf and Anseeuw, 2015; Rösler et al., 
2013; Gaertner et al., 2014; Eaton, 2001).
However, while inclusive investor-community relationships might be a 
good idea in principle, in practice a number of major considerations must 
1    In contrast, depending on local circumstances including the size of the investment relative 
to the local economy/community and so on, the investor might, in extreme cases, intertwine 
with the community through the provisions of education and health services (though in 
principle this would be taken on by the state as soon as feasible).
FIGURE 4.1  FDI inflows to agriculture sector as a share of total FDI inflows, 2010–2012 (per cent).
Source: UNCTAD, FDI-TNC-GVC Information System, FDI/TNC database 
(www.unctad.org/fdistatistics).
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be taken into account when pursuing such goals. First, while the aims might 
be laudable, the reality could be different and not necessarily because of any 
intentional malice on the part of any party. For instance, outgrower schemes 
can widen participation in economic processes and widen the sharing of 
value added and benefits, but can also lock farmers into the imperatives of 
the principal investing company, a tension well summed up in the subtitle 
of De Los Reyes et al.’s (2015) paper on agribusiness and smallholder farmers 
in the Philippines: A Free Hand, Increased Bargaining Power or Contract 
Regulation? Secondly, neither investors nor communities are homogenous 
entities. The benefits and costs of an investment to a community, for example, 
even if ‘net-positive’, may fall differentially on the many individuals and groups 
of which it is composed. Outgrower farmers can be powerful and overbear-
ing; agricultural workers will have different interests to those not engaged in 
the industry; how can women, minorities and other excluded groups have or 
attain voice? Thus perceptions of the value of an investment will vary within a 
community, in addition to the variation of perceptions between communities, 
investors, governments and other stakeholders. Finally, how an investment 
interacts with a community depends on a vast range of issues, including the 
crop involved, the value chain segment of the operation, the scale of the busi-
ness activities, local conditions and circumstances and so on.
Thus, even if desirable, it is not possible to propose a simple model of inves-
tor-community dynamics and even less so one that can be deemed ‘inclusive’. 
However, the literature is beginning to provide contingent good practices and 
tools that can be drawn on when striving for inclusive investor-community 
relationships and arrangements, be it in the context of an entirely new invest-
ment, or of an attempt to set an existing one on a different course (e.g. Lahiff et 
al., 2012; FAO, 2013; Deng, 2012). This chapter is based on an ongoing multi-stage 
study in this vein, whose ultimate aim is to draw detailed, practical knowledge, 
lessons and good practices from experiences on the ground to inform govern-
ments, investors, communities, civil society groups and international organ-
isations engaged in tackling the opportunities, the challenges and the risks of 
agricultural investments of this type.
The chapter draws on a field-based, intensive survey of the conduct of agri-
cultural operations at 39 larger-scale, mature agribusiness investments in sub-
Saharan Africa and South-East Asia, focusing in particular on their approaches 
to social, economic and environmental responsibility.2 Both the investors and 
2    Elements of this chapter appeared in an earlier report (UNCTAD and World Bank, 2014); addi-
tional analysis carried out to discern specific issues concerning South-East Asia was con-
ducted for this chapter.
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the communities affected were interviewed. One of the intentions of this stage 
of the research was not to discern the most important impacts on local com-
munities and the economy, but rather the range of the perceived important 
impacts of the investments, especially as seen by those locally impacted and 
other non-business stakeholders. At the same time, perceptions are grounded 
in realities, such as investors’ performance in creating benefits (e.g. net job 
creation) or imposing costs (e.g. on the environment), albeit the perceived 
impacts will vary depending on a number of factors, including—for instance—
the characteristics of the investment or the type of relationship between it and 
respondents. Hence the chapter includes discussion of, for example, invest-
ments with outgrower schemes, the performance of the investment, and the 
investor’s approach to responsibility and sustainability. A critical incidents 
instrument was used to discern the range of impacts from the community and 
local stakeholder perspective.
This chapter examines the impacts of investments in the South-East Asian 
countries visited (Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia), includ-
ing impacts on land rights and access to land, drawing primarily on the answers 
received from local communities and stakeholders; at the same time it assesses 
how these impacts are influenced by the type of operations or decisions made 
by investors.3 About a quarter of the investments surveyed were in South-East 
Asia, so—where relevant or useful—cross reference is made to the fuller sam-
ple of responses.
2 Methodology
A quota-based sample selection procedure was used to identify investors, 
drawing from a larger population of investors. The quota selection was based 
on a number of salient variables, including the size of the relative investment, 
coverage of different business models and value chains, inclusion of differ-
ent types of companies and funds, coverage of key home and host countries 
(including investors from developed and developing economies), different 
crops and so on. The objective was to obtain a diverse sample of investors.
The sample includes both domestic investors and foreign investors from a 
range of countries, developed and developing. Of the ten investors, four were 
3    Throughout this chapter the terms ‘investment’ and ‘investor’ are used interchangeably 
to describe the agribusinesses examined in this survey. Investment in agriculture involves 
a much wider set of actors apart from large-scale agribusinesses, and includes—most 
notably—small farmers investing in their own farms.
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pure estate business models, four were processing operations and two were 
nucleus estate with outgrower models. The products included palm oil, rice, 
rubber, spices, vegetables, animal feed, and coffee. The size of land alloca-
tion ranged from less than 100 hectares to over 50,000 hectares. As such, the 
sample reflects a broad spectrum of agricultural investments. In South-East 
Asia, the sample comprises five investments in Cambodia, two in Vietnam and 
one each in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Lao People’s Democratic Republic. Three 
investors were domestic, two were Thai, and one each were from India, China, 
Singapore, the UK, and the USA, respectively. The main products were palm 
oil (three investments) and rice (two), while there was one investment each 
in rubber, spices, vegetables, animal feed, and coffee. Five investments were 
operating on less than 100 hectares, three on between 100 and 10,000, one on 
between 10,000 and 50,000, and one investment had a land allocation greater 
than 50,0000 hectares.
Interviews were conducted on a confidential basis. This was an important 
condition for investors to be able to share information in a frank and open 
fashion. Nevertheless, the sample was constrained in that it could only include 
those investments that were willing to participate and, indeed, many inves-
tors contacted declined to participate or did not respond to our requests. 
In that regard, there is some bias in the sample towards relatively ‘good’ 
investors—that is to say, those with social and environmental programmes 
and those performing better operationally and financially. One would expect 
that these investors would be more likely to agree to allow researchers on-site. 
That caveat must be acknowledged but it should not be overplayed. In fact, the 
sample contained several investors that have been portrayed in a negative light 
in the media or by civil society groups.
Researchers spent around two to three days on-site with each agribusiness, 
conducting interviews with senior management to complete a semi-structured 
questionnaire, covering financial, human resources and operational informa-
tion on the investment, as well details of the investor’s approach to a wide 
range of socio-economic and environmental issues.4
4    The range of operational questions/variables included an orientation of the farm/business 
and its operations; copies of any useful background documents—farm map, concession 
agreement, model employment contract, environmental impact assessment, organogram, 
etc.; details of ownership structure and entities; details of farm size and enterprises; history 
of the operation and the surrounding area; personnel details—numbers, structure, employ-
ment conditions, training, etc.; outgrowers’ details—contractual arrangements, prices, qual-
ity requirements, etc.; markets for product(s) and sources of inputs; perspectives on the 
success of the investment and the constraints experienced; and tax and incentives. A study 
of the investor’s approach to social and environmental issues enabled an assessment of the 
extent to which a responsible agricultural approach to investments was being taken. These 
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A further two to three days were spent interviewing a wide range of stake-
holders in local communities. These interviews were conducted on a confiden-
tial and anonymous basis and in an open-ended fashion, allowing stakeholders 
to raise the issues that are important to them. This approach was taken because 
(a) the intention was to elicit the issues and obtain some sort of ‘qualitative 
weighting’, without assuming that the results were definitive (the findings will 
be used to partly establish the parameters and framework for future work); 
and (b) when being asked for details of actual situations, interviewees can 
respond concretely not formulaically, and the interviewer is able to tease out 
issues during the discussion. The researchers sought to capture the views of a 
broad cross section of the community and other local stakeholders. Figure 4.2 
provides the salient characteristics of the sample of stakeholders. One-third 
of the community interviewees were women. In total, 93 separate interviews 
were conducted. Some interviews included more than one person such that 
the total number of persons interviewed was 154.
In addition to the first-hand data obtained, media, civil society and other 
reports on each investor were consulted (including internal reports and docu-
mentation). A number of interviews were conducted with NGOs working on 
relevant issues, such as land rights or the environment, in the countries vis-
ited. These materials helped inform the thinking of the researchers, improved 
understanding of local contexts, and provided another lens through which to 
view information obtained through the fieldwork.
The write-ups of the company questionnaires and stakeholder interviews 
were imported into Nvivo, a software package designed for the analysis of 
large amounts of qualitative and quantitative data. The programme allows 
the researcher to classify (or ‘code’) the data according to particular themes 
(e.g. employment, resettlement, prices for outgrowers). Nvivo was also used to 
facilitate the quantification of qualitative socio-economic and environmental 
impacts obtained during the stakeholder interviews. This is in addition to the 
pure qualitative assessment of the extensive information received during the 
fieldwork, which was sorted, compared and analysed on a purely qualitative 
basis.
The remainder of this chapter is accordingly structured as follows: Sec-
tion 3 provides a high-level assessment of the socio-economic impact of the 
investments studied, based on quantitative summary measures of information 
questions/variables include land rights and natural resource rights; food security; consulta-
tion procedures; transparency; community development and social sustainability; impact 
assessments and monitoring; environmental impact and sustainability; grievance and 
redress mechanisms; human rights and best practice policies; and women and vulnerable 
communities.
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obtained in stakeholder interviews. It then provides more detail on the key 
issues identified using a quantitative and qualitative analysis of the material 
obtained in both stakeholder interviews and interviews with investors. Section 
4 translates those findings into potential policies and practices that can be 
applied by investors, governments and civil society groups to maximise bene-
fits and minimise risks, by applying observations of what has worked and what 
has not worked at the investments studied. Finally, Section 5 concludes with a 
discussion of complementary work and future research.
3 Findings: The Socio-Economic Impact on Communities in South-
East Asia
3.1 Overall Assessment
The investments studied generated both positive and negative socio-economic 
impacts on surrounding communities and host countries. Figures 4.3 and 4.4 
show the most common positive and negative impacts of the investments 
surveyed—as mentioned during the community and stakeholder interviews 
detailed in Figure 4.2—providing an overview of how these investments were 
perceived by those affected by them.
FIGURE 4.2 Number of community and stakeholder interviews and their relationship with 
investing companies(a) 
(a) Refers to the number of interviews conducted, some of which may have  
included multiple interviewees. More than one category can apply to each interview: 
for example an employee who was also a previous land user.
Source: UNCTAD, FDI-TNC-GVC Information System, FDI/TNC database  
(www.unctad.org/fdistatistics).
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FIGURE 4.4 Share of stakeholder interviews that mentioned a negative impact, by issue: 
investments in Asia. 
Notes: Figures 4.3 and 4.4 were created by classifying information from stakeholder 
interviews into whether the investment was perceived to have had a positive or 
negative impact, with the information further categorised by issue within each of 
these two top-level classifications. For example, an interviewee who stated he was 
happy to have a job with the investor would be classified as having described a 
positive impact with respect to employment. Some issues appear as both a positive 
and a negative impact because there can be both positive and negative dimensions to 
an investment’s impact with respect to each issue. For example, an investor may have 
improved local water access by installing hand pumps, but may also have had a 
negative impact by polluting water sources used by local communities due to 
environmentally unsound agricultural practices. In total, 93 separate interviews were 
conducted. Some interviews included more than one person such that the total 
number of persons interviewed was 154.
Source: UNCTAD-World Bank Survey of Responsible Agricultural 
Investment Database.
FIGURE 4.3 Share of stakeholder interviews that mentioned a positive impact, by issue: 
investments in Asia.
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Overall, the indications are that local communities and other stakeholders 
interviewed felt that the benefits of the investments outweighed the negative 
impacts (Figure 4.5). Nevertheless, there is a wide range of outcomes arising 
from these investments in terms of their socio-economic and environmental 
impacts, their broader impact on the host country, and the operational and 
financial success of the investment itself. There are some operations that have 
generated mostly positive perceived outcomes, while others have produced 
mostly negative ones (Figure 4.6). Most exhibit a mixture of positive and nega-
tive impacts, performing well with respect to some aspects, but with signifi-
cant room for improvement with regards to others. Investments in Asia were 
distributed throughout the sample, indicating that they had not systematically 
performed better or worse than investments in Africa.
FIGURE 4.5  Stakeholder perceptions of positive and negative impacts of investments in Asia, 
classified by issue(a). 
(a) The vertical axis shows the number of stakeholders who mentioned the 
investment as having had a positive impact on them with regard to that issue.  
The horizontal axis shows the number of stakeholders who mentioned the  
investment as having had a negative impact. The size of the bubbles represents  
the relative frequency with which each issue arose in stakeholder interviews,  
whether in a positive, negative, or neutral context.
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While figures 4.3–4.6 present an overview of the quantification of socio- 
economic and environmental impacts obtained during the stakeholder inter-
views, the detailed analysis in the following section relies on a qualitative 
assessment of the extensive information gathered during the fieldwork, infor-
mation that has been examined and assessed on a primarily qualitative basis.
3.2 Detailed Findings
3.2.1 Employment
Job creation was the most frequently cited benefit arising from the invest-
ments. The investments studied in Asia employed around 7,000 people 
(Table 4.1) in total. This refers to direct employment by the investor, the num-
ber of indirect jobs created being difficult to assess. As an indication of the 
FIGURE 4.6  Share of positive / negative socio-economic impacts mentioned in stakeholder 
interviews, entire sample(a). 
(a) All impacts of the investment mentioned in stakeholder interviews are classified 
as ‘positive’ or ‘negative’. Chart shows the balance of positive and negative mentions 
for each investor.
Source: UNCTAD-World Bank Survey of Responsible Agricultural 
Investment Database.
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possible scale of further job creation, two rice producers in Cambodia employed 
12,500 and 30,000 contract farmers, respectively (though these farmers may not 
work exclusively for these investors). Similarly one coffee processor contracts 
to 1,500 distributors in Vietnam, and another works with 2,800 farmers, also in 
Vietnam. Beyond this, there are various multiplier and other indirect effects 
leading to further jobs being created—or destroyed. To get a full idea of the 
impact on job creation/destruction, further work is required.
Direct job creation was relatively more land-efficient in Asia—that is to say 
approximately 14 hectares per job in Asia (Table 4.1)—compared with invest-
ments in Africa. This is partly because the sample of Asian investors included 
more processing operations, underscoring the point that the benefits of invest-
ment in agriculture can arise even in the absence of large-scale land allocations. 
Large land allocations do not necessarily create the most jobs per hectare.
The share of permanent jobs as a proportion of total employment was 
higher in Asia than in the full sample, at around 70 per cent, compared with 50 
per cent for the full sample. This is reflected in the more positive perception 
of working conditions that emerged from stakeholder interviews in Asia. Most 
investments visited paid higher wages than those available locally and those 
wages were sufficient for employees to maintain a decent standard of living. 
Several interviewees compared wages at agricultural investments favourably 
with those available in other industries in which foreign investors were present 
(for example, the garment industry in Cambodia).










Total formal employment 6,825 683 252 2,647 120 32% 1% 14
Permanent 4,655 466 145 2,647 40 26% 2% 20
Temporary/Casual/ 
Seasonal
2,170 217 20 1,200 0 38% 0% 44
(a) Not all investors provided female and expat share figures. These percentages are based on  
the subset of investors that did (i.e. eight out of ten).
Source: UNCTAD-World Bank Survey of Responsible Agricultural Investment Database.
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Employment of expatriates was low in the sample, but not all jobs went to 
the population directly surrounding the investment. And expatriates were 
over-represented in management positions. In almost all cases, semi-skilled, 
unskilled, and casual or seasonal employment was sourced from the host 
countries. But employees were not necessarily from surrounding communities 
and sometimes came from other parts of the country, including the capital city. 
This in some instances led to tensions between the local community and the 
domestic migrant community.
There was a considerable gender imbalance at most investments, both in 
terms of numbers and the types of jobs on offer. Only around one-third of 
employees were women, and they were more likely to hold casual, temporary, 
or seasonal jobs. As such, women were overrepresented in the worst paid and 
most insecure jobs.
3.2.2 Impact on Outgrowers
Investors also contributed to employment opportunities by providing a stable 
market for outgrowers’ produce: for example, the 11 investors with outgrower 
schemes helped to support—at least in part—the livelihoods of 30,000 con-
tract farmers in total. According to stakeholders interviewed, the concomitant 
rise in rural incomes contributed positively to food security, directly and indi-
rectly. As such, outgrower schemes interact significantly with several of the key 
benefits shown in Figure 4.3, notably technology transfer, access to markets, 
and food security. Impacts therefore had a wider dispersal vis-à-vis stakehold-
ers than in cases where the investments were estates only, and perceptions of 
positive impact from the investment were generally higher, although arguably 
some of the perceived negative impacts were more diffused (i.e. blame, where 
it existed, assigned to outgrower farmers and not just to the principal investor). 
At the same time, the perceptions of the outgrowers also need to be taken into 
consideration.
Outgrower schemes can be effective in supporting livelihoods while allow-
ing people to retain their most valuable asset—their land. Governments 
should consider which investors and business models are likely to maximise 
direct and indirect employment as these are key benefits of agricultural invest-
ment. Governments should consider the whole value chain and promote 
value-addition downstream of the raw materials produced from the land made 
available (a number of investors were processors, for instance), thereby maxi-
mising employment and other benefits. However, marginalised groups, includ-
ing women and minorities, were less likely to participate in outgrower schemes. 
Consideration should be given to how to improve access for these groups.
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The main advantage for outgrowers selling to major agricultural investors 
was higher prices and reliable, timely payments—a perception reiterated by 
senior management and outgrowers alike. But even major investors faced 
cash flow problems and some outgrowers—particularly those who have been 
assured a guaranteed minimum price for all their produce—have sometimes 
not been paid according to the agreed terms. More commonly, outgrowers lost 
money owed when investors faced capacity constraints. For crops that must be 
processed soon after they are harvested—including rubber, sugar, and palm 
oil—this occurred when investors did not facilitate timely pickups to transport 
outgrowers’ produce to the processing site, or lacked sufficient factory space to 
process the raw materials once there.
Outgrowers tended to feel excluded from price-setting mechanisms—
prices were usually set by the government, major industry players, the inves-
tors themselves, or a combination of these actors, always based in part on 
international market prices for the commodity. Despite company efforts to 
inform their outgrowers of current prices and mechanisms, pricing was often 
contentious, with many outgrowers voicing concerns about how their produce 
was quantified and assessed for quality, as well as about the final sum they 
received. Thus there is a need for good communication between farmers and 
company management about how prices are set, and for improved safeguards 
to ensure these prices are appropriately remunerative.
For instance, in Indonesia the price paid in each region for fresh fruit 
bunches of oil palm was set monthly through a multi-stakeholder process, 
involving members of the provincial plantation agriculture department, com-
pany management, and representatives of cooperatives. Those involved used a 
predetermined formula to fix the price; and one variable, the oil extraction rate, 
was the subject of much negotiation each month. Once a price was agreed, a 
formal notification was signed by the government, company, and outgrower 
representatives, obliging the investor to pay the set price.
3.2.3 Land Rights and Access to Land
The most prominent negative impacts arising in the investments examined 
were disputes over access to land. People’s lives in rural communities are inti-
mately tied up with their access to land and other natural resources and the 
arrival of an investor can have significant implications. Interviewees had, on 
balance, negative perceptions of the impact of investments across a range of 
land-related issues, including previous use of the land; the terms of, and pro-
cess for, land acquisition; resettlement procedures; access to, and use of, the 
land by communities; the degree of land use practiced by the investor; and the 
rights of pastoral farmers and other customary land users.
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Local communities often did not understand what rights to land they have 
under the laws of the country and frequently did not have formal titling deeds, 
even if they had been working the land for many years or generations. The 
situation was more complex in post-conflict countries where formal cadastral 
records had been lost during the conflict and a national land titling process 
was in progress.
Another common grievance was the failure to use the land in accordance 
with expectations. The under-use of allocated land was, however, a more 
prominent negative issue in Africa as compared with our Asian sample. 
Nevertheless, one investor in Cambodia appeared to be using its large land 
allocation for timber extraction only and not respecting its commitment to 
subsequently develop a rubber plantation on the land cleared. In this and 
other cases in the country, the failure to develop land resulted from inadequate 
financial capacity. Some investors have sufficient financial backing to acquire 
the land but not to develop it.
This risk can be minimised through full and early assessment and consulta-
tion of existing formal and informal rights to, and usage of, the land. Such con-
sultations should be first and foremost the responsibility of the investor, with 
appropriate monitoring from state and non-state actors. It proved perilous to 
leave consultations to the host government; or for the investor to assume that 
the land acquired was being provided by the government without any exist-
ing land disputes. Similarly, it was unsatisfactory to outsource the consulta-
tion process to third parties such as land agents. Governments or land agents 
sometimes claimed to have ‘prepared the land’—that is, left it issue-free for the 
investor to take over. Their claims that all land conflicts had been dealt with 
often proved spurious.
A lack of transparency with regard to the terms and process of land acqui-
sition had important consequences. Uncertainty about investor actions and 
intentions created a sense of fear and resentment within communities nearby, 
with adverse consequences for the investment. For example, some members 
of one local community asked the researchers whether the investor nearby 
planned to take their land. This situation could in part have been avoided by 
greater transparency about the investor’s operation.
Beyond such general aspects, a set of more financially-inclusive business 
models have begun to emerge and have been successful in forging partnerships 
with local communities, including over issues related to land. In explicit rev-
enue-sharing arrangements, for example, an investor operates on community 
or native land and, rather than renting the land, enters into a revenue-sharing 
arrangement based on a certain percentage of the monthly turnover. These 
schemes are beneficial because they provide a continuous revenue stream 
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across generations and genuine community-private partnerships in which 
communities take an interest in the success of the operation.
Since 2011, a palm oil company in Sarawak (Malaysia) has adopted a new 
business model whereby the company rents land from owners of Native 
Customary Rights (NCR) land to develop it for the cultivation of oil palm for a 
period of 30 years, after which the land and the palms will be returned to the 
land’s owners. The company will bear the costs of development and after the 
third year—when the palms start to bear fruit—the company will pay each 
owner a fixed rental per tree until the expiry of the 30-year lease. The company 
has chosen this model as it is viewed as a more equitable and fairer proposi-
tion than the approach used by other companies in Sarawak whereby about 60 
per cent of the ownership of the land would eventually be transferred to the 
company and the owners of NCR land would have only 30 per cent ownership.
3.2.4 Building In Responsibility and Sustainability: Initial Phases of the 
Investment
A key finding is that investor and host country actions at the pre-investment 
stage and during the initial phases of the investment are critical. This includes 
the investors’ approach to consultations and engagement with local communi-
ties, impact assessments and transparency, and the host country government’s 
pre-screening and monitoring of investors. While it is important that socially 
and environmentally responsible practices are embedded within the opera-
tion and monitoring of an investment on an ongoing basis, it is the processes 
followed, decisions taken, and requirements enforced in these early stages that 
dictate much of the future path of the investment.
In the investments studied, consultations were a key step in developing a 
strong relationship between the investors and the local communities. This gen-
erated more positive socio-economic outcomes and was in the interests of the 
investors because it contributed to financial and operational success, in partic-
ular by minimising the risk of land disputes. While initial consultations could 
be time-consuming and expensive, particularly for new investments, attempts 
to rush the process—due to the commercial expediency of getting the land 
acquisition settled quickly—led to negative long-term ramifications, both for 
the businesses and for the local communities, over a protracted period.
As mentioned above, stakeholder consultation was most effective when 
it was the responsibility of the investor. Host governments should establish 
regulations or guidelines for the conduct of such consultations and stringently 
monitor adherence, but not conduct these activities for investors. Ensuring 
community interests are represented requires the involvement of state and 
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non-state actors. Some countries have enacted legislation requiring govern-
ment oversight of community consultations. This has helped to ensure that 
investment projects have supported national and local development goals.
Formally established procedures through which stakeholders can raise 
grievances and seek redress also contributed to better relations with local 
communities. The best examples of grievance and redress mechanisms were 
those that were more formalised, typically involving a Community Liaison 
Committee on which the investor and the local community were represented.
In many cases, pre-screening of foreign investors can be improved to increase 
the prevalence of investors likely to make a positive contribution to the host 
country. Pre-screening should include, as a minimum, assessment of investors’ 
financial strength and technical capabilities, their proposed approach with 
respect to consultations and impact assessments, and their commitments in 
terms of the benefits that the investor will bring to the host country.
Pre-screening, however, should not extend to producing business plans on 
behalf of investors, plans that are then in effect sold as part of the concession 
agreement. Business plans provided by host governments were often based on 
unrealistic assumptions and sub-standard assessments of crop suitability and 
other environmental factors. A rubber plantation in Cambodia was being oper-
ated on soil that interviews with surrounding communities quickly identified 
as being inappropriate for rubber production.
Social and environmental impact assessments (SEIAs) are another impor-
tant tool for building responsibility and sustainability into the initial phases 
of an investment. There was a noticeable trend of investors taking their envi-
ronmental responsibilities more seriously, undertaking social and environ-
mental impact assessments, employing internal environmental management 
plans (EMPs), and making public their environmental policies. Investors cited 
increasing pressure from host country governments and the demands of certi-
fication processes as key drivers for this trend.
Yet SEIAs were too often ‘box ticking’ exercises, carried out merely to secure 
a license to operate rather than used as a tool to be actively incorporated into 
the conduct of the business. Many impact assessments were one-off assess-
ments, not accompanied by a system of ongoing monitoring and adherence 
to recommendations for changes to operations. Some EMPs only existed on 
paper and were not authentic tools used to manage the environmental impact 
of the investment.
As with consultations, the government’s role in impact assessments was 
most effective when limited to monitoring and ensuring proper conduct and 
implementation. This included providing detailed legal requirements covering 
98 zhan, Mirza, and Speller
what is expected of investors and the stipulation of requirements for third-
party, independent auditing of such assessments.
SEIAs should also be transparent. In Malaysia, for example, assessments 
are published on the Department of Environment website. In other countries, 
much less information is available publicly. This lack of transparency applies 
to other areas too. In general, there was an insufficient amount of publicly 
available information to ensure the fully transparent and accountable conduct 
of agricultural investment.
Once these initial phases have been completed, commitments made as part 
of the consultation, screening, and impact assessment projects need to be 
monitored by the host government. Ongoing monitoring of agricultural invest-
ments by host governments was often limited and productivity-focused. All 
investors were subject to some form of monitoring, typically by departments 
of agriculture, land, labour, or the environment. But when government officials 
came to assess agricultural concessions, they often focused on ensuring the 
investor was meeting productivity targets, with little monitoring of the socio-
economic and environmental impacts of an investment. The results or details 
of government monitoring were rarely made publicly available, making it dif-
ficult for other interested parties—be they local residents or civil society rep-
resentatives—to hold investors to account.
Some governments had allowed foreign investment in agriculture to pro-
ceed at a pace beyond their ability to realistically assess and monitor the inves-
tors. Wherever necessary, governments should consider how to improve their 
monitoring capacity and, if necessary, consider slowing down the approval of 
new agricultural investments.
3.2.5 The Financial and Operational Performance of Investors
A somewhat surprising finding from the overall study, at least at first glance, 
is that many investors were in operational and financial difficulties. Around 
45 per cent of investors were materially behind schedule or operating below 
capacity. About the same share were unprofitable at the time of the survey. The 
Asian investments tended to be performing better, with around 80 per cent 
profitable at the time of the survey and around one-third behind schedule.
A key distinction between the better or worse performers is linked to 
whether they have acquired substantial amounts of land or not. The Asian 
experience reflects findings in the wider sample that processing operations or 
those that do not involve large land allocations tended to be more success-
ful—that is to say, processors/outgrowers as opposed to estates/estates plus 
outgrowers (Figure 4.7). Many of the latter investments were spending signifi-
cant time and resources dealing with land disputes that could and should have 
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been identified and appropriately handled via pre-investment consultation 
and impact assessment procedures.
Investors highlighted a number of constraints that hindered their prospects 
of success (Figure 4.7). They noted the importance of host country govern-
ments in creating an enabling environment that allows investors to survive, 
thrive and contribute to the local community and the broader economy. 
International investors in several countries experienced a lack of a clear, trans-
parent and consistent approach towards foreign investment in agriculture, 
including policies and procedures for the purchase or lease of land. Access to 
finance, inadequate infrastructure and difficulties in sourcing local, qualified 
staff were other key constraints on profitability.
Financial and operational success is an essential precondition for agricul-
tural investments to make a positive contribution to development, whereas 
failure can create lose-lose-lose situations for investors, host countries and local 
communities alike. In this regard, investors noted the importance of striking 
the right balance between, on the one hand, imposing necessary requirements 
and regulations that promote responsible investment, and, on the other, ensur-
ing that requirements were not so burdensome as to preclude much needed 
investment by agribusinesses.
A key finding of this research is that a potentially win-win situation 
vis-à-vis investment performance and investments’ wider positive economic, 
social, and environmental impact is achievable. In the survey, investors that 
were financially and operationally successful tended also to be those that 
had the most positive impact on their host economies and surrounding 
communities—the result of more sophisticated approaches to social and 
FIGURE 4.7  Percentage of investors mentioning particular constraints on operations.
Source: UNCTAD-World Bank Survey of Responsible Agricultural 
Investment Database.
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environmental responsibility. Similarly, those investments that were well- 
integrated within the host country and surrounding community were most 
likely to be financially successful. Investors that acquired land but did not con-
duct thorough impact assessments and consultations with communities, or 
left it to host governments to conduct them on their behalf, often found them-
selves subsequently dealing with costly and time-consuming land disputes.
3.2.6 Environmental Impact
Almost all investors had cultivation and operational models the environmen-
tal impacts of which are likely to be negative, and the assessment and manage-
ment of which was often deficient. Most of the cultivation operations visited 
were undertaking intensive production operations of one or two crops, often 
involving extensive use of pesticides. Such intensive use of land and water con-
tributes to degradation and depletion of these resources and a loss of biodiver-
sity. Most investors have undertaken some measures to mitigate the negative 
environmental impact of their operations. Although these are initiatives that 
should be welcomed, it is important to note that they do not generate a posi-
tive or even a neutral environmental impact, but merely reduce to some extent 
the overall negative environmental impact of the investments studied in this 
research.
One exception was in Cambodia where one investor is promoting organic 
farming in a model farm that would comply both with guidelines under the 
International Foundation for Organic Agriculture (IFOAM) and with Indian 
Organic Certification Agency (INDOCERT) requirements for production of cer-
tified organic products. Agrochemicals and chemical fertilisers are not used. 
The farm maintains 30 cows to produce its own compost and organic fertilisers 
from cow dung and urine. Weeding is done manually.
Minimal tillage is practiced and the ground is protected by vegetation 
(mainly weeds) to prevent soil erosion. Crop rotation is practiced. The com-
pany is considering the feasibility of installing windmills to provide electricity 
to the farm and to the neighbouring village. The model farm is rain-fed for 
about 7–8 months in the year. In order to ensure that there is an adequate 
water supply during the dry months, the company has dug a network of 30 
water-harvesting and retention ponds at low points around the farm. Rain 
harvesting is also carried out from the roof of the workers’ quarters and other 
buildings.
More broadly, the environmental impact of the investments studies was 
difficult to discern, and so will be the subject of further research. Although 
environmental issues were not raised often in the stakeholder interviews, this 
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cannot be taken as an indicator of limited environmental impact. Interviewees 
would tend to raise only those obvious issues that they directly experience 
(such as those mentioned above). But most environmental consequences 
materialise gradually and may not be immediately obvious to surrounding 
communities. Although some government environmental officials were inter-
viewed, the results tended to reinforce the above conclusions about the inad-
equacy of environmental monitoring.
4 Lessons Learnt and Policy Implications
A number of key findings from the research described in this chapter have 
implications for investors, governments, and civil society. In particular, the 
research finds that issues such as due diligence, consultations with commu-
nities, financially inclusive business models, environmental impact assess-
ments and transparency issues are crucial for investors to get right. In a similar 
vein, host governments need to pay special attention to aspects such as the 
pre-screening and selection of investors, ongoing monitoring of investments, 
conduct of consultations, impact assessments and business plans, phasing of 
investment approvals, and land rights. Finally, activities such as engagement 
with investors, monitoring of investors, and helping investors forge partner-
ships with marginalised groups are areas in which the active participation of 
local communities and NGOs can make a difference. Building on this, includ-
ing the broader study of the sample of cases in Africa, it is possible to suggest 
policies and practices for governments, investors and civil society groups (in 
Asia and beyond) that, if implemented with due regard to local contingencies, 
can improve the chances of beneficial outcomes and minimise the risks of 
negative impacts associated with investments in agriculture.5
As discussed in the introduction to this chapter, and reinforced by the 
empirical findings of this study (and other research), the business models 
deployed and the investor-community relationships developed are central to 
both investment performance and impact on communities and economies. 
The differential outcomes of business models is most readily evinced, for 
example—in Section 3 of this chapter—in terms of employment generated 
and the performance of companies; while the investor-community relation-
ship’s importance can be discerned most readily in the analysis of land rights/ 
5    An UNCTAD and World Bank 2014 report provides numerous case study examples of best and 
worst practices, and a fuller discussion of lessons for investors, governments, and others.
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access to land and investor actions vis-à-vis stakeholders in the early phases of 
an investment. Some of the key implications of these findings for the policies 
and practices of investors are:
 • Early engagement and consultation with surrounding communities, includ-
ing previous and existing users of the land.
 • Transparency about the operation and ongoing dialogue with stakeholders, 
including the establishment of a formal grievance procedure.
 • Social development programmes that reflect local communities’ develop-
ment visions.
 • A financially inclusive business model.
 • Proper conduct of social and environmental impact assessments (SEIAs) 
and their integration within business models.
 • Setting of, and adherence to, realistic expectations about the pace of devel-
opment of operations; use of land in accordance with commitments.
 • Phasing of the investment, for example applying for and successfully devel-
oping a parcel of land before seeking a larger allocation.
 • Fair and adequate remuneration, contractual conditions, and training for 
employees and outgrowers.
 • Resolution of the business model prior to introducing outgrowers.
As knowledge of how to better the impact of investment in agriculture 
improves, there are policy implications for governments, often as counterparts 
to those for investors. Thus notable policy considerations for governments 
include:
 • Rigorous pre-screening of potential investors’ experience, financial capacity 
and technical capabilities.
 • Obtaining from foreign investors commitments to social development pro-
grammes, employment, and other benefits to the host country, as well as a 
detailed schedule for the development of operations.
 • Ongoing monitoring of investors’ agreements and commitments.
 • Monitoring consultations and SEIAs, but not conducting them on an inves-
tor’s behalf.
 • A clear, transparent regulatory framework for land acquisition (purchase or 
lease), consultations, resettlement, and compensation.
 • Formalised local community tenure rights under a proper land registry 
system.
 • Approval of foreign investment applications in line with the capacity to 
screen and monitor investors.
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 • Encourage phasing of investments, rather than mega-land deals; for exam-
ple, providing an initial allocation of land, with further allocations contin-
gent upon its successful development.
 • Monitoring and enforcement of adherence to environmental and water 
regulations.
 • Encouragement of innovation (new crops, technology, etc.), but not initially 
on a large scale.
 • Reducing red tape and creating an enabling environment for foreign invest-
ment and the development of domestic industry.
Finally, civil society groups also have a vital role to play, not least in supporting 
local communities, for instance in the initial setting up of investment opera-
tions and longer-term monitoring. For instance, civil society groups could:
 • Engage with investors to help them forge partnerships with marginalised 
groups and ensure that relevant stakeholders are included in decision-mak-
ing processes.
 • Help local communities to be well-organised, and to understand their rights 
and how to exercise them.
 • Monitor conflicts between investors and stakeholders and constructively 
draw attention to important issues.
5 Conclusions and Further Work
The diversity of experiences, performance, and impacts of investments ana-
lysed in this chapter suggests that a wide range of factors influence the out-
comes of an agricultural investment, and its impact on the local community 
and economy. Some factors are context specific. As such, one cannot be cat-
egorical about the types of investment that are most or least desirable, but 
business models adopted by investors, and specific approaches, policies, and 
practices adopted were shown to have a bearing on the outcome of invest-
ments. The nature of investor-community relationships, and the distribution 
of benefits (and costs) between the investor and the community, and within 
the community (the local economy) itself, also affect the overall impact. As 
discussed in the previous section, this can lead to actionable policies and prac-
tices for investors, governments, and communities.
The study on which this chapter is based has sought to contribute to the 
growing body of knowledge of what the responsible and sustainable conduct 
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of agricultural investment consists of in practical, operational terms for com-
munities, governments, and investors. In addition to the policy lessons out-
lined above, analysis of the range and type of impacts, and factors influencing 
the beneficial or negative outcomes of such impacts, can be used in con-
crete ways. For example, UNCTAD, the International Institute for Sustainable 
Development (IISD), and the World Bank are putting together a foundation 
for model contracts/contract clauses for investment in agriculture, using con-
crete examples of how to maximise the gains and minimise the risks of private 
sector participation in the agricultural sectors of developing countries, with 
information taken from this study and other works.
However, effective action by policymakers in specific areas of concern relat-
ing to investment in agriculture requires additional thoroughgoing work. Thus, 
in late 2014 UNCTAD and the World Bank embarked on a further, more con-
centrated (fewer cases), in-depth (focusing on specific issues gleaned from 
the first study, with a larger number of community/stakeholder participants) 
study on a selected sub-group of the original operations/communities visited. 
Among other aims, this research seeks to investigate the internal differences 
within local communities in terms of the impact of investments. That is, pick-
ing up on the variations in perceptions of impact within the communities 
mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the study asks which particular 
groups or persons win or lose from investments and, more importantly, under 
what circumstances.
Finally, many of the decisions and actions that determine the ultimate 
outcome of investments are taken prior to the investment or during its initial 
phases. For this reason, UNCTAD and the World Bank, along with FAO and the 
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), also launched—in 
2015—a new field programme working with investors, communities, govern-
ments, and other stakeholders from the outset of new operations. The primary 
objective of this next stage of the work is to infuse responsible and inclusive 
practices (taken from extant research, as discussed earlier) into agribusi-
ness operations—including vis-à-vis investor-community relationships—from 
the outset, and to ensure that the outcomes of these operations work to the 
benefit of local communities, the environment and the economy as a whole. 
Along the way, the research aims to create context-aware procedures, pro-
cesses, approaches and documentation—a toolkit, as it were—for building 
inclusive and development-friendly investment-community relationships and 
outcomes.
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CHAPTER 5
Sweet and Bitter: Trajectories of Sugar Cane 
Investments in Northern Luzon, the Philippines, 
and Aceh, Indonesia, 2006–13
Mohamad Shohibuddin, Maria Lisa Alano, and Gerben Nooteboom
Abstract
This chapter aims to understand the complex process of investment and land deal 
making through the in-depth study of three cases of sugar cane investment in the 
Philippines and Indonesia. It focuses on three different trajectories of sugar cane 
schemes—one in northern Luzon, the Philippines, and two in Aceh, Indonesia. By 
means of a processual approach, the chapter identifies critical junctures—defined as 
crucial moments of dealmaking and interactions in which relations among actors are 
renegotiated—at which the investments took decisive turns. These are the collabora-
tion of investors and bureaucratic cooperation between different levels of govern-
ment; control of the development agenda; land deal making and control over land; 
control of labour; and curbing resistance. The chapter thus shows that investments in 
sugar cane and bioethanol—which often involve land deals—usually turn out differ-
ently than originally envisaged. Implementation problems arise due to the competing 
strategies and interests of investors, government departments, workers, landowners, 
and brokers, and due to specific historical and institutional constellations. Therefore, 
it can be argued that the implementation of investment schemes cannot simply be 
understood as the implementation of a contract or an already-planned programme; it 
should rather be understood as a constant process of negotiation and adaptation. In 
such a context, the identification of critical junctures is crucial for the conduct of mon-
itoring activities and the adoption of adaptive policies during land deal processes.
 This paper is based on the PhD fieldwork of Maria Lisa Alano (in northern Luzon) and 
Mohamad Shohibuddin (in Aceh), carried out in 2012–13. The authors are members of a 
research project on (trans)national land investments in Indonesia and the Philippines, 
funded by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) WOTRO Science for 
Global Development programme.
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. . . land grabbing may be as much the result of host state action and 
domestic power dynamics as of foreign pressure (Fairbairn, 2013, 352)
1 Introduction
An integral part of the current boom in agricultural commodity production 
is investments in sugar cane and bioethanol—investments that often involve 
large land deals. So far, much attention has been paid to foreign investments 
and transnational actors who acquire or lease land and invest in commod-
ity production as a response to the increase of prices at the world market. 
Evidence suggests that in many areas of Asia, the squeeze on natural resources 
and farmers’ landholdings is caused by a less visible, longer-term process of 
land acquisition by local and national elites, often—but not necessarily—in 
conjunction with foreign investors (McCarthy et al., 2012). Relatively little 
consideration is given to the complexities and trajectories of deal making and 
implementation processes (Borras Jr. and Franco, 2010). Many deals turn out 
differently than originally envisaged by the investors, state agencies, stakehold-
ers and NGOs. Once an investment scheme has been announced or a contract 
has been signed, implementation problems arise due to the competing strate-
gies and interests of investors, government departments, workers, landowners, 
and brokers, and due to specific historical and institutional settings (Bakker 
et al., 2010, 168; Fairbairn, 2013, 137; Hall et al., 2011, 4).
In this chapter we argue that land deals are to be understood as processes 
of constant negotiation and adaptation. McCarthy et al. (2012, 556) empha-
sise the need to move beyond ‘more structural accounts that privilege trans-
national forces that have a tendency to overlook local agency and difference’. 
In understanding these processes, we therefore build upon approaches that 
see the dynamics of changing regime interests, state policies, agribusiness 
agendas, traders, and farmers as being mutually constitutive, ‘cumulatively 
shaping local production networks’ (McCarthy et al., 2012, 556). The way these 
elements work together in a particular location affects the pathway of invest-
ments (McCarthy et al., 2012, 556). We are further inspired by writers such as 
Tsing (2005) who wrote that ‘global forces are themselves congeries of local/
global interaction’ producing friction but also new coalitions and alternative 
forms of interaction.
This chapter aims to understand the complex processes of investment and 
land deal making through the in-depth study of three different implementa-
tion trajectories of sugar cane investment schemes—one in northern Luzon, 
the Philippines, and two in Aceh, Indonesia. Although investment and devel-
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opment policy play a central role in promoting and shaping large land deals in 
their initial stages, the relevance of policymaking and adaptation during the 
dealmaking process is often neglected. We argue that a processual approach 
to the analysis of land deals is needed to produce insights and tools that make 
monitoring and policy adaptation possible. Key questions concern which tra-
jectories are unfolding, which actors are important, and how local conditions 
play a role. What can we learn from the different outcomes of these sugar cane 
investment schemes and how significant are the different investment trajecto-
ries for policy? To examine these questions, we reconstruct the social history 
of dealmaking in three schemes of government-supported sugar cane invest-
ment and the implementation processes relating to such deals. We begin 
this article with the current outcomes of the three investment schemes, after 
which their investment trajectories will be analysed and described in detail. 
We identify the collaboration of investors and bureaucrats; control of the 
development agenda; land deal making and control over land; control of 
labour; and curbing resistance as key junctures at which the land deal process 
took a decisive direction which affected or influenced the specific land deals 
presented in the paper.
2 Research Locations and Investment Trajectories
The research locations are Isabela in northern Luzon, the Philippines, and 
Aceh in Indonesia. In the former, one area was studied (Isabela); in the lat-
ter, two (Central Aceh and Bener Meriah). In all three locations the respec-
tive national governments tried to attract foreign companies to invest in sugar 
and biofuel production. The interest in sugar cane emerged as a result of the 
global boom in agricultural commodity production, the rising prices of sugar 
and biofuels, and the gradual abolishment of domestic subsidies due to global 
and regional free trade agreements. In 2006,1 in Isabela, a biofuel production 
unit was established as a joint venture of foreign and domestic investors. In 
Aceh, sugar cane was a well-established crop in Central Aceh and was newly 
introduced to Bener Meriah in 2009.
The original plan of the Taiwanese, Japanese, and Philippine investors was 
to establish a biofuel company, Green Future Innovations Inc. A domestic 
company—Ecofuel Land Development Inc.—would supply the feedstock by 
developing 11,000 hectares of sugar cane plantation in the municipality of San 
Mariano using contract farming. However, the investment scheme was not 
executed as intended due to resistance from NGOs, the disinterest of farmers, 
1    The activities began in 2006 although the companies were registered in 2009.
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and complex property rights. In order for the plantation company to concre-
tise its plans, it shifted to short-term lease contracts and brought in cheap 
and experienced sugar cane workers from elsewhere. The bioethanol plant to 
which Ecofuel supplies feedstock began operating in 2012, albeit with lower 
production levels than originally envisaged because Ecofuel could not yet 
comply with the required volume of delivery.
The two cases in the Gayo highlands of Aceh show very different invest-
ment processes, which result in opposite outcomes. Various local varieties 
of sugar cane have been grown by local smallholders in Central Aceh since 
the mid-1960s. Since then, sugar cane has been processed into red sugar for the 
local and regional market in simple, locally built and owned processing units. 
As part of a governmental programme to boost biofuel production, in 2009 
the Indonesian government financed the establishment of a biofuel plant in 
Central Aceh. But this bioethanol plant could not compete with the local sugar 
factories, due to weak management, bureaucratic inefficiency, price distortions 
of the domestic biofuel market, and a lack of feedstock supply. As a result, the 
biofuel plant never became operational. Two years later, another attempt to 
establish an industrial processing plant took place when the Singapore-based 
company Indo-China Food Industries PTE Ltd began planning to develop a 
sugar factory. In 2011, Singaporean investors signed a contract with the Central 
Aceh district government to invest in a sugar processing plant. In 2012, a joint 
venture, PT Kamadhenu Ventures Indonesia, was established and by mid-2013, 
the construction of a sugar factory had begun and land was made available 
by the local government. The new investors managed to flexibly adapt to the 
local situation by starting with processing locally produced sugar cane so as 
not to compete with local production units.
The case of Bener Meriah provides a different story. The sugar investment 
area in Bener Meriah is situated on the old front line that separated the Free 
Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM) and the Indonesian Army. 
The area was depopulated as a result of strategic evictions and war atrocities 
during the peak of the civil war from 2000 to 2003. The old front line sepa-
rated ethnic Acehnese in the eastern coastal districts, who mainly supported 
GAM ideology, from native ethnic Gayonese and Javanese migrants in the high-
lands, who were neutral or in favour of the Indonesian government. Following 
the war, this depopulated area became a target of post-conflict development 
schemes aimed at reintegration and rehabilitation. The central Indonesian 
government, while trying to attract investors, spent a significant amount of 
money to introduce high-yield sugar cane varieties and boost smallholder 
sugar cane expansion. The district and central governments attempted to pro-
vide a labour force for the expected investors through resettlement and trans-
migration programmes oriented towards Gayo and Javanese migrants who had 
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been evicted and lost land during the war. The district government also tried 
to provide large tracts of land for the investors by proposing a reduction in 
state production forest. However, despite policies and programmes from the 
national and provincial governments to attract foreign and domestic investors, 
overseas investors pulled out due to the many difficulties they experienced 
acquiring land in the post-war landscape, and therefore no processing plant 
was ever constructed.
The programmes to introduce sugar cane, implemented by the district gov-
ernment of Bener Meriah and financed from national and district budgets, 
were successful in the sense that settlers—some returnees and some newly 
resettled inhabitants—started to grow sugar cane. The programmes enabled 
local investors to invest in land and simple processing units of the same type as 
in Central Aceh. Ethnic Gayo elites and bureaucrats profited significantly from 
these programmes, while former landowners and Acehnese war victims were 
excluded. Large difficulties were encountered in the introduction of the crops 
and with regard to access to land and the distribution of benefits. Meanwhile, 
traders and small and medium-sized entrepreneurs, army personnel, and gov-
ernment officials from nearby towns and even from North Sumatra and Java 
did acquire land and started to grow and produce sugar cane for the local and 
regional market. Unrefined, red sugar is now produced, by smallholders, for 
the local and regional market in nearby district capitals (Takengon, Simpang 
Tiga Redelong, and Bireuen) and for soy sauce factories in Medan, in North 
Sumatra province.
In all three cases, interventions clearly had different results than expected 
and governance of the investments was a rather complex and ineffective 
process. The impact for local people was mixed. In the Philippines, the inter-
ventions resulted in land leases from smallholders and contract farming 
arrangements that benefitted mid- and large-scale farmers. The establishment 
of a partly foreign-owned bioethanol plant was facilitated, but not managed, 
by the government. In Central Aceh, initial government investments failed, but 
foreign, private investment materialised and investors manoeuvred through 
local mechanisms and by making use of an existing sugar cane market—a pro-
cess which occurred without much government involvement. In Bener Meriah, 
many rural development schemes and government interventions were imple-
mented and the national and district governments tried to convince compa-
nies to invest in the area, but following initial agreements and field surveys, 
foreign and domestic investments did not—in the end—materialise. The 
government then turned to rural development programmes aimed at growing 
sugar cane. These interventions can be understood as attempts to restore state 
control over the old front line area and to exercise security measures for sake 
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of the Indonesian government vis-à-vis the GAM, which has dominated provin-
cial politics since the 2006 elections. As a result, government officials and local 
and regional pro-Indonesian entrepreneurs did profit, while most of the war 
victims, especially the Acehnese, were left out.
A more detailed explanation and analysis will be provided in section 6 
regarding the interventions and local outcomes.
3 Analytical Framework
In this chapter, we focus on sugar cane, since this agricultural commodity 
has attracted renewed interest not only from the government and investors 
but also from scholars researching the global land-grab phenomenon. Rather 
than focusing on international actors, here we will emphasise shifting power 
dynamics and competing actors at the sub-national level in the course of land 
investments. In doing so, we adopt a ‘processual’ approach to understand-
ing the evolvement of investments in sugar cane crops and land over time in 
the Philippines and Indonesia. A processual approach involves the study of 
processes rather than of discrete events and separated actions. In our under-
standing, investments should be studied as trajectories of dealmaking, and 
understood as extended processes of negotiation and adaptation stretched 
over time. In the following, we will outline some basic elements of this proces-
sual approach to clarify the social reality of policy and business investments. 
We will also explain why this processual approach is relevant for policy.
A study of land deals as processes draws upon several bodies of literature. 
The first concerns an interactional perspective, understanding land deals as 
arenas of struggle and contestation in which different stakeholders compete 
over resources and profits (Bakker et al., 2010; Bierschenk, 1988; Long, 2001; 
Olivier de Sardan, 2005). In this competition, the issue of access to resources 
and the benefits of the intervention is pivotal. ‘Access always involves insecu-
rities due to contested forms of legitimisation, the opportunity of employing 
multiple sources of legitimisation (including state law, international human 
rights and claims of ancestry), the absence of a single regulating authority 
(such as the state) and the relative nature of access (relative to other contend-
ers). Intervention is, therefore, subject to continuous contestation, renegotia-
tion, bargaining and accommodation through which all the parties involved 
may land up with some access and control’ (Bakker et al., 2010, 168). Local 
actors cannot predict the outcome of such interactive processes; neither can 
academics, who are also constrained when endeavouring to make absolute 
statements on rights of access.
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We can also learn from the francophone research on development inter-
ventions, of which Bierschenk (1988; 2008) and Olivier de Sardan (2005) are 
major proponents. It is revealing to apply their earlier research—into the 
implementation of development projects—to investment schemes in agri-
culture, in order to understand the transformation of original goals into new 
outcomes and social realities. ‘Project implementation does not mean carrying 
out an already-planned programme but is a constant process of negotiation. 
One must begin with an analysis of the project’s participants and other inter-
est groups, the goals and reasons for their negotiations, resources they have at 
hand—in short, of their own respective projects’ (Bierschenk, 1988, 146).
In post-conflict areas, securitisation is the key force in this process, as com-
peting parties articulate concerns on ‘security matters’ to legitimise their dif-
ferent political and economic stakes during the critical period of transition 
to peace. However, rather than reflecting on an objective threat, this kind of 
politicisation constitutes a ‘securitising move’ by powerful actors (especially, 
in this case, by former rebel and pro-Indonesia leaders), through which certain 
issues are elevated to the status of ‘security matters’ in order to be handled 
with the politics of emergency, thereby bypassing normal democratic proce-
dures and necessary technical requirements (Buzan et al., 1998). In the context 
of post-war Aceh, such securitisation is not merely an appropriation of the 
language of peace building ‘to justify [. . .] various predatory economic behav-
iours’ (Aspinall, 2009, 17); rather, it is also a means for the national govern-
ment to control certain areas and target loyal subjects through agribusiness 
and development schemes.
If we want to understand these processes in more detail and bring low-
level actors and groups into focus with global developments, the market, and 
local and national structures of unequal power relations and state dominance, 
we need an understanding of ‘the service of go-betweens or mediators who 
occupy a clearly strategic position’ in this process (Olivier de Sardan, 2005, 173). 
Again, here we draw on the rich literature on development interventions and 
improvement schemes, particularly that of researchers who carried out pio-
neering work on understanding brokers and brokerage (Bierschenk et al., 2002; 
Lewis and Mosse, 2006; Olivier de Sardan, 2005). It is revealing to apply this 
literature on development interventions and improvement schemes to under-
standing investments and development schemes as interventions. ‘[Central] is 
the premise that [such an approach] can provide policymakers and aid man-
agers with valuable reflective insights into the operations and effectiveness 
of international development as a complex set of local, national, and cross-
cultural social interactions; and it is no longer possible to isolate interactions 
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in the realm of development from those related to state apparatus, civil soci-
ety, or wider national or international political, economic, and administrative 
practices’ (Lewis and Mosse, 2006, 1).
The actions of investors, entrepreneurs, government officials, NGOs, go-
betweens and middlemen are entangled in wider structures of power, depen-
dency, inequality, culture and agro-ecological conditions. They are shaped by 
institutional legacies and historical repertoires that differ at different times 
and in different places. We thus cannot overlook the mediating role played 
by national-level institutions and domestic class inequality in determining the 
actually existing outcomes of agricultural commodity investment. We focus 
on the processes of brokerage between state development schemes, market 
opportunities, investor interests and local smallholders and labourers.
Such a focus on the role of domestic elite mediation is important, in part, 
because it belies the ‘win–win’ narratives on large deals currently being pro-
moted by the World Bank and the FAO, among others. Fairbairn’s (2013) study 
on foreign land investments in Mozambique finds that indirect land disposses-
sion is the result of the mediating role played by domestic elites. She identi-
fied five sources of power that privileged domestic actors in their relation to 
foreign investors: traditional authority, bureaucratic influence, historical accu-
mulation, locally based business knowledge and networks, and control over 
the development agenda. These largely correspond with the critical junctures 
we identified in Isabela and Aceh, as we shall see in the following sections.
4 Approach and Methodology
Investments are shaped and mediated by the institutional, political, and eco-
nomic context in which they are made. A historical ‘institutionalist’ approach 
adds to the understanding of why certain investments materialise and others do 
not and what particular shapes investments take. ‘When political institutions 
are weakened during transition periods, allocations of power and resources 
become open for competition’ (Bertrand, 2004, 10). These periods of institu-
tional change constitute ‘critical junctures’, during which the institutionalisa-
tion of social and economic relations is modified along with a reaffirmation, 
contestation, or renegotiation of the principles upon which these relations are 
based (Bertrand, 2004, 10). For this chapter, we identified the ‘critical junctures’ 
in the investment process—the crucial moments of dealmaking and interac-
tions in which the relations between investors, the state, institutions, and local 
actors changed or were renegotiated, reconfirmed, and reconfigured.
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During data collection, the extended case method (Lund, 2014; Van Velsen, 
1967) was used to follow the dynamic interaction and the different processes 
in land deal making and investment concretisation. Fieldwork was spread 
over a 10-month period in Isabela and the Gayo highlands, and consisted of 
interviews, participant observation, and data gathering at the village, muni-
cipal, and provincial levels. A survey was also carried out at the village level 
where the biggest concentration of sugar cane interventions took place. In the 
research, respondents included women and men, farmers and farm workers, 
labour contractors, company field staff and officials, traders, local government 
officials, and representatives of government agencies. In Aceh, former GAM 
combatants and anti-GAM militia members were also interviewed.
5 National Policies around Sugar Cane Expansion
Agricultural commodities such as sugar cane have attracted renewed attention 
during the current agricultural boom following the convergence of multiple 
global crises involving finance, food, energy, and climate. The Philippine and 
Indonesian governments’ decisions to exercise new policies for the expansion 
of sugar cane production can be understood as attempts to create economic 
opportunities from these crises through commodities characterised as ‘flex 
crops’2 (Borras Jr. et al., 2014). At the same time, the special treatment that 
sugar as a commodity demands, as a ‘special/sensitive product’ within free 
trade regime, provides some flexibility for both governments to establish a set 
of policies for allocating land, attracting private investments, and enhancing 
control over sugar cane downstream products (either biofuel or sugar).
5.1 Policies on Biofuels in the Philippines
Historically, the sugar cane sector had a special position in the Philippines, 
cane being its most important export commodity between the late eighteenth 
century and the mid-1970s. Large sugar estates, haciendas, were the basis of 
wealth for an important part of the Filipino elite—a landed elite that still has 
strong political influence as well as stakes in many agro-commodity firms. In 
2007, the Philippines was the 10th largest sugar cane producer in the world and 
second to Thailand among South-East Asian countries (Fischer, et al., 2008, 
31). The island of Negros can be considered as the sugar base of the country, 
with almost half of the country’s total sugar cane being produced by its thir-
teen sugar mills. While a small proportion is still exported, production is now 
2    Borras Jr. et al. (2014, 2) define flex crops as crops and commodities that have multiple uses 
(food, feed, fuel, industrial material) that can be, or are thought to be, flexibly interchangeable.
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primarily for the domestic market, given the fast-growing population and ris-
ing domestic demand.
Investors are seeing sugar cane cultivation in a new light with respect to 
the growing popularity of green energy. The Philippines has joined the bio-
fuel production hype with the aim of generating revenue while embarking on 
clean energy promotion, having become a signatory to the Kyoto Protocol. The 
country thus sees a future for biofuel use in the country and is now a mar-
ginal biofuel producer. Policies have been put in place to further this objective, 
most importantly the Republic Act 9367—better known as the Biofuel Act—of 
2006. It requires the phasing out of harmful gasoline additives and the use of 
a minimum of 10 per cent bioethanol blend in all gasoline fuel sold and dis-
tributed in the country. Joint Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 2008 identi-
fies proposed biofuel production sites as priority development areas for land 
conversion. Such areas are ‘underutilized and marginal’; ‘irrigated and irrigable 
lands, especially those used for rice production’ cannot be used for biofuel crop 
production. At least two million hectares of the country’s lands are targeted for 
agribusiness production, including crops for biofuel and agroforestry (NEDA, 
2010). Sugar cane is expected to play an important role in this. In addition, 
sugar cane planters supported the Biofuel Act in view of the possible reduc-
tion of import tariffs on sugar because of the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) economic integration scheduled for 2015.
5.2 Overlapping Policies on Sugar Cane in Indonesia
In Indonesia, many paradoxes can be found in national sugar cane policies. One 
set of policies aims to increase national sugar production as part of national 
food security policies. Being heavily dependent on imported sugar, the gov-
ernment issued an ambitious policy in 2009 to achieve sugar self-sufficiency 
by 2014. To meet this target, as much as 350,000 hectares of new sugar cane 
area were to be developed, including Bener Meriah in Aceh (El Hida, 2011). 
Another set of policies targets sugar cane as a priority crop in an attempt to 
boost biofuel production by complementing the existing production of palm 
oil as biofuel. These policies are framed as a key part of the ‘national energy 
mix’ policy3 stipulated by Presidential Regulation No. 5/2006, which envisions 
biofuel consumption constituting 5 per cent of total energy consumption in 
Indonesia by 2025.
3    The Indonesian ‘national energy mix’ policy envisages that fossil oil consumption would con-
stitute less than 20 per cent of total energy consumption by 2025 as total energy demands 
would be met from various energy sources including fossil oil, biofuel, natural gas, liquefied 
coal, and other renewal energies.
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With this kind of overlap in policies and agenda setting, the Indonesian 
case provides a sharp contrast to the Philippine case, where strong, clear-cut 
policies on biofuel production were put in place. In the Philippine policy con-
text, downstream oil industry deregulation allows private companies to invest 
in the biofuel industry. Its clean air policy demands emission reduction and 
the promotion of biofuels as a cleaner fuel alternative. The government of the 
Philippines has clearly made an effort to promote biofuel production—also 
because the country has no oil itself. The Indonesian policies, on the other 
hand, got caught in contradictions and never manifested as intended. Reasons 
for this include conflicting policies for sugar self-sufficiency, a national energy 
mix, and post-conflict development assistance to facilitate the return of refu-
gees and to involve them in sugar cane production.
6 Sugar Cane Interventions and Local Realities
As we indicated in the previous section, the differences between investments 
in biofuel and the need to enhance food production both in the Philippines 
and Indonesia have created conditions with regard to policy and institutional 
frameworks under which investments in sugar cane could thrive. However, as 
we will argue in this section, the specific outcomes of sugar cane interventions 
have a lot to do with sub-national power dynamics mediated by local elites 
with strong political and economic interests. The contrasting interests of local 
actors make straightforward implementation of national policies impossible.
6.1 Sugar Cane Investments in Isabela, the Philippines
In retrospect, the specific trajectory of sugar cane expansion and change in 
land and labour contracts in Isabela can be understood by taking a closer 
look at several critical junctures where a decisive direction was taken. 
In the following section, we follow the processual approach and identify 
the following junctures: protest and adaptations; bureaucratic support; the 
change from (intended) land acquisitions to land leases and contract 
farming; the establishment of beneficial labour contracts for local residents 
and the introduction of cheap and efficient labour from elsewhere; control of 
the development agenda; and the close cooperation between investors and 
local elites.
The investment plans evolved successfully due to a number of factors. 
In the beginning, the investment received a lukewarm reception in the villages 
because sugar cane cultivation was new to the locality. Some local farmers’ 
groups associated with bigger groups campaigning against large-scale land 
investments in the Philippines also vigorously campaigned against it. To these 
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groups, the establishment of the sugar cane investment violates the land and 
labour rights of local farmers, not to mention the threats to the environment 
and local food security (Aonishi et al., 2011) that such investment entails. 
Nevertheless, the investment scheme was established and has been operating 
now for eight years—albeit with deviations along the way. Local government 
played a crucial role in facilitating the entry of investors and the selection 
of the municipality of San Mariano as the main location of the investment. 
Once the area was identified by the central government, the investors had 
to deal with local government units. Ecofuel negotiated with provincial- and 
municipal-level officials in order to gain entry to the villages and identify 
plantation sites. The investment scheme received the endorsement of local 
government units and was hailed as one of the top investments in the province 
and the biggest active bioethanol project in the country. Provincial promotion 
brochures prominently feature Ecofuel’s production areas and Green Future 
Innovation Inc.’s (GFII) bioethanol plant.
The decision-making process lacked transparency and it excluded small-
holders. Village officials agreed to organise assemblies to promote the 
investment scheme at the village level, but the nature of the project and its pos-
sible implications for the community were not explained to the villagers, and 
nor was their input requested with regards to the introduction of sugar cane 
into their areas. The village officials could have played an active role in this. 
The village assemblies could have been utilised as platforms for dialogue 
on the acceptability of the investment scheme.
Ecofuel Land Development Corporation was registered as a corporation in 
2009, but as early as 2006 had signed contracts with farmers and begun devel-
oping the sugar cane nurseries. Currently, two main types of arrangement are 
enforced by Ecofuel: lease and contract farming. Lease contract is the domi-
nant scheme implemented by the company. The lease agreement usually cov-
ers three years and is renewable for another three years. The rent ranges from 
PHP 5,000–10,000 (roughly EUR 88–176 in 2014) per hectare per year depending 
on the distance of the farm from the processing plant. The company takes over 
the land for the duration of the contract, organising production and recruiting 
labourers.
The contract farming scheme requires that the landowners work or at least 
supervise the farm work themselves. The company advances the production 
costs, optionally including labour costs, then deducts these from the grower’s 
earnings in the harvest period, computed at PHP 1,200 (approximately EUR 21 
in 2014) per ton of sugar cane. Contract farming is the company’s preferred 
option, as it makes controlling the quality and productivity of the land possible 
and saves on the cost of organising labour. Moreover, all production risks are 
born by the farmer, not by the company.
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Another intervention, this time by the investor, was to capitalise on existing 
social relations in the villages in order to acquire land and labour. The com-
pany hired locals as technicians and labour contractors. Company technicians 
conducted house-to-house visits but only to convince farmers to lease their 
lands and with very little explanation regarding the terms of the contract. The 
farmers needed convincing, so technicians emphasised the possible earn-
ings, the advance rental payment, and advances for production costs to be 
provided by the company. Using its local personnel to promise incentives to 
farmers already facing economic constraints was an effective approach for the 
company.
Traditional big landowners turned out to be useful entry points for the com-
pany to gain access to land through lease or contract farming. They were the 
first to be contacted during plantation development and their lands were used 
for establishing nurseries. Despite the five-hectare ceiling on land ownership 
imposed under the agrarian reform programme, there are still landowners 
who possess at least 20 hectares, with one prominent landowner reportedly 
owning about a hundred hectares in one village. During village assemblies, the 
company officials used the experience of the big landowners in their dealings 
with Ecofuel to entice small farmers to lease out their lands to the company as 
well. The contract farming and lease arrangements with big landowners served 
FIGURE 5.�  Map of San Mariano, Isabela (the Philippines).
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as a guarantee that the investor could be trusted. At present, the majority of 
the lessors and contract growers are small-scale farmers owning less than five 
hectares. Their areas converted to sugar cane were previously either not uti-
lised, or used as pasture or cultivated for rice, corn, or vegetables.
The outcome of all these negotiations was that the planned contract farm-
ing arrangement preferred by Ecofuel did not materialise for the majority of its 
production areas. In the first years following the establishment of the scheme, 
almost all lands were leased for three years and workers were recruited to work 
on the leased lands. Labour contractors, on the other hand, were already expe-
rienced in pooling farmworkers to work in small groups on rice and corn farms. 
They could also easily mobilise labourers to work for Ecofuel. Nevertheless, 
a number of labour contractors recruited labour from traditional sugar- 
producing provinces in the Philippines beginning in 2006. Working for nine 
months in a year, the farmworkers are hired as migrant labour to perform the 
harder tasks avoided by the local farmworkers—for example the harvesting of 
canes and their transport to the processing plant.
Another setback for Ecofuel was that it could not develop its targeted 
11,000-hectare plantation site in San Mariano because not all farmers wanted 
to give up farming. It changed its strategy and looked into adjacent munici-
palities and provinces for possible production areas. Lease and contract farm-
ing remained the two schemes offered by the company. In addition, Ecofuel 
encroached upon existing sugar cane-producing municipalities in neighbour-
ing provinces and started buying sugar cane that was destined for the existing 
sugar mill in the region. The competition resulting from the entry of Ecofuel 
into these markets has been an unpleasant surprise for the existing sugar mill, 
but the resulting better prices for harvested cane have been welcomed by sugar 
cane farmers.
Existing socio-economic inequalities and political power differences pro-
vided leverage to the elite in dealing with Ecofuel. Members of the elite are 
able to bend company rules—such as not signing formal contracts or changing 
the nature of agreements, for instance from contract farming to self-financing. 
By comparison, smallholders were not given a choice as to which production 
arrangements were available to them, nor did they receive advice from local 
officials about the possible problems they could encounter if they contracted 
out their lands.
Smallholders also complain about the lack of government assistance with 
regard to the establishment of the sugar cane investment schemes. For them, the 
investments did not bring much benefit. But, true to its market-orientation, 
the Philippine government limited its role to identifying potential areas of 
production for large-scale land investments, leaving it up to companies and 
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landowners to negotiate the terms of their engagement, as is the case with 
Ecofuel.
Due to all these difficulties, adaptations, and time-consuming negotiations, 
investing in Isabela was quite complex for Ecofuel. Moreover, they faced oppo-
sition from organised farmers’ groups from early on. These groups had their 
own intervention strategies with which to resist the investment. The company 
suffered losses due to its equipment being burned by militant groups. Some 
mobilisations in 2011 and 2012 involved the uprooting of newly planted canes 
and the setting up of blockades to stop operations in areas where land own-
ership was contested. The workers also organised strikes in one of Ecofuel’s 
farming areas and in the processing plant of GFII in 2012, which also paralysed 
operations at one point. Complaints of violation of environmental regulations 
were lodged against GFII but the company was only issued with a warning by 
the environmental management agency.
The company had its own strategies with which to respond to actions pro-
testing against the investment scheme. Ecofuel pulled out from some of its 
production areas to counter such opposition. Halting operations affected the 
employment conditions of the local farmworkers. The lands of contract farm-
ers were, in some areas, not maintained, which meant lower cane quality and 
thus a lower market price. Ecofuel alleged that local officials had not protected 
them from the militants’ actions. Meanwhile, those campaigning against the 
investment criticised the inaction of local and national government agencies 
regarding environmental, labour, and land grabbing complaints lodged against 
Ecofuel.
We can observe a number of critical junctures in the investment and imple-
mentation processes. At these junctures, the interests and agendas of commu-
nity elites, state actors, and investors came together. This collaboration (Tsing 
2005) allowed the company to jump-start its operation in the municipality. 
Resistance to the investment was effective in the short term, but the investor 
was able to adapt and change its strategies, which restrained the opposition’s 
initial gains. The investor also managed to control land and labour through its 
flexible adaptation of production schemes and the labour regime. The invest-
ment offered income and employment opportunities to small farming house-
holds, but the landed elite profited more through the better deals that they 
negotiated with the investor.
6.2 Sugar Cane Interventions and Investments in Aceh, Indonesia
In comparison with Isabela, the specific trajectory of sugar cane expansion 
and the establishment of a bioethanol plant in Central Aceh, and the failure 
of foreign investments in Bener Mariah, should be understood in the historical 
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context of post-conflict interventions and peace agreements. These sugar 
cane investments took place in a post-war environment. In this context, com-
plicated land tenure as an outcome of war atrocities, and new provincial and 
district power reconfigurations following the peace agreement and the 2006 
local elections, became the two main factors influencing the process of invest-
ment in sugar cane and land over time.
After the conflict, local elections were held throughout Aceh province in 
December 2006. In these elections, former GAM strategist Irwandi Yusuf was 
elected as Aceh’s governor, (henceforth referred to as ‘Governor Irwandi’), 
while in the Gayo highlands former anti-GAM leader Tagore Abubakar was 
elected as district head (Bupati) of Bener Meriah district (henceforth referred 
to as Bupati Tagore). Both these leaders, and other key players in the interven-
tion, had access to development funds provided as a ‘peace dividend’ and soon 
engaged in intense contestations regarding post-conflict development agen-
das—including the agribusiness sector—contestations that replicated and 
even sustained conflict-era antagonism.
The specific trajectory of this intervention can again be understood by tak-
ing a closer look at the junctures at which critical decisions were made. In 
the following section, we look at critical junctures such as governmental and 
bureaucratic cooperation; control over and contestation regarding the devel-
opment agenda; available production repertoires and agricultural histories; 
the control of land and labour; and the role of labourers, migrants, and local 
business elites.
Three mid-slope areas in the Gayo highlands were targeted by the national 
government for various sugar cane schemes following the conflict (see 
Figure 5.2). The first location, the Pantan Tau plateau in Central Aceh,4 has been 
a sugar cane producing area since the mid-1960s. Pantan Perempusen (loca-
tion 2) and Rime Mulie (location 3), both in Bener Meriah, are situated in the 
former frontier areas. Tens of hectares of sugar cane existed there just before 
the war, but all disappeared due to the conflict: war atrocities were rampant 
in the area. While only a few people were displaced in Pantan Tau and sugar 
cane production continued without major interruptions during the war, many 
villages in Pantan Perempusen and Rime Mulie sub-districts were depopu-
lated, while most of the sub-districts’ agricultural areas became grassland or 
shrub land. This not only created a drastic change in the rural landscape but 
also led to land tenure insecurity after the war.
4    Pantan Tau and other names used for sub-districts and villages in this paper are all 
pseudonyms.
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6.2.1 Sugar Cane Investments in Central Aceh
In contrast to the two areas in Bener Meriah, foreign investors found more 
land in Pantan Tau, Central Aceh with which to pursue their investment plan. 
Firstly, no ‘post-war land’ existed there since the area had been classified 
as a ‘white zone’.5 Secondly, in the aftermath of the conflict, territorial and pop-
ulation control measures in this region had never become a matter of contes-
tation or the subject of securitisation, such as they had in Bener Meriah. Last 
 
5    During the war, the Indonesian military classified Aceh territory as ‘black’, ‘gray’, or ‘white’ 
zones according to the degree of their control over that territory and to the GAM’s presence 
there (see Aspinall, 2008).
FIGURE 5.�  Map of the Gayo highlands and areas targeted by sugar cane interventions 
(Indonesia). 
Note: Location 1 is Pantan Tau plateau; location 2 is Pantan Perempusen sub-district, 
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but not least, Pantan Tau is a well-established sugar cane area covering around 
8,000 hectares of low productive sugar cane, which could provide the initial 
supply to feed the sugar cane processing plant.
The first attempt to invest there was made by the central government. In 
2009, the Ministry of Industry built a plant to produce bioethanol—from sugar 
cane molasses—with a production capacity of around 3,000 litres per day. The 
plant cost IDR 16.172 billion (approximately EUR 1 million), and its construc-
tion was financed by the central government national biofuel programme. Its 
operation would depend on the supply of local sugar cane through free mar-
ket mechanisms. The plant, however, never became operational since the plan 
did not work. Without adequate initial capital and due to the distortion of a 
highly subsidised fossil oil price, the plant’s competition for feedstock with the 
local red sugar processing units made biofuel production uncompetitive. Thus, 
farmers continued to process their sugar cane for red sugar rather than selling 
it to the bioethanol plant, which offers much lower prices.
Soon afterwards, Pantan Tau was targeted for foreign investment by 
Singapore’s Indo China Food Industries PTE Ltd. The investors were inter-
ested in investing in a sugar cane processing plant and in sugar cane estates. 
On 24 October 2011, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed 
in Takengon, the capital of Central Aceh, by the managing director of the 
company and the Bupati of Central Aceh district. The MoU stated that 
the company would invest in the sugar cane processing complex, which would 
produce sugar, electricity, and ethanol.
For the first stage, a total of USD 7.5 million was to be invested in a pro-
cessing plant capable of managing 3,500 tonnes of cane per day (TCD). This 
could be expanded to about 10,000 TCD depending upon the economic viabil-
ity of such an expansion and the development of sugar cane estates around 
the factory. While the plant in its initial phase would depend on supplies from 
local farmers, in order to be able to increase its production capacity in the 
next operational step the company demanded that the Central Aceh district 
government allocate at least 10,000 hectares for a sugar cane plantation. If the 
plant’s production capacity did expand to 10,000 TCD, a further 30,000 hectares 
was to be provided by the district government.
In response to this demand, the Central Aceh district government allocated 
10,000 hectares of state land and of ex-plantation concession (Hak Guna Usaha, 
HGU) in Uning Gading, around 35 km from the north western side of Pantan 
Tau. An additional location was still to be found, which would most likely imply 
the reduction of production forest areas. Although the company had not yet 
started the land acquisition process in Uning Gading, rumours regarding the 
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search for land for plasma estate6 development had spread widely throughout 
the highlands since late 2011, triggering land speculation and a rush on land.
By mid-2012 the company had established a joint venture company, PT 
Kamadhenu Ventures Indonesia, and by early 2013 this joint venture had 
started to purchase 75 hectares of land in the centre of Pantan Tau to establish 
a factory complex. This process was accomplished in June 2013, and the fol-
lowing month the first stage of construction officially began. Although the 
construction process was interrupted by a big earthquake, which hit the area 
in July 2013, it resumed some months later. Factory construction was still in 
progress at the end of our fieldwork period.
Critical junctures in the investment process were: the co-optation of 
national and local units of government; converging development agendas; the 
ability of the foreign company to adopt a flexible and phased business plan; 
the shift to market based approaches, which curbed the opposition of farmers 
already producing sugar cane; the provision of land by the district government; 
and the availability of cheap labour and an experienced work force.
6.2.2 Sugar Cane Intervention in Bener Meriah
In the third case study area, Pantan Perempusen and Rime Mulie, in Bener 
Meriah—largely depopulated due to the massive outflow of refugees—any 
attempt to bring in agribusiness investments had to address the problem of 
a labour shortage and a general lack of agricultural inputs. The central and 
district governments, in their attempts to attract investors, therefore made 
great efforts and spent a significant amount of money to mobilise labourers 
and investments in crops and to allocate large tracts of land. In this regard, 
three interventions have been carried out by the government since 2007: the 
first was labour mobilisation, the second was the introduction of sugar cane, 
and the third relates to land allocation for sugar cane investments. These inter-
ventions were extremely complicated due to the problematic nature of secur-
ing the cooperation of local elites; conflicts over development agendas; GAM 
protests; and securitisation struggles, all of which constitute the key critical 
junctures in this case.
In relation to labour, in mid-2007 Bupati Tagore facilitated the arrival of 
136 families of conflict refugees and resettled them in Blang Bintang village, 
Pantan Perempusen. Interestingly, these families were mostly former Javanese 
6    The term plasma estate refers to a specific arrangement of contract farming between a com-
pany and smallholders in Indonesia in which smallholders are provided with agricultural 
supports (and sometimes with access to land) to produce a specific commodity as required 
by the company.
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(trans)migrants who had fled from various parts of Aceh during the war, 
but none originated from Pantan Perempusen. Thus, rather than prioritising 
former inhabitants, this programme targeted a group of refugees completely 
foreign to the area, but loyal to the Indonesian state. In early 2009, after living 
in tents for more than a year, the families were provided with modest hous-
ing built by the Ministry of Social Affairs. The housing complex was located 
entirely on Bupati Tagore’s own land.
Further, Bupati Tagore proposed a transmigration programme through 
which he expected not only to provide the 136 families in Blang Bintang with 
houses and pieces of land as promised, but also to mobilise more labours from 
other provinces in anticipation of the expected rise in labour demand due to 
the presence of the agro-industry investments. For this purpose, he allocated 
9,320 hectares in Pantan Perempusen and 4,200 hectares in Rime Mulie. In 
addition, a plan to develop an integrated agro-industry in the transmigration 
area was prepared by the Bupati, all with significant support from the central 
government (notably from the Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration).
Strong criticism of these agribusiness and transmigration plans was, 
however, voiced by the GAM. Since mid-2006, GAM spokesperson Bakhtiar 
Abdullah had reportedly denounced the Indonesian government for discrimi-
nating against conflict refugees: ‘Many (ethnic Acehnese) migrants who fled 
from Bener Meriah and Central Aceh are ignored, while transmigrant refugees 
previously [originating] from Java [have had their moves] fully facilitated and 
[are] taken care [of]’ (Warsidi, 2006). Such criticism—typical of the GAM—
was also echoed by Central Aceh’s Governor Irwandi, and when a letter of rec-
ommendation from the governor was requested as part of the administrative 
requirements for proposing a transmigration programme, Irwandi refused to 
sign. A compromise was pursued, and the governor finally agreed to recom-
mend the proposal on the condition that it should be a local rather than a 
national transmigration programme; that is, the participants could only be 
Aceh residents—not newcomers from other provinces.
Concerning the second category of interventions (i.e. those related to the 
introduction of sugar cane), a lot of investment was needed to re-establish 
the fertility of long-abandoned land in Blang Bintang. Most of the area had 
been covered by weeds (imperata cylindrica) and frequent grass fires had 
increased the acidity of the land. The newcomers were paid to clear the land. 
Yet it was a chaotic and frustrating period for them since certain people claim-
ing to be the rightful owners of the land came to reclaim their parcels after 
that these had been cleared. Most such attempts failed, with the exception of 
a handful of pre-conflict landowners with political and economic power, such 
as government and police officials and army members living in the city, who 
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succeeded to secure their land and even accumulated more of it after the end 
of the conflict. However, most people failed to get their land back.
The first attempts to introduce sugar cane to Blang Bintang took place in 
2009. With his good political networks and links—since the war years—to 
national elites, Bupati Tagore succeeded in convincing the central government 
to designate Bener Meriah as an area targeted by the sugar self-sufficiency 
programme. Thus, during 2009–10 significant funds could be drawn from the 
national budget in order to provide farmers in Blang Bintang with cash assis-
tance for preparing land, purchasing local varieties of sugar cane seedlings and 
establishing sugar cane plots. At the same time, to securitise the area and place 
it under his control, Bupati Tagore deployed military battalion 114/SM, purport-
edly to combat wild boar, the most damaging pest in Pantan Perempusen.
This introduction of sugar cane was a success. In late 2011 a further IDR 
1.9 billion (around EUR 119,000) were provided by the Ministry of Agriculture to 
develop 50 hectares of nursery plots in Bener Meriah for the purpose of grow-
ing a high-yield variety—PSJT 941—in new sugar cane areas in the highlands. 
Bupati Tagore personally benefitted from these projects since he controlled 
the programme and located all nursery plots on his own land.
Since 2012, the third sugar cane intervention, again using the PSJT 941 vari-
ety produced by three farmers’ groups on Tagore’s land, has been pursued by 
the government in order to further expand smallholding sugar cane areas. This 
programme, to be implemented in several years, involves 120 new hectares of 
sugar cane production areas in three adjacent villages. The following year, the 
programme was executed again by the government targeting more land for 
sugar cane production. To support this programme, the district government 
of Bener Meriah allocated additional funds from its own budget. This sugar 
cane expansion attracted a rush of wealthy investors and entrepreneurs who 
wanted to acquire land and thus buy in to the sector.
In 2010, with the sugar cane introduction programme ongoing, the govern-
ment started to offer areas of Bener Meriah to foreign investors. On 11 March 
2010, the Director General of the Directorate General of Plantation, within 
the Ministry of Agriculture, chaired a meeting between Bupati Tagore and 
South Korean Park Energy PTE Ltd. In this meeting, Bupati Tagore offered the 
investors as much as 17,000 hectares in Pantan Perempusen and 20,000 hect-
ares in Rime Mulie for sugar industry development. Since large parts of the 
areas designated for sugar cane were classified as state forest, the Director 
General promised to bring this issue to the attention of the National Team of 
Sugar Self-Sufficiency Programme, of which the Minister of Forestry became 
a member.
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Following this meeting, on 29 March, the chairman of Park Energy PTE Ltd 
Shung Curk Park visited Bener Meriah to start an initial survey. A feasibility 
study was conducted some months later and delivered a promising result. The 
investors then stated their interest in investing around IDR 1.8 trillion in Bener 
Meriah in a sugar cane processing plant capable of handling 10,000 TCD. To 
feed this plant, the investors demanded that at least 20,000 hectares of land for 
sugar cane plantation be provided by the government.
Another attempt to attract investors was made by the Minister of Manpower 
and Transmigration. During his visit to Guangzhou on 28 May 2011, a public–
private partnership (PPP) to develop sugar cane agro-industrial complexes 
in the transmigration area was agreed with Chinese state-owned Guandong 
Agribusiness Ltd. In this PPP scheme, a MoU was signed between the company 
and Indonesia’s PT Pulau Sumbawa Agro (a subsidiary of PT Kapal Api Group). 
In accordance with this MoU, the CEO of PT Kapal Api Group and the Director 
General of Transmigration Area Preparation visited Bener Meriah from 12 
to 15 July 2011 to survey potential areas for investment. During this visit, the 
allocation of at least 15,000 hectares of arable land was discussed with Bupati 
Tagore—the amount of land necessary to concretise the company’s plan to 
invest in a sugar plant capable of handling 6,000 TCD.
In response to the demand for large tracts of land, the last type of interven-
tion relates to attempts by the Bener Meriah district government to designate 
certain areas for agro-industry complexes and to allocate land for corporate 
sugar cane plantation. On 22 December 2010, Tagore issued a decree on the 
establishment of an integrated agro-industry development area named Garuda 
in Pantan Perempusen (the Garuda is the Indonesian national symbol and its 
use by Bupati Tagore reflects his ideological inclination vis-à-vis the GAM eth-
nonationalist movement). The area covers around 17,000 hectares of ‘private 
land with and without land titling, all kinds of idle land, and state land’. In 
addition, on 21 February 2011, Bupati Tagore proposed a reduction of produc-
tion forest to the Minister of Forestry, involving as much as 3,445.32 hectares in 
Pantan Perempusen and 12,119.25 in Rime Mulie.
Governor Irwandi, however, strongly opposed Tagore’s proposal to reduce 
forest area in Bener Meriah, as he envisioned another agenda for managing 
Aceh’s natural forest and protected areas—his ‘Green Aceh’ development plan. 
His refusal to issue a letter of recommendation for reducing forest area pre-
vented the allocation of the large tract of land necessary for sugar cane invest-
ment, and with the land to be derived from forest areas no longer available, 
the investors found it impossible to continue their investment plan in Bener 
Meriah.
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7 Discussion: Contrasting Outcomes and Critical Junctures
Despite the efforts of various schemes for foreign investment in sugar cane 
plantation in the Philippines and in Aceh, Indonesia, involving investors 
and the respective governments, of the three cases discussed, only two for-
eign investment programmes were realised. This outcome of the intervention 
process can be understood by looking at the differences in the trajectories 
of the investments and at the decisions taken, negotiations carried out, and 
adaptations made during the process of implementation. The key decisive 
moments—the critical junctures—reveal these differences and help to better 
analyse and understand them.
If we compare the different trajectories, we can identify five key junctures: 
the collaboration of investors and bureaucratic cooperation between different 
levels of government; control of the development agenda; land deal making 
and control over land; control of labour; and curbing resistance.
In Isabela, investments proceeded thanks to co-optation and agreement at 
most junctures. However, ambitions and control over land and labour changed 
during the trajectory partly due to refusal of landowners to engage in contract 
farming and fierce opposition from civil society groups. Governmental policies 
are clear and coherent and the government is cooperative on all levels. Local 
landed elites have room to modify deals according to their interests and large 
landowners profit more than small landowners. The decision to bring in sugar 
workers from elsewhere and to pull out from conflict-ridden areas led to a fur-
ther deterioration in the position of the rural poor. At present, short-term lease 
agreements dominate the production arrangements of Ecofuel. The company 
uses labour from both migrant and local farmworkers.
In Central Aceh, eventually, the commercially viable investment made in a 
Singaporean owned sugar plant thrived under free-market conditions. Critical 
junctures were again the co-optation of national and local governments and 
the existence of converging development agendas; a shift to market-based 
approaches, which curbed the opposition of farmers already producing sugar 
cane in combination with the ability of the foreign company to adopt a flexible 
and phased business plan; the provision of land by the district government; 
and the availability of cheap labour and an experienced workforce. Where 
government investments failed due to mismanagement and as a result of con-
tradictory food and energy policies in Central Aceh, once again the flexible 
adaptation of the foreign investors turned out to be crucial for penetrating the 
sugar area. The company did not intervene in the existing situation of local 
land control. Instead, it adopted a phased business plan that allowed it to rely 
on local supply for its initial production and only demanded large tracts of 
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land in the next phases of its business expansion plan. In the end, the state 
was largely absent; its attempt at involvement having failed due to mismanage-
ment, conflicting national policies and poor adherence to market laws.
In Bener Meriah, Aceh, Indonesia, implementation of the investment 
scheme turned out to be much more of a struggle, filled with unexpected turns 
and moves in which local and regional governmental figures used agricultural 
investments to enhance political control and to cater to private gains. At most 
of the junctures conflicts could not be solved and antagonism prevailed. The 
power play of local authorities and the political, legal, and ethnic complexi-
ties present made foreign investors move out quickly. Government investment 
served other political goals than inclusive development and reconstruction 
agendas and the interventions were not market driven. However, when the 
agricultural investments did unfold, new opportunities were created and other 
parties came in, eager to profit from cheap available land, the introduction of 
improved cane varieties, and favourable post-conflict business circumstances. 
For indigenous Gayonese, small and medium-sized investors, and ethnic Gayo 
elites and bureaucrats, the outcomes of the agricultural development initia-
tives were rather sweet, and investments ended up being quite profitable, 
although these benefits were unevenly distributed among them.
For former landowners and pre-war inhabitants from various ethnic back-
grounds, however, sugar cane investments provide a bitter outcome since most 
of them were excluded from these new opportunities. Meanwhile, for newly 
resettled Javanese settlers, the outcomes were rather ambiguous since only 
a few have been able to build up savings—from their participation in sugar 
cane programmes—with which to purchase land, thus becoming indepen-
dent farmers. The state is significantly involved throughout the process, but 
juggles security interests, local power plays, and private interests. As a result, 
contestation and conflict were paramount at almost all the critical junctures 
and continued over longer periods of time, frustrating foreign investments but 
favouring ad hoc coalitions of local elites, small farmers, and local authorities.
8 Conclusion
Investments are usually understood to involve contracts, and contracts to 
involve two parties. As the cases described in this chapter show, in agricul-
tural commodity investments in Asia, the reality is much more complex and 
investments are processes. Many more actors are involved and results locally 
differ from the original intentions of the government parties and investors 
who signed the contracts. Investors often operate as joint ventures, conjoined 
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with local companies, brokers, and elites. It is typically national or provincial 
governments that facilitate deals and make land available to investors; but after 
that, other government bodies are involved, with different roles and interests. 
In the process of negotiations and adaptations to local agro-ecological circum-
stances and political realities, an increasing number of actors play a role. As a 
result, the investment process becomes unclear and outcomes are often unex-
pected and not always sweet.
Hence, while the investments and agricultural development projects rep-
resented a common arena of negotiation for all groups involved in the Isabela 
and Central Aceh cases, and while respective national biofuel and food secu-
rity policies provided a common ground for legitimation, the different actors 
used very different frames of reference to guide their social interaction and 
the rationalisation of their actions. Where in the Philippines free-market nar-
ratives and strong anti-liberalist opposition dominated the debate, in Bener 
Meriah, Aceh, government investments proved essentially to be a fight over 
territory and people—a continuation of the war by other means. The specific 
outcomes of the sugar cane interventions thus have a great deal to do with sub-
national power dynamics mediated by local elites with strong political and 
economic interests and, in the case of the Philippines, by farmers’ resistance.
The three case studies discussed in this chapter show how local tensions 
and circumstances, as well as conflicts, enable the specific outcomes of invest-
ments. In each case, the outcomes did not evolve exactly as planned. Moreover, 
local forces and power constellations also significantly influence the outcomes 
of investment schemes. Key junctures are control of the development agenda; 
collaboration between investors and the government; land deal making and 
control over land; control of labour; elite and bureaucratic cooperation; and 
curbing resistance. Our analysis makes clear that this is not a case of com-
panies versus local people, but is rather a much more complex web of inter-
ests and struggles in which government parties can play different roles. Our 
analysis also shows the differential outcomes of investments in terms of con-
trol over land, territory, and labour, and of resources divided and distributed 
among multiple stakeholders; a series of battles over land, labour, and capi-
tal, culminating in a sequence of critical junctures. If agreement is reached at 
one juncture, interests can still be divided at another, critically determining 
the direction of the intervention. Further research should therefore examine 
the identification and comparison of such critical junctures and the possibili-
ties for policies to monitor the process by focusing on these junctures. Our 
conclusions emphasise the unpredictability of intervention processes, as the 
outcomes of investment deals are far from clear at the start. We believe that 
understanding the processual nature of land deals and the identification of 
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critical junctures have important implications for investment policies and 
land deal governance. A clear focus on critical junctures in this process will 
make adaptive and processual policies possible. Which might, in turn, make 
possible transforming some of the bitter consequences of interventions into 
sweeter realities along the way.
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CHAPTER 6
Marginal Land or Marginal People? Analysing 
Patterns and Processes of Large-Scale Land 
Acquisitions in South-East Asia
Peter Messerli, Amaury Peeters, Oliver Schoenweger, Vong Nanhthavong, 
and Andreas Heinimann
Abstract
This chapter aims to overcome the gap existing between case study research, which 
typically provides qualitative and process-based insights, and national or global inven-
tories that typically offer spatially explicit and quantitative analysis of broader patterns, 
and thus to present adequate evidence for policymaking regarding large-scale land 
acquisitions. Therefore, the chapter links spatial patterns of land acquisitions to under-
lying implementation processes of land allocation. Methodologically linking the 
described patterns and processes proved difficult, but we have identified indicators that 
could be added to inventories and monitoring systems to make linkage possible. 
Combining complementary approaches in this way may help to determine where pol-
icy space exists for more sustainable governance of land acquisitions, both geographi-
cally and with regard to processes of agrarian transitions. Our spatial analysis revealed 
two general patterns: (i) relatively large forestry-related acquisitions that target forested 
landscapes and often interfere with semi-subsistence farming systems; and (ii) smaller 
agriculture-related acquisitions that often target existing cropland and also interfere 
with semi-subsistence systems. Furthermore, our meta-analysis of land acquisition 
implementation processes shows that authoritarian, top-down processes dominate. 
Initially, the demands of powerful regional and domestic investors tend to override 
socio-ecological variables, local actors’ interests, and land governance mechanisms. As 
available land grows scarce, however, and local actors gain experience dealing with land 
acquisitions, it appears that land investments begin to fail or give way to more inclusive, 
bottom-up investment models.
1 Introduction
A growing body of scientific evidence on large-scale land acquisitions (LSLAs) 
is helping to inform the heated debate regarding this rapidly unfolding 
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phenomenon. Some researchers—particularly those using qualitative, in-
depth case studies—have examined land-acquisition processes within the 
dynamics of agrarian change and larger political-economic shifts. Other 
researchers have striven to establish quantitative inventories of LSLAs to 
improve our understanding of the scale and dimensions of land acquisitions 
at the national (Görgen et al., 2009; Schönweger et al., 2012; Üllenberg, 2009), 
regional (Friis and Reenberg, 2010), or global level (Anseeuw et al., 2012; Cotula, 
2012; Deininger and Byerlee, 2011). Based on such inventories, the World Bank 
has deemed 445 million hectares (ha) of land worldwide to be ‘marginal land’ 
that could benefit from agricultural investments because it is not forested 
or under protection and has population densities below 25 people per km2 
(Deininger and Byerlee, 2011).
Both qualitative case-based approaches and quantitative inventory-based 
approaches have persistently met with difficulties and criticism when it comes 
to guiding policy on land investments. While case studies focussing on specific 
local contexts are good at capturing processes and interactions, they have lim-
ited geographical validity and are typically ill-suited to generalising and inform-
ing policy at higher spatial levels (Anseeuw et al., 2012; Messerli et al., 2013). 
By contrast, regional and global inventories based on quantitative approaches 
are useful for making large comparisons, but frequently lack insight into pro-
cesses and fail to account for variety and differentiation; they have also been 
criticised for relying on faulty or incomplete data sources and for lacking veri-
fication on the ground (Edelman, 2013; Oya, 2013). Similarly, hasty assessments 
about unused or underused ‘marginal’ land have been consistently refuted by 
intensive case study research (Borras Jr. et al., 2011; Dwyer, 2013; Nalepa and 
Bauer, 2012). This research has shown that land targeted by international land 
deals is often not idle at all, but rather is subject to claims and is used by peo-
ple who are increasingly being marginalised by processes of globalization.
From a policy perspective, it remains a point of dispute whether or to 
what extent LSLAs target marginal land and/or create marginalised pop-
ulations. Overall, the policy-related evidence provided by researchers 
appears ambiguous and often contradictory. Because of this, recent pro-
posals have recommended bringing together country-level and case-based 
research approaches, taking advantage of conceptual and methodological 
complementarities (Messerli et al., 2013; Scoones et al., 2013). Such a research 
agenda would aim at linking patterns of quantitative, place-based (spatially 
referenced) assessments of LSLAs to insights from processes-based, frequently 
qualitative case studies.
Supplying useful scientific evidence for decision-making and policy making 
has also proven difficult in South-East Asia. Here, LSLAs have emerged mainly 
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as a regional phenomenon, contrasting somewhat with the ‘land rush’ in 
Africa and Latin America where global drivers are seen as especially impor-
tant (Anseeuw et al., 2012). Such acquisitions reflect a broader picture of agri-
cultural and societal transformation, characterised by a rapid shift away from 
rural subsistence-oriented agriculture in favour of more urbanised societies 
and industrialised, market-based forms of land use. Often termed ‘agrarian 
transition’ (De Koninck, 2004; Rigg, 2006), this transformation comprises many 
simultaneously occurring processes such as agricultural intensification and ter-
ritorial expansion, market-based economic integration, rural-urban migration, 
new forms of regulations governing agricultural production, and urbanisation. 
None of these processes necessarily follow a linear path and their pace differs 
from place to place. Rural transformation processes vary considerably across 
the region and across different scales, making it difficult to properly concep-
tualise and understand changes in the Asian countryside as they occur (Rigg, 
2005). LSLAs have led to highly dissimilar outcomes from one place to another. 
Thus, using single case studies or locally obtained empirical results to formu-
late regional or national policy is highly problematic.
This paper focuses on land investments in Laos and Cambodia. The land 
resources in both countries are under significant pressure from LSLAs, espe-
cially as a result of foreign direct investment by neighbouring riparian coun-
tries. Our overall goal is to identify distinct spatio-temporal patterns of LSLAs 
across the two countries and to attempt to link them to recurrent or archetypal 
processes of implementation of land deals from concession granting to the 
final allocation of land. This encompasses two primary objectives: (1) meth-
odologically, we aim to explore and illustrate how quantitative, place-based 
(spatial) analysis of land investments can be linked to process-based, quali-
tative studies; (2) as regards content, we aim to improve—based on better 
methodology—the generalisation of evidence on LSLAs for policymaking and 
decision-making.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we describe our methodol-
ogy and the results of analysing spatial patterns of LSLAs based on country-
level inventories. Here, we focus on the origin of the investors, on crop 
types, and on geographical target contexts (including social and ecological 
characteristics). In section 3, we describe how we used a meta-analysis of case 
studies to identify key factors of LSLA implementation processes and recurrent 
linkages between these key factors. Based on these recurrent linkages, we pro-
pose four so-called archetypes of land acquisitions as the basis for a working 
typology of implementation processes. Finally, in section 4 we discuss whether 
and to what extent spatial patterns of land deals can be related to archetypes of 
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implementation processes in order to improve the validity and generalisation 
of research results for policymaking purposes.
2 Analysing Spatial Patterns of LSLAs in Laos and Cambodia
2.1 Materials and Methods
In both Laos and Cambodia, national databases of LSLAs have been gradually 
built using different information sources furnished by different agencies and 
initiatives. In Laos, the bulk of data was collected through an inventory of land 
concessions and leases (from the local level to the national level) conducted 
between 2007 and 2010, with additional updates and data cleaning occurring in 
2012 (Schönweger et al., 2012). Only 50 per cent of the granted deals collected 
in this inventory were spatially referenced. For the purpose of our analysis, 
only the spatially referenced deals were used, encompassing 597,600 ha of land 
(out of 1.1 million ha, in total, of granted land concessions and leases).
The Cambodian database was drawn together from a variety of information 
sources. It includes official data gathered by Open Development Cambodia 
(ODC, 2013); data from LICADHO (2013); data from NGO Forum (2012); and data 
from the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries of Cambodia (2012); as 
well as our own field data. The resulting database combines data on land conces-
sions (with spatial-reference data) comprising 490 deals that cover 4.5 million ha; 
the most recent updates and data cleaning took place in September 2013.
Using these unique data sets, we conducted a descriptive analysis looking at 
investors’ country of origin, the intended purpose of the deal (by sub-sector), 
and the date of approval for each land deal. To gain some initial insights into 
the national-level characteristics of land acquisitions in Laos and Cambodia, 
we compared the geo-referenced land-deal data with other important spatially 
referenced country-level data sets, in particular those on poverty incidence, 
accessibility to provincial capitals, and land cover. Because the national land 
cover data sets for Laos and Cambodia were not comparable (due to differ-
ing methods and classifications), globally available data were used from the 
GlobCover 2009 land classification (Arino, 2010). We calculated the acces-
sibility of provincial capitals (i.e. travel time in minutes) with cost–distance 
algorithms in ArcGis 10, using national road data sets, digital elevation mod-
els, land cover data, and main rivers as inputs (Messerli et al., 2008). For 
Laos, we used village-level poverty data—from Epprecht et al. (2008)—that 
were calculated using small-area estimation based on figures from the 2005 
Lao Population and Housing Census and the 2003 Lao Expenditure and 
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Consumption Survey (LECS) III. For Cambodia, poverty measures were derived 
from the Identification of Poor Households Programme data set (Kingdom of 
Cambodia, 2012) and the Commune Database (NCCD, 2012) for 2008–2010.
2.2 Spatial Patterns of LSLAs in Laos and Cambodia
2.2.1 Dimensions and Scale of LSLAs
An openness to private investment in the form of land concessions has been 
present in the economic development policies of both countries for many 
years. In Cambodia, a new legal framework was adopted for land investment in 
2001; the same occurred in Laos in 2003. In both countries, a series of additional 
laws and decrees have reinforced and concretised the trend towards private 
land investment (NAoL, 2004; GoL 2008; RGC, 2005). Investors’ responses have 
not been slow in coming, giving rise to a veritable ‘land rush’ in both countries. 
The countries’ respective governments have also made private investments in 
land an explicit part of their official development strategies and policies. But 
the growing scale and pace of land concessions have proven highly challeng-
ing to govern properly, sparking criticism both locally and internationally. The 
total number of concessions granted in Laos increased fiftyfold between 2000 
and 2009, rising steeply after 2005 (Figure 6.1). In Cambodia, there was also a 
FIGURE 6.1 Trends of land concessions granted in Cambodia and Laos.
 Note: Figures for Cambodia do not include mining concessions, as no information 
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sharp increase in land deals after 2005. The most impressive observation, how-
ever, remains that—starting in 2000—it took only eight years to double the 
area granted to investors, from 0.5 million ha in 2000 to over 1 million ha in 
2008, and only another four years to double it again, reaching over 2 million 
hectares in 2012.
Despite the announcement of moratoriums on new land concessions in 
Laos (2007, 2009, and 2012) and Cambodia (2012), these deals play a major role 
in the economies of each country and will continue to do so based on the sheer 
size of existing deals. Today, Laos has already granted approximately 2,640 land 
concessions for 1.1 million ha (Schönweger et al., 2012), while Cambodia has 
granted about 490 concessions for 4.5 million ha, including mining concessions. 
Notably, land granted as concessions or leases constitutes around 5 per cent 
of the territory of Laos and around 25 per cent of the territory of Cambodia.
2.2.2 Spatial Distribution of LSLAs
While land investments are spread throughout the two countries, there are 
regions where they are more clustered and more highly concentrated in terms 
of land area used (Figure 6.2): in the north of Laos, in the north and the north-
east of Cambodia, and also in the south-western region of Cambodia. With 
regard to the origin of investors, domestic investments play an important role 
in terms of the absolute number of deals in both countries. These domestic 
investments are distributed in a similar manner to foreign investments across 
each country.
2.2.3 Investors and Main Sub-Sectors Behind LSLAs
While in Cambodia domestic deals account for almost 50 per cent of the entire 
land area granted, in Laos they account for less than 15 per cent (Table 6.1). 
Consequently, domestic investors in Laos have much smaller deals (by area) 
on average. Non-domestic investments are dominated in both contexts by the 
following neighbouring countries: China, Vietnam, and Thailand. The prox-
imity of areas to country of origin of the investors who invest in those areas 
partly explains the distribution of these regional investments (Figure 6.2). 
Investments from foreign countries outside the region, aggregated here under 
the category ‘international’, only represent small shares (by area and number) 
of the remaining concessions (Table 6.1).
In terms of the intended purpose of deals, the forestry sub-sector—includ-
ing all forms of tree crops (mainly rubber, eucalyptus, and teak)—outweighs 
the agricultural sub-sector in both countries based on land area used: the 
figures are 15,157 km² (forestry) versus 2,813 km² (agriculture) in Cambodia; 
and 2,878 km² (forestry) versus 834 km² (agriculture) in Laos. Again, regional 
investors from neighbouring countries are the main source of forestry-related 
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FIGURE 6.2  Investment project locations in Laos (above) and Cambodia (below) by investors’ 
countries of origin and by subsectors.
Source: compiled based on Schönweger et al. (2012), ODC (2013), 
LICADHO (2013), NGO Forum (2012), and our own data collection.
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land deals in both countries taken together (53 per cent of deals), with domes-
tic investors also being very important in Cambodia (44 per cent of deals). 
International investors hold only 11 per cent of all forestry concessions in both 
countries combined. Agriculture-related land deals are generally smaller than 
forestry-related land deals. Agriculture-related investments are dominated by 
regional (40 per cent of deals) and domestic stakeholders (39 per cent of deals) 
in Laos and Cambodia combined; international investors account for another 
21 per cent of agriculture-related deals. It is also important to note the signifi-
cance of the mining sector in Laos, as it accounts for the biggest share of land 
(92 per cent) among the sub-sectors classified under ‘Other’ for that country 
(Table 6.1).
2.2.4 Geographic Contexts of Land Acquisitions at the National Level
Overlaying our map of land deals with earlier land cover data revealed some 
interesting spatial patterns. Overall, land concessions are mainly granted in 
forested landscapes (42 per cent) and in landscape mosaics of forest, shrub-
land, and grassland (39 per cent); in Laos, such landscape mosaics have histori-
cally been the site of small-scale (mainly shifting) cultivation. Other general 
patterns emerging in both countries are that forestry-related concessions (e.g. 
tree plantations) tend to be granted in forested landscapes, while deals with 
an agricultural focus tend to be granted in landscapes of existing cropland. In 
Laos, agriculture-related concessions are twice as likely to be granted in crop-
land landscapes than in other types of landscapes.
Moreover, our spatial analysis reveals that the vast majority of investments 
are located in relatively easily accessible areas. Concessions in agriculture are 
the closest to provincial capitals in both countries, with an average travel time 
of two hours. Forestry concessions come next with an average travel time of 
two hours and 41 minutes to provincial capitals. Finally, concessions in other 
sub-sectors average over four hours of travel time—this especially reflects the 
importance of mining concessions in Laos, which must be situated where min-
eral deposits are located, of course, regardless of how remote that situation 
is. In Laos, land concessions tend to be more accessible than in Cambodia. 
Nevertheless, the main investors (domestic, Chinese, and Vietnamese) also run 
projects in very remote areas of both countries.
2.2.5 Summarising Patterns of Forestry- and Agriculture-Related LSLAs
Laos and Cambodia have both experienced a sharp increase in LSLAs over the 
past decade, corresponding to a fiftyfold increase in the number of land deals 
in Laos and a fourfold increase in the area granted in Cambodia. The land 
acquisitions in Laos are smaller in size but greater in number, and in Cambodia 
fewer but larger. Our analysis of the geography of LSLAs in both countries 
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revealed some key commonalities and differences. Aware of the risks of over-
simplification, we nevertheless identified and defined the following general 
patterns and socio-ecological contexts of LSLAs.
First, forestry is the most important concession-related sub-sector in 
Cambodia and Laos based on the amount of land involved. Investors from 
neighbouring countries—especially Vietnam and China—play a bigger role in 
these forestry-related concessions than do international investors from outside 
the region. In Cambodia, domestic investors also play a key role in this sub-
sector. Forestry-related concessions are typically granted for large, contiguous 
plots of land, often relatively close to borders of riparian countries. In most 
cases, these plots are located in landscapes previously classified as ‘forest’; this 
suggests that investors may also see opportunities to extract value from tim-
ber obtained when clearing and preparing investment plots for their ‘intended 
purpose’. In Laos, the areas where forestry concessions are located exhibit 
the highest poverty rates of all areas affected by LSLAs, while in Cambodia, 
forestry deals are in average below the national mean but concern less poor 
areas compared to agricultural deals. The agrarian systems affected are partly 
subsistence farming systems but more often semi-subsistence systems because 
their relatively good accessibility enables farmers to diversify their activities to 
include growing commercial crops or earning off-farm income.
Second, agriculture is the next most important concession-related sub-
sector. Domestic and regional investors both play an important role in this 
sub-sector. Agricultural concessions are typically smaller in size than forestry 
concessions but are somewhat more accessible. In Laos, they tend to occur 
in areas displaying lower poverty incidence. Though some agricultural con-
cessions target areas classified as forests, they more frequently target existing 
croplands and thus affect populations practicing lifestyles of semi-subsistence, 
commercial agriculture, and/or off-farm activities.
3 Analysing Patterns of LSLA Implementation Processes
After identifying these general patterns and socio-ecological contexts of land 
acquisitions, we sought to distinguish the different types of implementation 
processes that steer such acquisitions. We defined implementation processes 
as encompassing all phases, from the initial negotiation of a land concession to 
the final allocation of land in specific socio-ecological contexts. Our process-
based analyses comprised three steps: (i) conducting case studies on different 
types of LSLAs in order to understand the actors, activities, and institutions 
that guide the implementation of land deals; (ii) conducting a meta-analysis 
of these case studies in which we identified common key factors and analysed 
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their role in the implementation process; (iii) pinpointing and examining 
recurrent linkages between the key factors in an effort to distinguish arche-
types of LSLA implementation processes as part of a broader typology. The 
following section describes each of these steps. While it provides a detailed 
account of the specific set of methods used and the results obtained, the case 
studies are initially described only briefly (number and type), as we wish to 
focus more attention on how they were used in our meta-analysis.
3.1 Case Studies on Implementation Processes of LSLAs
Our meta-analysis draws on 15 case studies primarily conducted as Master’s the-
sis projects between 2011 and 2013 in Laos and Cambodia, as part of a broader 
research project (Michel, 2013; Sommer, 2013; Zurflueh, 2013). Each case study 
focused on a separate company that sought to acquire land in order to invest 
in a specific crop. The case studies were designed to improve our understand-
ing of land-deal implementation processes over time (from negotiations to 
allocation of land) and across different scales, whether spatial or administra-
tive. Each was conceptually based on a human actor model that differenti-
ates the activities and agency of actors from the dynamic conditions of action 
and the intuitions in which actions are embedded (Wiesmann et al., 2011). The 
case studies were selected based on national inventories of land investments in 
Cambodia (LICADHO, 2013; ODC, 2013) and Laos (Schönweger et al., 2012) using 
factors such as crop type, investor origin, and size of concession area as sample 
criteria. A total of 22 case studies in seven Lao provinces and 8 case studies in 
two Cambodian provinces were conducted; of these, 15 were included in our 
meta-analysis (see Table 6.2).
3.2 Meta-Analysis of Case Studies on LSLA Implementation Processes
3.2.1 Identification of Key Factors
In general terms, our meta-analysis corresponds to an a posteriori compari-
son of already published case studies (Lambin and Geist, 2006). However, our 
approach differs from many meta-analyses in land science that investigate 
land use decision-making based on comparison of predefined direct or indi-
rect drivers. Because each of our case studies followed a conceptual design 
based on a human actor model (Wiesmann et al., 2011), they revealed numer-
ous interrelations between actors, actions, conditions of actions, and institu-
tions. In order to maintain this broad range of important variables and also to 
focus our analysis on the most relevant, recurrent interactions, we performed 
a sensitivity analysis for each case study as a basis for our meta-analysis. 
The sensitivity model for the analysis of dynamic systems was initially devel-
oped by Vester and Hesler (1987), and then further adapted for the analysis of 
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socio-ecological systems by Messerli (2000). It initially requires researchers to 
define a set of key factors that: (i) are representative of the social, political, 
economic, and environmental dimensions of the system; and (ii) capture key 
interactions between these factors occurring in the system.
This narrowing down of key factors was discussed and carried out together 
with the researchers who conducted the original case studies. We defined three 
general domains considered to be important mutual conditions of action in 
the LSLA implementation process: the domain of land investment, the domain 
of land governance, and the domain of the socio-ecological context. For each of 
these domains, we then chose eight key factors covering relevant components 
of the human actor model and corresponding to the criteria mentioned above 
in (i) and (ii). Table 6.3 lists all 24 key factors identified across the three general 
domains, specifying their quality and rationale.
TABLE 6.2 Case studies used for the meta-analysis of LSLA implementation processes
Crop Investors’ 
origin
Company Location (Province) Area granted 
(ha)
Rubber China Ruifeng Luangnamtha 10,000
Lilieng Vientiane Prov. 2,500
Rongxieng Savannakhet 2,407
Guangda Savannakhet 1,800
Vietnam Daklak Attapeu, Champasack 10,000
Hoang Anh Ya Lay Attapeu 10,000
Ho Chi Minh Youth Attapeu, Champasack 6,000
Viet Lao Rubber 
Joint Stock
Champasack 10,000












Japan Oji Lao Khammuane 50,000
Coffee Singapore Outspan Champasack 2,900
Thailand Paksong Highland Champasack 3,100
Sugar cane Thailand Mitr Lao Savannakhet 10,000
Source: Authors.
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TABLE 6.3 Key factors in LSLA implementation processes














1. Origin of investors Country of origin
2. Type of crop Intention of investment
3. Time of investment Year when land was allocated
4. Access to political power Investors’ access to political power including 
historical ties and political backing in host 
country and country of origin
5. Access to cheap labour 
force
Perceived and actual availability and price of 
labour force
6. Size of company Overall power of company including access to 
capital and stock exchange
7. CSR commitment Investors’ commitments to corporate social 
and environmental sustainability and a good 
reputation















9. Economic growth 
strategies
Government endeavours to push economic 
growth through regional integration and 
foreign direct investment (FDI) in land
10. Policies related to land Includes policies related to shifting cultivation, 
land use planning, infrastructure development, 
relocation, etc.
11. Top-down granting of 
concessions
Central level officials granting concessions and 
delegating implementation to lower 
administrative levels
12. Power of district/
provincial officials
Power of provincial and district officials 
actively involved in granting rights and support 
to investors
13. Experience with LSLAs Decision makers’ prior experience of LSLAs
14. Patronage and corruption Patronage and corruption among different 
stakeholders and also across sectors and levels
15. Land tenure insecurity Legal pluralism and relative power differentials 
of institutions governing land access and land 
use rights
16. Land surveys Companies and/or government collecting 
information on land, involved stakeholders, 
and possible impacts
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17. Available and suitable 
land
Land availability as perceived by local people 
or as constructed by powerful actors and 
policies
18. Land cover and land use Pre-existing land use and land cover in areas 
targeted for land investments
19. Logging Logging prior to investment is often seen as an 
important incentive for investors or/and 
authorities involved
20. Biophysical factors and 
topography
Opportunities to acquire large and connected 
plots of land; biophysical factors influencing 
suitability such as soil, climate, altitude
21. Historical ties Confidence of rural population and local 
authorities in investors from neighbouring 
regions and countries based on a shared 
history
22. Capability and assets of 
villagers
Includes factors of well-being/poverty and 
ethnicity, as well as social relations, networks, 
etc. of villagers and their representatives
23. Accessibility Accessibility in travel time to nearby city 
centres, processing factories, and border 
crossings. Defined by topography, 
infrastructure, and land use
24. Land allocation Final identification and allocation of land to 
the investor as a new land user
Source: Authors.
3.2.2 Meta-Analysis of Case Studies and Role of Key Factors
Having defined domains and representative sets of key factors, we were then 
able to focus in a comparative manner on our main object of interest: the 
diverse interactions between these key factors. For each case study, we assessed 
any possible interactions between the 24 key factors in either direction (i.e. 
influencing or being influenced). Referring back to the original research results 
of every case study, we assessed any possible interaction between any two 
factors. Based on their knowledge of the case-study settings, the researchers 
involved rated each possible interaction between key factors on a scale from 
absent (0), through weak (0.5) and moderate (1.0), to strong (2.0). This rating 
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system enabled us to calculate the average strength of an interaction between 
any two key factors across all 15 case studies.
The matrix in Figure 6.3 summarises the most important interactions 
observed in each of the 15 case studies (shaded in dark gray). For example, 
reading across row 1 we see that the key factor (KF) Origin of Investor (KF 
1) has a direct and strong influence on Access to Political Power (KF 4) and 
on the Size of Concession (KF 8). Similarly, reading down column 17 we see 
that Available Land (KF 17) is influenced by various key factors from differ-
ent domains, including: Type of Crop (KF 2), Time of Investment (KF 3), and 
Size of Concession (KF 8) from the land investment domain; Policies Related 
to Land (KF 10), Land Tenure Insecurity (KF 15), and Land Surveys (KF 16) 
from the governance domain; and Capability and Assets of Villagers (KF 22), 
Accessibility (KF 23), etc. from the domain of socio-ecological context. Among 
other things, this powerfully demonstrates that, in practice, ‘available land’ 
(KF 17) cannot be observed strictly by means of remote sensing or according to 
environmental indicators; rather, it is something that is constructed based on 
power relations between actors and according to relevant policies.
Beyond looking at influences from a first factor on a second factor, we can 
use the matrix to examine how a second factor influences a third factor, and so 
on. This makes it possible to describe whole chains of interactions. For exam-
ple, the Time of Investment (KF 3) is seen to strongly influence the Power of 
District/Provincial Officials (KF 12); indeed, during the early years of conces-
sion granting, alliances between provincial officials and investors flourished, 
and land deals did not require national-level approval. Provincial officials (KF 
12), in turn, strongly influence the way Land Surveys are conducted (KF 16). As 
a consequence, provincial officials are able to define Available Land (KF 17) 
according to their own interests and those of investors. Finally, this definition 
of Available Land (KF 17) determines Land Allocation (KF 24) and the granting 
of contiguous plots and large Sizes of Concessions (KF 8).
Perhaps of even greater interest from a policy perspective is to identify 
which key factors play the biggest role in particular outcomes of the LSLA 
implementation process. Our meta-analysis provides information on the gen-
eral role played by each factor, in particular how strongly each factor interacts 
with others in the system and whether it exerts or is subject to more influence 
overall. To this end, we calculated: (i) the sum of the influences that each factor 
exerts (referred to as the active sum, or AS, for each row), and (ii) the sum of the 
influences that each factor is subject to (referred to as the passive sum, or PS, for 
each column). By comparing the active sum of any given factor with its passive 
sum, we can calculate its activity ratio (AR=AS/PS)—that is, whether and to 
what extent it exerts a greater influence than it is subject to. In addition, it is 
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very useful to calculate how strongly each factor interacts with other factors. 
This can be done by multiplying the active sum by the passive sum to arrive at 
the total strength of interaction (IR =AS*PS).
Next, we identified all the factors that display activity ratios where the 
active sum outweighs the passive sum (AS/PS >1). These factors may be seen 
as having the biggest influence on the outcomes of the implementation pro-
cess. In the land investment domain, these factors comprise Origin of Investor 
(KF 1), Type of Crop (KF 2), Time of Investment (KF 3), and Size of Company 
(KF 6). Indeed, the case studies we analysed showed that large companies—
mainly from Vietnam and China—that arrived early and invested in forestry 
concessions (e.g. rubber, eucalyptus) were generally able to obtain large plots 
of land, where they wanted them, with little to no resistance or administrative 
obstacles. By contrast, relatively small companies and latecomers experienced 
significantly more problems and were required to cooperate with district 
officials, to conduct land surveys, and to negotiate the allocation of smaller 
plots of land with villagers. In the land governance domain, the most influ-
ential key factors comprise national-level Economic Growth Strategies (KF 9) 
and Policies Related to Land (KF 10), as well as different actors’ Experience 
with LSLAs (KF 13). In the socio-ecological context domain, only Accessibility 
(KF 23) of urban centres appears to play an influential role; Biophysical Factors 
(KF 20) and Historical Ties (KF 21) exhibit positive activity ratios but appear 
only weakly interrelated.
Finally, we identified all the factors that display activity ratios where the 
passive sum outweighs the active sum (AS/PS<1) but which are highly inter-
related. These factors may not have the power to influence the outcomes of 
the implementation process; however, because they are strongly influenced 
by many other factors, they serve as useful indicators of the type of imple-
mentation process in question. The most important of these indicative factors 
are the quantity and quality of Available Land (KF 17) and Land Allocation 
(KF 24), which vary substantially depending on whether the corresponding 
implementation process occurs in a more authoritarian/top-down or par-
ticipatory/bottom-up manner. Further, Size of Concession (KF 8) serves as an 
excellent indicator of the type of implementation process, since careful nego-
tiations and planning processes usually result in more fragmented, modestly 
sized plots than originally anticipated or desired by investors. Lastly, the fol-
lowing factors serve as useful indicators of the monitoring of the implementa-
tion process—that is to say, in terms of the role they play: the type and quality 
of Land Surveys conducted (KF 16), the role attributed to pre-existing Land 
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Use (KF 18), and the Capability and Assets of Villagers (KF 22). The fact that 
villagers’ capabilities only serve as an indicator and not as an influential fac-
tor suggests that villagers’ empowerment is subject to very real constraints. 
Indeed, from a systemic perspective, other factors have a much bigger role in 
the outcome of LSLA implementation processes.
3.3 Archetypes of LSLA Implementation Processes and Resulting Typology
As shown above, our meta-analysis enabled generalisation, based on 15 case 
studies, of the importance of different key factors in the LSLA implementation 
process. As we have also seen, however, the interactions between these factors 
display different qualities and levels of strength, involve feedback mechanisms 
and chain-like effects, and ultimately lead to different outcomes. In an effort to 
account for such differentiations in our meta-analysis, we looked for recurrent 
linkages between the key factors, links that may point to archetypal patterns. 
So defined, the resulting archetypes could provide the basis for a working 
typology of LSLA implementation processes.
For this purpose, we analysed how the three main domains of the implemen-
tation processes—namely, land investment, land governance, and socio-ecolog-
ical context—influenced each other. For example, do the combined factors 
from the land governance domain exert a greater influence on the combined 
factors from the land investment domain or vice versa? To find out, we anal-
ysed the matrix of influences for every case study (Figure 6.3) and calculated 
the balance of influences between any two domains of the implementation 
process. Our analysis of all 15 case studies revealed four distinct archetypes in 
terms of the way the main domains influence each other (Figure 6.4). They are 
detailed below.
3.3.1 Archetype 1: Marginal People
Our analysis of the interrelations between the selected key factors revealed the 
following pattern among eight of the 15 case studies: a net influence exerted 
by the domains of land governance and land investment, respectively, on the 
domain of the socio-ecological context; and, at the same time, a net influence 
exerted by land investment on the land governance domain (observe the direc-
tions of the arrows in the outer ring of Figure 6.5). Based on this shared pat-
tern, we posit an implementation-process archetype we refer to as ‘Marginal 
People’: land acquisitions in this category are essentially steered by the claims 
of powerful external actors, irrespective of local realities, thus exploiting and 
exacerbating the weak position of marginalised populations.
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For the majority of the case studies in this category, analysis of the recurrent 
interactions between key factors (Figure 6.5) reveals strong ties in the land 
investment domain. Origin of Investor (KF 1)—typically neighbouring coun-
tries such as Vietnam, China, or Thailand—is positively correlated with the 
Size of Company (KF 6) and has a favourable influence on investors’ Access 
to Political Power (KF 4). In many cases, strong alliances were established 
between investors and provincial authorities on either side of nearby national 
borders. These factors, corresponding to strong political and economic back-
ing, in turn influence the intended Size of Concession (KF 8)—relatively large 
in these case studies (44,500 ha for pulp concessions and 10,000 ha for rubber 
concessions, on average). The strengths of the land investment domain led to 
FIGURE 6.5 Archetype ‘Marginal People’.
 Note: Recurrent interactions among key factors in LSLA implementation 
processes (displaying an average rating ≥ 1.25). The outer arrows indicate 
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recurrent influences on both the domain of socio-ecological context and on the 
domain of land governance. Notably, the definition of Available and Suitable 
Land (KF 17) appears to be defined by the Type of Crop (KF 2) and on the Size 
of Concession (KF 8) requested. Further, the efficient Top-Down Granting of 
Concessions (KF 11) corresponds to investors who arrived early on. Due to their 
lack of Experience with LSLAs (KF 13), local authorities and villagers could be 
easily swayed by empty promises. While key factors of the local socio-ecological 
context may influence the definition of Available and Suitable Land (KF 17) 
to a certain degree, they have limited influence on the Time of Investment 
(KF 3), Type of Crop (KF 2), or Size of Concession (KF 8). At the same time, key 
factors from the land investment domain influence processes in the domain 
of land governance. Investors’ Access to Political Power (KF 4) and economic 
power corresponds to Top-Down Granting of Land Concessions (KF 11), which 
limits the Power of District/Provincial Officials (KF 12). Such access to power 
also strongly influences the conduct of Land Surveys (KF 16), contributing 
to greater Land Tenure Insecurity (KF 15). These factors together influence 
what is defined as Available and Suitable Land (KF 17) and to what degree the 
Capability and Assets of Villagers come into play (KF 22).
3.3.2 Archetype 2: Marginal Governance
Four cases of rubber investments from Chinese and Thai companies revealed 
a different pattern of recurrent interactions among key factors. While the 
net influence emerging from the land investment domain still dominates 
the influence of the socio-ecological context and the land governance domains, 
respectively, key factors in the socio-ecological context now clearly affect 
land governance. We refer to this archetype as ‘Marginal Governance’, since land 
governance here is shaped by specificities of the socio-ecological context, but 
still remains largely under the control of the land investment domain.
The recurrent interrelations of key factors in these four case studies (Fig-
ure 6.6) once again point to strong investors, namely two relatively small 
and two large companies (Ruifeng from China, and Lao Thai Hua from Thai-
land), which were initially granted concession areas of 10,000 ha and 30,000 
ha, respectively. These large investments exerted powerful influences on the 
Power of Provincial/District Officials (KF 12) and the implementation of Land 
Surveys (KF 16). In addition, the Size of Concession (KF 8), Time of Investment 
(KF 3), and Type of Crop (KF 2) dictated what land was deemed available and 
needed to be allocated.
Also notable in these cases, key factors of the socio-ecological context were 
not simply overruled by outside forces. We observe in Figure 6.6 that Available 
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Land and Suitable Land (KF 17), Land Cover and Land Use (KF 18), Capability 
and Assets of Villagers (KF 22), and Accessibility (KF 23) exerted an influence 
on the Size of Concession (KF 8) and the Power of District/Provincial Officials 
(KF 12), and shaped the outcomes of the Land Survey (KF 16). In other words, 
the definition of available land and the final allocation of land were also influ-
enced by people, by pre-existing land use, topography, and accessibility. This 
new pattern can be explained as follows: firstly, large companies with higher 
CSR standards (and a sensitivity to reputational risks), such as the Lao Thai 
Hua company, explicitly followed a bottom-up approach, paying careful atten-
tion to the context of the investment. Others, such as the Rongxieng Company, 
FIGURE 6.6 Archetype ‘Marginal Governance’.
 Note: Recurrent interactions among key factors in LSLA implementation 
processes (displaying an average rating ≥ 1.25). The outer arrows indicate 
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also adopted a more bottom-up approach, but only following initial bad 
experiences using an authoritarian approach (involving use of armed soldiers). 
The key characteristics of this archetype of implementation processes are 
strong investors who maintain control but pay careful attention to the socio-
ecological context and allow it to shape land governance. Such investors are 
willing to accept a slower LSLA implementation process, smaller concessions 
than originally planned, or the subdivision of concessions into multiple plots. 
In one case, such perceived downsides were compensated for by means of 
high-value timber-extraction activities during land clearing.
3.3.3 Archetype 3: Marginal Investments
One case study involving a Japanese pulp production company exhibited 
a unique pattern of LSLA implementation, which did not fit with the other 
archetypes. In this case, the land investment domain was clearly dominated by 
factors in the land governance and socio-ecological context domains, ultimately 
threatening the whole project. While it is only a single case, we wish to high-
light it as it may point to a unique archetype that we will refer to as ‘Marginal 
Investments’.
In this type of LSLA implementation process (Figure 6.7) the company 
experienced a very smooth start because it was able to take over a pre-existing 
concession and benefited from Access to Political Power (KF 4) through high-
level diplomatic ties. Despite its promising start, however, years have passed 
and the company continues to struggle to actually have the land allocated. 
They lack support from District/Provincial Officials (KF 12) and there is no lon-
ger enough Available and Suitable Land (KF 17) due to the earlier ‘land rush’ 
(Time of Investment—KF 3). Villagers and authorities from districts/prov-
inces have also learned from past Experience with LSLAs (KF 13) and are now 
able to negotiate better conditions for land deals. In such cases, the Capability 
and Assets of Villagers (KF 22) and local authorities—that is, their ability to 
resist coercion or financial temptations and to negotiate effectively with com-
panies and district officials—considerably influence contractual modalities 
(e.g. contract farming or concession type) and the overall terms of investment 
(e.g. land area, compensation). This has led the company in question to pur-
sue a more bottom-up approach, fulfilling CSR commitments. However, this 
approach has allowed local socio-ecological factors—pre-existing Land Cover 
and Land Use (KF 18) and lack of Available Land and Suitable Land (KF 17)—
to act as constraints, increasing the risk of investment failure. In response, 
the company recently diversified the crops it intends to produce from euca-
lyptus to a variety of agricultural products, and is conducting market and 
suitability studies.
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3.3.4 Archetype 4: Marginal Land
Finally, two case studies—involving a Vietnamese and a Chinese rubber 
investment, respectively—revealed yet another pattern of LSLA implementa-
tion. We believe these companies provide a good example of effectively tar-
geting agricultural investments towards underused land, and we refer to the 
corresponding archetype as ‘Marginal land’. In these cases: the socio-ecological 
context mainly influences land governance; land governance controls the land 
investment domain; and land investment, in turn, shapes the socio-ecological 
context (Figure 6.8).
First of all, the recurrent interactions observed between key factors indi-
cate limited economic and political power on the part of the companies 
FIGURE 6.7 Archetype ‘Marginal Investment’.
 Note: Recurrent interactions among key factors in LSLA implementation 
processes (displaying an average rating ≥ 1.25). The outer arrows indicate 
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involved. While the land investment domain had some influence on the way 
Land Surveys (KF 16) were carried out, it did not significantly influence Policies 
Related to Land (KF 10) or Top-Down Granting of Concessions (KF 11). This 
prevented the investors from manipulating aspects of land governance to their 
advantage. The search for Available and Suitable Land (KF 17) proved to be a 
very difficult endeavour for the investors. As they arrived later than other com-
panies in the respective regions, their own interests—for example, obtaining a 
large Size of Concession (KF 8) or producing a specific Type of Crop (KF 2)—
played a limited role in defining what was deemed available. They were obliged 
to negotiate locally regarding available land and, as a result, key factors of the 
FIGURE 6.8 Archetype ‘Marginal Land’.
 Note: Recurrent interactions among key factors in implementation 
processes of large-scale land acquisition (manifesting an average rating  
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socio-ecological context—such as Land Cover and Land Use (KF 18), Biophysical 
Factors and Topography (KF 20), Accessibility (KF 23), and Capability and 
Assets of Villagers (KF 22)—played a significant role. Though it was a lengthy 
and frequently complicated process, the resulting Land Allocation (KF 24) 
was the most inclusive of all those observed, with both villagers and investors 
agreeing to it. These actors then sought support in terms of land governance 
from provincial and district authorities, eventually requesting Land Surveys 
(KF 16) and formal recognition of the agreements. Ultimately, these processes 
positively influenced the implementation of Policies Related to Land (KF 10) 
and Land Tenure Insecurity (KF 15) (the latter in the sense that such insecurity 
was reduced).
4 Synthesis and Discussion
In previous sections, we have presented the results of applying two comple-
mentary approaches to the analysis of LSLAs, in an effort to provide better 
evidence for policymaking. On the one hand, we conducted a spatially refer-
enced analysis of land acquisitions in Laos and Cambodia, revealing patterns 
of investor type, investment purpose (sub-sector), and socio-ecological con-
texts. On the other, we conducted a process-based analysis of LSLA implemen-
tation, reaching from initial negotiations to the final allocation of land. This 
was done by means of a meta-analysis of case studies in which we identified 
recurrent interactions between selected key factors of LSLA implementation. 
This enabled us to identify possible archetypes that could serve as a basis for a 
working typology of LSLA implementation processes.
Both approaches are capable of generating policy-relevant information, but 
each has clear limitations on its own (discussed below). That fact brings us 
back to our guiding question: can distinct spatial patterns be tied to specific 
types of LSLA implementation processes by means of common indicators? 
This would enable observers to either interpret spatial patterns in terms of 
underlying implementation processes, or to validate and generalise case-study 
findings regarding implementation processes to inform policies at higher spa-
tial levels.
Our spatial analysis of LSLA inventories revealed two general patterns. 
(1) Numerous regional investors and some domestic investors have engaged 
in forestry sub-sectors, mainly focussing on rubber and eucalyptus or aca-
cia plantations. The corresponding concessions are generally large, contigu-
ous plots of land found in somewhat inaccessible landscapes once classified 
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as forest or shrub land. The populations affected by these concessions are 
generally poorer than the respective national poverty line of each country and 
often practice small-scale agriculture (mainly, in Laos, shifting cultivation). (2) 
A mix of regional, domestic, and some international investors have engaged 
in agricultural sub-sectors. Their concessions are generally smaller and often 
compete with pre-existing cropping mosaics cultivated by smallholders. The 
affected areas are usually relatively accessible and populated by less-poor peo-
ple in Laos and by poorer people in Cambodia.
These insights are consistent with a growing body of evidence showing that 
LSLAs are a strong driver of agrarian transition in South-East Asia (Anseeuw 
et al., 2012). LSLAs have increased exponentially, making rural areas the site 
of fierce competition over resources in settings where powerful investors 
from riparian countries play a key role (Schönweger et al., 2012). Our analy-
sis shows that optimistic assumptions about investment mainly flowing to 
‘marginal land’—that is, land that is unused yet suitable for agriculture—are 
fundamentally flawed (Borras Jr. et al., 2011; Cotula et al., 2009; Messerli et al., 
2014). Instead, land concessions are increasing resource competition, affecting 
two vulnerable groups in particular: smallholders in densely populated crop-
ping mosaics; and poorer ethnic minorities in forest mosaics where shifting 
cultivation is common. Overall, spatial, quantitative analysis of land conces-
sions clearly demonstrates that LSLAs are and will remain a driving force of 
agrarian transition in the region. Given the advanced stage of expansion into 
agricultural and forested landscapes and existing conflicts with affected land 
users, policymaking questions should no longer be limited to whether to per-
mit, prevent, or regulate the arrival of LSLAs in the area. Rather, the focus must 
increasingly shift to policies relevant to conflict resolution, labour issues, and 
outmigration as new drivers of poverty.
In view of such questions, our analysis of spatial patterns remains very 
coarse and provides insufficient differentiation. While some general correla-
tions can be posited between the origins of investors, the type of operations 
they conduct, and the socio-ecological contexts targeted, we neither under-
stand the causalities of LSLA implementation processes nor can we identify 
the precise spatio-temporal contexts with the most vulnerable environments 
and populations.
However, our meta-analysis of case studies reveals a more differentiated 
picture of the processes behind the implementation of LSLAs. The majority of 
our case studies pointed to an archetype of LSLA implementation processes 
that we have termed ‘Marginal People’. In this sort of authoritarian, top-down 
LSLA implementation process, ‘available land’ is defined less according to local 
socio-ecological factors than it is according to factors from the domains of 
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investment and land governance. Contrary to the analysis of spatial patterns, 
we found that this type of implementation process can be observed both in 
the forestry sector and in the agricultural sector, encompassing crops as varied 
as rubber, eucalyptus, coffee, and sugar cane. Also, it involved investors from 
different countries of origin, both regional and international. Closely related 
to this type of LSLA implementation is the archetype we refer to as ‘Marginal 
Governance’. It too is characterised by a strong investment domain but is some-
what shaped by the socio-ecological context, providing an empowerment to 
the socio-ecological context vis-à-vis policy pressures. Nevertheless, the eco-
nomic and political power wielded by investors means that land governance is 
ultimately constrained in its effectiveness.
The remaining case studies were attributed to two more recent types of LSLA 
implementation processes. One type we refer to as ‘Marginal Investments’, in 
which investors struggle to obtain land. Accepting that available land—as 
defined by local land users—is very scarce, and lacking government support, 
investors in this category face the very real prospect of total failure. Investors 
also face possible failure in the final archetype we identified, ‘Marginal Land’. 
This category comprises rubber companies that arrived late to the region and 
were forced to follow a more bottom-up approach in their search to find suit-
able land—by now exceedingly scarce. Their negotiations with local land users 
resulted in the most inclusive form of LSLA implementation we observed. 
After reaching an agreement about available land, villagers and investors 
jointly sought the support of district and provincial land governance institu-
tions, which in turn lent their support to the investment domain.
Our analysis of LSLA implementation processes reveals various policy-
relevant insights. First, we found that authoritarian forms of implementation 
dominate, as was suggested by the spatial patterns identified earlier. However, 
in contrast to our initial spatial observations, we found that investors from 
other countries besides Vietnam and China were also involved in top-down 
modes of implementation. In general, authoritarian implementation processes 
appear to be associated with powerful companies who arrived on the scene 
early, just after foreign direct investment had received policy approval, and had 
access to political elites within the government. These sorts of implementa-
tion processes occur very quickly, leaving little space for policy intervention. 
In these cases, openings for local people to voice their interests only appear to 
occur when they are granted by the investors themselves, whether for strategic 
reasons or because of commitments to corporate social responsibility.
Second, we found that new, more inclusive models of implementation 
emerge as land concessions begin to proliferate. Notably, these emerging mod-
els of implementation may provide spaces for policy intervention, whether at 
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the national, provincial, or local level. Yet, it should be noted that they have not 
emerged due to regulatory measures, but rather due to the increasing scarcity 
of available land, competition between investors, and the learning processes 
of actors at different policy levels. One archetype emerging in this advanced 
stage of land acquisitions is that of failing land investments. This trend also 
appears to be reflected globally, as evidenced by the high rates of abandoned 
deals found in the Land Matrix (Land Matrix Partnership, 2014). Notably, 
failed deals could also provide space for a policy reboot in favour of more 
inclusive forms of land investment and agricultural development. Finally, the 
last archetype we identified—‘Marginal Land’—points to alternative modes 
of agricultural investment that are actually beginning to occur. They appear to 
materialise once socio-ecological constraints—for example, demographic and 
environmental realities—begin to outweigh economic and political power. 
This newly emerging archetype has not received a lot of attention so far, but 
may come to play an increasingly important role worldwide.
We believe that such archetypes of implementation processes could 
contribute to a better, more differentiated and policy relevant understand-
ing of LSLAs as driving forces of agrarian transitions. But this requires us to 
validate and generalise such archetypes to inform policies at higher spatial 
levels. Ideally, this could be done by linking our process-based archetypes 
with observable place-based (spatially referenced) patterns of LSLAs. In other 
words, we wish to identify whether these archetypes display spatial signatures 
that can be extrapolated using spatio-temporal data sets spanning larger geo-
graphic areas. Table 6.4 lists the key factors of our process-based archetypes 
and highlights the key factors for which spatio-temporal data sets are readily 
available.
As seen in Table 6.4, the key factors for which data from inventories and 
spatial layers are available (shaded rows in Table 6.4) only marginally overlap 
with the most important indicators of the different archetypes of LSLA imple-
mentation processes. With the exception of the Size of Concessions, it seems 
that no other key factor differentiating the four archetypes can be quantified 
with currently available spatio-temporal data sets. Conversely, many of the 
indicators that are decisive to LSLA implementation processes are difficult or 
impossible to capture fully using spatially explicit, country-level data; the most 
prominent example being Available and Suitable Land (KF 17). No statistics or 
map can adequately capture the characteristics of this factor. Correspondingly, 
spatial signatures differentiating these four archetypes can scarcely be extrap-
olated in time and space. However, a closer look at the indicators shows that 
expanding the information collected by existing inventories could make a big 
difference. If factors such as Time of Investment (KF 3) and characteristics of 
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TABLE 6.4 Synthesising implementation processes and spatial patterns of land acquisitions




















Origin of investor 1
Type of crop 2
Time of investment 3 Early arrivals Early arrivals Late arrivals
Access to political power 4 High level ties, 
diplomatic
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Large as well as 
small
CSR commitment 7 Generally high
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20 Reflected in 
land survey
Historical ties 21
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Land Allocation (KF 24) were made publicly accessible and were more exhaus-
tive, they could serve as excellent proxies for the type of implementation 
process. Furthermore, existing LSLA monitoring systems could additionally 
incorporate indicators such as the role of provincial or district authorities in 
the implementation process, the way Land Surveys (KF 16) were implemented, 
and the Capabilities and Assets of Villagers (KF 22). Finally, refining methods 
to understand who and what define the availability of land would represent a 
breakthrough for understanding the processes of land allocation.
5 Conclusions
The research we have described is intended to help overcome certain persistent 
difficulties of providing adequate, robust evidence on LSLAs for the purpose of 
decision-making and policymaking, specifically in Laos and Cambodia. Much 
of this difficulty stems from the existing gap between case study research—
which typically provides qualitative and process-based insights—and national 
or global inventories that typically provide place-based (spatially referenced) 
and quantitative analyses of broader patterns. Using a meta-analysis of case 
studies that focuses on recurrent interactions between selected key factors, we 
defined four archetypes of implementation processes. We argue that this type 







Capability and assets of 
villagers






















Note: The table lists the key factors of our four archetypes and existing spatio-temporal data sets 
that capture these key factors. Shaded rows indicate key factors for which statistical and spatial 
data are readily available.
Source: Authors.
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of generalisation not only provides insights for land-related policies, but also 
represents a precondition for linking process-based insights with spatial pat-
terns emerging from place-based studies.
Methodologically, we conclude that both approaches generate valuable 
yet incomplete evidence for policymaking. Spatial patterns mask important 
differentiations and do not enable causal understanding. At the same time, a 
working typology of LSLA implementation processes such as ours is difficult to 
assess in terms of its validity for higher levels of policymaking and scaling up 
to different contexts. Finding ways of linking these two perspectives remains 
a crucial task. At present, there is a dearth of available indicators serving 
both perspectives, making it difficult to properly link them. Yet, the solution is 
clearly within reach: inventories of land acquisitions could make these kinds 
of indicators available with little extra effort. They would need to document 
how the size and contiguity of a land deal changes over time from the grant-
ing of concessions to the final allocation of land. Additionally, information 
on the use and form of land surveys as well as the time and type of involve-
ment of different actors represents an important proxy for implementation 
processes.
We believe that this type of combined approach is capable of generating 
important evidence to inform policy. It enables a better understanding of the 
overall dimensions and relevance of LSLAs in agrarian transitions. Our own 
quantitative results point to a highly advanced stage of LSLA proliferation in 
South-East Asia, necessitating new policies capable of addressing conflicts, 
impacts on pre-existing land use and natural resources, threatened livelihoods, 
and outmigration, which could all drive new waves of poverty. At the same 
time, our analysis of implementation processes clearly shows that there is little 
space for participatory forms of agricultural investment when large and pow-
erful companies initially arrive on the scene in a new region and are essentially 
given a pass by senior government authorities. For a long time, the prevailing 
processes of land allocation in Laos and Cambodia were top-down and author-
itarian, further marginalising vulnerable populations. Only now, as land has 
become scarcer and competition between investors has increased, are new, 
more inclusive implementation processes emerging. These implementation 
processes enable various stakeholders to agree on what land is truly underused 
or ‘marginal’, and thus ripe for investment. In terms of future land policies, this 
suggests a role for spatially differentiated moratoria on land concessions. In 
other words, policymakers could ban concessions in certain areas and allow 
them in others, encouraging competition between investors and negotiation 
with local land areas in certain places, while keeping other places free of land 
concessions to protect vulnerable smallholders.
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CHAPTER 7
From Lagging Behind to Losing Ground: 
Cambodian and Laotian Household Economy 
and Large-Scale Land Acquisitions
Christophe Gironde and Gilda Senties Portilla
Abstract
Large-scale land deals in the agriculture and forestry sectors have significantly affected 
livelihoods in South-East Asia. This chapter analyses the implementation of land deals 
for rubber plantations since the mid-2000s and their consequences for rural livelihoods 
in north-eastern Cambodia and southern Laos. The analysis provides empirical mate-
rial on how these deals were facilitated by previous policies and how they were imple-
mented on the ground. It further highlights different levels of dispossession in in a 
series of villages studied and examines the uneven transformations in people’s liveli-
hoods. The conclusions complement scholarly assessments of land deals’ immediate 
impact with a medium-term analysis of the consequent transformation of livelihoods. 
The chapter indicates that land acquisitions and related crop booms have set in motion 
dynamic, market-based developments including changes in social attitudes and life-
styles. Yet, the majority of the population has been caught in an insecure environment, 
where it is vulnerable to the opportunistic behaviours of more powerful actors. Family 
farming-based livelihoods are no longer ‘lagging behind’, as they were once considered; 
they are now losing ground, as opportunities to diversify their means of subsistence 
remain inadequate. Finally, the chapter provides policy-relevant recommendations 
on how to alleviate some of the worst short-term consequences for the local rural 
populations.
1 Introduction
Cambodia and Laos have both placed export-oriented, cash crop agriculture 
at the core of their development strategies. To do so, the two countries have 
leased vast areas of land to foreign and domestic companies in order that 
they invest in large-scale agricultural production. Addressing cases of rubber 
investment in Ratanakiri province in north-eastern Cambodia and Champasak 
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province in southern Laos, this chapter analyses the implementation of these 
land deals and their medium-term consequences for rural livelihoods.
The chapter contributes to bridging the existing gaps in the ‘land grab’ lit-
erature by addressing three main scholarly challenges. The first challenge is to 
complement standard assessments of immediate impact—mostly measured 
in terms of land loss—with a medium-term analysis1 including how house-
holds respond to new constraints and opportunities, and to what extent they 
have, or have not, managed to adapt their productive activities to create sus-
tainable livelihoods. The second challenge is to go beyond the winners–losers 
picture (Borras Jr. and Franco, 2012), which opposes outside investors and local 
communities, by analysing the outcomes of the social differentiation induced 
by large-scale land acquisitions. The third is to include various types of inves-
tors and land deals of all sizes (Edelman et al., 2013) in order to highlight to 
what extent different types of rubber sector land acquisitions have different 
consequences.
This chapter has three sections. The first presents the debate on the region’s 
agricultural model for export-oriented cash crops and provides the analytical 
framework and methodology. The second section is dedicated to case studies, 
describing and analysing local contexts, the process of land acquisitions, and 
changes in livelihoods over a period of 5–7 years. In the third section we syn-
thesise and discuss our case studies. In the conclusion we reflect on the current 
stage of agrarian transition in the spaces studied and draw some policy recom-
mendations based on people’s own reflections on their realities.
2 Research Background and Methodology
Our research relates to the debate on whether the outcomes of agrarian tran-
sitions are ‘disruptive’ or ‘more developmentally positive’ (Rigg et al., 2012, 
1469–70). We discuss to what extent local livelihoods are ‘disrupted’ (Cotula, 
2013) by large-scale land acquisitions and what new opportunities or alterna-
tive economic occupations are available in relation to such acquisitions. We 
also address the issue of the social differentiation that occurs in relation to the 
dynamics of land acquisitions and the changing farming system. More specifi-
cally, the chapter contributes to the discussion on the capacity of smallholders 
to engage with crop booms (Hall, 2011), in a context in which their land tenure 
1    By ‘medium-term’, we refer to the period of 5 to 7 years that followed the acceleration of 
large-scale land acquisitions for rubber plantation, which occurred in 2006–08.
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and access to resources are increasingly being challenged by radical changes in 
property regimes and actors (Peluso and Lund, 2011; Bakker et al., 2010; Guérin 
et al., 2003). Our analysis is particularly inspired by the attention drawn to 
‘new actors’ by Peluso and Lund (2011, 668), and the call from Tania Li (2011) 
for more attention to be paid to labour regimes, as non-farm job creation and 
access to salaried work are of increasing importance in agrarian transitions 
(Rigg, 2006).
Numerous South-East Asian experiences show that smallholders can grow 
rubber successfully (Delarue, 2011; Sikor, 2012; Sturgeon, 2012). In line with a 
broad consensus that public support to farmers is crucial to the diffusion of 
technology, the key lesson from those experiences is that farmers have been 
successful when they have benefited from secure land tenure (Sikor, 2012) and 
that their performance depends greatly on the support they receive, or do not 
receive, from the state (Gouyon, 1995; Fox and Castella, 2013). Another impor-
tant factor in farmers’ performance is the learning process, as illustrated by 
the cases of farmers in northern Thailand, who could learn tapping in planta-
tions in the south before developing their own farms, and of northern Laotian 
farmers who benefited from ‘sharecropping arrangements with relatives’ from 
China who ‘extended their rubber holdings across the border’ (Sturgeon, 2012).
For Cambodia, it is argued that rubber is more profitable than other trees, 
such as acacias, eucalyptus, cashew nut or oil palm (Hansen and Top, 2006). 
The study by Fox et al. (2009) similarly shows that rubber is the best alter-
native to current natural forest uses and argues that it provides a ‘better eco-
nomic position’ to local populations. And rubber is deemed attractive ‘due to 
its fewer (agricultural) inputs, long economic life and high market demand’ 
(CDRI, 2009, 13). Other studies draw attention to the fact that rubber plan-
tations ‘require huge investment in both financial and technical resources’ 
(Yem et al., 2011), and that small producers might not be paid adequately for 
their rubber because of the commercialisation system (Gironde and Fortunel, 
2014). Predictions made over the last decade are not optimistic about the 
sustainability of local populations’ livelihoods, particularly when consider-
ing the rate of forest loss (Fox et al., 2008), the unavoidable abandonment of 
traditional farming practices (Ruohomäki, 2004), and ‘neo-patrimonialism’ 
practices and abusive power relations (Un and So, 2011; Ironside, 2009). 
As most populations are left out of complex registries of land-use rights 
(Simbolon, 2002; Luco, 2008) the risk of marginalisation and forced displace-
ment is deemed high, in particular for ethnic minorities (Bourdier, 2009).
For northern Laos, economic gains for smallholders have been observed 
under certain market conditions and incentives from contract farming and 
governmental policies (Manivong and Cramb, 2008). However, studies have 
found that these investments are often accompanied by unfair and uncertain 
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terms for farmers (Diana, 2008; Gerbert, 2010; Lin, 2010) and by losses in terms 
of food security due to soil degradation and deforestation (Luangmany and 
Kaneko, 2013). In southern Laos, where contract farming is unusual for rubber,2 
farmers’ land has been enclosed in rubber estates that are managed by public/
private (mainly foreign) companies (Schönweger et al., 2012). Engagement 
with rubber is limited to a few local elites who have the necessary capital and 
know-how. A growing body of literature has mostly documented the negative 
outcomes—for local communities and the environment—induced by these 
deals (Barney, 2007; Baird, 2011; Kenney-Lazar, 2012; McAllister, 2012). Farmers 
at large, however, are not necessarily averse to certain changes brought about 
by the rubber boom, but are limited in terms of their capital, secure land rights, 
and access to markets. They often become easy prey to ‘price dictation, oli-
gopsony and unscrupulous practices’ (Fullbrook, 2011, 15), a risk that is more 
pronounced for ethnic minorities.
The case studies in this chapter are based on the authors’ personal field 
research carried out in villages of Ratanakiri (Cambodia) and Champasak 
(Laos) provinces, respectively. Data were mostly collected through semi-
structured interviews with households, local authorities, and company repre-
sentatives. Villages were selected based on the presence of large-scale rubber 
land concessions for at least five years, accessibility during rainy and dry sea-
sons, and different processes of land acquisitions reported by district authori-
ties. Fieldwork in Cambodia was spread over four 10-day missions in 2012–13, 
covering three villages: Pra Lai and Trang in Loum Choar Commune (O’Yadav 
district) and Malik in Malik Commune (Andounge Maes district). Data collec-
tion in Cambodia included a questionnaire-based survey of 240 households—
that is to say, 24 per cent of the population of the villages. In Laos, fieldwork 
took four months spread across 2012 to 2014 in four villages: Thongpao, 
Huaytong, and Lak Sip Kao in Bachiang district, and Lak Sao Paet in Paksong 
district. Interviews in Laos were complemented with participant observation3 
and focus group discussions with the elderly and the youth of the village.
Due to the sensitivity of the topic, interviewees remain anonymous and 
comments made by public officials are not openly credited to any particular 
2    The government in Champasak has recently unveiled a ‘land as equity’ model, including 
rubber, in which farmers will allegedly receive more benefits as they will hold shares in the 
concession contracts and retain land ownership rights if a venture fails (Vientiane Times 
Reporters, 2015).
3    This included household activities, such as farming chores in the dry and rainy seasons, cook-
ing and meal times, collection of non-timber forest products (NTFPs), fishing, and village 
festivals or social gatherings. Situations, symbols, or objects indicative of the transformation 
of livelihoods were also observed, such as cash-related actual work and consumer goods.
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individual. Direct quotes of respondents are not literal citations, but are trans-
lations of the original statements made in Khmer, Lao, or in the local indig-
enous language.
A further note on terminology is pertinent. While the term ‘land acquisi-
tions’ is used to refer to any type of land deal regardless of origin and type of 
investment, (economic) ‘land concessions’ specifically refers to state grants of 
land, in either concession or lease form, to foreign and national investors in 
areas that are categorised as pertaining to the state (Schönweger et al., 2012).
3 Case Studies
3.1 Ratanakiri
3.1.1 Local Context and Background
In the area studied, local livelihoods—until the mid-1990s—were based on 
customary land tenure consisting of oral recognition of farming use-rights 
(Springer, 2013). Families had to inform or ask the village chief or more simply 
agree with neighbours on the demarcation of plots to be farmed. Testimonies 
gathered from people native to Loum Choar and Malik, indicating that access 
to land was not an issue because there was plenty of land, corroborate those 
gathered by Fox and Vogler (2009, 316), who report on a neighbouring commune 
(15 km away) in which each person had access to approximately 11 hectares 
(ha) in the late 1980s. Social differentiation was low with respect to farming 
land and access to forest areas, which provided the core of necessary resources. 
All families had equal access to land and equal use rights as well as access to 
forest resources. Families could be distinguished by their possession of cattle 
and buffaloes and prestigious handicraft goods (White, 1996). Food crops—
mostly rice and vegetables—were dominant in a rotational cropping system 
including 10–15 years fallow after 2–3 years use of the same plot. Rain-fed crops 
were, if necessary, completed by paddy rice in lowlands. Fruit trees, husbandry, 
fishing, hunting, and the collection of non-timber forest products (NTFPs) in 
the areas surrounding the villages completed resources from cultivation. Non-
farming activities were minimal. Cash crops, mostly soya and cashew nut, were 
progressively developed during the 1990s.
Prior to the mid-2000s land rush, local livelihoods were impacted by public 
policies implemented in the 1990s. Once the state of warfare and instability 
ended, the government developed its administrative capacity in remote and 
border areas such as Ratanakiri. New villages were established closer to roads, 
public services, and communal administrations. Displaced inhabitants were 
assigned areas of land to which neither the traditional inheritance system nor 
communal management provided them with legitimate access and use-rights. 
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At the same time, the ‘Khmerisation’ policy, which aimed to settle people of 
ethnic Khmer origin in ethnic minority areas, brought newcomers to these 
remote territories. Pioneer in-migrants would later open the door to their 
relatives and networks, which led in turn to additional cohorts of newcomers 
acquiring land during the 1990s, in some cases to the point where indigenous 
populations decided to move away from in-migrant clusters (Tang, 2014, 30–31).
Rubber plantation in Cambodia was revived from the mid-1990s on, when 
former state plantations were privatised (Fortunel, 2014). Then, powerful 
members of the state apparatus and ‘entrepreneurial groups sympathetic to 
the Cambodian People’s Party’ (Hugues, 2003) acquired large tracts of land, 
mostly for logging. In the early 2000s, a series of government initiatives and 
development projects—model farms, planting schemes, training courses, 
etc.—were set up to promote rubber. Until that time, populations had pre-
ferred to invest in cashew nut; rubber being not well known and seedlings 
difficult to find. However, the conditions necessary for a rapid spread of rub-
ber plantation were met. The rubber boom started with the sharp increase in 
rubber prices in 2005, triggering an unprecedented change in land cover and 
land use (Fox et al., 2008) driven by Khmer entrepreneurs (accounting for up 
to several hundreds ha holdings), medium-rank officials and their relatives 
(up to a few dozens of ha), and in-migrants (a few ha). In parallel, the first eco-
nomic land concession (ELC) contracts were signed; their numbers increased 
from 2009 onwards. In 2012, there were 16 ELCs for a total of approximately 
114,000 ha for the entire province.
3.1.2 Land Acquisitions
In Pra Lai, Trang, and Malik, rubber expansion started about eight to ten years 
ago. This is corroborated by the dominance of rubber plantations that are not 
yet productive, large areas of cleared land not yet planted, and the influx of 
in-migrants who nowadays represent 31.5 per cent (one family in three) of the 
total population of the two Communes in which these villages lie.
In Pra Lai village, two main investments affect the population’s access 
to land: a 5,000 ha ELC to a Khmer-Vietnamese joint-venture named Chea 
Chenrith (contract signed in 2002; revised in 2012) and a Khmer company 
named Mekong Express, which bought 480 ha of land between 2007 and 
2010.4 The closest point of the Chea Chenrith joint-venture land’s perimeter 
is located approximately four kilometres from the village; no demarcation 
marks—fences, pillars, or marked trees—could be seen. The land encom-
passes an area that has not yet been prepared for rubber trees, and Pra Lai 
4    The 480 ha now the property of Mekong Express are spread across the two villages of Pra Lai 
and Trang; it is not possible to quantify how much land is on each village’s territory.
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inhabitants have, so far, continued farming in this area. Surprisingly, we even 
found rubber trees planted by villagers on land that, they say, is part of Chea 
Chenrith’s territory. These trees—two dozen ha—belong to five well-off fami-
lies, including the chief of the village and his close relatives. The rest of the 
Pra Lai villagers have also continued to cultivate annual crops on this unused 
portion of the ELC landholding. In 2012, villagers applied for the measurement 
of the land plots they farmed, in accordance with Prime Minister Directive 01 
(D01) (issued in May 2012), which stipulated that citizens could claim back the 
land plots that had been granted as part of ELCs and that they cultivated at 
the time when the ELC was set up. During August 2012, government officials 
measured a total of 173 ha of land plots; fallow land plots were not measured 
and are considered as being the property of the company. In Pra Lai, 72 families 
(56 per cent) reported that their land was measured and received land titles 
that, so far, guarantee that they can ‘keep’ these plots. The situation is signifi-
cantly different with Mekong Express, which in one to two years prepared the 
land and planted rubber trees. No attempt by villagers to continue farming 
on the Mekong Express landholding was reported. Apart from the rapid plan-
tation of rubber trees, villagers explained this situation by stating that this 
acquisition cannot be contested since part of the land was sold by villagers 
themselves, and another part was sold by representatives of the communal 
authorities. Villagers also reported being afraid of contesting the acquisition as 
the land’s owner is Khmer. Furthermore, D01 applies only to ELC-companies, 
not to ordinary private ones such as Mekong Express.
The situation differs in Trang where the population was impacted by 
Mekong Express and Khmer in-migrants. The purchases there by Mekong 
Express took place in two phases: in 2007–08, the company bought its first 
land plots directly from villagers; in a second phase, the company dealt with 
the local authorities and bought communal land. At the same time, the village 
experienced many acquisitions by Khmer in-migrants, who settled first along 
the main road, in Oun village, where they opened shops, restaurants, etc. They 
then progressively bought land plots further from the road, in Trang. The vil-
lagers explained that between 2007 and 2009, they had sold part of their fallow 
plots assuming that there was enough land left to be cleared for the next rota-
tion; they simply could not have known that—at that moment—large tracts 
of land were in the process of being sold to Mekong Express. As a result, since 
2010, Trang families have been left with stripes or dots of land between the 
landholdings of the migrants and the hundreds of hectares now the property of 
Mekong Express. The process has not stopped: about a third of Trang families 
(31 per cent) report that they have sold land since 2010 and 40 per cent of Trang 
families report having less land than in 2010.
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The third village, Malik, is surrounded by two Vietnamese ELCs—Heng 
Brother and Chieng Ly Investment—since they were granted, respectively, 
2,361 ha in 2009 and 5,080 ha in 2011. In addition, numerous Khmers have 
acquired land plots on the outskirts of the village. The ELCs deprived Malik 
villagers not only of land they could farm but also of fishing and hunting in 
an area that, they explain, was particularly rich for such activities. Monetary 
compensation for cultivated plots—USD 150–200 per ha, based on the cost of 
labour for clearing—were derisory when compared to the income that could 
be made from certain crops on those plots. But the most important distinc-
tive feature in Malik village is the population’s response. First, Malik villagers 
opposed Heng Brother when the company started to expand beyond its granted 
area. The opposition benefited from the support of local organisations, which 
helped to forward villagers’ formal claims to provincial government represen-
tatives. Although it is not possible in the field to measure the area that may 
have been saved, the Malik population certainly stopped the further expansion 
of the company. In parallel, those Malik villagers who had the resources—that 
is to say, a work force or/and cash to hire workers, rushed to clear land plots 
at the edge of Heng Brother’s landholding to fix these areas as their land. They 
opened new plots, continuously grew annual crops and built wooden houses. 
The other ELC beneficiary, Chieng Ly, a Khmer-Chinese company, encoun-
tered organisational challenges and delays, such as securing adequate budget 
and machinery for land clearing or for developing rubber nurseries. These 
contingencies gave Malik villagers time to react and limit dispossession; like 
with Heng Brother, they could continue farming as the company was slow in 
expanding the planted area. In some places, the villagers were able to continue 
farming until 2012, and their efforts were rewarded: of the three villages stud-
ied, Malik is the one with the highest proportion of families (90 per cent) who 
had land measured in 2012. The measurement operation is not negligible, as 
the average area families had measured—and for which they later received a 
land certificate—was 4.63 ha. The Chieng Ly development was also challenged 
by Khmers, as explained by one of its managers, who complained about pow-
erful ‘Khmer land-grabbers’ that the company is not able to chase out.
We thus have three sites, each with various dispossession dynamics of 
uneven magnitude: Pra Lai, where, despite the ELC-related, large land loss 
on paper, villagers are—overall—left with enough land to meet their basic 
needs; Trang, where the entire village lacks land to satisfy its basic needs; and 
an in-between situation in Malik. At all three sites, land acquisitions generated 
differentiation among families depending on their respective capacities to 
compensate for land loss by clearing other plots. The families who had a large 
enough workforce could rapidly compensate for the land they had lost; others 
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could not or could only to a lesser extent. Differentiation increased further, 
as those who could clear land were also able to sell the wood thus gathered. 
This gave them the financial capital needed to pay workers for further clearing. 
Moreover, in a context in which state control over forest clearing and ‘illegal’ 
logging was intensifying, the families who had political and social capital could 
clear land and sell wood, whereas ordinary families were forbidden to do so 
and were at risk of having the wood they had gathered confiscated. The arrival 
of new landholders, companies, and in-migrants opened new avenues for 
access to productive capital. Representatives of communal authorities, who 
had eased the settlement of these newcomers, were the first to get access to 
the start-up package for rubber—that is, good quality rubber seedlings, fertil-
isers, and technical advice for planting. Meanwhile, the majority of the indig-
enous population could—at best—only find jobs clearing the lands of the new 
landholders.
3.1.3 Livelihood Change
For communities who did not know any limitation to access to land and forests 
other than the availability of the workforce needed to clear them, the foremost 
difference in current livelihood systems is the comparably limited natural 
areas they use. According to the survey conducted in 2013 in the three villages 
studied, for all villages almost two-thirds of the families (64 per cent) had less 
than 5 ha of land to farm, which is deemed the minimum area for meeting 
basic needs (with the current, ordinary cropping system including mostly rice, 
vegetables, cassava, and soya). The median land area per family is 3.9 ha and 
the mean is 5 ha. This is roughly about half the area that average families used 
to farm, including fallow areas, before the acceleration of land acquisitions a 
decade ago. The limitation in land available for farming is uneven across the 
three villages and within each village, as shown in Table 7.1. Land loss is more 
acute in Trang village, where half of the families have less than 2 ha each, 
whereas in Pra Lai and Malik villages this figure is 9.4 and 4.8 per cent, respec-
tively. One-fifth (18.7 per cent) of Trang families reported being landless, com-
pared to 6.2 and 2.4 per cent, respectively, in the two other villages. From our 
qualitative interviews, we did not find any indication that land areas were less 
abundant in Trang than in Pra Lai or Malik prior to the land acquisitions ana-
lysed above. The difference is explained mostly then by the purchases of land 
by Khmer migrants, who—so far—have not reached Pra Lai.
The reduction in the land indigenous populations can have access to has 
led first to an intensification of land use, typically farming the same plot more 
times and reducing fallow duration, until rice yield significantly declines. 
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Traditional 10–15 year-long fallow periods no longer exist; fallow land is at 
risk. A total of 63 per cent of respondents reported that they did not have any 
fallow area at the time they were interviewed; the proportion reaches 70 per 
cent among households who hold less than 6 ha, and 81 per cent for those 
who hold less than 4 ha. The intensification of land use is also related to the 
fact that families tend to be made up of an increasing number of people to 
feed, as there is no land left for the youth to open new fields. Furthermore, 
farming what is left of land is not always profitable: in Trang, we found cases 
where near-landless families explained they had not farmed the entire area 
they have access to because of soil exhaustion. They also explained that they 
had abandoned farming their land because the output was less than what they 
can expect from off-farm activities, although the availability of job opportuni-
ties is rather random.
A second transformation in cropping systems is a reinvestment in paddy rice 
for those who have access to low, wet land which had been relatively neglected 
TABLE 7.1  Distribution of households by size (in ha) of land parcel owned (percentage of all 
surveyed households)




6.2% 3.1% 18.7% 25% 6.2% 12.5% 28.1%
Cumulative 
percentage




18.7% 31.2% 31.2% 0.0% 0.0% 6.2% 12.5%
Cumulative 
percentage




2.4% 2.4% 17.1% 36.6% 19.5% 7.3% 14.6%
Cumulative 
percentage
4.8% 21.9% 58.5% 78.5% 85.4% 100%
Source: SNIS project questionnaire-based survey, August 2013.
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as farmers invested in cash crops. Of the total number of households, 56 per 
cent grow paddy in low, wet land. A third transformation is the increasing 
share of farmed land dedicated to cassava, and to a lesser extent to soya beans, 
rather than to rice and associated vegetables. Cassava is grown by 82 per cent 
of the households, on a mean area of 1.98 ha per household, whereas soya is 
grown by 37 per cent of the households. Cassava has become the cornerstone 
of farming systems as it provides farmers’ main income in the context of an 
increasing need for cash; cassava is also the main source of savings for capi-
tal expenditure (housing and transportation) and eventual investment into 
rubber. A fourth transformation is the plantation of rubber trees, rather than 
cashew nut trees, although there were only 15 per cent of the families who 
reported owning rubber trees.
Another major change explained by our interviewees consists in the reduc-
tion of the cattle that they own due to several reasons: families sell animals 
to raise much-needed cash; there is increasingly less space for grazing and 
people cannot spend the required time to walk their cattle; finally, owing to 
the limited space available, they fear the possible damages that the animals 
might make to rubber trees, and the fines or retaliations (especially in terms of 
animals killed) on the part of the companies. At the time of interview, seven 
households out of ten did not own one single buffalo and eight out of ten did 
not have a single cow.
Household members are increasingly searching for salaried employment 
in the various types of rubber plantations. New landholdings at first cre-
ated jobs, to clear and prepare the areas to be planted and to take care of 
the plantations during their early years; then, the plantations needed fewer 
workers—mechanisation developed and companies hired workers with skills 
TABLE 7.2  Distribution of households by size (in ha) of rubber land area (percentage of all 
surveyed households)
<0.1ha 0.1–1.9 ha 2–3.9 ha 4–5.9 ha 6–7.9 ha 8–9.9 ha ≥10 ha Total
Number of 
households
204 12 14 8 1 0 2 241
Percentage of 
households
84.6% 5.0% 5.8% 3.3% 0.4% 0.0% 0.8% 100%
Cumulative 
percentage
89.6% 95.4% 98.7% 99.1% 99.1% 100%
Source: SNIS project questionnaire-based survey, August 2013.
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that indigenous people do not have. Also, job creation benefits migrants more 
than native populations: Khmer owners have made it very clear that they hire 
Khmer workers because native populations lack not only skills but also com-
mitment—that is to say, they do not commit durably to their employers’ com-
panies as they must also pursue their own farming activities, whereas Khmer 
in-migrants work full-time and remain with their employers longer. Only 8.7 
per cent of people reported having a regular salaried occupation. The over-
all process of rural development has certainly created petty opportunities in 
food processing (typically pealing cassava tubers), local trade, transportation 
services, etc., but most of these are taken up by in-migrants. Similar to the low 
proportion of households the members of which have regular salaried jobs, 
only 11 per cent of households reported members having non-farming occupa-
tions of their own, and they were almost exclusively non-native households. 
Out-migration is not an option for the inhabitants of Trang, Pra Lai, or Malik: 
only 3.7 per cent of families reported they have one member living outside 
the commune and 4.1 per cent reported that they receive remittances. While 
respondents lack acquaintances outside the area and do not know anyone liv-
ing in cities, the need and the motivation—of the area’s youth in particular—
for leaving the village is strong, as illustrated by the number of interviewees 
who said that they would be ready to move, even when considering the risks 
they have heard of associated with migration.
Differentiation among families is increasing, in particular with respect to 
land area. When comparing change in land area between 2010 and 2013 with 
land area in 2013, we found that among the families who reported having less 
land in 2013 than in 2010, seven out of ten belong to the group with less than 
6 ha of land, whereas three out of ten belong to the group holding more than 
6 ha. The difference in land assets is even more acute between the native popu-
lation and the newcomers, as shown in Table 7.3. Forty per cent of the native 
population report having less land, whereas the proportion is only 10.7 per cent 
TABLE 7.3  Change in households’ land assets between 2010 and 2013 (percentage of relevant 
population category)
Less land Same land More land Total
Entire population 32.6% 56.1% 11.3% 100%
Native 40.0% 54.5%  5.5% 100%
Non-native 10.7% 60.7% 28.6% 100%
Source: SNIS project questionnaire-based survey, August 2013.
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for the non-native population. Similarly, 28 per cent of the non-native popula-
tion have increased their land area over the period, whereas this figure is only 
5 per cent in this case of the native population.
3.2 Champasak
3.2.1 Local Context and Background
After the failure of the first rubber plantation in Laos, established by the French 
in the southern province of Champasak in 1930, a few other public and private 
attempts at developing the crop were made during the 1990s (Manivong and 
Cramb, 2008; Baird, 2010). Yet, only recently has rubber become a widespread 
distinctive feature of the rural landscape. Through large land concessions 
granted by the central or provincial government, Vietnamese investors have 
revitalised rubber in Champasak, mainly in Bachiang and, to a lesser degree, 
Paksong districts5 (Schönweger et al., 2012). Both districts are located on the 
Bolaven Plateau—Bachiang in its western hillsides; Paksong in more altitudi-
nal areas—a region predominantly inhabited by autochthonous Mon-Khmer 
ethno-linguistic groups (Goudineau, 2008; Baird, 2010) and also by non-native 
Lao-Tadai groups (Fortunel, 2007). These groups rely on semi-subsistence 
farming, most of which is carried out manually.
The villages studied—Thongpao, Huaytong, Lak Sip Kao (all in Bachiang), 
and Lak Sao Paet (in Paksong)—were founded shortly before or amid the US 
heavy bombardments that followed the escalation of the Laotian Civil War.6 
Despite movements of people related to the war, collective memory stresses a 
time of plentiful land resources, with livelihoods tied to the cultivation of rice, 
coffee, vegetables, fruit, peanuts, and cardamom, and to the raising of livestock. 
After a brief and only feebly enforced period of collectivisation,7 farming con-
tinued as usual: ‘[in principle] families could clear as much as they wanted’8 
under customary arrangements mediated by village chiefs or between fami-
lies. Due to labour limitations, families usually cleared and farmed up to 5 ha. 
Social differentiation at the time was minimal; the founders of the village and 
party-appointed leaders, including war veterans, enjoyed more social prestige, 
but not necessarily larger productive assets. Households in possession of cattle 
and irrigated rice paddies were regarded as wealthier. Subsistence farming 
5    In Paksong, land concessions for coffee outweigh those for rubber.
6    This war (1955–1975) was fought between the royalist government forces (backed by the US) 
and the communist Pathet Lao (supported by North Vietnam).
7    Except for Lak Sip Kao’s collectivisation (1976–89), other villages participated only loosely 
for 2–3 years.
8    Interview with village authorities, 26 February 2014.
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was practiced in rotational mixed-cropping systems with long fallow periods 
of a minimum of five years. In lower areas, paddies complemented rain-fed 
rice. Rivers and forests also provided a major source of nutrition (fish, wild 
game, NTFPs), especially in between the dry and wet periods (February–April), 
coinciding with the end of the coffee harvest and the start of a new rice farm-
ing cycle.
The Land and Forest Allocation Programme (LFA), implemented in the 
1990s, brought about a crucial change in people’s modus vivendi. Aimed at dis-
tinguishing forest from other lands, the LFA was a nationwide programme that 
covered processes from mapping and zoning village land to issuing temporary 
use certificates for farmland and degraded forest (Fujita and Phanvilay, 2008). 
It was coupled with a ban on rotational cultivation and with other poverty-
reduction plans, often entailing the relocation of villages to focal areas—close 
to roads, markets, schools, and clinics (Evrard and Goudineau, 2004). Although 
the cases studied here did not involve relocation, the imposition of different 
land zones both created confusion and limited people’s access to resources. 
Government and development aid agencies encouraged intensive cash-crop 
agriculture over ‘unproductive’ fallow land. Paksong, with a small coffee indus-
try fruitfully initiated by the French in the 1920s (but interrupted by wars), 
saw a boom in coffee production (Sallée and Tulet, 2010). Coffee (mostly of 
the robusta variety) has since become the main source of income in Lak Sao 
Paet. Without proper, elevated soils for coffee and without sufficient attempts 
at developing higher-value cash crops, the usual rainy-season crops for sale 
in Bachiang remain corn, peanuts, and fruit, in reduced rotational systems. 
Cassava is a recent addition, sold in the dry season. Households in Lak Sao Paet 
and Lak Sip Kao have recently diversified incomes by turning to, or increasing 
a long-established small trade in, artisanal baskets and brooms, and machetes, 
respectively.
On the ground, since the LFA was barely enforced at all by the relevant 
authorities, rotational farming and NTFP collection had somehow persisted 
prior to the granting of concessions. Weaknesses in the LFA’s implementation 
also meant that the step of handling land use certificates went largely missing 
in the studied sites, especially for fallow land, which would later facilitate the 
granting of concessions.
3.2.2 Land Concessions
Between 2004 and 2006, up to 30 per cent of Bachiang district land (of a total 
of 78,676 ha) featured in announced concession plans for three Vietnamese 
rubber companies: Viet-Lao Joint Stock Rubber, Yao Tieng Rubber Partnership, 
and Dak Lak Rubber (Srikham, 2010). Although the companies started clearing 
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land at the time, the total concession area after approval, as registered by 
the National Land Management Authority (NLMA, 2009–2011), represents a 
lower, yet still significant, share of the district land (18.4 per cent). Yao Tieng 
was granted a total area of 1,489 ha in Bachiang, and 333 ha in Paksong; Viet-
Lao was granted a concession for 10,316 ha, and Dak Lak for 2,677 ha, both in 
Bachiang (NLMA, 2009–2011). Concession areas coincided with the locations of 
the studied villages (and many others) for reasons of soil suitability, land avail-
ability, and relatively easy access.9 Lak Sip Kao is the closest to the provincial 
capital of Pakse (19 km away); Thongpao is the farthest (circa 70 km away). 
Given its location in a less elevated area, adequate for the rubber crop, Lak Sao 
Paet (28 km from Pakse) is currently the only village in Paksong with a rubber 
plantation, operated by Yao Tieng since 2008 (Department of Agriculture and 
Forestry, 2013). Table 7.4 shows the hectares cleared on each site per company, 
relative to the village size beforehand. Concession areas span from 34 to 95 per 
cent of total village area cleared—with 89 per cent as the average for Bachiang 
villages. As rubber was rapidly planted, companies had reached the tapping 
phase by 2013.
TABLE 7.4 Magnitude of land concessions in four selected villages









Thongpao10 Yao Tieng 400 273 68%
Huaytong, Viet-Lao 144  68 47%
Lak Sip Kao11 Dak-Lak / Yao Tieng 563 536 95%
Lak Sao Paet Yao Tieng 717 245 34%
Source: Field research by Senties Portilla, 2012–13. 
9     Interview with district authorities, 15 July 2013.
10    According to an anonymous source, Dak Lak’s concession also contained Thongpao, but 
village records of 2006 only register Yao Tieng. Discussions with two village chiefs led the 
researchers to conclude that the land in question was part of Thongpao, but had been 
lost to a neighbouring village following a border dispute in 2005—and then granted to 
Dak Lak.
11    The area cleared is for two companies (Dak Lak and Yao Tieng); areas for each were not 
specified.
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The way land concessions unfolded on the ground is described in similar terms 
across all the villages. The central or provincial government had planned and 
approved land allocations for the companies without previous consultations 
with village authorities and local populations. Villagers were told that the 
companies would adequately compensate them. The base average payment 
for one hectare was 1 million Laotian kip (LAK),12 which was not enough to 
cover the purchase of the rice required for two months by the average (eight-
member) family interviewed. With rare exceptions, families believed they 
could not (or should not) oppose the concessions, especially because higher 
authorities had taken those decisions. Most villagers felt pressured by the fact 
that district officials organised village meetings to announce the approval of 
grants by provincial or central level authorities (showing papers not necessar-
ily signed yet), and did so in the presence of company representatives and, 
in some cases, the district police. Village chiefs did not have any say in the 
investment plans and decision-making process, but most served as facilitators 
of the concessions. When some families were reluctant to agree, village chiefs 
warned them that the company would take their land anyway without provid-
ing any compensation.
The outcomes of such dispossession vary across and within the sites due to 
the magnitude of land loss, the new actors drawn into the land rush, and liveli-
hood assets and trajectories up until the concessions were granted. Lak Sip Kao 
has suffered the most serious loss, as 95 per cent of its land has been absorbed 
by two different concessions. An estimated 80 per cent of the total 270 house-
holds in Lak Sip Kao had in between 2–5 ha of land. Most of the families inter-
viewed in this group were left with none, despite their attempts to avoid their 
land being cleared by planting fruit trees on their ‘idle’ swidden land. At the 
other end of the spectrum lies Lak Sao Paet, where, since the cultivation of 
coffee entails more permanent uses of land, some coffee smallholders were 
able to demonstrate that land was ‘in use’—as opposed to being kept fallow, 
in which case it was given away in the form of concessions with no compensa-
tion being received in return. Notwithstanding these differences, it was found 
that the majority of households in all villages experienced serious land loss, as 
illustrated by Table 7.5 below.
A comparison of the situations prior to and after companies planted rubber 
indicates that the average size of household farmland for all villages combined 
fell from 3.96 to 1.17 hectares. Households who had 3–5 ha prior to concessions 
being granted were left—post-concessions—with around 1–2 ha of farming 
12    USD 125 at current conversion rate (May 2015). Conversion rate around the time when the 
concessions were granted was USD 1 = LAK 9,000.
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land, usually paddy or coffee plots. This is true for approximately 70 per cent 
of households of all the studied villages combined. Consequently, swidden 
agriculture is—for the majority—no longer possible, in a context where most 
villagers were rotational farmers. None of the families interviewed had tempo-
rary land certificates for farmland, which the LFA had meant to provide. This 
supported the argument that villagers’ ‘idle’ swidden land was to become the 
property of the state, a transfer for which no compensation would be provided. 
Some certificates had been given to villagers in Lak Sip Kao, Huaytong, and Lak 
Sao Paet. These, however, only covered land close to the main road, including 
houses, paddy fields, and fruit or coffee trees; but not larger, more distant plots 
of farming land.13 District and village authorities claimed that no such certifi-
cates had (yet) been provided in Thongpao. In Lak Sao Paet, there were cases 
in which villagers approached the company themselves to sell some of their 
previously ‘certified’ plots; sales for which they had allegedly received a higher 
price—compared to the average base payment on other sites, the difference 
was not significant.
In addition to the Vietnamese plantations, a few cases were encountered in 
which provincial government officials hold concessions. In Huaytong, 2.2 ha 
of the first colonial plantation—presumably the same plantation that a state-
owned company later revamped in the 1990s—was recently granted to a public 
official from Pakse. Employees have been brought in from outside the area, 
13    These findings confirm a previous study in Lak Sip Kao (Hall et al., 2011). Respondents 
from our study remained unclear as to whether these certificates were land titles within 
the framework of a titling programme, the second phase of which (in rural areas) began 
in 2003.
TABLE 7.5 Average household farmland size in four selected villages (2003 and 2013, in ha)
Village Average household land size 
in 2003 (ha)




Lak Sip Kao 3 0.75
Lak Sao Paet 4.25 2.45
Total average 3.96 1.17
Source: Field research by Senties Portilla, 2012–13.
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allegedly because the local inhabitants are already occupied at the Viet-Lao 
plantation or with their own farming activities. In Lak Sip Kao, other civil ser-
vants have set up smallholdings (figures unspecified) growing rubber, which 
has required buying whatever land is left from the local inhabitants. These 
cases of land acquisition by Lao nationals seem, however, to be operating with 
more ease because locals think of these investors primarily as ‘government 
people’, against whom any open resistance is unthinkable.
Margin for manoeuvre or for avoiding major losses is limited to very few 
households. Farmers at large, including those with permanent land use 
rights, had greater chances of keeping some or all of their land if they had 
acquaintances in the government and/or some information about their land 
rights under statutory land laws. There were also exceptional cases, seemingly 
without the aforementioned advantages, in which households negotiated or 
opposed their dispossession. In Huaytong, a villager successfully pushed for 
a higher price per hectare, even though a Viet-Lao representative threatened 
to have provincial officials sent to ‘re-educate’ him. In Lak Sao Paet, an elderly 
widow refused altogether to sell her land to Yao Tieng because their proposed 
payment was not enough to make up for her loss in crops. She threatened to 
cut down their rubber trees if the dispossession went ahead. In these cases of 
seemingly limited or no dispossession, other losses come into play.
The proximity of the rubber plantations to local farming land (a range of 
0.5–3 km) has created a scenario in which households who have kept enough 
land prefer not to carry on with shifting cultivation due to fears that nearby 
rubber trees will catch fire when those households’ own fields are burned. In 
addition to farming land loss and disruption of traditional cultivation, there 
has been a reduction in forest land and watercourses have been polluted. This 
means that the enclosure of plantations and their proximity to villagers’ farm 
lands have also prevented villagers from continuing to pursue other livelihoods, 
such as cattle grazing, fishing, hunting, and collecting NTFPs. Some families 
have observed reductions in fish populations in nearby rivers and blamed this 
on the use of chemicals on the plantations, chemicals that have created health 
problems for workers.
3.2.3 Livelihood Change
Over the past seven years, households have substantially decreased family 
farming activities, which were their main occupation until the onset of the 
concessions, and have instead increased their salaried activities. Some now 
devote their time entirely to wage labour, a trend that is more pronounced 
in Bachiang. For households with more than 1 ha of land left, (now insuffi-
cient) farming output is complemented with paid work, typically at the rubber 
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plantations. These households have continued with the cultivation of tradi-
tional cash crops (corn, peanuts, coffee), and they are increasingly planting 
cassava, especially in Bachiang. In the initial two years of rubber plantation, 
Bachiang families could continue planting peanuts and corn in between the 
young rubber trees, but as the trees have now grown, people have turned 
to their remaining plots, where rotation is very limited. In Lak Sao Paet, in 
Paksong, most households have continued with coffee cultivation, but report-
edly more are now engaged in basket- and broom-making, or in selling the raw 
materials for these activities to intermediaries who then sell these for a higher 
price in Pakse or Chong-Mek, the border checkpoint with Thailand. While old 
cash crops, and newer ones such as cassava, have provided incomes to meet 
growing needs, land is at risk of exhaustion when it is cultivated without rota-
tion. This intensification is also found in the case of upland rice, where fallow 
duration has been shortened to a maximum of three years.
For families with less than 1 ha, farming only takes place if family mem-
bers cannot find anything (salaried) else to do. There are a few instances in 
Thongpao and Huaytong where those who were landless prior to the conces-
sions were already salaried workers for other landed families, mainly outside 
their villages. Now they also work at the plantations.
The availability of work at the plantations has, however, fluctuated over 
time and cannot be taken for granted. In the early years, companies were 
reluctant to engage local inhabitants because they were perceived as ‘unreli-
able sompao [ethnic] people’, who are ‘difficult to work with because they do 
not commit for long’.14 Companies brought in labour from outside, including 
Vietnamese workers. In some cases, this reluctance was mutual, as villagers 
mentioned not wanting to work for the companies either out of expressed feel-
ings of resentment, or because they believed they could not compete with the 
Vietnamese, who are said to be ‘better and faster’ at the tasks. In Huaytong, the 
village authorities reported that in 2006 Viet-Lao only hired ten people from 
the village (i.e. 4 per cent of the population). Eventually, the companies had 
to engage more local labour due to the amount of clearing required, but when 
those tasks were complete less labour was needed. Hiring experienced another 
resurgence when the rubber tapping started.
Jobs at the plantations are mostly for young people; ‘old’ people (>40 
years old) are often considered ineligible. Working conditions and salaries 
were systematically reported to not match people’s expectations and house-
hold needs. Whereas male rubber tappers earn, on average, LAK 1 million per 
month across all studied sites, female tappers reported an average wage of LAK 
14    Informal conversation with a Vietnamese company representative, 26 July 2013.
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TABLE 7.6 Main livelihood activities in four selected villages (2003 and 2013)
Village 2003 2013
Thongpao –  Agriculture –  Salaried work
a)  Rain-fed rice, for consumption a)  Rubber plantations
b)  Peanuts and corn in swidden 
systems, as cash crops
b)  For other families in village 
or nearby
–  Agriculture
a)  Remaining farmland turned 
to cassava production
Huaytong –  Agriculture –  Salaried work
a)  Irrigated and rain-fed rice, for 
consumption
b)  Fruit trees, cassava, and coffee in  
permanent land, for consumption
a)  Rubber plantations
b)  Factory and domestic work 
outside village
–  Agriculture
Fruit trees, coffee, and cassava
Lak Sip Kao –  Agriculture –  Salaried work
a)  Irrigated and rain-fed rice, 
for consumption
b)  Fruit trees and coffee in  
permanent land, as cash crops
a)  Rubber plantations
b)  Construction work
c)  For other families outside 
village
–  Machete-making –  Machete-making
Lak Sao Paet –  Agriculture –  Agriculture
a)  Coffee (mainly robusta) in  
permanent and swidden systems,  
as a cash crop
a)  Coffee and fruit trees
–  Salaried work
a)  Rubber plantations
b)  Coffee plantations
–  Basket- and broom-making –  Basket- and broom-making
Source: Field research by Senties Portilla, 2012–13.
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700,000. Other tasks, such as clearing, provide lower (daily) wages.15 The most 
frequently cited reason for gender-based wage differences was ‘you get paid 
depending on how much rubber you tap’, followed by ‘the boss in your team 
decides how much you get’.
In their search for jobs, some villagers have had to go further away from their 
place of residence. Such mobility, which is temporary in most cases, depends 
on networks outside the area, which are developed in all the studied villages, 
but to a lesser degree in Thongpao. For the few young people in Thongpao 
who have experienced temporary work outside their home village, having a 
rubber plantation located in the area has meant that they ‘can now choose 
to stay’, even though they are aware of the poor employment conditions and 
their limited future prospects as small landholders. Across villages there is a 
general perception among the young that having cash is relatively better than 
having land that produces only food for the household. Cash, and its perceived 
regular availability (on-site) with the coming of the plantations, can provide 
young villagers with their three main desires: ‘you can buy a motorbike’, ‘you 
can have a better [concrete] house’, and ‘it gets you clothes and nice things 
[consumer goods]’. Although the majority of the young acknowledged that 
cash could also be obtained from family farming, they highlighted various con-
straints: a lack of labour input; a lack of necessary capital and/or skills in their 
households to have a good, copious harvest; and—above all—that land was 
becoming scarcer. Another constraint mentioned was a lack of the knowledge 
necessary to market their produce at a higher price. A few of them—chiefly 
those who had experienced more years of schooling outside their village, but 
had ‘no money to continue’—mentioned they were ‘not so interested in farm-
ing; we just do it, we have no choice’. For the middle-aged and older villagers, 
things are not worse or better: ‘Before, we had land and we had food; now we 
have almost no land but we can find money to buy food.’
In Lak Sip Kao, where households have so far coped by combining salaried 
employment (at the plantations or elsewhere) with machete-making, the situ-
ation is now uncertain because possible village relocation plans for a stadium 
construction are underway. According to village authorities, at the time of 
latest interview (21 January 2014), the project’s approval was being discussed 
in Vientiane.
Growing rubber, although appealing, remains impossible due to a lack 
of land and start-up capital and/or know-how. Only one interviewed family, 
in Huaytong, has invested in rubber. Since the household head is a war vet-
eran and an influential figure in the village, particularly with regard to land 
15    Interviews, 16 July 2013, and group discussion, 29 January 2014.
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issues, he was able to retain some of his land. After family members acquired 
knowledge of rubber by working for Viet-Lao, they bought rubber trees from 
the company and planted them in two hectares. The family is confident and 
enthusiastic about the potential of their small rubber plantation, which will 
turn profitable in 2016: ‘By then, others will see [the benefit] and perhaps start 
doing the same.’
4 Synthesis, Comparisons, and Discussion
Our case studies present several points of resemblance. In contrast to depic-
tions of poverty and vulnerability as endemic and intrinsic to traditional cul-
tivation systems, we found that local populations’ vulnerability prior to the 
mid-2000s was mostly generated by public policies, which pertain mainly to 
the population’s displacement for Ratanakiri, Cambodia, and to restrictions on 
access to and use of farmland in Champasak, Laos. In both countries, the agrar-
ian transition was marked by the introduction of cash crops prior to the wave 
of land acquisitions, coupled with more radical changes driven by the arrival 
of large-scale rubber plantations, which are similar in size in our case stud-
ies—4,147 ha on average for Ratanakiri; in Champasak, an average of 4,938 ha.
In both areas, the acceleration of land deals and the development of new 
crops—rubber but also cassava—has greatly changed the economic environ-
ment in which indigenous populations lead their lives and experience their 
social systems. Rural interconnectedness has increased thanks to new and 
better-maintained roads and because most of the families nowadays own at 
least one motorcycle. Secondary towns, district-centres, rural marketplaces, 
and crossroads have grown rapidly. The supply of agricultural inputs, tools, 
construction materials, medicine, consumption goods, etc. has increased. 
Small retail shops have opened in villages—people who travel back and forth 
on motorcycles supplying them regularly—and the range of goods has diversi-
fied. In addition, travelling sellers make tours of the villages, where they sell 
meat, fish, vegetables, etc. However, urban and market development are not 
systematically synonymous with betterment for the bulk of the population. 
Some of the foods that these travelling sellers offer for sale in the villages are 
items that villagers used to produce or collect by themselves, and that they 
must now pay for, as these products are now produced less and because popu-
lations are increasingly busy with other off-farm tasks. Trade and markets have 
developed, but farmers sell their harvests mostly at home. Although sale prices 
are higher a few kilometres outside villages, producers do not know how to 
operate in those marketplaces.
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The major difference between Champasak and Ratanakiri lies in the mag-
nitude of land loss and the consequent importance of non-farming activities 
to new livelihoods. Land loss in Champasak has overall been more severe 
than in Ratanakiri. Yet, our research in Cambodia shows that ‘the bigger, the 
more severe’ is a premise that does not always stand. In Ratanakiri, the pace 
of development of the (large) ELCs left some time and space for former users 
to respond, whereas no such time was given to the population of Champasak. 
Several factors can explain this difference, including the proximity to/distance 
from, and overlap with, areas that were previously used. In Ratanakiri compa-
nies did not have sufficient physical capital to plant the large granted areas. 
A second major difference is the involvement of a wider range of new actors 
in Ratanakiri, including medium-sized Khmer companies operating outside 
the frame of ELCs and numerous in-migrants who settled in the villages, all of 
whom contributed significantly to the process of land acquisitions. Incoming 
migration in Champasak villages, in relation to salaried work at the rubber 
plantations, was found to be much lower and more temporary. Champasak 
families have found more, although intermittent, job opportunities in rubber 
plantations than their peers in Ratanakiri, who suffer from the tough competi-
tion of Khmer in-migrants.
We also observed differences in populations’ attitudes towards the new 
holders of land. In Ratanakiri, populations dared to respond to and in some 
cases to contest central government-signed ELCs, whereas in Champasak 
villagers rarely contested upper-level decisions, and even less so challenged 
acquisitions by public officials. This may reflect the fact that the state in Laos 
has a tighter and more effective control over its populations than does the 
state in Cambodia—whether this is real or merely perceived as such by those 
who are governed. Another marked difference was found in Ratanakiri where 
local populations express a fear of Khmer landowners, who they say are high-
ranking and well-connected people with unlimited power, which is not the 
case with foreign-held land concessions. Local populations responses are also 
telling regarding the subjective meanings underlying power relations, as illus-
trated by the Ratanakiri population, which expresses having lower capabilities 
compared to the Khmer, who they say they are ‘more clever’. Similar expres-
sions from villagers in Champasak (non-Lao ethnic and Lao alike) were also 
heard regarding the Vietnamese.
We can thus distinguish two levels of dispossession that we will hereafter 
label as ‘partial’ and ‘severe’. As dispossession levels are uneven across house-
holds within a single village, we then draw on a typology of the transformation 
of household livelihoods across our cases.
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Partial dispossession, as found to be predominant in Pra Lai and Malik 
(Cambodia) and Lak Sao Paet (Laos), comprises situations in which villages 
were left with enough land for the majority of families to—so far—satisfy 
their basic needs from farming. Partial also means that livelihoods remain 
centred around family-based activities, although families are increasingly in 
search for salaried jobs. The magnitude of partial dispossession is tied to the 
capacity of local populations to make up for their land loss by clearing other 
areas, to negotiate with companies the retention of some of their (the popula-
tions’) land, to get incorporated into rubber companies, or to receive monetary 
or non-monetary compensation. Apart from the size of land loss relative to 
the total area previously farmed by the local population, some cases of partial 
dispossession are related to a slower pace of development achieved by com-
panies, and the consequent opportunity for the local population to anticipate 
and respond to land acquisitions. Thus, the transformation of partial dispos-
session into severe dispossession might just be a matter of time; the time it will 
take for investors to plant the full holding they were granted.
Severe dispossession, as observed in Trang and the three villages in Bachiang, 
depicts situations in which access to land and other natural resources is not 
enough to satisfy basic needs. Dispossession is severe particularly for swidden 
land, as both national governments concerned have facilitated the granting 
of land areas left fallow, with the argument that those areas were ‘not used’ or 
were ‘state land’. Using the same argument, swidden plots were frequently not 
eligible for any type of compensation. Severity relates to the size of and a faster 
pace of plantation development; to people’s powerlessness or perceptions of 
powerlessness in reacting to dispossession, particularly vis-à-vis certain types 
of investors or authority levels granting the concessions; and to the derisory 
amount of compensation, if compensation is provided at all. In some cases, 
severe dispossession also relates to the combination of large-scale land deals 
with a wave of small-scale acquisitions by in-migrants or public officials.
The typology of livelihood transformations reflects (1) how households were 
affected by and could respond to the politics of dispossession, (2) the main 
transformation of their economic activities over the last five to seven years, 
and (3) how they have managed, or not, to engage in the rubber boom.
A first group, which mostly includes village elites and their close relatives, 
has managed to retain some land or avoid being dispossessed altogether by 
orienting investors far enough away from their land. This represents around 
2 per cent of households in Champasak and 4 per cent in Ratanakiri. Thanks to 
their status and power in their respective villages, they could easily compen-
sate for any loss by obtaining access to other land. As they themselves often 
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facilitated the land acquisitions, their acquaintance with investors enabled 
them to obtain access to inputs (seedlings) and/or technical advice to develop 
rubber plantations of their own on areas ranging from 2 to 10 ha. Only one 
case of a member of a village elite who planted rubber was documented 
in Champasak. This group also includes some of the oldest and well-off 
in-migrants.
A second group has thrived on the wave of land acquisitions and rub-
ber boom-induced local development. It includes shop owners, traders, and 
households providing services such as transport, restaurant, repair work, bro-
kerage, worker recruitment, and money lending. In Champasak, this group 
does not exceed 10 per cent of households of all the studied sites combined. 
In Ratanakiri, this group represents 7 per cent of the sample; members of the 
group are mostly outsiders to the places in which they have settled and estab-
lished their business, and some of them invested in rubber at a time when land 
was still cheap, and they today possess plantations similar in size to those of 
the first group.
For the third group, farming activities have remained at the core of their 
livelihoods; farming-based livelihoods include an increasing share of land 
dedicated to cash crops, cassava and fruit trees, and a little rubber (1–2 ha). 
In this group, which accounts for 12 per cent of the total population surveyed 
in Ratanakiri, households have engaged in rubber through their own invest-
ments; only one such case was encountered in southern Laos. The engage-
ment process has been slow or came later than for the two previous groups, as 
these households did not possess the necessary start-up capital and were not 
acquainted with the rubber companies. We cannot predict if these households 
will manage to turn their investment into profitable cropping systems, as the 
trees are not productive yet. So far, they have not had to work for others, or only 
occasionally.
For the fourth group, livelihood transformation is marked by an increas-
ing share of salaried work—or petty commodity production for a few—as a 
proportion of their total income. They have become part-time farmers who 
do not have the capacity to engage in rubber. Their best achievement lies in 
finding more regular salaried jobs and possibly semi-skilled better-paid ones. 
Their prospects at home are much constrained by in-migrant workers; and 
their future elsewhere depends much on the social networks needed to facili-
tate migration. This group represents around 49 and 75 per cent of the totals, 
respectively, in Ratanakiri and Champasak.
A last group consists of rural workers for whom farming is practiced only 
when there is nothing else to do. In Champasak, this situation is reflected in an 
estimated 13 per cent of households, all studied sites combined. In Ratanakiri, 
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28 per cent of households belong to this group. Salaried work has become the 
pillar of their livelihoods. Engagement in rubber was never an option. The exis-
tence of this group relates to severe cases of dispossession, where households 
sold too much of their land at an early stage, an occurrence in Ratanakiri, or to 
households that had large plots of swidden land falling in concession areas, as 
was the case in Champasak. In Ratanakiri, this group also includes in-migrants 
who have not yet acquired land and who came in search for work. Although 
regular jobs are rare, selling labour has become a more rational pursuit than 
farming. As job opportunities are not sufficient at home, out-migration of 
one or several household members tends to increase. Those who are not capa-
ble of migrating are left with limited choices, including ‘desperate’ sales of 
their remaining land assets.
5 Conclusion
In the seven villages that feature in this chapter, an agrarian transition from 
dominant subsistence-oriented swidden forms of agriculture had started prior 
to the acceleration of land acquisitions. However, as local government only 
loosely implemented public policies, and the development of cash crops for 
outside markets remained limited, the ‘powers’ of regulation and the market 
(Hall et al., 2011) were not strong enough to include these communities in the 
market economy. Yet, those public policies eroded the former agrarian system 
and thus paved the way for an ‘insecure boom’ (Hall, 2011, 3).
The power and pace of transition changed from the mid-2000s. The effec-
tiveness of regulation increased because local governments were involved in 
its implementation process; furthermore, they contributed to its legitimation 
or rather its acceptance by local populations. At the same time, the power of 
the market increased: the booming demand for rubber, stronger than for any 
previous crop, made it more profitable for local government representatives to 
comply with central government strategy; it also convinced smallholders that 
rubber could be profitable. The transition strengthened further, as small land-
holders themselves became ‘agents’ of land transactions, with opportunistic 
village elites—in some cases—becoming agents of land grabbing within their 
own communities.
Despite substantial land acquisitions by outsiders, most local populations 
have until now managed to keep some land and to maintain farming activi-
ties for themselves. However, this state of affairs is bound to change at some 
point as large-scale companies are increasing their planted acreage and 
medium-scale companies are pursuing their search for surrounding areas to 
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expand, and as the flow of in-migrants, in the case of Ratanakiri, is continu-
ing. Furthermore, in response to the reduction in land available, families have 
intensified their cropping systems—of cassava in particular—in ways that 
might not be sustainable.
Beyond the reduction and depletion of those natural resources that are 
left to local populations, the majority are cornered by a socio-economic 
environment that increases their need for cash, while their former household 
farming-based livelihoods are not providing enough of a livelihood anymore, 
and rubber remains out of reach. In reference to the agrarian transition as 
described by Rigg et al. (2012), our cases show some major nuances. First, at 
the provincial level, the increasing share of non-farming activities is found in 
urbanising areas, market places, and along the main transportation networks; 
but for native populations the process is not advanced, despite their need and 
wish to get out of farming solely. Second, the process of ‘delocalisation of life 
and living’ is reflected in the shift of spaces created by land acquisitions, but 
the ‘mobility’ of native populations is confined to within the vicinity of their 
villages. Third, a dis-embedding of households and families is occurring, but 
not so much because of social and economic relations being ‘stretched across 
space’, but rather because of the development of individual interests, notably 
among the youth of the areas in question. Last, the dissociation of the village-
community is strong, as illustrated by the uneven opportunities brought about 
by newcomers and the opportunistic behaviour of village elites.
Family farming is not lagging behind; it is losing ground, as illustrated 
by land sales that are no longer even a short-term cash opportunity, but fall 
more and more into the category of ‘desperate’ sales to cover existing deficits. 
As opportunities to diversify economic activity remain insufficient, people 
will have to turn to the diversification of localities; out-migration is likely to 
become one of the key features of this agrarian transition.
Needless to say, a political commitment from the two national governments 
concerned to seriously and substantially reassess their development strategies 
in light of these consequences is urgent, and not simply a matter of proce-
dural design or wishful, responsible thinking on the part of investors. The usual 
recommendation of prior informed consultations about land deals has not 
only—in our cases—become outdated, its presumed effectiveness for future 
investments remains more than uncertain in the light of current development 
drives. Furthermore, we cannot expect much from the Voluntary Guidelines 
for responsible investments,16 as investors on the ground have no incentive 
to abide by such guidelines, and nor will they feel under any pressure to harm 
their business with such instruments.
16    http://www.fao.org/3/a-au866e.pdf (accessed on 26 May 2015).
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There are indeed other remarkable issues that people are facing on a daily 
basis for which a broad palette of interrelated human rights instruments could 
be called upon for action. These include the right to food, the right to water, 
and the right to a livelihood. Nevertheless, international governance mecha-
nisms will remain ineffective if they have no links or outreach to civil society 
organisations on the ground. In both countries studied in the context of this 
chapter, such organisations are few and often only mildly familiar with the 
work of global governance structures, and their intervention capacity is rather 
limited when compared to the magnitude of continuing land acquisitions.
Beside a structural policy change that would be needed to halt an agrar-
ian transition that is undermining the livelihoods of the majority, it is also 
important to take into account that the process of losing ground has also been 
accompanied by a process of dislocation/disruption of family-based liveli-
hoods. In such a situation, younger generations, which have—or can expect to 
secure—some autonomy by obtaining salaried employment, are considering 
moving away as they are faced with limited options at home, notably a lack of 
land for the foreseeable future. Moreover, having a salaried job has—locally—
become a perceived way of ‘moving forward’ or ‘improving oneself ’. Since such 
a direction ‘forwards’ is already leading some, and is very likely to lead many 
more, into exploitative situations, development practitioners should comple-
ment their advocacy of land rights, land tenure security, and access to informa-
tion with assessments of capabilities and learning needs, in terms of vocational 
training, in a number of areas for which these populations express an interest; 
agriculture remaining one of them.
In Cambodia, salaried employment is developing with the rubber boom—
tapping rubber for instance—but indigenous peoples cannot access it 
because they lack the necessary skills. Even the indigenous elites hire Khmer 
in-migrants to tap their trees. In Laos, there is growing interest in pursuing 
the benefits from farming products and other activities that, for some years, 
have been practiced in parallel to household farming (e.g. basket-making and 
machete-making), and in newer activities such as mechanised textile sewing 
and hairdressing, particularly among the country’s youth. Therefore, training 
programmes to support the development of such activities and the marketing 
of agricultural and non-agricultural products and services should be encour-
aged. Further, for the growing number of people who are in search of work 
outside their villages, vocational training could also make a great difference. In 
addition, awareness raising and legal advice should be provided regarding the 
risks associated with migration.
Although we do not take the socio-economic transformation described in 
this chapter as given and irreversible—and therefore we do not intend, by any 
means, to accept it—we do recognise that, while waiting for solutions to its 
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structural causes, whose search, we hope, will no longer be delayed, we need to 
address the negative consequences of this transformation currently affecting 
local populations.
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CHAPTER 8
‘Better-Practice’ Concessions? Lessons from 
Cambodia’s Leopard-Skin Landscape
Michael B. Dwyer, Emily Polack, and Sokbunthoeun So
Abstract
In the context of the global land rush, policy debates are split on the question of state 
land concessions: are smallholder-centric ‘inclusive’ investment models the only real 
form of responsible agricultural investment, or are ‘responsible’ concessions possible 
when it comes to the protection of local land access? To help move this debate forwards, 
this paper examines two case studies in Cambodia—an oil palm plantation recently 
certified by the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) and a teak plantation certi-
fied by the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC)—which we refer to as ‘better-practice’ 
concessions. These cases reflect efforts to operationalise the Cambodian government’s 
‘Leopard-Skin’ policy, which stipulates that concessions be developed around small-
holders rather than directly on top of them. We argue that regularisation is not inher-
ently objectionable, but carries risks when carried out on a concession-by-concession 
basis, because it distances vulnerable land users from the potentially protective effects 
of the law and defers to localised, and often unequal, relations of authority. The paper 
thus highlights the challenges that investors and communities are likely to face even 
when concession developers seek to respect existing local land claims, and suggests that 
models based on empowered communities with more secure forms of tenure are likely 
to work better for all parties involved.
1 Introduction
In many destination countries in the global land rush, the state lays legal claim 
to large swathes of land, including land occupied and used by smallholders 
and managed under a variety of customary governance systems. This disjunc-
ture between formal and de facto property is exacerbated by many states not 
even knowing the extent of their landholdings (FAO et al., 2010), and has in 
recent years been used to put large amounts of land into play through the blur-
ring of both legal and cartographic boundaries (Cotula et al., 2009; Deininger 
and Byerlee, 2011; HLPE, 2011; Borras Jr. and Franco, 2012). This imprecise legal 
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geography has major implications for investors who have been lured into so-
called ‘frontier’ markets by promises of cheap and abundant state land (Adler 
and So, 2012; Borras Jr. and Franco, 2012; de Leon et al., 2013). If state land is 
actually state-owned in the sense of being demarcated and uncontested, it can 
give investors attractive incentives: ‘one-stop’ acquisition, efficient regulation 
and, most important, low cost of access. But when land is state-‘owned’ in only 
the formal sense—that is, when it remains occupied, used, or even locally held 
under soft forms of title—investors are vulnerable to a range of delays, addi-
tional costs, and reputational risks (Munden Project, 2012; de Leon et al., 2013). 
Whether state ownership of land is actual, merely formal, or somewhere in 
between is thus a subject of great interest.
The role of the private sector in helping bridge the gap between formal and 
de facto property remains a key point of contention in debates about land 
grabbing, responsible agricultural investment, and the gulf in between (Cotula 
and Leonard, 2010; FAO et al., 2010; UNCFS, 2012). In many ways Cambodia 
is exemplary of the global land grab problem, in which local elites and for-
eign investors collaborate with each other and with state officials to acquire 
and develop large concessions of putatively state-owned (but previously un-
demarcated) land. State land concessions in Cambodia, various estimates 
of which range between 1 and 3 million hectares (Titthara and Boyle 2012a; 
ADHOC, 2013; 2014), have reportedly flouted legal provisions on landhold-
ings and community protection, and many have reportedly involved substan-
tial violence and displacement yet delivered minimal or no benefit to locals 
(LICADHO, 2009; Chak, 2011; Müller, 2012; Kuch and Zsombor, 2013; Neef et al., 
2013). But while this may be the standard story within the Cambodian land 
sector (see Gironde and Senties Portilla; Cismas and Paramita, both in this vol-
ume), this pattern has nonetheless become a growing liability for the actors 
involved—not just companies and their investors, but also state officials at 
multiple levels, and even foreign donors. This article focuses on two cases 
where companies have sought to develop more socially benign—and, they 
believe, more profitable and sustainable—plantation concessions in a context 
that is still marred by extensive land conflict. The first is the Mong Reththy 
Investment Cambodia Oil Palm (MRICOP) Company (Preah Sihanouk prov-
ince); the second is the Grandis Timber Company (Kampong Speu province). 
We examine each case empirically, investigating how two well-intentioned 
yet strategically oriented companies navigate the complex landscape of mul-
tiple entitlements and competing claims that lurk beneath the surface of state 
ownership in Cambodia’s rural hinterland. In doing so, we interrogate the pri-
vate sector’s role in helping address the state land problem, both in Cambodia 
and elsewhere.
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The two cases sit within a national regulatory context that is increasingly 
linked to what government officials, private sector actors and the media call 
the government’s Leopard-Skin (Sbek Khla) policy. The term, apparently 
coined by state officials around 2010 and circulated increasingly since (CDC, 
2010; RGC, 2012a; 2012c), remains vague for some, and contested for others in its 
status as well as its intended operational meaning (Milne, 2013; Beban, 2014). 
For some, it is a clear policy, carrying significant government weight (if not 
quite the force of law), while for others it is more like a concept, approach, or 
formula that is still being tested, but that holds significant appeal because of 
its contrast with the status quo (ADHOC, 2014). The basic idea behind it boils 
down to concession development through regularisation rather than eviction: 
treating illegal smallholders—occupants whom official discourse often terms 
‘encroachers’—as legitimate parts of the economic landscape, and develop-
ing concessions around them rather than by evicting them first (CDC, 2010; 
RGC, 2012c; ADHOC, 2014). One foreign advisor to the Cambodian land sec-
tor described the policy as ‘leaving the people where they are and just using 
the rest’ (Müller, 2012, 10). Similarly, the Phnom Penh Post (Becker 2012) called 
the approach a ‘workaround strategy’ in the literal sense of leaving small-scale 
farmers in place and making companies work around them.
Regularisation is hardly a new idea in Cambodian policy circles. A prefer-
ence for avoiding evictions has been stated in various policy documents and 
discussions for over a decade (see e.g. CLP, 2002, 27; RGC, 2007; MAFF, no date). 
Yet, as has often been noted, the concept has been minimally implemented 
(Müller, 2012). What is notable about the last few years is the political currency 
that regularisation has gained, as land conflicts, evictions, and land-related 
arrests mushroomed, especially in the run-up to Cambodia’s national elections 
in July 2013 (ADHOC, 2013; Un, 2013). The case studies presented below are nota-
ble for providing a closer look at what regularisation efforts in Cambodia have 
actually looked like. The cases were chosen for their ability to show Leopard-
Skin development in practice—both companies have publicly committed to 
avoiding eviction and made the business case for leaving local land users in 
place (Chakrya and Sherrel, 2011; Becker 2012)—and because each has been 
identified by outside experts, including third party certifiers (Intertek-Moody 
International, 2012; GFA Certification, 2013), as being a positive example in a 
concession landscape defined largely by its governance failures (for MRICOP, 
see UNCOHCHR, 2007, 20; Chakrya and Sherrel, 2011. For Grandis Timber, see 
IWA, 2011; Müller, 2012, 11; and Becker, 2012).
Looking at how private sector actors negotiate the landscape of existing 
property claims and entitlements that confront their efforts to develop con-
cessions of so-called state land is useful because it provides a window into the 
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social, political-economic and legal dynamics that exist in pluralist contexts 
where statutory, use-based, and patronage-based ownership norms all vie for 
supremacy—contexts where, in short, ‘the law is not the law’ (Adler and So, 
2012). Studying private sector efforts to take advantage of state-legal land claims 
while also acknowledging local, use-based understandings of ownership—at 
least in part—provides insight into the political economy of concession devel-
opment, framing regularisation as a strategic move for legitimising state land 
concessions at a moment of crisis, and showing how the private sector per-
forms for the state the difficult task of making the legal abstraction of state 
land operational on the ground. In examining this reciprocity, we show how 
concession development risks blurring the lines between public authority 
and private interest, but also suggest that at least some in the private sector 
are thinking more pragmatically than the government about local land enti-
tlements. Whether this pragmatism should be equated with good practice, 
however, is a difficult question; the cases thus show the need to look closely 
at how Leopard-Skin development deals with entrenched relations of power 
and marginality in rural landscapes. Finally, by gesturing to both the needs 
and challenges associated with getting accurate information about how land 
acquisition occurs, the cases provide opportunities to connect with wider 
debates on transnational regulation, including third-party certification and 
soft law (see Cismas and Paramita in this volume).
This paper is based on findings from desk research and a field study involv-
ing key informant interviews (including company directors, project staff, local 
officials, and residents of project-area communities) conducted in November 
and December 2011, as well as additional investigation during 2012 and early 
2013, the periods during which both projects were being evaluated for third-
party certification. The study is based on best available information. However, 
as is typical in the Cambodian agribusiness sector, most project documents 
such as impact assessments and land inventories remained unavailable to us. 
While rough project timelines could be constructed from fieldwork and online 
data, access to project documents would have increased our ability to analyse 
and explain the cases more substantially. Opacity is typical of the Cambodian 
agribusiness sector (and of investment in Cambodia more generally), but this 
lack of access to documents presented a limitation nonetheless. Second, our 
focus, both conceptually and methodologically, is on questions of land access; 
while these are inevitably connected to larger issues of livelihood, sustainable 
development, and so on, such wider issues as such are beyond the scope of this 
chapter. (For linkages to livelihood, human rights, and a governance analysis of 
agricultural investments in Cambodia, see Messerli et al., Gironde and Senties 
Portilla, and Cismas and Paramita, all in this volume).
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2 Background: The Political Economy of ‘Anarchic Encroachment’
While Cambodia has featured centrally in the ‘global land grab’ debate of 
recent years (GRAIN, 2008; Deininger and Byerlee, 2011; Neef et al., 2013; Baird, 
2014), land grabbing and related problems of unmapped state land are hardly 
new. Dating back to the social and economic dislocations of Khmer Rouge rule 
(1975–1978) and its aftermath (during the 1980s and 1990s), the distribution of 
land and associated questions of access and ownership have long been at the 
heart of contemporary Cambodian politics (Chandler, 1993; Gottesman, 2003; 
Hughes, 2007; Un and So, 2009; Cock, 2010; Heder, 2011). One of the central 
motifs through which this history has unfolded is ‘anarchic encroachment’, a 
term that state officials often use to describe the activities of smallholders on 
lands that are claimed as state property. Anarchic encroachment is far more 
complicated than just smallholders, however, harkening back not just to the 
legal disarray that followed the Khmer Rouge’s removal in 1979, but also—and, 
we argue, especially—to contemporary Cambodian state policy predicated on 
the allocation of state land for development purposes.
Despite having an official policy of collectivised production (as in Vietnam 
and Laos at the time), the Cambodian government that came to power in 1979 
had little choice, given the memory of Khmer Rouge rule, but to allow the tra-
ditional model of smallholder farming to return on a wide scale (Chandler, 
1993; Gottesman, 2003). This occurred during the 1980s, and in preparation for 
the Vietnamese military withdrawal from Cambodia at the end of the decade 
(and presaging the formal UN-mediated transition period of 1992–1993) the 
government offered farmers the chance to formalise these entitlements; by the 
end of 1991, roughly 4 million applications had been filed (So, 2009, 106). Only a 
fraction of these applications were eventually converted into actual certificates 
of ownership, however, in part because the Land Law of 1992 excluded agricul-
tural land from eligibility for private ownership (Van Acker, 1999, 37; Cooper, 
2002, 17). Instead, in a move that favoured elite patronage over smallholder 
populism, state officials focused on handing out concession rights to powerful 
individuals, most (in)famously for logging. Thus neoliberalism, in the form of 
‘public enterprise privatization’ (RGC, 1994; MEF, 1995), articulated with the 
politics of patronage; timber concessions, for example, increased from roughly 
2.2 million hectares in 1994 (World Bank et al., 1996, 4; also see Global Witness, 
2002, 3) to as much as 8 million hectares by the end of the 1990s (Chan et al., 
2001; also see Springer, 2011).1 Writing in 1999, an Oxfam legal advisor lamented 
1    Cambodia is hardly unique in this regard, although a wider comparison is beyond the scope 
of this chapter.
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the growing landlessness that accompanied this first concession boom, not-
ing that ‘the current system is unable to cope with the pressure it has come 
under from the newly opened market economy and the growing population 
[. . .] [F]or the first time in its history, Cambodia is experiencing a shortage of 
arable land’ (Williams, 1999, 2).
The discourse of ‘anarchic encroachment’ (RGC, 1999) came into widespread 
use during this period as government officials sought to describe the rural land 
situation without directly implicating economic elites, whose activities were a 
key part of the problem, but who were also key political allies. Encroachment 
on state (e.g. forested) land, then as now, frequently involves the supervision, 
resources, and political connection of elites who offer access to land and/or 
work to the poor and socially vulnerable. This system held steady for a time, 
especially during the 1990s when the Khmer Rouge were still a military threat 
from the forests of the Thai border region (Le Billon, 2000), and elite resource 
patronage could be widely tolerated ‘as a necessary evil’ because it provided 
much-needed economic stability and development (Hughes, 2007, 840). But 
as the Khmer Rouge threat receded, neo-patrimonialism’s blatant unfair-
ness—its ‘discriminatory enforcement of laws and regulations, discretionary 
provision of monopoly franchises, concessions and contracts, and diversion-
ary collection of public revenues and disbursement of state lands, funds and 
employment’ (Cock, 2010, 263)—became increasingly disruptive. Seeking to 
place land development on a firmer legal basis, the government rewrote the 
Land Law in 2001.
The 2001 Land Law is notable for its strategic orientation: much like that 
which the Leopard-Skin policy is currently attempting to achieve (see below) 
The 2001 Land Law is also notable for including provisions that recognise small-
holder entitlements at both the household and community scale, but that also 
develop a flexible and powerful doctrine of state land ownership, particularly 
when it comes to the allocation of concessions. In the spirit of continuing the 
process of ‘reconstituting ownership over immovable property after the period 
of crisis from 1975 to 1979’ (Article 29), the new law thus reversed the 1992 Land 
Law’s exclusion of agricultural land from the legal definition of smallholder 
ownership, and outlined pathways for titling both individual smallholdings 
and indigenous communal lands (see also Grimsditch and Henderson, 2009; 
Adler and So, 2012). At the same time, however, it ended the establishment of 
new rights of possession, singling out ‘the private property of the state and 
public legal entities’ as a priority area where the practice of ‘encroachment’ via 
the establishment of possession rights needed to be stopped (Article 17).
The new law also created a powerful doctrine of state land, strengthening the 
legal foundation for ongoing ‘public enterprise privatisation’ and positioning 
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concessions as a key piece of the state’s development repertoire. ‘State pub-
lic’ lands, which include areas of natural and cultural significance, as well as 
areas with infrastructure for general public use, were protected from alien-
ation (Article 15), although they could be transferred out of state-public status 
‘when they lose their public interest use’ (Article 16); Everything else—all state 
lands that were not state-public lands—were state-private lands by default, 
and eligible for allocation via concessions (Articles 48–62). Concessions could 
take two broad forms: economic land concessions (ELCs), aimed at cultivating 
large-scale investment, and social land concessions (SLCs), aimed at alleviat-
ing landlessness through the provision of surplus state land.
ELCs were already in existence, but needed legal grounding and protec-
tion after the free-for-all of the 1990s. Building on a 1989 Council of Ministers’ 
Instruction (No. 3) and the 1994 Investment Law, the 2001 Land Law extended 
their maximum duration to 99 years, stipulated that ELC land be put to use 
within twelve months, and imposed a limit of 10,000 hectares per concession-
aire. Existing ELCs over 10,000 hectares, of which there were roughly a dozen at 
the time (UNCOHCHR, 2007), were allowed to maintain their size if reduction 
‘would result in compromising the exploitation in progress’ (Article 59). SLCs 
were a new invention, oriented explicitly towards replacing ‘encroachment’ 
with a more orderly and managed solution to landlessness and demographic 
expansion. After prohibiting further ‘encroachment’ on state land, Article 17 
of the new law thus contained a provision for allowing ‘vacant lands of the 
State private domain [to] be distributed to persons demonstrating need for 
land for social purposes in accordance with conditions set forth by [a future] 
sub-decree.’ The new Land Law, anticipating a move that would be repeated in 
2012–2013 (see below), thus sought to harness the allocation of state land to the 
aspirations of the landless and land-poor.
Unfortunately, the geography of ELCs and SLCs has never approached any-
thing like parity. Although the enabling sub-decree for SLCs was issued more 
than a year and a half before the one for ELCs, the SLC-granting process has 
continued to lag far behind that of ELCs. A German advisor to the Cambodian 
land sector recently put the number of SLCs at a few thousand hectares, 
lamenting that ‘as a gross summary, it has to be stated that 99 per cent of the 
distributed state land was handed over in long-term leases of up to 99 years 
to national and international investors, to the detriment of the rural poor, 
who got only a 1 per cent share’ (Müller, 2012, 3–4). This asymmetry was mir-
rored in the accompanying bureaucracy: the slow allocation of SLCs is often 
explained by its adherence to rules, while ELC allocation has proceeded apace 
(Un and So, 2011; Müller, 2012: 3; ADHOC, 2013). The same advisor quoted above 
noted that despite the extensive regulatory requirements governing ELCs—
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including social and environmental impact assessments, community consul-
tations, legal efforts to avoid relocation, and formal land use planning, all in 
advance of signing a contract—these prescriptions have been ‘widely ignored’ 
(Müller, 2012, 6).
The current landscape of Cambodian concessions thus poses a problem. On 
the one hand, the allocation of ELCs has been so extensive that many worry 
that Cambodia’s arable land is ‘all but gone’ (Titthara and Boyle, 2012a). On the 
other hand, much of this land—land that is located inside formal concessions 
but has yet to be actually alienated—is still being used by local communities. 
Even as the intersection of post-2001 neo-patrimonialism and the global land 
rush has created widespread (and putatively low-rent) corporate land access, 
land conflicts and entitlement losses for Cambodia’s rural poor and indigenous 
communities have become a growing political liability. It is into this breach 
that the Leopard-Skin policy has sought to step.
3 Blurred Boundaries: The Case of Mong Reththy Investment 
Cambodia Oil Palm Company (MRICOP)
In July 2011, one of Cambodia’s most famous tycoons delivered an unexpected 
lecture to his fellow members of the Cambodian senate. Publicised widely 
in the days that followed, Oknha Mong Reththy’s speech criticised the rash 
of evictions and legal violations that have plagued Cambodia’s land sector in 
recent years. Referring to ‘some investors’ who ‘claim that they need to evict 
people to develop their concessions’ Reththy said: ‘I disagree with this tactic—
these people have been living on their land for generations. Where will they go 
when they’re kicked out?’ According to Chakrya and Sherrel (2011), he ‘urged 
investors to employ local residents on their concessions rather than hiring 
outsiders,’ and ‘called on the government to create a panel to verify that com-
panies granted ELCs abided by their [legal] conditions.’ At the time he made 
this speech, Reththy was himself confronting land tenure-related business risk. 
Just days later, a prospective USD 115 million joint venture with France’s larg-
est sugar company was reported to have fallen through (Hul, 2011); while the 
precise timing and details remain unclear, Reththy’s speech suggested that 
Cambodia’s business elite—many of whom rely on foreign capital for joint-
venture partnerships—were feeling the need to distance themselves publicly 
from the scourge of land grabbing.
Reththy’s comments were not just posturing, however. They were based on 
his experience developing his flagship MRICOP concession, an oil palm plan-
tation that was named in an influential United Nations human rights report 
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as Cambodia’s only ‘successful’ ELC (UNCOHCHR, 2007, 20). This project had 
its roots back in 1993, when Reththy purchased some land in northern Preah 
Sihanouk province with the help of a local intermediary (Pal, 2010, 233–234). 
Two years later, Reththy submitted a proposal to the Council for Development 
of Cambodia, requesting land on which to develop an oil palm plantation. By 
November 1995, he had been approved for an 11,000-hectare concession in Ta 
Ney village, in the southern part of Choeng Kou Commune (Figure 8.1); by 
January 1996 the contract was signed.2 In March of 2000, Reththy signed a sec-
ond contract, adding a second, smaller ELC of 1,800 hectares. Despite having 
2    MAFF, ELC profile section, Mong Reththy Investment Cambodia Oil Palm Co., Ltd, 
‘Legal Papers and Right for Investment’ (http://www.elc.maff.gov.kh/en/profile/23-shv/ 
82-sihanuk-mongreththy.html) (accessed 2011; for contemporary access, see http://
OpenDevelopmentCambodia.net).
FIGURE 8.1 Mong Reththy Project Area (hatch), Northern Preah Sihanouk Province (Cambodia).
 Note: The precise location of his ELC was not specified, and is approximated here; 
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areas, Reththy’s ELCs were not given precise locations; other than commune 
and village names, no concession maps existed at the time. As this case illus-
trates, the ELC therefore functioned in practice more like a general license to 
develop the northern part of Preah Sihanouk province.
Soon after its initial contract was signed, MRICOP conducted a study 
with local officials to identify area residents who would be impacted by 
the plantation.3 This study, while not an Environmental and Social Impact 
Assessment (ESIA) of the type later mandated by law, created a list of local 
occupants and provided a basis for the negotiations that followed.4 Three com-
pensation options were documented in different key informants’ accounts: 
(i) monetary compensation in exchange for their land; (ii) land-for-land 
exchange outside the concession area; and (iii) exclusion of the person’s land 
from the project.
MRICOP’s ELC acquisition in the 1990s was characterised by a situation 
in which Reththy was viewed by many local residents (and even some offi-
cials) not only as an investor, but also as someone who carried state authority. 
Interviews with area residents who lived along the main north-south road (see 
Figure 8.1), and thus tended to experience the company’s land access efforts 
early in MRICOP’s history, tended to give rather critical accounts (also cf. Lang, 
2000). While respondents took pains to avoid directly criticising Reththy him-
self, they nonetheless raised concerns about their unequal relationship with 
the company, a pattern typical of the Cambodian context more generally. In a 
few instances, residents explained that they felt pressure to accept cash com-
pensation or land exchange simply by virtue of living near the plantation of 
a wealthy and powerful developer. They reported that people were told they 
could remain on and continue to cultivate their land as they normally would 
but were also warned about causing damage to the new plantation crops. In 
this context, rumours and innuendo were used to significant effect. One area 
resident reported deciding to sell after ‘hearing people say that my land was 
under a development project and would be taken’ anyway.
The presence of the company also created a speculative land market geared 
towards providing MRICOP with land. Some residents reported the presence 
of speculators who used the name of the company to undermine residents’ 
3    Interview with village and commune officials, December 2011. Unless otherwise indicated, 
interviews and informants referenced in this section refer to fieldwork in the Choeng Kou 
commune, December 2011.
4    According to local officials, this study was carried out by a MRICOP associate designated 
personally by Mong Reththy. We were unable to obtain a copy of the actual study, and thus 
base our account solely on interviews.
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faith in their own land tenure, thus acquiring land that would have otherwise 
sold at higher prices (or possibly have been kept). One villager explained that 
land brokers bought from people at lower prices and sold to MRICOP at higher 
prices (for example buying at USD 200 per hectare and selling for USD 700–
800). Residents reportedly sold to speculators out of fear they would lose the 
land anyway. This pressure to sell was reportedly sometimes the result of collu-
sion between speculators and government officials, or in some cases between 
officials and people claiming to be Reththy’s employees.
These accounts point to a heterogeneous mix of property claims encoun-
tered by the company; this hardly accords with the notion of a state-owned 
countryside. In this context, farmers who lacked documentary proof of 
ownership were able to have their entitlements recognised. But these enti-
tlements were also precarious. Rumours of living ‘under the Oknha’s devel-
opment project’ were mobilised by rival elites, land brokers, and even some 
who claimed to be Reththy’s employees, and were used to convince reluctant 
smallholders to sell ‘before it was too late.’ While it is impossible to determine 
how often this took place, it is clear that various actors exploited the fears of 
poor land users, capitalising on the fact that the MRICOP concession area was 
geographically ill-defined. This is hardly a situation of prior state landowner-
ship. Rather, it is a case where locally existing landholdings were recognised to 
a point, but also rendered precarious through the granting of a concession to a 
powerful businessman over a general area.
At later stages, MRICOP’s land acquisition efforts were more positively expe-
rienced, especially when they were paired with the work opportunities and 
expanded infrastructure that accompanied the conversion of Kaev Phos—a 
coastal village in the concession’s western zone—into a port facility. During 
the building of ‘Oknha Mong’ Port in Kaev Phos in 2003–2004 (see Figure 8.1), 
residents described having their pictures taken in front of their old homes, 
and receiving land transfer documents certified by local authorities with these 
pictures attached. This process of land exchange was the same regardless of 
the gender of the residents and was described by respondents as being widely 
accepted. One resident explained that locals had not only received new land 
but gained access to a health centre, a school, and better roads thanks to the 
company. Another resident of ‘Reththy 1’, a village built to resettle Kaev Phos’s 
former residents, described actually making money after he sold some of the 
land he received as part of the compensation process.5
This diversity of responses highlights the issue of timing: negative responses 
were related to MRICOP’s land acquisition in the 1990s, whereas positive 
5    This paragraph is based on interviews with residents of Reththy 1 Village, December 2011.
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responses referred to events in the following decade, when MRICOP had more 
business relations with clients around the world, including European compa-
nies. Presumably to facilitate selling in European markets, MRICOP began the 
process of joining the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) in the mid-
to-late 2000s. While the company’s membership was initially delayed due to 
the land conflict reported by Lang (2000), it was granted in late 2011 after certi-
fiers determined that the dispute had been resolved in an acceptable manner 
(Intertek-Moody, 2012, 12).
4 Managing the Frontier: The Case of Grandis Timber
Grandis Timber is a teak plantation company that has been developing an ELC 
in western Kampong Speu province since 2009. Catering to a small but grow-
ing group of sustainability-oriented ‘frontier’ investors,6 the company aims to 
turn its plantation into ‘an asset class [that] hits [. . .] financial returns and is 
socially responsible and environmentally sustainable’ (Daniel Mitchell, man-
ager, quoted in Becker, 2012). Most of its plantation land is a former logging 
concession, and the company emphasises its mix of reforestation, conserva-
tion, and economic development activities. The company is a joint venture 
between the SRP International Group and Danish and Swedish pension funds, 
and was certified by the Forest Stewardship Council in July 2013 (FSC, 2013).
Like MRICOP, Grandis has attracted significant attention for its publicised 
belief that it is cheaper, as a feature about the company in the Phnom Penh 
Post (Becker, 2012) put it, ‘to treat people well and have them stay in their 
homes and work their small farms, rather than pushing them off the land.’ 
Grandis was featured as a field-trip destination by the International Woodfibre 
Association (IWA, 2011), and lauded by the Phnom Penh Post in the paper’s 
above-mentioned feature as a company that was successfully implement-
ing the Prime Minister’s Leopard-Skin approach to development. Grandis’s 
emphasis on local entitlements also caught the attention of German coopera-
tion (Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit, GIZ) land sector advi-
sors, who have been working with the Cambodian government’s SLC program 
in recent years (Bickel and Löhr, 2011; Müller, 2012; Neef et al., 2013). This inter-
est relates to the company’s policy of working around existing land users even 
if they do not have legal rights to the land (Müller, 2012)—a preference for 
6    See also Frontier Investment Development Partners (http://www.fidp-funds.com/) and 
Leopard Capital (http://www.leopardasia.com/) (both accessed on 16 March 2015).
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regularisation over eviction that exemplifies the Leopard-Skin approach. As 
this case demonstrates, however, this is rarely a straightforward process.
Grandis’s ELC is located in the foothills of western Cambodia’s Cardamom 
Mountains (Figure 8.2), a part of Kampong Speu province where permanent 
settlement is comparatively recent. During the 1980s the area was insecure and 
therefore sparsely populated, especially following a Khmer Rouge offensive in 
1989 that scattered many residents and left Reaksmey Samaki Commune (to 
the north) almost entirely empty (see Gottesman, 2003). Repopulation began 
in significant numbers in the late 1990s, and especially in the early years of 
the twenty-first century, right around the time the 2001 Land Law was passed. 
Some settlers were drawn by the low density of farmsteads, others by reports 
that government officials were distributing land. Local officials identified areas 
where new settlement could occur, and in many cases helped settlers file appli-
cations for legal possession rights. One commune chief described the rapid 
but erratic expansion of settlements and farmland as producing ‘villages that 
stretched like rubber bands’, with residences and agricultural plots frequently 
separated by wide distances, and with few ways for authorities to regulate the 
geography of settlement and production.7
7    Interview with commune official, Phnom Srouch District, December 2011.
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In 2007 a local commune chief proposed a 1,200-hectare Social Land 
Concession to be established in Prey Torteng and Krang Deyvay villages, at the 
southern end of what eventually became the Grandis concession (Figure 8.2). 
The SLC was approved. But when, in early 2009, Grandis proposed using the 
same area for its own ELC, the SLC had not yet materialised.8 Ultimately, it 
was decided to move the proposed SLC to a different location nearby, and to 
develop the Grandis ELC in the area where the SLC had been proposed.9
Setting its sights on full legality, social responsibility, and environmental 
sustainability, Grandis embarked on an effort to delimit its concession from 
locally used land, to carve out patches of good forest for conservation, and to 
begin the certification process with the FSC. A feasibility study conducted by 
company representatives and local authorities was finalised in late July 2009, 
and identified 682 hectares of landholdings, used by 310 families. These lands 
were mapped using GPS and demarcated with cement posts in order to show 
local residents that Grandis intended to respect their land boundaries, and, 
presumably, to help prevent encroachment on the company’s land. The sur-
vey also identified large areas of intact forest to be set aside for a variety of 
environmental uses. Excluding these forest lands and the 682 hectares of local 
landholdings, Grandis’s final proposal for its ELC came in at 9,820 hectares, just 
under Cambodia’s legal limit. A month after the proposal, the company signed 
an ‘Agreement in Principle’ with Cambodia’s Council of Ministers. On the last 
day of 2009, Grandis signed a concession contract with the government, giving 
the company the legal right to develop a teak plantation in the area identified 
by the survey.10 Land clearing began in early 2010.
Many residents we spoke to described the company’s activities, including 
its ongoing presence, in positive terms. One resident of Krang Deyvey village, 
for example, noted that many locals, including those living inside the conces-
sion area, were working for the company. Although this was day labour work 
on the Grandis ELC, the combination of wages (USD 2.5 per day) and trans-
portation (‘company trucks come into local villages every morning to pick up 
8     Interview, same as previous.
9     Despite being moved, the SLC fared better than many (cf. Neef et al., 2013), and was final-
ised in 2012; see http://lwd.org.kh/lwd/land-allocation-for-poor-families-in-kampong-
speu-kicks-off/ (accessed on 16 March 2015).
10    http://www.elc.maff.gov.kh/en/profile/13-ksp/33-ksp-grandis.html (accessed 2011; for 
contemporary access, see http://OpenDevelopmentCambodia.net). In accordance with 
Cambodian law, an environmental and social impact assessment (ESIA) was apparently 
conducted sometime during this period as well; this was not made available to us, as is 
unfortunately standard practice in Cambodia.
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workers and drop them off in the evening’) suggested that it was a relatively 
good option compared to other local alternatives. A local official also praised 
Grandis for its provision of work opportunities, although noting the challenge 
of not enough skilled people locally to meet the company’s needs. This meant 
some skilled workers were recruited from other provinces.11
The company has also allowed local residents to harvest tree stumps from 
its concession area. These are a valuable resource for charcoal production—an 
important source of cash, especially for land-poor and landless households. 
Taking wood for charcoal in other areas is classified as illegal and regulated by 
the forest administration with serious consequences for those found extract-
ing wood. A local official we spoke to thus also praised Grandis’s policy on pro-
viding access to tree stumps, albeit that it is also a means of clearing the land 
and therefore of benefit to the company.
Somewhat surprisingly, Grandis’s decision to respect existing land uses 
rather than legal land rights eventually brought the company into conflict with 
state authorities. Following the 2009 survey and corner marker placement, 
company staff drew up GPS-referenced paper maps to hand out to residents. 
These ‘farm map documents’ were not intended to carry legal meaning, but 
rather to formalise the company’s commitment not to encroach on villagers’ 
land;12 presumably they could also have been used as a form of prior agree-
ment if cases of encroachment emerged in the future. However, cadastral offi-
cials worried that the documents could be (mis)interpreted as proof of legal 
tenure rather than simply as company-acknowledged limits on its own con-
cession land. Faced with the charge of encroaching on the state’s authority to 
define and demarcate property, Grandis backed off its initial plan and decided 
not to distribute the documents.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
In a context of widespread land conflict marked by a mix of unequal power 
relations, insufficient land administration capacity, and the popular percep-
tion that land rights are a reform-unfriendly area, this paper has examined the 
possibility of ‘better practice’ within the modality of state land concessions. As 
the economic and political liabilities of land conflict are increasingly felt, both 
in Cambodia and elsewhere in the global south, a key question that remains 
is the extent to which this room to manoeuvre hinges on local contextual 
11    Interviews with residents and local officials, Krang Deyvay Commune, December 2011.
12    Interview with a Grandis employee, December 2011.
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circumstances versus more general factors. The cases examined above provide 
a number of insights.
Notwithstanding their individual differences, one of the most striking fea-
tures of both the MRICOP and Grandis Timber cases is their family resemblance 
to the Land Law revision that took place in 2001, albeit with a key difference. 
As noted in Section 2, the 2001 Land Law moved in two directions simultane-
ously: it offered significant potential benefits to smallholders and communi-
ties in the form of titles, but it also strengthened the legal doctrine of state 
land by drawing a ‘line in the sand’ when it came to establishing new rights of 
possession. Cutting off the establishment of new possession rights (after 2001) 
was a key feature of the new Land Law, and was part of the larger project of 
strengthening the state’s legal claims to land as a way of replacing the allegedly 
‘anarchic’ development of land with more governable and efficient means. 
The cases presented here show how the Leopard-Skin approach is pursuing a 
variant of this ‘line in the sand’ approach, but this time with respect to actual 
possession rather than legal possession rights. By acknowledging the de facto 
right to keep lands that are already under concession-area-households’ pos-
session, MRICOP and Grandis are pursuing a version—from their perspective 
a much more practical one—of the possession rights compromise enshrined 
in the 2001 Land Law. The difference is that, unlike the 2001 Land Law (where 
legal respect for possession rights was limited by the state’s ability to formalise 
those rights in a timely manner), these companies are actively working on the 
ground. By developing the lands that come up to the borders of current small-
holder plots, companies like MRICOP and Grandis can enforce the ‘line in the 
sand’ compromise in ways that the 2001 Land Law failed to.
This shift from recognising legal to actual possession has major implications. 
The intention to mitigate conflict and avoid needless and harmful evictions 
should be acknowledged and built upon. As global supply chains (not only in 
palm oil and teak, but in timber, sugar, rubber, maize and other commodities) 
become increasingly transparent, tenure-related risk is growing; as it does, the 
business case for these types of steps increases. However, the ad hoc approach 
examined above is forced to rely on local power relations to regulate land-
related negotiations between local users, companies, and state officials. This 
is a tough sell to communities and their advocates; while third-party certifica-
tion may be able to alter incentives by increasing transnational oversight, the 
degree to which it can tip the balance towards equality is doubtful. One advan-
tage of law is that it can, in theory, give equal rights to parties who, in practice, 
do not have equal power. Moving the basis of land-related negotiation from 
law to case-by-case negotiation may work well in particular cases (and as the 
MRICOP case shows, within the same case at particular times), but it depends 
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on the benevolence of the powerful, and it further attenuates the already weak 
capacity of law to protect the most vulnerable members of society.
The shift towards recognising (without legally recognising) local land pos-
session seems, then, to be geared towards improving the legitimacy of the 
state land concession system at a time when it is facing increasing strain from 
both local communities and transnational investors (see e.g. Brinkley, 2013; de 
Leon et al., 2013). This essentially tactical dimension is important because it 
highlights the issue of timing in maintaining power asymmetry between local 
land users and would-be concessionaires. The German advisor quoted above 
in Section 2 described (in another part of the same paper) the rationale of the 
Cambodian Ministry of Land Management, Urban Planning and Construction 
(MLMUPC) when it came to Grandis’s significance: the ministry, he said, 
‘was initially reluctant to implement Circular 02 [on regularisation], giving 
the reason of not wanting to encourage further encroachments. But MLMUPC 
[began] to pilot Circular 02 [in 2012] [. . .] in Kampong Speu province where 
an institutional investor from Denmark [i.e. Grandis Timber] [. . .] has already 
anticipated the ‘leopard skin’ feature of the Prime Minister’ (Müller, 2012, 11; 
emphasis added). The cases examined above show how Leopard-Skin develop-
ment is attempting to prevent ‘further encroachments’: namely, by allocating 
concessions first, and conducting regularisation only in areas where small-
holders are already surrounded.
This approach is expanding. In May 2012, the Cambodian government 
expanded the ‘Leopard-Skin formula’ significantly with the issuing and imple-
mentation of a prime ministerial order (No. 01BB) on ‘strengthening and 
increasing the effectiveness of the management of economic land concessions’ 
(RGC, 2012a). Implementation has focused largely on demarcating rural land-
holdings, especially in concession-contested areas, and issuing titles or small-
scale concession agreements to occupants (Titthara and Boyle, 2012b; ADHOC, 
2014; Grimsditch and Schoenberger, forthcoming). While this process was ini-
tially praised for reorienting land titling towards rather than away from socially 
marginal communities, it has come under substantial criticism for its opacity, 
its uneven implementation, its inability to actually address the land conflicts 
it encounters, and its creation of social divisions in indigenous communities 
forced to choose between individual and communal titles (Titthara and Boyle, 
2012b; Rabe, 2013; Milne, 2013; Beban, 2014; ADHOC, 2014). Notwithstanding 
these issues, the significance of the process is clear for the purposes of this 
paper. Order 01BB represents a model of Leopard-Skin development based 
on the allocation of state land to deserving recipients (‘in order to favour the 
conditions of land development’—RGC, 2012b), rather than the provision of 
title based on existing legal rights. The Order-01BB campaign was thus widely 
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criticised as an election-year ploy—and it may well have been that—but it is 
also significant in that, much like the cases examined here, it acknowledged 
occupation-based rights in exchange for the acknowledgment of the state’s 
right to distribute land. In this move away from a rights-based model of prop-
erty recognition, like the cases presented above, it exemplifies the reciprocity 
between public authority and property-making described by Sikor and Lund 
(2009). If the MRICOP and Grandis cases showed how private actors can blur 
the lines that surround this authority—substantially in the case of MRICOP, 
and merely in the form of a threat (exemplified by the farm map documents) 
in the Grandis Timber case—the Order-01 campaign illustrates the state’s 
efforts to claim the mantle of Leopard-Skin development clearly for itself.
The cases of MRICOP and Grandis Timber raise the questions of where the 
line between ‘better’ and ‘good’ concession practice lies, and of the degree 
to which those concerned with reforming land governance in the interest of 
smallholders should pursue good concessions in addition to their efforts to 
promote alternatives. These are fraught questions, and we refrain from trying 
to answer them definitively here. Our research found evidence pointing in both 
directions, with significant improvements over time (in the MRICOP case) as 
well as significant proactive work carried out by both companies (especially 
by Grandis) to minimise community contestation up front. But the jury is still 
out; high-quality, responsible, and sustainable investments go beyond the 
short term (and beyond the issue of land access alone). What is needed most, 
both in the cases examined above and in other investments more broadly, 
are improved transparency to allow greater public scrutiny; free, prior, and 
informed consent of local land users; independent investigation; and effective 
grievance mechanisms—all of which are basic components of most guidelines 
and regulatory frameworks on land and investment governance. Third-party 
certification has provided some of this in our two case studies, and its impacts 
should not be minimised. But the limits of audit-based research are also sig-
nificant: it is limited to occasional visits and forms of remedy (i.e. additional 
investigation, and ultimately denial or revocation of certification) that may not 
enable or inspire communities to voice concerns openly. Indeed, much like the 
community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) paradigm, without 
adequate transparency and local ownership, certification could end up legiti-
mising enclosure and thus stifling expressions of discontent by affected com-
munities (cf. Tubtim and Hirsch, 2004).
Time will thus tell whether private sector efforts to ‘work around’ local land 
uses will produce truly sustainable development. While we would prefer to see 
an investment model that allows communities to deal with investors directly 
as empowered landowners, we realise the gulf between these positions is 
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nontrivial. Acknowledging communities’ de facto rights not only in the pres-
ent, but for future needs as well, entails a business model predicated on the 
community having a much greater role in representing the public interest. 
Current experiments at the ‘better practice’ end of the concession spectrum 
are likely to shape the contours of this debate for the coming years. In the 
meantime, their ability to sustain their investments and the communities in 
their midst remains to be seen.
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CHAPTER 9
Identifying and Monitoring Human Rights 
Violations Associated with Large-Scale Land 
Acquisitions
A Focus on United Nations Mechanisms and South-East Asia
Christophe Golay
Abstract
This chapter aims to contribute to the debate on contemporary ‘land grabbing’ and its 
impact on human rights. It describes the role played by United Nations (UN) human 
rights mechanisms in monitoring violations associated with large-scale land acquisi-
tions (LSLAs), with a focus on UN treaty bodies. A typology of human rights violations 
associated with LSLAs is presented, on the basis of the assessment that UN treaty bodies 
have made in examining the impact of LSLAs in Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, and 
Vietnam. Three common threads can be extracted from this assessment. The first relates 
to the actual or potential human rights implications of the internal displacement and 
forced evictions caused by LSLAs, which often lead to drastic changes in livelihood 
opportunities. The second involves the impact of LSLAs on the procedural rights of 
indigenous peoples, in particular their right to free, prior, and informed consent to poli-
cies and activities that directly affect their land, territory and livelihoods. The third con-
cerns the disproportionately negative effect that LSLAs have on individuals and groups 
who are vulnerable to discrimination and marginalisation, including women, children, 
indigenous peoples, rural communities, and small-scale farmers. The example of Laos, 
where we conducted research in 2012 and 2013, confirms the assessment made by UN 
treaty bodies. The overall conclusion is that human rights are well recognised in inter-
national law and that national laws seem to be adequate in many countries, including 
   The author was joint coordinator of the Swiss Network for International Studies (SNIS)-
funded project “Large-Scale Land Acquisitions in Southeast Asia: Rural Transformations 
between Global Agendas and Peoples’ Right to Food”. He would like to thank Irene Biglino 
for her contribution to this chapter, and for her invaluable support in the research that led to 
the writing of this contribution. Ioana Cismas, Patricia Paramita and Samuel Segura Cobos 
should also be thanked for previous research done on the subject in the context of the SNIS-
funded project (www.snis.ch).
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in South-East Asia. Yet, human rights instruments and national laws are poorly imple-
mented on the ground, or not implemented in favour of local communities.
1 Introduction
The aim of this article is to contribute to the debate on contemporary ‘land-
grabbing’ and its impact on human rights (Cotula, 2009; De Schutter, 2011a; De 
Schutter, 2011b; Monsalve Suárez, 2013; Cotula, 2012; Narula, 2013; Künnemann 
and Monsalve Suárez, 2013; Clays and Vanloqueren, 2013; Golay and Biglino, 
2013) and, more specifically, to present a typology of human rights violations 
associated with large-scale land acquisitions (LSLAs) and present the role 
played by United Nations (UN) mechanisms in monitoring these violations.
The focus in this contribution will be on UN monitoring mechanisms, which 
can be classified as political or quasi-judicial (Golay, 2009), and not on access 
to justice, despite the fact that a key principle of human rights law is that 
victims of human rights violations should have access to justice (Borghi and 
Postigione Blommestein, 2006, IX). Access to justice has also been described 
as a powerful tool for giving meaning to human rights ‘in small places close 
to home’ (Robinson, 2003, 1). For the UN Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (CESCR),1 ‘[a]ny person or group who is a victim of a violation 
of [a human right] should have access to effective judicial or other appropriate 
remedies at both national and international levels. All victims of such viola-
tions are entitled to adequate reparation, which may take the form of restitu-
tion, compensation, satisfaction or guarantees of non repetition’ (1999, 32).
As we will see with the example of Laos, access to justice for victims of 
human rights violations is often very difficult in practice (Special Rapporteur 
on Extreme Poverty, 2012). And in the great majority of cases, mechanisms that 
monitor human rights violations associated with LSLAs are not judges, but 
administrations at the local and national levels and UN human rights monitor-
ing bodies and experts at the international level. This contribution will focus 
on the second category, with an emphasis on their role in monitoring human 
rights violations in South-East Asia.
The second part of this chapter presents the international legal basis that 
can be used to monitor human rights violations associated with LSLAs. The 
third part focuses on the role played by UN treaty bodies in monitoring human 
rights violations in Cambodia, Laos, Indonesia, and Vietnam, and presents a 
1    The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) oversees compliance with 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).
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typology of human rights violations associated with LSLAs. The fourth part 
takes the example of Laos as a case study.
2 International Legal Basis for Monitoring Human Rights Violations 
Associated with LSLAs
International human rights law includes a number of treaties and soft-law 
instruments. With regard to the first category, treaties relevant to monitoring 
the impact of LSLAs include the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR), the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (CRC) and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (CRPD).
Under these treaties, state parties have the obligation to respect, protect and 
fulfil human rights in the context of LSLAs, without any discrimination (Special 
Rapporteur on the Right to Food, 2009). They should also implement policies 
to support particularly vulnerable individuals and groups, such as women and 
indigenous peoples. Women’s rights to land and property are specifically pro-
tected in the CEDAW Convention (Arts. 14(2) and 16), and the rights of indig-
enous peoples in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and 
in the International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention No. 169 concern-
ing Indigenous and Tribal Peoples. Indigenous peoples’ rights of ownership, 
possession and control of their land, territories and resources, and states’ obli-
gations to guarantee their effective protection, as well as the requirement of 
indigenous peoples’ prior, free, and informed consent—all recognised in inter-
national law—are particularly important in the context of LSLAs.
If we except ILO Convention No. 169, these international treaties have 
been accepted by all or a great majority of states, and therefore potentially 
offer a good basis for UN bodies to monitor human rights violations associated 
with LSLAs.
Turning to soft law, it must be highlighted that in recent years a num-
ber of instruments have been developed with a view to reaffirming the rel-
evance of human rights in the context of LSLAs (UN Special Rapporteur on 
the Right to Food, 2009; Golay and Biglino, 2013). The most important step 
in this area was the adoption, by the UN Committee on World Food Security, 
of Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, 
Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security (Governance 
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of Tenure Guidelines) in May 2012. The main objective of the Governance of 
Tenure Guidelines is to promote secure tenure rights and equitable access 
to land, fisheries and forests in order to reduce poverty and realise the right to 
food. Two central elements of the guidelines are the need to identify, record 
and respect legitimate tenure rights, whether formally recorded or not, and 
to protect tenure rights holders against forced evictions (guidelines 3.1.1. and 
3.1.2, respectively). Special protection should be accorded to smallholders 
and to indigenous peoples and other communities with customary tenure 
systems (guideline 7.3). The guidelines also recommend that states provide 
safeguards to protect legitimate tenure rights, human rights, livelihoods, food 
security and the environment from risks that could arise from LSLAs (guideline 
12.6) and that responsible investments should do no harm, safeguard against 
dispossession of legitimate tenure right holders and environmental damage, 
and respect human rights (guideline 12.4). The guidelines further underline 
that redistributive reforms can facilitate broad and equitable access to land 
and inclusive rural development (guideline 15.1).
In March 2010, the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Olivier 
De Schutter,2 submitted a report to the Human Rights Council in which he 
described the phenomenon of LSLAs and its causes and presented a set of 11 
human rights principles applicable to LSLAs (Special Rapporteur on the Right 
to Food, 2009).3 The report’s objective was to delineate the ‘minimum human 
rights obligations’ that states, but also investors and financial institutions, must 
comply with when negotiating and concluding LSLAs. For De Schutter, the 
principles ‘are not optional; [but] follow from existing international human 
rights norms’ (Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, 2009, 5).
The 11 principles describe the obligation of states and investors to conduct 
negotiations leading to LSLAs in a fully transparent manner and with the par-
ticipation of local communities; the requirement of free, prior, and informed 
consent of the local communities concerned; the general prohibition of forced 
evictions; the obligation to recognise and protect the land tenure rights of local 
communities; the importance of the sharing of revenues generated by LSLAs 
2    Olivier De Schutter’s mandate began in May 2008 and ended in May 2014. Jean Ziegler was 
the first mandate holder between September 2000 and April 2008. Hilal Elver replaced Olivier 
De Schutter in June 2014.
3    Among the many other UN Special Rapporteurs who could have played a role in response 
to LSLAs (Piccone, 2012; Subedi et al., 2011; Golay et al., 2011; Nifosi, 2005), the UN Special 
Rapporteur on human rights in Cambodia offered the most important response in monitor-
ing the impact of LSLAs in this country in 2012. See Golay and Biglino, 2013, 1637–1638; and 
Cismas and Paramita in this volume.
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with the local population; the necessity of choosing labour-intensive farming 
systems in countries facing high levels of rural poverty and few employment 
opportunities in other sectors; the need to protect the environment; the neces-
sity of including clear and detailed obligations for investors in the agreements, 
with sanctions for non-compliance; the need to include a clause providing 
that a certain minimum percentage of the crops produced will be sold in local 
markets in food-importing countries, to contribute to local food security; the 
necessity to undertake prior impact assessments, including on food secu-
rity, the environment and employment; the obligation to protect indigenous 
peoples’ rights; and the obligation to respect the applicable ILO instruments 
(Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, 2009, 5).
De Schutter’s principles were not received unopposed and attracted some 
criticism from certain states and civil society organisations, which feared that 
they would ‘legitimise’ land grabbing, instead of contributing to halting the 
phenomenon (Clays and Vanloqueren, 2013). But De Schutter’s principles have 
also been used to assess the implications of LSLAs in concrete cases.4
3 Identifying and Monitoring Human Rights Violations Associated 
with LSLAs in South-East Asia: the Role Played by United Nations 
Treaty Bodies
Several UN mechanisms have monitored human rights violations associated 
with LSLAs (Golay and Biglino, 2013). This section focuses on UN treaty bodies, 
with particular emphasis on the monitoring role they have played in relation 
to South-East Asian countries.5
The UN treaty bodies are committees made up of independent experts, 
established under the international human rights treaties, which monitor the 
implementation of the treaties through the periodic review of reports submit-
ted by state parties (Vandehole, 2004; Bassiouni and Schabas, 2011; Keller and 
4    For example, in 2010 the Government of Switzerland participated in a public symposium, 
alongside the Director of Addax Bioenergy, a Geneva-based company investing in Sierra 
Leone, and civil society organisations representing communities affected by the LSLA in 
Sierra Leone. During the event, the human rights impact of Addax’s LSLA was discussed with 
reference to De Schutter’s principles. The symposium Business and human rights. Clearing the 
path to foster corporate accountability took place on 18 October 2010 in Geneva. More infor-
mation is available at http://www.reports-and-materials.org/Land-grabbing-symposium-
Geneva-18-Oct-2010.pdf (accessed on 27 April 2015).
5    This second part is largely inspired by Golay and Biglino (2013, 1635–1642), but the focus here 
is on South-East Asia.
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Ulfstein, 2012). Most of them also have the competence to receive individual 
or collective complaints—also called ‘communications’—in cases of human 
rights violations (Golay, 2009, 32–33).
Many UN treaty bodies have monitored human rights violations associated 
with LSLAs in the context of the periodic review of reports submitted by state 
parties; these include the CESCR, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD), the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW Committee), and the Committee on the Rights of the 
Child (CRC Committee). Based on a review of their examination of state par-
ties’ reports since 2006, at least three common threads can be extracted from 
their monitoring and recommendations.
The first overarching concern relates to the actual or potential human rights 
implications of internal displacement and forced evictions caused by LSLAs, 
which often lead to drastic changes in livelihood opportunities. A connected 
concern is that in many cases the displaced groups are not resettled and com-
pensated for their livelihood losses. In its consideration of Cambodia, the 
CESCR examined issues relating to the human rights impact of LSLAs in quite 
some detail (see also Cismas and Paramita in this volume), and concluded 
that, ‘authorities of the [state] party are actively involved in land-grabbing’ 
(CESCR, 2009, 30). The CESCR expressed grave concerns over the vast conces-
sions granted to private companies and noted the increase in forced evictions 
and threats of eviction linked to such concessions and expressed deep concern 
about the lack of effective consultation with persons affected by the forced 
evictions. It also called attention to the inadequate compensation or reloca-
tion provisions for families forcibly removed from their properties (CESCR, 
2009, 30).
The second common thread involves the impact of LSLAs on the procedural 
rights of indigenous peoples, and in particular the fact that policies and activi-
ties that directly affect their land, territory and livelihoods require their free, 
prior, and informed consent. For example, the CESCR examined the impact of 
land concessions on indigenous peoples during its assessments of Cambodia. 
In its recommendations, the committee highlighted the need for carrying out 
environmental and social impact assessments and consultations with affected 
communities with regard to economic activities, including mining and oil 
explorations, ‘with a view to ensuring that these activities do not deprive the 
indigenous peoples to the full enjoyment of their rights to their ancestral lands 
and natural resources’ (2009, 16). In further pointing out that legislation pro-
viding for the titling of indigenous communities’ lands had not been imple-
mented in an effective manner, the CESCR urged Cambodia to provide for the 
implementation of the provisions without delay.
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The CERD has also extensively monitored the impact of LSLAs on the rights 
of indigenous peoples. In 2007, for instance, it expressed concerns about the 
denial of indigenous peoples’ rights in Indonesia in connection with LSLAs 
made for agro-industrial purposes, such as the expansion of oil palm planta-
tions on indigenous territories (2007, 17). The committee called on Indonesia 
to secure indigenous peoples’ ownership rights to their lands, territories and 
resources and to obtain their consent prior to further oil palm development. 
The CERD voiced similar concerns in 2012 in its review of Vietnam (2012b, 15).
In examining the situation in Cambodia, the CERD noted that such trans-
actions were in many cases being conducted ‘to the detriment of particularly 
vulnerable communities such as indigenous peoples’ (2010, 16). Another con-
cern related to reports that concessions affecting land traditionally occupied 
by indigenous peoples were being granted without full consideration, or the 
exhaustion of procedures provided for by national legislation. The committee 
strongly encouraged the development of a series of protective measures, such 
as procedures to delay the issuing of concessions on indigenous lands and only 
issue such concessions pursuant to free, prior, informed consent being given 
by the affected communities. The reach of the committee’s recommendations 
extended even further, as it called on business entities negotiating concessions 
to take into consideration their corporate social responsibility as it relates to 
the rights and well-being of local populations (CERD, 2010, 16).
The third recurrent theme is the disproportionately negative effect that 
LSLAs have on other populations that are vulnerable to discrimination and 
marginalisation. In addition to indigenous peoples, concerns have been raised 
about negative impacts on women, children, rural communities, and small-
scale farmers. CEDAW focused its attention on female heads of households in 
Cambodia who had lost their sources of livelihood because of the confisca-
tion of land by private companies and were excluded from decision-making 
processes concerning land distribution (2006, 31). Similarly, in its concluding 
observations on Cambodia in June 2011, the CRC expressed a deep concern 
that thousands of children and families, especially the urban poor, small-scale 
farmers and indigenous communities, were continuing to be deprived of their 
land ‘as a result of land grabbing and forced evictions carried out by people in 
positions of power’ (2011, 61). The committee recommended the establishment 
of a ‘national moratorium on evictions until the determination of the legal-
ity of land claims is made’ (CRC, 2011, 61). As an overarching recommendation 
in its assessment of Cambodia, the CERD requested that a proper balance be 
struck between development objectives and the rights of citizens and that the 
former not be enacted ‘at the expense of the rights of vulnerable persons and 
groups covered by the Convention [on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
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Discrimination]’ (2010, 16). Following CEDAW’s review of Laos, it was recom-
mended by the committee that the state party ensure that development proj-
ects are implemented only after gender impact assessments involving rural 
women have been conducted (2009, 44–45).
Finally, a separate issue relates to land policy reforms financed and pro-
moted through development cooperation and assistance, which in certain 
cases have been found to lead to human rights violations (Künnemann and 
Monsalve Suárez, 2013, 127). One of these cases came to the CESCR’s atten-
tion: the involvement of the German Agency for International Cooperation in 
financing the land titling system in Cambodia. It has been suggested that the 
scheme—aimed at recognising individual and not collective rights—contrib-
uted to weakening the tenure status of vulnerable and marginalised commu-
nities, exposing them to the risk of eviction as a result of LSLAs (Künnemann 
and Monsalve Suárez, 2013). Following that reasoning in its review of Germany 
in 2011, the CESCR explicitly cited the land-titling scheme in Cambodia to 
illustrate the concern that ‘the [state] party’s development cooperation pro-
gramme has supported projects that have reportedly resulted in the violation 
of economic, social and cultural rights’ (2011, 11).
An overview of UN treaty bodies’ monitoring function must also briefly con-
sider communication procedures. A number of international human rights 
treaties are supplemented by Optional Protocols allowing for the consideration 
of individual or collective complaints usually referred to as ‘communications’. 
Avenues that are potentially relevant for monitoring human rights violations 
associated with LSLAs are those established by the Optional Protocol to the 
ICCPR, by Article 14 of the ICERD, and by the Optional Protocol to the CEDAW 
that has been ratified by Cambodia, the Philippines, and Thailand (Golay, 2009, 
32–33). Turning to practical cases, there are some examples from the Human 
Rights Committee, the body entrusted with monitoring the ICCPR, in which 
indigenous communities have sought protection of their way of life, their eco-
nomic activities and their means of subsistence (Human Rights Committee, 
2000 and 2009; Golay and Özden, 2009, 55). These cases, although not dealing 
necessarily with LSLAs and cases in South-East Asia, provide some useful les-
sons on how these UN mechanisms may be used in the future to monitor the 
actual or potential human rights violations associated with LSLAs in South-
East Asian countries.
A communication procedure that has recently become available is the one 
established by the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR (Biglino and Golay, 2013). 
The optional protocol, which entered into force on 5 May 2013, provides for the 
right of individuals and groups to submit complaints regarding violations of 
the rights contained in the covenant. This makes this procedure ideally suited 
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to victims of human rights violations associated with LSLAs who wish to sub-
mit communications to the CESCR, but no South-East Asian country has yet 
accepted it.
4 The Example of Laos
We undertook field research with colleagues in Laos in 2012 and 2013 in the 
context of a research project on the impact of LSLAs on the right to food in 
South-East Asia.6 The presentation of Laos as a case study in this part of the 
chapter complements information and cases analysed in other chapters of this 
volume, in relation to Laos and Cambodia (see Messerli et al., Gironde and 
Senties Portilla, and Cismas and Paramita in this volume). This part begins 
with a presentation of the relevant legal framework in Laos, followed by an 
analysis of the examination of human rights violations associated with LSLAs 
in Laos by UN treaty bodies.
4.1 Legal Framework and Lack of Access to Justice and Effective 
Remedies at the National and Regional Levels
In Laos, like in Cambodia (see Cismas and Paramita in this volume) and sev-
eral other countries, there is a solid legal framework that, in principle, offers 
numerous safeguards in human rights terms. However, there is an important 
gap between what constitutes ‘law on paper’ and how that law is actually 
implemented and applied ‘on the ground’.
Laos has ratified the most important international human rights treaties, 
including the ICCPR, ICESCR, ICERD, CEDAW, CRC, and CRPD. But it has not 
ratified optional protocols allowing for individual or collective communica-
tions in cases of human rights violations.
The Constitution of Laos (adopted in 2003) recognises a list of fundamen-
tal rights, including the right to education (article 38), the right to health 
(article 39), the right to submit complaints and petitions (article 41), and the 
rights and freedoms of expression, assembly, and association (article 44). It 
also provides that the ‘[s]tate, society and families attend to implementing 
development policies and supporting the progress of women and to protect-
ing legitimate rights and benefits of women and children’ (article 29). It is 
worth mentioning however that many human rights are not enshrined in the 
6    For a description of the two-year research project and to access the outputs that were pro-
duced by the researchers, visit http://www.snis.ch/project_large-scale-land-acquisitions-
southeast-asia-rural-transformations-between-global-agendas.
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Constitution, such as the right to life, the right to food, and the right to housing, 
and that the Constitution does not mention international human rights instru-
ments ratified by Laos. It is also important to note that Laos’s legal framework 
does not recognise indigenous peoples but ethnic groups (articles 8 and 22).
The most important national law in the context of LSLAs is the 2003 Land 
Law, which creates eight land categories: agricultural land, forestland, water 
area land, industrial land, communication land, cultural land, land for national 
defence and security, and construction land. When it was adopted, one of its 
main objectives was to support small-scale farmers in better using agricul-
tural land, and to provide them with a secure legal environment. However, 
more than ten years after its adoption, the great majority of people living in 
Laos’ rural areas remain untouched by or unaware of these potential benefits 
(Gironde et al., 2014, 40). Senties Portilla found that, in practice, the Land Law 
‘paved the way for foreign investment in land through [ . . . ] legally defining the 
circumstances under which land can be conceded to investors [, with] enor-
mous implications [for] the typically rural and subsistence-oriented agrarian 
structures of the country, which [ . . . ] largely remain founded on customary 
practices’ (2012, 61–62, 69). She also observed that the titling of communal 
lands that could be used to protect villagers against restrictions imposed by 
corporations, for example to accessing food and water, is poorly implemented 
(2012, 67–69).
What also emerges with great clarity in Laos is that access to justice and 
effective remedies in cases of human rights violations is extremely difficult, or 
non-existent. Individuals affected by LSLAs encounter many hurdles in their 
attempts to access justice (Gironde et al., 2014, 47). In a report presented to 
the UN General Assembly in 2012, the UN Special Rapporteur on extreme pov-
erty and human rights Magdalena Sepulveda Carmona developed an analyti-
cal structure for the analysis of the obstacles, experienced when attempting 
to access justice, faced by people living in poverty. The special rapporteur’s 
framework identifies a set of macro-categories whereby obstacles can be clas-
sified (Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty, 2012). A large number of issues 
identified in the framework reflect barriers that exist to accessing justice in 
Laos, including ‘institutional and structural’ as well as ‘social and cultural’ 
obstacles.
Access to other kind of remedies, including those of an administrative 
nature, is also extremely difficult in Laos for victims of human rights violations 
associated with LSLAs (Gironde et al., 2014, 47). The main avenue that exists 
is a hotline, created in 2012, to the national assembly. According to many, a 
great number of complaints submitted through this hotline were related to 
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land disputes (Baird, 2011). In one case at least, it allegedly led to a member of 
the national assembly visiting the community and compensation being given 
to its members (Gironde et al., 2014, 47). But as the process is purely oral it is 
difficult to gather more information regarding the efficiency of this remedy.
This lack of access to justice and effective remedies in Laos is representative 
of a context in which human rights education is extremely poor, or non-exis-
tent, and speaking about and reporting human rights violations is extremely 
difficult. Illustrative of this context is the fact that two people who spoke out 
on human rights issues were either forced to leave the country or disappeared. 
On 9 December 2012, the country director of Helvetas, a Swiss non-govern-
mental organisation (NGO) working in the field of development and with rural 
communities in Laos, Anne-Sophie Gindroz, was given 48 hours to leave the 
country because she criticised the government for creating a difficult environ-
ment for development actors and civil society organisations by restricting free-
doms of expression and association (Radio Free Asia, 2012).7 One week later, 
on 15 December 2012, Sombath Somphone, a well-known Lao activist, disap-
peared. More than two years later, the government of Laos still stands accused 
of not conducting a proper investigation into Somphone’s disappearance, and 
his family has no information on where he could be (APHR, 2014).8 It also seems 
that there is no hope of a rapid improvement of the human rights situation in 
Laos, with new laws being proposed to Parliament to further restrict the free-
doms of association and expression of NGOs and their members (APHR, 2014).
Unlike Africa, the Americas, and Europe, Asia is a region in which there is no 
regional human rights treaty, human rights court, or commission covering the 
region in its entirety (Golay, 2009, 37–46). When victims of human rights viola-
tions face difficulties accessing justice and effective remedies at the national 
7    In a letter addressed in November 2012 to participants at a round table on foreign aid strategy 
in Laos, A.-S. Gindroz wrote: ‘We are working in a challenging environment: this is a coun-
try governed by a single-party regime, where there is little space for meaningful democratic 
debate, and when taking advantage of that limited space, repercussions follow.’ (Radio Free 
Asia, 2012). Before being evicted from the country, Ms. Gindroz chaired a coalition of civil 
society organisations working on land issues in Laos—the land issues working group (http://
www.laolandissues.org ) (accessed on 28 April 2015).
8    After a visit to Laos in September 2014, C. Santiago, Malaysian parliamentarian and vice-
president of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Parliamentarians for 
Human Rights (APHR) declared: ‘The Lao authorities have erected a brick wall of silence on 
this investigation, so much so that the only intelligent conclusion is that there is in fact no 
investigation taking place at all and that the obstinacy is part of a cover up for state officials 
implicated in his abduction’ (APHR, 2014).
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level, it is therefore impossible for them to use regional monitoring bodies. Two 
positive developments in this sphere were the establishment of the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Intergovernmental Commission on 
Human Rights and the ASEAN Commission for the Promotion and Protection 
of the Rights of Women and Children, in 2009 and 2010, respectively.9 But the 
commissions’ added value in the area of LSLAs and human rights remains 
unclear, as does their engagement with the topic (Gironde et al., 2014, 39).
4.2 The Role Played by UN Mechanisms in Monitoring Human Rights 
Violations Associated with LSLAs in Laos
In a context in which access to justice and effective remedies is extremely dif-
ficult at the national and regional levels, national (Gender and Development 
Group—Alliance for Democracy in Laos)10 and international (INDIGENOUS11 
and UNPO)12 NGOs have used international treaties ratified by Laos to denounce 
the negative impacts of LSLAs. They have done so through the submission of 
parallel reports—parallel to the government report—when UN treaty bod-
ies examined Laos’s human rights record (Alliance for Democracy in Laos, 
2012; INDIGENOUS, 2012; UNPO, 2012; GDG, 2008). These NGOs have targeted 
the CERD and the CEDAW committees, which have responded by evaluating 
human rights violations associated with LSLAs in Laos and issuing recommen-
dations to the government (CERD, 2012a; CEDAW, 2009).
The CERD has examined the need to better protect the livelihoods—and the 
right to an adequate standard of living—of ethnic groups. In its consideration 
of reports concerning Laos, the committee reiterated the right of communities 
to give, or withhold, their free, prior, and informed consent and called for the 
state to ensure that this decision is respected in the planning and implementa-
tion of large-scale projects affecting these communities’ lands and resources 
9     In 2009 and 2010, these two institutions (composed of states’ representatives) were cre-
ated by ASEAN to monitor existing international human rights obligations of ASEAN 
members, in agreement with Article 14 of ASEAN’s charter, adopted on 20 November 2007 
and in force since 15 December 2008.
10    The Alliance for Democracy in Laos presents itself as a worldwide network of Lao political 
opposition organisations and active advocates committed to a peaceful change towards 
genuine democracy in Laos. It is an NGO and is based in Germany. Its website can be 
found at www.laoalliance.org (accessed on 28 April 2015).
11    INDIGENOUS is the International Network for Diplomacy Indigenous Governance 
Engaging in Nonviolence Organizing for Understanding & Self-Determination.
12    UNPO is the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization, and is based in The Hague 
and Brussels. Its website can be found at www.unpo.org (accessed on 28 April 2015).
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(2012a, 16–17). Express references were made to the importance of ‘the cultural 
aspect of land, as an integral part of the identity of some ethnic groups’ (CERD 
2012a, 16–17). Following its examination of the situation in Laos, the CEDAW 
committee recommended that the government ensure that development 
projects are implemented only after conducting gender-impact assessments 
involving rural women (2009, 44–45).
On the basis of the assessments made by UN treaty bodies, and field research 
conducted in 2012 and 2013 in the context of a project on the human rights 
impact of LSLAs in South-East Asia, it is possible to conclude that the typol-
ogy of human rights violations associated with LSLAs that we presented in 
the second part of this chapter (see part 2, above) is relevant when discussing 
human rights violations in Laos (Gironde et al., 2014, 43–46). As is the case in 
many other countries, such violations include the human rights implications 
of internal displacement and forced evictions caused by LSLAs, which often 
lead to drastic changes in livelihood opportunities, and in the great majority of 
cases leave the displaced individuals and communities without adequate reset-
tlement and compensation for their losses in livelihood (see the cases in the 
province of Champasak described in the contribution by Gironde and Senties 
Portilla in this volume). They also include violations of ethnic minorities’ right 
to give, or to withhold, their free, prior, and informed consent to externally 
imposed policies and activities that directly affect their livelihoods, and the 
disproportionately negative effect that LSLAs have on other individuals and 
groups who are vulnerable to discrimination and marginalisation, including 
women, children, rural communities, and small-scale farmers (Gironde et al., 
2014, 43–46). Inadequate participation and consultation, and information 
asymmetry, also appear to constitute a dominant trend in Savannakhet and 
Luang Prabang provinces in Laos (Gironde et al., 2014, 45–46).
These violations also include the disproportionately negative effect that 
LSLAs have on individuals and groups who are vulnerable to discrimination 
and marginalisation. To give a concrete example, a study of the impacts of a 
land concession—of 7,000 ha, granted to a Chinese rubber company (Sino 
Company) in 2006—on a local community in Nambak District, Luang Prabang 
Province in Laos, revealed that the implementation of the concession led to 
the large-scale enclosure of upland resources that these villages depended on 
(Friis, 2013). This also implied the imposition of a strict penalty scheme for 
damage to rubber trees caused by roaming animals, which led to a prohibition 
on villagers continuing to rear livestock, which had negative impacts on soil 
fertility and led to a decline in paddy rice yields. In a number of reported cases, 
individuals and their families were left with no option but to purchase food on 
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the market although, due to their precarious economic conditions, they could 
not afford the rich, nutritious and diverse diet they had enjoyed when they 
had had agricultural land on which to grow food and access to forest areas that 
provided additional food sources (i.e. fish and wild animals) (Gironde et al., 
2014, 45).
5 Conclusion
In the second and third parts of this contribution, we have presented the inter-
national legal basis that can be used to monitor human rights violations associ-
ated with LSLAs, and have provided examples of the role that UN treaty bodies 
can play in monitoring these violations, with a focus on South-East Asia. We 
have also presented a typology of human rights violations associated with 
LSLAs. In the fourth part, we presented Laos as a case study.
We conclude that three common threads can be extracted from this assess-
ment. The first concern relates to the actual or potential human rights impli-
cations of the internal displacement and forced evictions caused by LSLAs, 
which often lead to drastic changes in livelihood opportunities. The second 
thread involves the impact of LSLAs on the procedural rights of indigenous 
peoples, in particular their right to give, or to withhold, their free, prior, and 
informed consent to policies and activities that directly affect their land, terri-
tory and livelihoods. The third recurrent theme is the disproportionately nega-
tive effect that LSLAs have on individuals and groups who are vulnerable to 
discrimination and marginalisation, including women, children, indigenous 
peoples, rural communities, and small-scale farmers.
Taking a step back, we can conclude that human rights are well recog-
nised in international law and that national laws seem to be adequate in 
many countries, including in Cambodia and Laos. These rights and laws rep-
resent a good basis from which to evaluate the impacts of LSLAs. But these 
human rights instruments and national laws are poorly implemented in the 
ground, or not implemented in favour of local communities (see also Cismas 
and Paramita in this volume). And despite a constructive role played by UN 
monitoring mechanisms, which certainly offer one of the few avenues that 
exist for denouncing human rights violations associated with LSLAs, violations 
continue to be widespread in the countries affected by the phenomenon and 
evaluated by UN experts.
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CHAPTER 10
Large-Scale Land Acquisitions in Cambodia: 
Where Do (Human Rights) Law and Practice Meet?
Ioana Cismas and Patricia Paramita
Abstract
Being anchored in the broader policy debate on the effectiveness of international 
human rights standards on the ground, this chapter inquires whether human rights 
carry any relevance in the Cambodian landscape of contestation of large-scale land 
acquisitions (LSLAs) and long-term leases. The chapter first establishes that substantive 
and procedural obligations relevant to LSLAs result from Cambodia’s ratification of 
human rights treaties. It then examines whether and to what extent this normative 
framework informs the acts and actions of the government in relation to land transac-
tions, and the strategies employed by affected communities. The study relies on legal 
analysis to unearth tensions between processes set in motion by land laws and short-
comings in their implementation in terms of transparency and participation, account-
ability and redress, and identification of vulnerable groups. It also draws on desk and 
field research in a rural and an urban area of Cambodia to examine the mobilisation 
strategies employed by the two communities affected by LSLA-related forced evictions; 
the focus is on processes of appropriation and adaptation of human rights by affected 
local communities, known as ‘vernacularization’. The chapter shows that the rural-
urban spatiality, a constructed element, is of relevance in explaining the different con-
figurations of social activism occurring in each setting and these configurations’ use of 
human rights. It finds that, contrary to similarly LSLA-affected rural citizens, urban 
dwellers made extensive use of human rights language and human rights mechanisms 
to challenge their forced evictions and also achieved a certain success. Furthermore, the 
chapter shows that deficient governmental practice, in particular in the area of infor-
mation and access to justice may play a role in entertaining this divided spatiality, espe-
cially by incapacitating the vernacularization of human rights in rural settings.
1 Introduction
Unlike past rushes for land, the wave of large-scale land acquisitions and long-
term leases (LSLAs) of the last two decades in Africa, Asia, and parts of Eastern 
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Europe is embedded in a liberalised world economy and involves new actors, 
new labour processes, and new legal instruments (White et al., 2012; Peluso and 
Lund, 2011). This recent expansion of LSLAs has triggered debates on whether 
the phenomenon represents an opportunity for investment and development 
or corresponds to an exclusionary process that specifically marginalises vul-
nerable individuals and societal groups (Arezki et al., 2012; Borras Jr. et al., 2011; 
Cotula et al., 2009; Kachika, 2010; Moyo and Chambati, 2013). This antagonism 
is best reflected in the two terms most often used to describe the phenome-
non: ‘land investment’ and ‘land grab.’ Beyond the symbolism that these terms 
encapsulate, it becomes clear that LSLAs are intertwined at the junction of 
development economics, land use and land governance, colonial memory, 
and post-colonial practice, against the background of states’ obligations under 
international human rights law (Gironde et al., 2011; de Schutter, 2013).
These complex intersections are certainly present in the case of LSLAs 
in Cambodia. As one of the fastest growing economies in South-East Asia, 
Cambodia has experienced, over the past two decades, a rapid increase in for-
eign investment, often taking the form of economic land concessions (ELCs).1 
In parallel to the economic phenomenon, and as a consequence of land becom-
ing scarcer, disputes over land have become more intense, frequent, and often 
violent, involving state authorities and company representatives, stakehold-
ers from rural communities, urban dwellers, politicians, human rights activ-
ists, and journalists (ADHOC, 2013; Special Rapporteur on Cambodia, 2013). In 
this landscape of contestation, do human rights have any relevance? Put dif-
ferently, our aim here is to examine whether and to what extent human rights 
standards inform the acts and actions of the government in relation to LSLAs, 
and the strategies employed by affected communities.
This chapter is premised on the understanding that ‘[h]uman rights are not 
just abstract’, they acquire value through their application in practice (Marks 
and Clapham, 2005, 388). As such, the chapter is anchored in the broader 
policy debate on the effectiveness of international human rights standards 
on the ground. To explain and strengthen state compliance with international 
human rights norms, scholars have focused on the national and international 
mechanisms monitoring or adjudicating the obligations of states2 and the 
internalisation/domestication of human rights (Golay, 2011), the reputational 
damage that would result from non-compliance (Chayes and Chayes, 1995), 
1    Estimates of the number of, and area covered by, ELCs vary. In this volume, Messerli et al. 
estimate that Cambodia has 486 land deals comprising 4.5 million hectares.
2    An illustrative example for this strand of the literature is Christophe Golay’s contribution in 
this volume.
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on processes such as material inducement, persuasion, and acculturation 
(Goodman and Jinks, 2013), and the legitimacy of international instruments 
and modalities for enhancing ownership thereof in various (cultural) contexts 
(Franck, 1995; An-Na’im, 1990). While drawing on some of these descriptive and 
proscriptive approaches to verify where human rights law and practice meet 
in the case of LSLAs in Cambodia, our particular interest lies with the process 
of appropriation and adaptation of human rights by affected local communi-
ties, known as ‘vernacularization’ (Merry, 2006), and the impact of rural-urban 
spatiality thereon.
Structurally the chapter has three parts. The first part lays out the human 
rights framework relevant to LSLAs as it can be distilled from the UN treaty 
bodies’ process of review of Cambodia’s implementation of its international 
obligations. Second, relevant domestic legislation and governmental actions 
are contrasted with the previously identified human rights framework. The 
third part addresses the practices of affected communities in an urban and 
a rural area of Cambodia and inquires whether and how these actors utilise 
human rights law to prevent LSLAs or challenge the effects thereof. The con-
clusion appraises our findings.
Methodologically, the chapter relies on legal analysis, including Cambodia’s 
history of ratification of human rights instruments and their transposition 
into domestic law, and on analysis of data obtained through desk research 
and fieldwork. It presents case studies from a rural area (the village of Sein 
Serrey in Kampong Thom province) and an urban one (the Boeung Kak lake, 
Phnom Penh). In selecting these cases we sought to ensure that processes of 
land commercialisation were pronounced, that different land transfer and 
livelihood scenarios could be identified, and that there was at least some evi-
dence of awareness of human rights.3 The information for the rural case was 
collected through semi-structured qualitative interviews with 30 evicted fami-
lies and local authorities, conducted from January to April 2013. The urban case 
study is examined through the prism of the academic literature, NGO reports, 
videos of interviews, and interviews with non-residents involved in social 
activism. These cases allow us to illustrate the Cambodian version of the rural-
urban ‘dichotomy’ and the connotations and meanings attached to it, and to 
3    Phnom Penh, the capital city, was selected because it has witnessed both a significant change 
of land use and urban forced evictions, and it is ‘home’ to many non-governmental organisa-
tions (NGO) that have articulated LSLA-related demands in human rights terms. Sein Serrey, 
meanwhile, is a newly established village surrounded by forest and plantations, and is a place 
where residents who were forcibly evicted to make space for LSLAs had little contact with 
and received little support from NGOs.
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ultimately deconstruct this dichotomy and examine how it informs debates on 
the dissemination of human rights and claim-making in Cambodia.
2 Mapping Cambodia’s Human Rights Obligations Relevant 
to LSLAs’ Contexts
In the legal positivist tradition a state’s consent to be bound by international 
norms is central to determining the sources of its human rights obligations. 
Cambodia’s obligations stem from international human rights instruments to 
which it has become party, notably the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR); and sectoral treaties on the elimination of racial discrimina-
tion, on the elimination of discrimination against women, on the rights of the 
child, and the rights of people with disabilities.4 Whilst these instruments are 
silent as to the permissibility of LSLAs as such, the concluding observations 
of bodies monitoring their implementation reveal that the treaties have cre-
ated a human rights map, or framework, which entails substantive and proce-
dural obligations of relevance to land transactions in Cambodia and beyond 
(Cismas, 2013; Golay and Biglino, 2013; Golay et al., 2014).5
As to the substantive features, Cambodia has a triadic obligation to respect 
(refrain from interfering with the exercise of an existing right), protect (ensure 
against abuse by third parties, including powerful individuals and companies), 
and fulfil human rights (take positive action to ensure enjoyment of rights). 
In addition, it has a general obligation not to discriminate against individu-
als or groups, inter alia, on grounds of ethnicity, gender, social origin, or their 
rural–urban residence. In their concluding observations on Cambodia, treaty 
bodies have emphasised the negative consequences of LSLAs and flagged pos-
sible non-compliance with the respect and protect obligations in relation to a 
number of rights. These include the prohibition of forced evictions, the right to 
livelihood, the rights to food and housing, and the rights of indigenous people 
to dispose of their lands and natural resources (CESCR, 2009; CEDAW, 2006). 
In the Cambodian context forced evictions and internal displacement with-
out adequate resettlement and compensation have triggered a wider range of 
abuses perpetrated by or with the involvement of third parties, including viola-
tions of the rights to freedom of expression and assembly, violence against land 
4    A comprehensive ratification history of Cambodia can be consulted at http://indicators 
.ohchr.org (accessed on 16 March 2015).
5    See also Golay’s contribution in this volume.
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rights defenders, and the criminalisation of the latter (Amnesty International, 
2012; ADHOC, 2011).
Treaty bodies have consistently emphasised the disproportionately nega-
tive effect, in human rights terms, that land transactions in Cambodia have 
on populations that are vulnerable to discrimination, or are marginalised or 
disadvantaged, such as indigenous people, rural communities, the urban poor, 
women, and children (Golay et al., 2014). The situation is in profound contrast 
with the state’s obligation to fulfil human rights specifically through the identi-
fication and implementation of measures for the benefit of vulnerable groups. 
Therefore, the government has been urged to pursue the demarcation of state 
public land and state private land,6 the implementation of titling of the com-
munal land of indigenous people (CESCR, 2009), and—importantly—the 
establishment of a ‘national moratorium on all evictions until the proper legal 
framework is in place and the process of land titling is completed’ (CESCR, 
2009; CRC, 2011). It is clear that the fulfil dimension under the ICESCR entails 
a strong social justice component: ‘the granting of economic concessions 
[should] take into account the need for sustainable development and for all 
Cambodians to share in the benefits of progress rather than for private gain 
alone’ (CESCR, 2009).
The substantive rights stipulated by human rights conventions are under-
pinned by a number of procedural safeguards of paramount relevance in the 
context of LSLAs in Cambodia. These can be grouped for analytical purposes 
under two headings: transparency and participation, whereby an obligation 
to obtain prior free and informed consent is linked to the holding of effective 
consultations and to the participation of stakeholders, in particular vulner-
able groups; accountability and redress, which includes holding perpetrators 
of human rights violations responsible and affordable access of victims to 
courts and other administrative mechanisms for seeking an effective remedy 
including adequate relocation and compensation. The Voluntary Guidelines 
on Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the 
Context of National Food Security, a recent addition to the flurry of soft-law 
instruments applicable to land transactions (see Annex), hold great potential 
6    The 2001 Land Law divides state land into state public land and state private land—together 
these account for approximately 75–80% of Cambodia’s total land area (USAID, 2012). State 
public land refers to land of a natural origin (such as rivers, lakes, or forests) which has gen-
eral public use, and to archaeological and cultural heritage sites. State private land is state 
land that does not provide a public service and which does not come under any of the other 
categories of state public land. The 2001 Land Law and Sub-Decree No. 146 stipulate that ELCs 
can be granted only for state private land (RGC, 2001; RGC, 2005a).
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for guiding Cambodia’s actions in particular in relation to procedural safe-
guards. The effective performance of these safeguards may not be sufficient 
for land transactions to be human rights friendly or even neutral. However, 
it is clear from Cambodia’s process of review by human rights mechanisms 
that a failure to uphold these guarantees would, with great likelihood, result in 
violations of human rights and the country’s non-compliance with its interna-
tional obligations.
3 Governmental Performance with Regards to Human Rights 
Obligations
‘Context matters’ has long been one of the mantras of the social sciences. As 
an agriculture-based society, Cambodia has witnessed, through the centu-
ries, massive changes to its land tenure system. It is important to recall that 
the genocidal evictions and the collectivisation campaign implemented by 
the Khmer Rouge in which over 1.7 million individuals lost their lives repre-
sented a process of ‘population geography: a discipline of bodies through a 
control of space’ (Tyner, 2009, 134). As such, not only was private property 
abolished but most of the land tenure and cadastral records were obliterated 
(Sar, 2010), which led to the current situation where an estimated two-thirds of 
Cambodians do not possess proper deeds to the land they inhabit (IRIN, 2013).
To take this context seriously means to recognise that land reform in 
Cambodia, including land titling, will be a strenuous and lengthy process. At 
the same time, it is the context of past violations and land-related conflict that 
recommends the integration of the human rights framework ensuing from 
Cambodia’s ratification of international treaties as a necessary and particularly 
auspicious step in the country’s efforts to undertake land reform and pursue 
economic development.7 Along these lines, our analysis agrees that, at a for-
mal level, land legislation in Cambodia is ‘relatively well developed’ (Special 
Rapporteur on Cambodia, 2012). Nonetheless, important human rights con-
cerns derive from tensions between processes set in motion by the same and/
or different bodies of legislation, and by major shortcomings in the implemen-
tation of domestic legislation.
7    Importantly, Cambodia’s Constitution recognises, in Article 31, that international instru-
ments supersede domestic legislation.
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3.1 Processual Tensions
The 2001 Land Law recognises the possession of rights by those people who 
enjoyed land prior to 2001, in a manner that is ‘unambiguous, non-violent, 
notorious [sic] to the public, continuous and in good faith’, even if those peo-
ple have not yet been formally recognised as owners of the land8 (RGC, 2001, 
chapter 4; Special Rapporteur on Cambodia, 2012). The law also distinguishes 
between state public land and state private land, whereas the 2005 Sub-Decree 
on State Land Management provides the framework for the identification, reg-
istration and classification of state land, and the process of re-classifying state 
land from one category into another (Special Rapporteur on Cambodia, 2012; 
RGC, 2005b). But the 2001 Land Law also provides for the possibility of granting 
ELCs. The latter are ‘a legal right established by a legal document issued under 
the discretion of the competent authority, given to any natural person or legal 
entity or group of persons to occupy a land and to exercise thereon the rights 
set forth by this law’ (RGC, 2001). Article 4 of Sub-Decree 146 on ELCs (RGC, 
2005a) lists among the criteria that need to be cumulatively respected for land 
to be eligible for concessions, the following:
The land has been registered and classified as state private land in accor-
dance with the Sub decree on State Land Management and the Sub 
decree on Procedures for Establishing Cadastral Maps and Land Register 
or the Sub decree on Sporadic Registration.
As can be gauged from the above, there is a processual tension that arises as 
a result of the provisions of the 2001 Land Law, the 2005 Sub-Decree on State 
Land Management, and Sub-Decree 146 on ELCs. The effective implementation 
of the latter sub-decree relies on the output of the processes established by the 
former acts. As such, as long as the titling programme and the identification, 
registration, and classification of state land are ongoing, the mere opportu-
nity to request and grant ELCs (as provided by Sub-Decree 146) will invariably 
skew the latter processes and open the door to abuse in relation to what land 
receives title and what land is classified as state public land. Unsurprisingly, 
UN mechanisms and land activists have requested a moratorium on ELCs until 
such time as titling and other land programmes are finalised. On 7 May 2012, 
Prime Minister Hun Sen announced a moratorium on new ELCs. Direct causal-
ity of the compliance of the Cambodian government with the request made by 
8    The Law stipulates that a title for this land can be requested, which then converts possession 
into full ownership rights.
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human rights mechanisms cannot be established; however, it is interesting to 
note that the moratorium was announced during the UN Special Rapporteur’s 
mission to Cambodia, which was undertaken with the aim of examining the 
country’s human rights situation.
3.2 Major Shortcomings in Implementation
Beyond the above-mentioned tensions set in motion by legislative acts with 
regards to land, the implementation of such legislation raises major concerns. 
Evidence suggests a striking failure to adequately implement existing domestic 
legislation, and to respect international obligations, in three areas: transpar-
ency and participation, accountability and redress, and identification of vul-
nerable groups.
‘The granting and management of economic and other land concessions in 
Cambodia suffer from a lack of transparency and adherence to existing laws’—
this was the bleak assessment on transparency and participation provided by 
the UN Special Rapporteur on Cambodia (2012). NGO reports confirm that the 
majority of people living in concession areas have not had the opportunity 
to participate in decision-making processes, have not been consulted, and 
have not given their consent to ELCs. Amnesty International (2009) found that 
‘evictions are routinely carried out without any court order or verification of 
the claim of ownership’ of the land. Other sources suggest that, at the most 
basic level, villagers have not been informed about the land transactions tak-
ing place, including the exact location of a concession, its dimensions, com-
panies involved, intended use of the land, and other similar aspects (FIDH, 
2012). Research points to relevant links between lack of access to information 
and lack of access to redress, and conversely suggests a positive correlation 
between information and compensation (Golay et al., 2014).
Turning to accountability and redress, it may be observed that in principle, 
there are several options for settlement of land disputes in Cambodia, largely 
depending on whether the disputed land is officially registered or not (BABC, 
2010; LICADHO, 2009; Sithan, 2012). When the land is registered, disputes will 
be settled in national courts. When land is not registered, complaints over land 
issues are to be submitted to the Administrative Commission and the Cadastral 
Commission (CC). Despite these existing avenues, institutional, structural, and 
social factors often serve as barriers to accessing justice in LSLA-related dis-
putes (Golay et al., 2014; Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty, 2012).
The CC, for instance, is portrayed as institutionally weak due to lim-
ited budgetary resources and monitoring capacities (BABC, 2010). Physical 
inaccessibility (affecting rural communities in Cambodia since these courts 
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are clustered in urban areas) and economic inaccessibility (due to fees for lodg-
ing a complaint, costs related to transportation, lost wages, and legal counsel) 
represent structural barriers that deprive individuals of their right to access a 
remedy (Golay et al., 2014).
The corruption-retaliation-mistrust triad presents another obstacle in the 
path of accountability and access to remedies. The bias of dispute mechanisms 
towards, those who could generally be termed, the rich, and against poorer 
communities and land rights activists is an aspect that plagues the implemen-
tation of ELC legislation (ADHOC, 2011; LICADHO, 2012). A recent communica-
tion addressed to the Cambodian government by the Special Rapporteur on 
Cambodia (OHCHR, 2014) notes that
Too often, court cases submitted by families contesting ownership of 
land with wealthy business owners are denied their day in court, whereas 
those filed by the company against the villagers have been diligently pro-
cessed and resulted in numerous convictions.
It has been reported that, because of corruption or due to fear of retaliation, 
judges side with companies, dismiss cases on jurisdictional grounds, or use 
legal tactics to delay proceedings indefinitely (Golay et al., 2014). That retalia-
tion in LSLA contexts is a serious concern is evidenced by the high number of 
land rights activists and journalists who have been prosecuted (ADHOC, 2011), 
and the repercussions, including ‘raw remarks descending to the personal 
level’, which the Special Rapporteur on Cambodia (2013) was faced with in the 
aftermath of his reports. The consequence of such practice is that corruption 
and fear of retaliation has led to a generalised mistrust of the justice system 
among the population (Golay et al., 2014). It becomes evident that effective 
and accessible remedies and affordable and prompt enforcement—as stipu-
lated by the Voluntary Guidelines on Land Tenure, for instance—remain ele-
ments that exist solely on paper for a high number of Cambodians.
Lastly, it should be noted that the obligation to identify vulnerable groups 
and the promotion and implementation of policies targeting the realisation of 
their rights is echoed by Article 61 of the Constitution of Cambodia (Kingdom 
of Cambodia, 2010), which stipulates that
The State shall promote economic development in all fields, especially in 
agriculture, handicraft, industry, to begin with the remotest areas, with 
concern for water policy, electricity, roads and means of transportation, 
modern techniques and credit system.
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A report of the then Special Representative of the Secretary-General for 
human rights in Cambodia (2007) states that ‘a large number of economic 
land concessions have been granted in favor of foreign business interests and 
prominent Cambodian political and business figures’. Importantly, the report 
underlined that the benefits for rural communities were not evident and that 
not even the purported positive effects on state revenue stemming from these 
concessions were apparent (Special Representative on Cambodia, 2007). In 
a similar vein, the current UN Special Rapporteur on Cambodia (2012) noted 
more recently: ‘[T]hroughout my analysis, I struggled to fully comprehend the 
benefits of many land concessions that the Government has granted. In gen-
eral, it is not clear to what extent the people of Cambodia have actually ben-
efited from land concessions’. Here again, the gap between law and practice 
remains glaringly wide.
4 LSLA-Affected Communities and Human Rights Vernacularization: 
Two Case Studies from Rural and Urban Cambodia
National and international NGOs including the Cambodian Human Rights and 
Development Association (ADHOC), the Cambodian Human Rights Portal, the 
Community Legal Education Center (CLEC), the Cambodian League for the 
Promotion and Defense of Human Rights (LICADHO), the Cambodian NGO 
Forum, Amnesty International, Bridges Across Borders Cambodia (BABC), 
and the Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) have put forward a 
human rights framework in their advocacy efforts and strategic litigation cam-
paigns against ‘land grabbing’ in Cambodia. Against such a background, the 
authors’ engagement with communities affected by LSLA-related forced evic-
tions in one urban and one rural area in Cambodia was concerned with how 
these communities made sense of their experiences, which—according to 
international law—may be classified as human rights violations. Did ‘human 
rights’ become their language in enunciating their situation? In what ways did 
they rely on human rights ideas and law, if at all? How did particular cultural, 
historical, and social contexts and spatiality play out in the use of human rights 
ideas and law?
4.1 The Relevance of the Cambodian Rural-Urban Divide in Human 
Rights Vernacularization
Our analysis of social mobilisation in LSLA contexts in rural and urban set-
tings draws on scholarship on cultural circulation and translation. Numerous 
authors have become preoccupied with the dissemination of human rights 
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ideas; among them Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink (1998), and Sanjeev 
Khagram et al. (2002), who scrutinise the role of transnational advocacy net-
works and the process of institutionalisation. In their works, Sally Merry and 
Peggy Levitt introduce the term ‘vernacularization’ to describe the process of 
appropriation and local adaptation of human rights ideas (Merry, 2006; Merry 
et al., 2010; Merry and Levitt, 2011). They contribute to the classic rights-culture 
and universalism-relativism debates by looking at these as a continuum, 
instead of a binary opposition. In their account, universal ideas and cultures 
are negotiated and adapted by the ‘brokers’9 in a certain cultural setting.
Other scholars, while noting that social behaviour is context specific, have 
studied the mutual incubation processes between space and society (Leitner 
et al., 2008). Their argument is that an analysis of social processes needs to 
include an examination of multiple spatialities. John Allen suggests that space 
and spatiality are essential to our understanding of power (Allen, 2003). At the 
same time, places and spaces are deemed to be products of political contesta-
tions over access, control, and participation (Tonkiss, 2005). As such, actors 
including local communities and brokers are embedded in spaces; spaces are 
constructed by a power constellation that is socially and historically specific; 
and spaces constrain as well as enable certain types of social activism and 
behaviours, including the vernacularization of human rights ideas and claims 
based on such ideas.
Our working hypothesis is that, in the case of Cambodia, victims of LSLA-
related human rights violations in rural areas articulate their grievances dif-
ferently than those in urban areas, despite what might appear to be a shared 
cultural and historical background. We postulate that it is these different 
spaces that shape, in a distinct way, the rural and urban communities’ narra-
tives and strategies of response to LSLAs, including their vernacularization of 
human rights.
Before proceeding to the case studies, it is important to provide an insight 
into the construction of the rural-urban divide in Cambodia. In our interviews, 
we could grasp that the division between rural and urban is always present 
especially in the way our interviewees labelled themselves as either neak 
chamkar (‘farmland people’) or neak krong (‘city people’). This sense of divi-
sion has been engrained in Cambodian society at least since the beginning 
of French colonialism. During that period, cities located in the strategic areas 
around the Mekong River, and in particular Phnom Penh, were given priority 
9    ‘Brokers’ move between local, national, regional, and global contexts and meaning systems; 
they take, negotiate, translate, and adapt ideas that apply in a certain locality to be trans-
planted into another (Merry, 2006).
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in terms of development and ‘modernisation’; beyond geographic rational-
ity, at stake was the stigmatisation of farmers from rural areas as ‘poor’, ‘lazy’, 
and ‘easily contented’ (Derks, 2008, 31). During the Vietnam War, the United 
States military expanded their air campaigns to the rural areas of Cambodia 
to target Vietnamese communist troops installed there, destroying multiple 
villages and creating further rural impoverishment (Osborne, 2008). During 
the Khmer Rouge regime, inhabitants of cities were forcibly displaced to rural 
areas in order to boost agricultural production—millions died in the collec-
tivisation processes in rural areas (McIntyre, 1996). After this series of wars, 
the rural-urban dichotomy continued to exist and exert its effects, not least 
as a consequence of the massive socio-economic reconstruction of Phnom 
Penh. In addition to the income gap between city and farmland people, dis-
crepancies can be found in relation to access to information and public facili-
ties, including electricity, infrastructure, education, housing and health care. 
For instance, the main channel for accessing news in rural areas is battery-
driven radio, for which broadcast content remains very much controlled by the 
government; main roads in rural areas are mostly gravel and can only be used 
during dry weather.
This socio-historical lens allows us to understand that a number of con-
structed factors are at stake, which may contribute to different types of social 
mobilisation in rural and urban areas. That the two worlds are a construction is 
further evidenced by the fact that many of those who had been forcibly moved 
during the Khmer Rouge period, subsequently moved once again in order 
to start a new life (Heuveline, 1998). At that time, rural-urban conceptions 
were hardly a matter for consideration. Today, larger cities like Phnom Penh 
are expanding with the birth of peri-urban areas, whereby national roads are 
built to connect cities to remote areas—development that ultimately provides 
more avenues for rural-urban interaction (Derks, 2008). Despite the porous 
boundary, and duly acknowledging that the divide between rural and urban 
Cambodia is constructed, one cannot neglect that there are indeed discrepan-
cies between the two types of areas when it comes to resources and access to 
information, in particular.
4.2 Bonteay Rongeang, Sein Serrey Village
In 2008, Tan Bien, one of the main Vietnamese rubber companies, was granted 
an ELC comprising 8,100 ha in the area covering the Bonteay Rongeang settle-
ments. Information provided to the affected community concerning the ELC 
was limited to the setting up of wooden noticeboards (although authorities 
would have been aware that the literacy rate is generally low in rural areas) 
and the reading, on several occasions by district officers of official letters 
(individuals who lived far from the village would have been unable to attend). 
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Our data clarify that there were no consultation campaigns, nor was any 
express consent for the relocation and the ELC itself sought. Based on the 
interviews undertaken with individuals from the affected community, we can 
conclude that the type of information and means of dissemination were inad-
equate; authorities did not provide the villagers with an accurate understand-
ing of how their livelihoods would be impacted upon by the ELC, or inform 
them about available avenues to contest the project. In our view, the lack of 
adequate information partially explains why the community did not seek to 
organise in order to oppose the ELC.
Later that year, several villagers’ houses were bulldozed and the land was 
turned over to the company. The villagers’ first organised efforts came in 
response to the evictions and the destruction of their houses, and took the 
form of setting ablaze bulldozers and heavy equipment owned by the com-
pany. Seven villagers were subsequently arrested by the local authorities 
(Sarat,10 personal communication, 2013).
ADHOC was reportedly the only NGO involved in the advocacy efforts related 
to this case. Its involvement changed the dynamic of the social activism to a 
certain extent: it provided the community with direct assistance and consul-
tation, as well as with a channel for conveying the villagers’ concerns by the 
initiation of a three-party negotiation process. As a result, the aforementioned 
nebulous actions conducted by dispersed villagers and some of their repre-
sentatives were replaced by coordinated mediation between the villagers, Tan 
Bien, and local authorities. The subsequent negotiations resulted in the release 
of the arrested individuals and a commitment from the central government 
to grant compensation in the form of residential land (40×20m) and cultivat-
able land (1–2 ha) for all evicted households. Nevertheless, most of the villagers 
refused to relocate from Bonteay Rongeang as they had invested a compara-
tively large amount of capital in growing their crops.
In late 2009, the Government of Cambodia mobilised a military battalion 
to evict individuals—the military, reportedly, exhibited a very aggressive and 
threatening attitude towards the villagers. One interviewee recalled that ‘No 
one dared to refuse [to leave], they were holding electric tasers. They would 
electrocute anyone who stood up [to their instructions]’. As a consequence, 
673 families were forcibly relocated to a new village, Phum Thmay,11 carrying 
with them whatever belongings they could gather and leaving most of their 
 
10    ADHOC Coordinator for Kampong Thom.
11    The literal translation of this name is ‘the new village’. Phum Thmay was considered too 
large to accommodate a population of more than 700 families and, in 2011, was divided 
into two villages, Serrey Monkul and Sein Serrey.
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possessions behind. Whilst they were granted the 40x20m of residential land 
per household, contrary to the negotiated agreement, compensation in culti-
vatable land was never provided. Living conditions upon arrival in their new vil-
lage further illustrate the inadequacy of the compensation package. Although 
roads around and inside the village had been built, no housing was available 
for the newly arrived villagers. Upon reaching their respective residential plots, 
they had to clear the area in order to build their houses. No assistance was 
provided by the authorities; during the first months of their relocation, the vil-
lagers were forced to live in tents.
When asked about their response to the breached compensation agreement, 
most interviewees said that they did not know who was responsible for over-
seeing the process. They also concluded that their lack of legal know-how and 
the absence of a recognised ombudsperson presented a serious constraint to 
their ability to formulate and make their grievances known, specifically in the 
case of filing legal complaints with the authorities. A former representative of 
the community, belonging to the opposition party, explained that he indepen-
dently prepared a petition demanding that the cultivatable land promised be 
provided—more than six hundred villagers from Phum Thmay had signed it. 
At the time of the interview, he had not submitted the petition and expressed 
uncertainty as to the appropriate addressee. The interviewees expressed their 
view that without advocacy and legal assistance from NGOs (they specifically 
mentioned ADHOC) their petition would remain largely ineffective.
It appears that the villagers interviewed felt a strong sense of disappoint-
ment towards the injustice they were experiencing. Yet this was rarely artic-
ulated in terms of injustice per se, rather they used the language of failed 
economic development. For example, they emphasised that their landless-
ness that resulted from their eviction due to the ELC had further impoverished 
them instead of providing them with more economic opportunities. It must 
be noted that the terms ‘human rights’ and ‘human rights violations’ were not 
used to describe either their eviction, or the general situation they experienced 
as a result of the ELC.
Some preliminary conclusion can be drawn. First, the failure of the authori-
ties to provide villagers with adequate information relating to the ELC (includ-
ing what the concession entailed and how it could be contested) increased 
the vulnerability of the Bonteay Rongeang community; it prevented them from 
organising and considering alternatives. Once confronted with the evictions, 
forward-looking planning was not at the heart of their actions; rather, their 
activism took a spontaneous and reactionary form. In our view, the burning 
of the company’s heavy machines was fuelled by shock, anger, and a desire to 
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maintain their homes and possessions ‘on the day’—the outburst was not part 
of a strategy intended to lead to a long-term resolution of the dispute through 
violence. Similarly, the petition that they started remains, so far, unused due 
the lack of a concrete plan about what to do with it. Although there is a sense 
among the community that an injustice has been done, this has not been 
articulated in human rights terms, nor has recourse to courts been envisaged 
as a possibility of securing domestic rights. Vernacularization of rights is lim-
ited in this case, yet not inexistent as is reflected by the collaboration with a 
human rights NGO (ADHOC) and the shared opinion that the latter’s ongoing 
support would be essential for the resolution of the villagers’ dispute. Second, 
the relevance of space should be noted. The movement was concentrated and 
isolated in the sense that the actors involved are local authorities and villagers, 
and their concerns were rarely heard outside the disputed area.
4.3 Boeung Kak Lake, Phnom Penh
In 2007, the Municipality of Phnom Penh announced that it had entered 
a 99-year lease agreement with a private developer, Shukaku Ltd12 cover-
ing a 133 ha area including the Boeng Kak Lake. The lake, once well known 
as an affordable touristic destination, is one of the largest urban wetlands in 
Phnom Penh, and a source of the city’s aquatic life (Cultivate Understanding 
Multimedia, 2012). The plan of the municipality envisages the transforma-
tion of the area into ‘pleasant, trade, and service places for domestic and 
international tourist [sic]’ (Phnom Penh Government, 2011). According to 
the UN Special Rapporteur on Cambodia (2012), the project has affected over 
4,000 families, ‘most of whom were forcibly evicted, relocated involuntarily, or 
who accepted sub-standard compensation under duress’.
In an effort to challenge the evictions and the ELC itself, the residents of 
Boeung Kak organised themselves and pursued multiple strategies. Shortly 
after the company started developing the project, the residents sought legal 
counsel and submitted complaints to Cambodian courts demanding the dis-
continuation of the development (Channyda, 2008). As their legal motions 
were rejected, in February 2011 they petitioned a number of relevant govern-
mental authorities and presented an alternative proposal for in situ resettle-
ment and onsite housing on 12 per cent of the leased area (BABC, 2010). 
12    In 2010, Erdos Hong Jun Investment Co., Ltd, a Chinese firm, formed a joint venture com-
pany with Shukaku, and the Boeng Kak Lake lease agreement was re-registered under 
the name of the joint venture, Shukaku Erdos Hong Jun Property Development Co., Ltd 
(BABC, 2012).
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With the support of a coalition of NGOs—The Housing Task Force—they 
requested the concessioner company to endorse their alternative proposal as 
part of the company’s corporate social responsibility (CSR) policy. While these 
efforts were unsuccessful, it is notable that the community shifted its strategy 
from litigation to advocacy, including by attempting to capitalise on business 
practices such as CSR.
The Boeung Kak residents further diversified their advocacy through 
protests timed to coincide with the visits of UN and foreign dignitaries, by 
expressly articulating their grievances as human rights violations, by drawing 
on cooperation and support from local and international NGOs, and by peti-
tioning international complaint mechanisms.
The urban dwellers’ protests organised on the occasion of the UN Secretary 
General’s visit to Cambodia in 2010 were met with violent attacks by police 
forces, and by arrests—a number of press releases from local and international 
NGOs served to further internationalise the grievances of the Boeung Kak com-
munity (House and Billo, 2011; BABC, 2010; LICADHO, 2009). In 2012, during the 
visit to Cambodia, for the East Asia Summit, of US President Barack Obama 
and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, dwellers of Boeung Kak organised an 
‘Obama Save Our Souls (SOS)’ march through the city of Phnom Penh, particu-
larly taking in eviction sites. They demanded that the US dignitaries increase 
political pressure on the Government of Cambodia to respect human rights 
and stop forced evictions. It should be noted that women representatives 
of the Boeung Kak Lake community have been at the forefront of these and 
other demonstrations. Reportedly, there was an assumption that protests led 
by women were less likely to be targeted by police forces—however, violence 
against women and arbitrary arrests have multiplied (UN Special Rapporteur 
on Cambodia, 2012). In March 2012, women ‘bared their breasts publicly, osten-
sibly to avoid apprehension by the police, demonstrating unprecedented des-
peration’ (UN Special Rapporteur on Cambodia, 2012).
In comparative perspective, we recognise that it would be difficult for rural 
communities, such as Bonteay Rongeang village, to organise protests that 
target specific international actors during their visits to Cambodia. The city 
dwellers were undeniably ‘advantaged’ by physical proximity to different loca-
tions where international meetings and visits took place and to the offices of 
national and international NGOs, and by better access to information in gen-
eral. The ease, due to such proximity, of collaborating with human rights advo-
cates should also be emphasised.
The level of sophistication of the toolbox of strategies that the Boeung 
Kak community employed is attested by their petitioning of the World Bank 
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Inspection Panel.13 Represented by the Geneva-based NGO the Centre on 
Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE), the former residents of Beoung Kak 
Lake requested that the Inspection Panel review the land management and 
administration project (LMAP), alleging that the design and the implementa-
tion of the project ‘denied urban poor and other vulnerable households pro-
tection against widespread tenure insecurity’ and increased forced evictions 
in Cambodia (COHRE, 2009). The World Bank and other donors financed 
the LMAP with the aim of assisting Cambodia in the issuance and registra-
tion of land titles and the implementation of a land administration system 
(Inspection Panel, 2010). When the Boeung Kak Lake area was adjudicated in 
the LMAP scheme in January 2007, despite their legitimate claims under the 
2001 Land Law residents were denied titles (COHRE, 2009). The Inspection 
Panel found evidence in favour of the petitioners’ claim that the World Bank’s 
failure to properly design and supervise the LMAP had ultimately led to their 
forced eviction and involuntary resettlement (Inspection Panel, 2010; Special 
Rapporteur on Cambodia, 2012). It ceased the related loans to Cambodia after 
December 2010.
Another recipient of petitions from the former residents of Boeung Kak 
is the Special Rapporteur on Cambodia. The Rapporteur submitted to the 
Cambodian government a number of communications concerning the case, 
visited the area while on mission to Cambodia, and reported regularly on 
the human rights violations that these individuals had experienced, thereby 
maintaining international pressure and demanding a resolution of the dispute 
(OHCHR, 2012; Special Rapporteur on Cambodia, 2012; 2013). The dispute found 
a partial resolution when, in August 2011, a sub-decree was issued to adjust the 
size of the Boeung Kak Lake Development, providing title to communities liv-
ing on a 12.44 hectare stretch of land. In the words of the Special Rapporteur 
(2012) ‘a positive development in this long-standing dispute. Nevertheless, this 
was not as inclusive as it should have been, and some families were subse-
quently evicted and continue to protest the eviction and relocation.’
Two aspects should be noted at this stage. First, the aim of the Boeung Kak 
Lake movement goes beyond maintaining the status quo (defending dwell-
ers’ houses at the time the eviction took place). The intention appears to be 
to effect long-term social change by generating social awareness and political 
pressure on the government. Second, spatiality played a central role in the case 
13    The Inspection Panel is an independent complaints mechanism that is open to petitions 
from individuals and communities that have been adversely affected by a World Bank-
funded project.
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of the urban dwellers. Unlike the movement in Sein Serrey, the efforts of the 
urban dwellers are not limited by and localised in the commune or munici-
pality. They are supported by national and transnational networks and tar-
get an international audience. A wide array of actors were supportive of the 
movement—local attorneys and NGOs that joined forces under the banner of 
The Housing Task Force, international NGOs, and other types of non-resident 
human rights activists—exposing the Boeung Kak Lake story (including via 
media outlets) to a worldwide audience. As they had access to factual and legal 
information relevant to their cause, the urban dwellers were able to use their 
advocacy efforts to strategically target foreign governments, financial institu-
tions, and high-level UN officials. The language of human rights in which they 
chose to express most of their grievances and the appeals to courts and inter-
national human rights mechanisms may have ‘come easier’ to the Boeung Kak 
community (compared to the villagers) for reasons of space (proximity to and 
support from human rights groups, physical proximity to courts). Beyond the 
adoption of human rights ideas and the utilisation of specific mechanisms, a 
process of adaptation is at stake: a vernacularization, in so far as the successful 
appeal to the World Bank’s Inspection Panel (a non-traditional human rights 
mechanism) is concerned.
5 Conclusion
This chapter has established that a human rights framework entailing sub-
stantive aspects (the requirement to respect, protect, and fulfil human rights), 
and procedural safeguards (transparency and participation, accountability 
and redress) carries legally binding force for Cambodia. Not least in situations 
regarding land transactions. Notably, much of the domestic legislation regard-
ing land, and even the decree on ELCs, mirror these human rights standards. 
It is the implementation of these laws, the actual practice, that gives rise to 
what one close observer calls ‘chronic disputes’ in LSLA contexts (Special 
Rapporteur on Cambodia, 2012). Our findings suggest that this deficient gov-
ernmental practice, in particular in the areas of information, consultation, 
and access to justice, to a certain extent incapacitated the vernacularization 
of human rights ideas in the studied rural setting; it did, in a sense, and with-
out aiming at extrapolation, reinforce the (constructed) division between 
the rural and the urban space. Contrary to the affected community in Sein 
Serrey village, the urban dwellers of Boeung Kak Lake have made extensive 
use of human rights language and mechanisms to challenge their forced evic-
tions and have achieved a certain success. In joining a small category of other 
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communities from elsewhere in the world they have pursued non-traditional 
avenues for adjudication of human rights—as such their contribution may 
have a wider significance for human rights compliance and for mechanisms 
that are able to induce such compliance. Spatiality, it should be recognised, 
played a major role: the proximity to information and a network of ‘brokers’, 
including national and international NGOs, have enabled Boeung Kak Lake 
dwellers to advocate and claim their rights.
Appraising the findings of our research, we can conclude that in Cambodia, 
in the context of LSLAs, human rights law and practice meet halfway. On the 
one hand, we have solid domestic legislation, backed by a moratorium on ELCs. 
And while our two case studies do not permit generalisation, they do speak for 
a certain activism of affected communities and the solidarity of civil society 
organisations. One the other hand, however, we have major shortcomings in 
the implementation of the said legislation and the reality of a moratorium, 
which by definition is temporary and reversible.
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CHAPTER 11
Large-Scale Land Acquisitions, Livelihoods 
and Human Rights in South-East Asia
Christophe Gironde and Christophe Golay
The various contributions to this volume show, first, that previous episodes 
of land acquisitions are crucial to an understanding of why, where and how 
the current wave is occurring; of how they are implemented and turned, or 
not, into production units; and of how and to what extent they affect liveli-
hoods. Second, beyond the usual emphasis on foreign companies, historical 
analysis also allows us to take stock of the key role played by nation states, 
which put in place regulatory frameworks and public policies or adopted a 
laissez-faire approach that paved the way for current land deals and acquisi-
tion practices around land and natural resources. Third, this volume highlights 
the importance of economic and political dynamics at local, national and sub-
regional levels, which prove in South-East Asia to be as powerful as the global 
forces typically foregrounded in writings on ‘land grabbing’. This is observable 
in the (land deal) negotiation stage, during the implementation of deals, and 
throughout the process of the transformation of the livelihoods that such deals 
induce in the medium term. A processual approach, as used by Nooteboom 
et al. (this volume), goes hand in hand with historical analysis. The diversity 
found in the implementation of land acquisitions shows that land deals are 
more often the beginning of a process of transformation to new livelihoods 
than the end of former ones.
Overall, large-scale land acquisitions are a significant challenge for affected 
populations, but their consequences vary greatly between localities and 
among social groups. Dispossession, exclusion, disruption, etc. are undeni-
able. Extreme cases in which populations lost all, were displaced, and had to 
rebuild from zero (Cismas and Paramita, this volume) do exist. In other cases, 
some populations are left with some time and space for resistance, adaptation, 
opportunism, etc. Everywhere the processes of land acquisitions and their 
consequences are highly contingent on the particular contexts in which they 
occur.
    The authors are extremely grateful to the anonymous reviewer for the comments and sugges-
tions provided to the draft of this chapter.
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In terms of human rights analysis, the gap is huge between the abuses and 
violations of human rights perpetrated against local populations and the 
human rights instruments that have been developed for protecting them. 
Although instruments and mechanisms exist at the international and national 
levels, they do not provide substantial protection to affected populations, as 
there is not much implementation on the ground.
1 Recurrence and Expansion of Large-Scale Land Acquisitions
The current wave of large-scale land acquisitions has often been addressed as 
a phenomenon caused by the 2007–08 ‘F-F-F crisis’ (Food, Fossil, Financial). 
The food price surge and export restrictions undeniably triggered a reac-
tion from importing countries, who attempted to secure provision of food by 
engaging—among other activities—in land investment (McMichael, 2012; 
Akram-Lodhi, 2012). The rush for land can also certainly be ascribed to agro-
fuel production, as illustrated by the case of sugar cane in Indonesia and the 
Philippines (Nooteboom et al., this volume), and to the fact that land has 
become a valuable financial asset (Smaller and Mann, 2009). Yet this short-
term perspective is not sufficient for an understanding of the current dynamics 
of large-scale land acquisitions and the agrarian transformation they contrib-
ute to shaping (Zoomers and Kaag, 2014).
An argument has been made for ‘analysing land grabbing historically’, since 
the acquisitions ‘tend to occur in cycles’ and because each new cycle is some-
what related to the previous ones (Edelman and Leon, 2013, 1697–8). Roudart 
and Mazoyer (this volume) recall that large public estates, back to ancient 
times and the Old Kingdom of Egypt, have always existed—within or outside 
national or imperial boundaries—and are not unique to capitalism. Some, like 
those of the Roman State, were created for the purpose of funding wars and 
feeding armies; others, as was the case for Spanish and Portuguese estates in 
the Americas, for mercantile interests; others still to seize the opportunities 
presented by industrial demand and international trade (from wool in the six-
teenth century to ‘tropical’ commodities in the nineteenth century), or to fund 
rapid industrialisation as in the 1930s in the USSR.
The need to look back into history is particularly valid in South-East Asia, 
which experienced not only the European colonisations and the opening up 
of ‘previously inaccessible tracts of land’ in the second half of the nineteenth 
century (Hayami, 2001), but also major territorial expansions from the 1960s 
in Thailand and the Philippines, then in Malaysia, Indonesia, and—lastly—
in Vietnam from the 1990s on (De Koninck, 2003). Although most of the sites 
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studied in this volume have experienced booms related to new crops, the sites’ 
expansion is related to the role these crops played in previous decades and 
even centuries, as best illustrated by the case of sugar cane, which has been 
core to the economies and the societies of the Philippines and Indonesia since 
the middle of the nineteenth century (Hayami, 2001; Maurer, 1986). Until the 
mid-2000s, the extent of rubber exploitation remained very limited in south-
eastern Laos and north-eastern Cambodia (Baird, 2011; Fortunel, 2014) and the 
crop was almost unknown to local populations. Yet, the development of rub-
ber that began around 2005 has its origins in the rubber sector set up across 
Indochina (except in Laos, where the attempt failed) by the French early in the 
twentieth century. Following approximately three decades of disuse due to the 
effects of war and inefficient post-independence state structures (Aso, 2014; 
Pham and De Koninck, 2014), it has been revived from the 1990s on, begin-
ning in Vietnam. The current dynamics of land acquisitions and crop booms 
in Champasak (Laos) and Ratanakiri (Cambodia)—the former involving not 
only rubber but also coffee—are for a substantial part the result of the cross- 
border territorial expansion of Vietnam’s Central Highlands production area, 
in which there is no more frontier to open. For South-East Asia, these temporal 
dynamics suggest that the wave of land acquisitions that dates—or became 
visible—from the mid-2000s is somewhat a continuation of the territorial 
expansion witnessed from the 1960s on.
2 The Crucial Role of the State
In the same vein as Roudart and Mazoyer, Keulertz and Woertz (this volume) 
recall that in previous centuries states adopted laws and policies in order to set 
up production and trade regimes that best served their interests. In the nine-
teenth century, the abolition of protectionist laws enabled the cheap import 
of food—often grown a great distance away—to feed the growing industrial-
urban working class. After the Second World War, production subsidies made 
North America and Western Europe into net grain exporters and enabled them 
to reverse trade flows by disposing of their surpluses in developing countries 
while at the same time replacing imported raw materials with domestically 
produced industrial or synthetic commodities. These state interventions 
also included, in the first half of the twentieth century, the introduction of 
regulations—most using quotas and taxes—to control food production, simi-
lar to the regulatory approach to controlling rubber adopted in Malaysia and 
Indonesia; and—in the second half of the century—assistance to smallhold-
ers, mostly provided via support for the diffusion of high-yield crop varieties 
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and better chemical inputs (Bissonnette and De Koninck, 2015). In some cases, 
these interventions benefited large estates; in other cases they supported the 
expansion of smallholders; in all cases, they were of crucial importance.
The current wave of land acquisitions was preceded by legislative changes 
that established a state monopoly on land management and created inse-
curity in land tenure for local populations. This trend can be traced back to 
the land-related laws imposed on European empires’ colonies and, as Merlet 
(2010) argues, to some extent to those imposed by the Roman Empire. States 
gained control over the land and left populations unable to claim their rights, 
typically due to the fact that customary laws were not registered by colonial 
authorities and later were not recognised by the states arising from the process 
of decolonisation. In cases where peoples’ land rights were recognised, forest 
and fallow lands were not taken into account. From Indonesia and Malaysia at 
the time of the Dutch and the British presence to Cambodia and Laos from the 
1990s on, there are striking resemblances among the processes of non-recog-
nition of customary laws and of land takeover by the state. Furthermore, since 
the 1980s, states have received the support of international organisations that 
shape global development governance in this field; the most influential being 
the World Bank, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the United 
Nations Conference for Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the Asian 
Development Bank, as well as major actors such as the European Union (EU) 
(Borras and Franco, 2011). These organisations have followed the path of land 
titling described by De Schutter (this volume), starting with Thailand in the 
1980s (Burns, 2004; Hutchinson, 2008, quoted in Fortunel and Gironde, 2011; 
Verhaegen, 2013). They have provided substantial funding, guarantee schemes, 
technical expertise, and powerful legitimacy to the current land dynamics 
described in this volume. These interventions occurred in parallel with others 
that contributed to local populations’ resettlement, and which were also sup-
ported by the same organisations, with the fallacious rhetoric that they were 
supporting ‘voluntary resettlement’ (Baird and Shoemaker, 2007).
De Schutter (this volume) reveals how the main outcome of the formali-
sation of land rights has been the creation of markets for such rights. This 
process, through which land titles have become commodities, has not only 
benefited the well-off groups within rural communities, but also opened the 
door to outsiders, local and national elites, and foreign buyers. The protective 
aim of land titling sounds like a fallacy when considering that titling can have 
powerful exclusionary consequences for certain types of actors (Hall et al., 
2011; Dwyer, 2015). This can be found in the Lao villages studied by Senties 
Portilla (Gironde and Senties Portilla, this volume), where the policy of tempo-
rary use certificates for farmland and degraded forest was poorly implemented 
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and later facilitated concessions instead. Similarly, Dwyer et al. (this volume) 
analyse how measures for regularising smallholder entitlements in Cambodia 
contributed, instead, to legitimising and enabling land concessions.
The ground for large-scale land deals was thus prepared by land laws and 
public policies that made them legal, as illustrated by the ‘zoning policies’ of 
Indonesia and Laos, and the creation of special categories of land use and per-
mits in Indonesia and Cambodia. This process is the continuation of the trend 
to eradicate customary land laws and regulations, such as the various adat in 
newly independent Indonesia and Malaysia, which took hold across South-East 
Asia in the 1990s (Cleary and Eaton, 1996). This ‘preparation’ also involves an 
attempt to make land concessions legitimate by persuading local communities 
that they would benefit from the promised development of infrastructure and 
markets and from job creation. But such process has gone even further than 
that, as it was achieved through the progressive delegitimisation of former 
land rights, of the community institutions that governed them, and of prior 
land use. Village and population displacements in Laos—also called ‘village 
consolidation’ in the case of the smallest settlements in Laos and Cambodia—
and the ban on rotational cultivation in Laos made the communities targeted 
for large-scale concessions vulnerable. In Ratanakiri, the Khmerisation policy 
further challenged indigenous peoples’ livelihoods, as it led to the arrival of 
in-migrants who were better endowed in terms of financial, human, and social 
capital. Despite the emergence of certain opportunities, such as selling land 
plots to newcomers or the availability of jobs clearing those newcomers’ plan-
tations, all this increased the ‘sentiment of surviving in a new insecure social 
environment’ (Bourdier, 2009). It also created such a pervasive confusion 
regarding whom the land belonged to that it ultimately made the newcomers 
more acceptable. Thus, the drawing up and signing of land deals, although it 
can occur in a very short span of time, is rather the ultimate step in a longer 
process whereby land rights (property or use; individual or collective) have 
been contested by governments, weakened by public policies and legislation, 
and challenged by newcomers—mostly migrants and merchants.
3 Specificities and Diversities of Land Acquisition Trajectories
Among the factors that are striking about current land grabs is their sudden-
ness—that is to say, the fact that many land deals are quickly agreed and 
signed (Neef et al., 2013), and that populations can thus be immediately dis-
possessed of their resources, discovering that their lands and natural resources 
have been enclosed overnight. Concepts such as ‘rush’ and ‘boom’ contribute 
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to building a view whereby land deals trigger the full deployment of exclu-
sion processes and spell the end of pre-existing livelihoods. Yet the signing of 
a land deal is also (just) the beginning of the story, as shown by the case of 
investors who were ‘materially behind schedule or operating below capacity’ 
(Zhan et al., this volume) and initial plans that were substantially negotiated 
and adapted before and during their implementation (Nooteboom et al., this 
volume). Although the process of implementation appears to be more mono-
lithic and closer to original plans in the cases of Laos and Cambodia, it varies 
significantly depending on the types of investors and the corresponding reac-
tions of populations (Gironde and Senties Portilla, this volume). ‘Timing’ also 
proves to be important in the power relations between former land users and 
new rights holders (Dwyer et al., this volume).
In contrast to the commonly held view of unstoppable land acquisitions 
and mono-crop plantation landscapes as an inevitable process, one must take 
into account cases where land deals remained mere intentions and plans on 
paper, as occurred in the context of the 1997–98 Asian crisis where Thai inves-
tors pulled out (Baird, 2011) or in the case of China in Africa (Brautigam, 2013). 
Where land deals do result in production, one must take into account the time 
it takes for the signing of the deal to lead to the effective occupation of land 
and production beginning, which definitively exclude former or other users. 
The conclusion of land deals is sometimes only the beginning of the story, 
because they may be contested on the ground; because investors may decide 
not to implement their proclaimed plan; because a plan as it appears on paper 
may not be the real plan—as in cases reported from Cambodia where compa-
nies, once they had logged precious trees, withdrew; or because investors may 
not be able to mobilise the capital needed to turn land into production. Thus, 
acquisitions are not always synonymous with immediate occupation—or with 
plantation/cultivation—and former users may have time, and space not yet 
occupied, in which to respond.
Moreover, one must not neglect the fact that the cropping systems that are 
currently being developed by large land estates may not last. This has already 
occured, for example, in the case of rain forest lands that were transformed 
to accommodate systems that quickly proved unsustainable (Dufumier, 
2006). Keulertz and Woertz (this volume) also draw attention to the volatility 
of ‘rushes’ and to eventual reversals, illustrated by the case of Gulf countries’ 
investments, which faded in the 1980s and 1990s only to return in 2008. This 
is of relevance in a context of global markets marked by high-volatility cycles, 
and of particular relevance in South-East Asia where the ‘implementation gap 
has been particularly pronounced’ (Keulertz and Woertz, this volume). This 
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resonates with the cases of Bener Meriah (Aceh), where all large-scale inves-
tors pulled out; of Luzon, where the company changed its plan from growing 
on its large plantation to short-term lease contracts (Nooteboom et al., this 
volume); and of Ratanakiri, where large Vietnamese and Chinese companies 
have not all had the physical capital (machines, seedlings) necessary to rap-
idly transform all the land they were leased into tree plantations (Gironde and 
Senties Portilla, this volume).
Conversely, the beginning of the story may lead on to expansion and accel-
eration. Existing land deals and crop booms may lead to further ones, in the 
same way that pioneer migrants are followed by many others. Again following 
Edelman and Leon (2013), who call for a ‘history of the present’, one must add 
to links over time links across territories. The dynamics of rubber plantation 
in Cambodia and Laos are the result not only of Vietnamese-held land conces-
sions but also of Vietnamese traders, who buy most of the liquid rubber and 
export it to Vietnam. Their presence is the strongest marker of the profitability 
of rubber for investors, companies, entrepreneurs, small peasants, brokers, etc. 
Similar spillover can also be seen for cassava, and—very recently—for pepper 
at the border between Ratanakiri and Vietnam. Another category of actors that 
link territories is the native population of Kampong Cham—the century-old 
rubber area of Cambodia—who play a crucial role in the boom taking place 
at the new frontier to which they migrate. Sturgeon (2012) highlights similar 
territorial connections between northern Laos and China, as Lao farmers have 
been able to benefit from ‘sharecropping arrangements with relatives’ from 
China who ‘extended their rubber holdings across the border’. Short distance 
connections are more obvious, but there are also longer distance connections 
such as for northern Thailand, where farmers have been able to develop their 
own rubber farms after having learned tapping techniques in the south of the 
country where they were salaried workers (Sturgeon, 2012). These connections 
are found on a broader scale: the dynamics of industrial crops—including 
sugar cane and rubber, as well as palm oil, cocoa, and coffee—have been inter-
twined for several decades in South-East Asia, as illustrated by the changes in 
the comparative advantage and market shares held by the various countries 
(De Koninck and Rousseau, 2012).
4 Large-Scale Land Acquisitions and Livelihoods
The debate on the negative and positive impacts of large-scale land acqui-
sitions on local populations is still very much open (Edelman et al., 2013). 
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The realisation that large-scale land acquisitions can have negative conse-
quences for local populations is not new. Roudart and Mazoyer (this volume) 
recall that tensions and violence have not been the exception; rather they 
have been systemic features of the development of the large-scale domains 
that have been forcibly set up, as illustrated by the examples of enclosures 
in eighteenth and nineteenth century Britain, European colonial appropria-
tions, and collectivisation in the former USSR. Local populations have been 
severely dispossessed, and not only of their land; they also lost autonomy as 
they were enslaved or were left with no other option than to accept poorly 
paid salaried work from the new landholders; they were displaced, confined to 
restricted areas (reserves for Native Americans), and/or—in the case of ‘colo-
nies of settlement’—exterminated. The same authors also highlight the fact 
that when ‘pro-poor’ land laws have been passed, they have met with strong 
resistance from large landowning elites.
Zhan et al. (this volume) conclude that the impact of large-scale land 
acquisitions in terms of employment and income, land rights, and the envi-
ronment, is largely dependent on decisions taken by governments and inves-
tors. Consultation with populations, at the pre-investment and initial stages 
of acquisitions in particular, minimise the risk of land disputes. Messerli et 
al. (this volume) see some positive changes occurring, with moves to replace 
top-down, authoritarian processes of land allocation—which have further 
marginalised vulnerable populations—with more inclusive implementa-
tion processes. They conclude that new policies are needed to support this 
evolution and address the negative consequences of large-scale land acqui-
sitions, including conflict, loss of pre-existing land use rights and access to 
natural resources, the threat to livelihoods, and out-migration, which could 
all drive new waves of poverty. They therefore propose a list of recommen-
dations addressed to governments and investors, as well as to civil society 
organisations; these include consulting and engaging with local populations, 
formalising their tenure rights under a proper land registry system, monitor-
ing adherence to environmental and water regulations, and undertaking social 
and environmental impact assessments.
In-depth field research shows that the process and magnitude of dispos-
session vary significantly across communes and villages (Gironde and Senties 
Portilla, this volume), and include, on the one hand, cases in which popula-
tions lost the vast majority of their lands without any compensation or oppor-
tunity to negotiate or even seek compensation (‘severe dispossession’), and 
on the other cases in which populations were left with enough land to satisfy 
their basic needs (‘partial dispossession’). In other cases, populations had to 
rebuild livelihoods from zero after they lost all their assets when they were dis-
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placed (Cismas and Paramita, this volume), a situation that the authors qualify 
as extreme dispossession (Gironde et al., 2014). The cases of ‘better-practice’ 
concessions in Cambodia analysed by Dwyer et al. (this volume) prove that 
concessions can be granted without evictions proving necessary and can rep-
resent a ‘relatively good option compared to other local alternatives’. Yet the 
authors argue that there remain many challenges that must be overcome for 
these concessions to have a long-standing, positive impact on local popula-
tions, as such populations are left to depend on the benevolence of powerful 
actors. For Dwyer et al., models based on empowered communities with more 
secure forms of tenure are likely to work better for all parties involved.
Accounting for losses, typically of land, due to land acquisitions is actually 
a difficult exercise. In some cases, populations lose more land than indicated 
in the respective land deals themselves, as—in parallel—governments imple-
ment measures that additionally restrict people’s access to natural resources, 
typically forest areas, or because large landholdings increase the distance 
people must travel to reach their plots and hamper activities such as animal 
grazing. In other cases, land losses were lower than indicated by an examina-
tion of land acquisitions areas alone, as not all land was immediately occupied 
by the new landholders, as explained above. Beyond the loss of land and access 
to natural resources, large-scale land acquisitions contribute to substantial 
transformations in local economies. The new socio-economic environment in 
which people have to reorganise their livelihoods is certainly more dynamic in 
terms of economic growth, diversification, and urban-rural linkages, but it also 
generates or exacerbates conflicts within local communities. Overall, the new 
opportunities do not benefit the majority of the population, who suffer from 
increasing competition over access to land and jobs. The benefits from crop 
booms and economic diversification are unevenly distributed and inequality 
is, overall, on the rise. The results of livelihood trajectory analysis (Gironde 
and Senties Portilla, this volume) echo the findings of supporters of large-scale 
land acquisitions, who have acknowledged that promises made are not kept 
and that land acquisitions are in some cases detrimental to a large proportion 
of the population (Deininger and Byerlee, 2011).
5 Human Rights Violations and Limited Responses
The negative consequences of large-scale land acquisitions for local popula-
tions can also be described as human rights violations (De Schutter, 2011a; De 
Schutter, 2011b; Künnemann and Monsalve Suárez, 2013). Golay and Biglino 
(2013) find that the rights that are most frequently violated as a consequence 
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of large-scale land deals are the right to food, the rights of indigenous peoples 
to dispose of their lands and natural resources, the right to housing and the 
right not to be forcibly evicted, and the right to water. The authors show that 
violations of these rights tend, in turn, to trigger a wider pool of infringements 
such as lack of access to education and healthcare, and violations of cultural 
rights, and that procedural rights such as rights to participation and consulta-
tion; the right to give, or withhold, prior, free, and informed consent; and guar-
anteed access to effective remedies—including adequate relocation measures 
and compensation—are also threatened.
Analysing the jurisprudence of those United Nations mechanisms that have 
monitored the situation in South-East Asia, Golay (this volume) proposes a 
typology of the human rights violations that result from large-scale land deals. 
These violations include those linked to internal displacement and forced evic-
tions, as also revealed by Cismas and Paramita (this volume), which often lead 
to drastic changes in livelihood opportunities; violations of the procedural 
rights of indigenous peoples, in particular their right to give, or to withhold, 
their free, prior, and informed consent to policies and activities that directly 
affect their land, territory, and livelihoods; and violations of the right to food of 
individuals and groups who are vulnerable to discrimination and marginalisa-
tion, including women, children, indigenous peoples, rural communities, and 
small-scale farmers.
New international instruments have been proposed in response to these 
violations. The former United Nations Special Rapporteur on the right to 
food, Olivier De Schutter, has presented a set of eleven human rights prin-
ciples that should be respected by states, investors, and financial institutions 
when they negotiate and implement land deals (Special Rapporteur on the 
Right to Food, 2009). In 2012, the Committee on World Food Security adopted 
the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, 
Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security (Governance of 
Tenure Guidelines), with the aim of promoting secure tenure rights and equi-
table access to land, fisheries, and forests; of reducing poverty; and of realising 
the right to food. The guidelines specifically recommend that states provide 
safeguards to protect legitimate tenure rights, human rights, livelihoods, food 
security and the environment from the risks that could arise from large-scale 
land acquisitions, and that responsible investments should do no harm, should 
safeguard against the dispossession of legitimate tenure-right holders and 
against environmental damage, and should respect human rights.
While Gironde and Senties Portilla (this volume) are sceptical about the 
use of international guidelines at the local level, Monsalve Suárez (2013) shows 
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that using such human rights instruments can have positive impacts on local 
populations, including ‘the empowerment of oppressed groups to stand up for 
their rights, decreasing violence in land conflicts, changing the way conflicts 
over resources are framed, opening up space for policy dialogue centered on 
people’s lives, fighting against agrarian legislation biased in favour of corpo-
rate interests and formulating alternative legal frameworks’. Monsalve Suárez 
also identifies a number of conditions that need to be in place for the applica-
tion of these instruments to be effective. Awareness of rights and an ability to 
claim them are among these conditions, but she also stresses the importance 
of linkages with law professionals and advocacy networks and of pressure from 
below. Creative uses of different aspects of law become possible, especially 
when people have access to courts. Monsalve Suárez also recognises the limita-
tions of using the human rights framework: it assumes that people know about 
human rights and have the resources to sustain political and legal action, and 
that the circumstances are such that they have access to justice, a condition 
that may be particularly circumscribed for women.
Golay (this volume) shows that these conditions, including access to 
justice—very often non-existent in cases of large-scale land acquisitions, are 
far from being fulfilled in South-East Asia, which could explain why human 
rights instruments have little influence in the cases studied. Cismas and 
Paramita (this volume) describe the extreme disparities that exist in Cambodia 
regarding the extent to which human rights instruments inform the acts and 
actions of the government in relation to land transactions, and regarding the 
strategies employed by affected communities. The authors suggest that rural-
urban spatiality is relevant to explaining these disparities, with rural com-
munities left with no information, consultation options, or access to justice, 
and urban dwellers having made extensive use of human rights language and 
mechanisms to challenge their own forced evictions with a certain success.
In the end, what counts from a human rights—and development—
perspective is that the rights and needs of the local populations are respected, 
protected, and fulfilled. In the future, an argument more convincing than 
using the human rights framework to persuade states, investors, and financial 
institutions to ensure that large-scale land deals have a positive impact on 
local populations might be to demonstrate that land deals have less chance 
of being implemented if the rights of local populations are not respected. 
If the rapid and forceful acquisition of land exacerbates tensions between 
villagers and companies, prior consultations, negotiation, and conflict-resolu-
tion mechanisms could significantly mitigate these tensions and the negative 
consequences for local populations (Gironde et al., 2014). It is also important to 
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note that informed, knowledgeable, and strong local leaders are often crucial 
in making the difference regarding whether, and—if so—under which terms, 
a land deal will be implemented (Gironde et al., 2014).
6 Beyond Current Land Dynamics in South-East Asia
Current land dynamics in South-East Asia bring to the fore a number of ave-
nues for further research and policies that could better support local popula-
tions in their efforts to cope with, and benefit from, these dynamics. At least 
three of these avenues have been explored in detail in this volume.
First, this volume echoes the call by ‘land grab’ analysts to move beyond the 
initial picture and early-stage assumptions, a move reflected by the insistence 
on the need for historical analysis (see, for instance, White et al., 2012 for Asia; 
Baglioni and Gibbon, 2013 and Wily, 2012 for Africa; and Edelman and Leon, 
2013 for Central America). The current wave of land acquisitions that became 
evident around a decade ago cannot simply be dated from that point in time. 
What has happened elsewhere, and before, is crucial to an understanding of 
the here and now (Edelman et al., 2013). The recurrence of large-scale land 
acquisitions and the formation of large estates under different contexts also 
call for an investigation of the cases and contexts of non-grabbing (Sikor, 2012) 
and raise the question of why there is not more land grabbing all over the globe.
Second, the importance of particular contexts in which land acquisitions 
occur calls for in-depth field research in order to make the link between partic-
ular contexts, processes, and outcomes of land acquisitions and the different 
trajectories of agrarian transition they contribute to shaping. Empirical mate-
rial analysing how land deals are negotiated and then implemented across var-
ious governmental, administrative, and jurisdictional scales is crucial not only 
for the purposes of generalisation and out-scaling (Messerli et al., this volume), 
but also for the design of policies that correspond to realities on the ground.
Third, the outcomes of the current wave of land acquisitions can also 
been assessed from a human rights perspective. These outcomes have been 
addressed mostly in terms of dispossession, marginalisation, exclusion, dis-
ruption, etc. These analyses come mostly from the fields of political economy 
and political ecology and build on livelihood studies. Despite a great interest 
in the governance of large-scale land deals (Margulis et al., 2014) and the fact 
that many studies have shown that human rights violations can be one of their 
immediate consequences (De Schutter, 2011a; De Schutter, 2011b; Künnemann 
and Monsalve Suárez, 2013), a human rights perspective that would analyse 
the efficiency of using human rights instruments and monitoring mechanisms 
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to mitigate these violations is still embryonic (Cotula, 2009; 2012; Monsalve 
Suárez, 2013; Narula, 2013; Clays and Vanloqueren, 2013; Golay and Biglino, 
2013) and could also be developed further.
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